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The future of the Ottoman Empire was an important issue in international politics during 
the early years of the Twentieth Century. As more and more of its territory was chipped 
away, the events caused by this this process of disintegration became central to Great 
Power relations in the period before the First World War. These developments were 
particularly significant from the British perspective, not only because the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908 seemed to promise a brighter future for Anglo-Turkish relations, but 
because the British interest in maintaining the Ottoman Empire for as long as possible, for 
fear of what came next, directly conflicted with the more aggressive designs of Russia, one 
of the two Powers with which Britain had recently become aligned.  
 
Much of the literature on Anglo-Turkish relations of the period has tended to argue that a 
‘golden opportunity’ existed for Britain to improve her relations with the Ottoman Empire 
following the coming to power of the ‘Young Turks’, who were, both at the time and in 
more recent scholarship, asserted to have possessed Anglophile tendencies. In the literature 
on Britain’s Great Power relations of the period more widely, meanwhile, a discernible 
trend has emerged suggesting that Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, was 
wedded to a policy of ententes, which blinded him to the wider realities of Great Power 
relations.  
 
In understanding how historical events took place, it is important to view events through 
the eyes of those experiencing them. Through means of an analytical narrative, this work 
will reconstruct contemporary worldviews and decision-making processes within the British 
Foreign Office to examine these two conclusions critically, and demonstrate both that 
Grey was not fixated on a policy of ententes and that a ‘golden opportunity’ was no more 
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Notes on names 
 
In keeping with general practice, I have used modern spellings when referring to 
contemporary figures, hence ‘Abdülhamid’, ‘Kâmil’ and ‘Charykov’. When an archaic 
spelling is used in a quotation, I have left it in place undisturbed.  
 
Replacing place names with modern versions is an often unsatisfactory compromise, 
especially when terms such as ‘Constantinople’ or ‘Salonica’ have a certain resonance, and 
even, it seems, refer to places different in fundamental ways to their modern equivalents: 
the modern day ‘Istanbul’ of the Turkish republic is not the same as the old 
‘Constantinople’, capital of the extant Ottoman Empire. Consequently, I have used period 






 The period between the 1908 revolution in Turkey and the outbreak of war was 
one of contrasts. 1908 saw a new regime, the Young Turks, seize control of the Ottoman 
Empire. Seemingly pro-western and keen to improve their relationship with Great Britain, 
the Young Turks nevertheless entered the First World War alongside Germany, the power 
which had been closest to the previous regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Surprisingly, there 
is little literature on this period of change. Only two book length studies have been 
produced, and other treatments have been limited. The work which does exist has focused 
on the idea of a ‘golden opportunity’, following the revolution, for Britain to improve her 
political and economic position in Turkey. In general, much of this work has criticised the 
embassy and ambassador, and suggested that the poor performance of British officials in 
Turkey was a major contributing factor to the breakdown of relations. This is a reductive 
and unhelpful way of approaching the problem. The present work contends that such an 
‘opportunity’ was no more than illusion. 
 Thinking about Anglo-Turkish relations from the point of view of an ‘opportunity’ 
is unhelpful both for its own sake, but also because the region was important more widely, 
both in terms of British policy and great power politics more generally. A narrow focus on 
a failure to grasp an opportunity risks obscuring the wider issues at play. In particular, 
British commercial dealings with the Turks in the latter part of this period demonstrate the 
extent to which her policy in the near east was focused on Persia, and more specifically the 
protection of India. This is suggestive of wider currents in great power politics of the 
period. With the Anglo-Russian convention, which was rooted in compromises over Persia, 
seemingly becoming unfit for purpose, British policymakers needed to seek other ways of 
maintaining their position in the lands bordering India, the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the 
British Empire.   
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 This ties into other debates around wider British policy of the period. Keith Wilson 
wrote that much of British policy was focused around a core assumption that possession of 
India was all that maintained Britain’s membership of the great power club, and that it 
must be protected at all costs. Certainly, the British focus on improving her position in the 
eastern hinterlands of the Ottoman Empire suggests that there is some truth to this. Egypt, 
a de facto British possession officially under the control of the Khedive, an Ottoman 
official, was also an area of concern, in particular as it contained the Suez Canal, an 
important shipping lane which shortened the route to India. British officials were 
concerned, following the 1908 revolution, that unrest might spread towards Egypt, 
threatening the British position there. 1 
 
 Although Wilson’s arguments concerning the importance of India have merit, his 
wider arguments about the foreign policy of Sir Edward Grey are less satisfactory. He 
argued that Grey implacably followed a policy of ententes, focusing his attentions entirely on 
his entente agreements with France and Russia to the exclusion of all else. Since the 
publication of Wilson’s work, a number of scholars have followed his lead. 2 The present 
work asserts that this argument fails to take in the full complexity of Grey’s strategy from 
1906 to 1914, and ignores the way in which policy naturally evolved towards the end of the 
period. Turkey was again important in demonstrating this. The Bosnian crisis of 1908 
established that Grey was willing to explore, at the least, alternatives to the Russian 
convention, and the financial settlement of the matter caused some resentment in Britain 
towards France. Later, as war raged in the Balkans, Grey worked closely with Germany to 
 
1 For the background of Britain in Egypt, see Roger, Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian 
Proconsul (Oxford, 2004); Tignor, Robert, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, 
1966).  
2 See for instance Charmley, John, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World 
War (London, reprint 2009), and especially Ferguson, Niall, The Pity of War, 1914-1918 (London, 1998). 
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prevent conflict enveloping the Powers. A wide study of Anglo-Turkish relations cannot fail 
to suggest that arguments about ententes miss the mark.  
 
 An examination of the British approach to the Ottoman Empire reveals both that 
much of the existing literature is narrow in its approach, and provides a valuable lens 
through which British foreign policy more generally can be understood. This work will 
rectify this, and argue that no ‘golden opportunity’ existed. In the light of this, a richer 




The literature on the period before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 is 
vast. As a recent author put it, the debate over the origins of the war has sometimes taken 
on the character of an ‘Agatha Christie crime drama’. 3 In many ways, this was perhaps 
inevitable. The controversial Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, affixing blame for the 
war on Germany, gave rise to a debate which has in many ways never abated. From the 
1960s and Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht, many have sought to judge and assign 
blame for the war. Fischer argued that German ambitions were the principal cause of the 
war, and that Germany had ‘willed’ war. 4 Over time, the leaderships of other European 
Powers have also been blamed. Samuel Williamson, for instance, lay the blame at the door 
of Austro-Hungarian elites, Sean McMeekin on Russia, while Niall Ferguson blamed 
British indecisiveness for the outbreak of conflict. 5 Other elements, such as the 
 
3 Clark, Christopher, The Sleepwalkers, How Europe Went to War in 1914, (London, 2013) p. 561. For an 
overview on the scholarship, see Mulligan, William, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, 2010). 
4 Fischer, Fritz, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London, 1967).  
5 Williamson, Samuel, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1991); McMeekin, Sean, 
The Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA., new edn. 2013); Ferguson, Pity of War. 
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‘militarization of men’s minds’ have also been pointed to. 6 The traumatic nature of the 
First World War, marking the sudden end of the ‘long nineteenth century’, and the 
pervasive notion of its futility, means that it is both natural and satisfying to seek to 
apportion blame and judge those deemed guilty of causing such a cataclysm. That the 
pointing of fingers played a role in contributing to an even more violent war mere decades 
later only added fuel to the fire.  
 Such a ‘blame game’ can be unhelpful. In trying to interpret the past in this way, 
the picture can be distorted. Trying to judge historical events and figures through the 
application of modern values can often make understanding more difficult. For instance, 
unlike today, war was regarded by the policymakers of 1914 as a normal, if regrettable, 
part of international relations. The war itself lies outside the scope of this work, but it can 
usefully demonstrate that modern sensibilities are not appropriate underpinnings for 
historical endeavour. Loosely connected to this is the fact that from a modern vantage 
point, a far fuller picture of events is possible than that which was available to 
contemporaries. Not only do historians know what ‘came next’, they also know what the 
other side was thinking, so to speak. It is easy to criticise a statesman when the analyst is in 
possession of more information than their subject, although that is not to say that a failure 
to consider or predict the future should be ignored. In the case of the First World War, 
policymakers, certainly in Britain, were largely aware of the risks of war and what it might 
entail; and one suggests that any future historians will be scathing at the failure of modern 
day policymakers to act in the face of climate breakdown. It is also not to say that there is 
no call to point out when historical figures might have done better. If history is to provide 
any ‘lessons’, then such a policy is essential. However, in general, the historian should be 
concerned with an understanding of the realities of historical situations, and not in serving 
 
6 Stevenson, David, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914 (Oxford, 1996), p. 421.  
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as judge and jury on the past. Nevertheless, the present work does not advocate a kind of 
sterile, dry, neo-Rankean analysis of the past. To state situations plainly as they were would 
be both dull and unhelpful, and would ignore the fact that foreign policy is not made in a 
vacuum. Indeed, it is made by people with their own prejudices, views and approaches, 
many of them influenced from different quarters. For the purposes of the present work, a 
more human and live analysis is required.  
 
 An historian may well be best placed to observe and explain rather than judge, but 
this does not mean, again, that the human aspects of a historical situation should be 
ignored. There is long history of such an approach in pre-1914 international relations. 
Since the late 1960s, scholars have been engaged in trying to find James Joll’s ‘unspoken 
assumptions’. 7 Zara Steiner, for instance, worked in this vein throughout much of her 
career. 8 More recent work, for instance by Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, has also tried to 
reconstruct the decisions made by British officials, in order to better understand the course 
of policy during this period. 9  
 If foreign policy is made by people, then it is only by identifying them, their views 
and their ideas, that it can be understood. In particular, to appreciate the composition of 
policy, it is beneficial to build up an idea of the view which existed in the minds of 
contemporary policymakers. In this sense, insights from political science may be helpful. 
Robert Jervis wrote that ‘it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies 
 
7 Joll, James, ‘1914: The Unspoken Assumptions’, Koch, H.W. (ed.), The Origins of the First World War, Great 
Power Rivalry and German War Aims (Basingstoke, 1972) pp. 307-328. 
8 Steiner, Zara; Neilson, Keith, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, (Basingstoke, 2nd edn. 2003); 
Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1970) ; Steiner, Zara, ‘The Foreign 
Office under Sir Edward Grey, 1905-1914, in Hinsley, F.H, (ed.) British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, 
(Cambridge, 1977) pp. 22-69. 
9 Neilson, Keith; Otte, T.G., The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854–1946 (London, 2009); 
Neilson, Keith, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1995); Neilson, Keith, 
‘’Incidents’ and Foreign Policy: A Case Study’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(1), 1998, pp 53-88; Otte, T.G., The 
Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge, 2011).  
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without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their views of others’, 
and that they are often a direct cause of action. He added that such perceptions are often 
wrong. 10 If this is so, then an approach aimed at discovering the objective ‘truth’ of a 
given situation will not bear fruit in understanding situations. The historian must, as 
another theorist put it, seek to understand the ‘world in their minds’, and recognise that 
perception can be a vital element of crisis management. 11 On one level, work such as 
Edward Said’s Orientalism can be used to try and understand aspects of policymakers’ views 
on Turkey. Superficial examples are easy to find: diplomats and officials regularly made 
reference to ‘oriental methods of bargaining’ or similar. Whether this represented, as Said 
might have held, the ‘Orient’ being ‘almost a European invention… since antiquity a place 
of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences’, or 
more prosaic attempts by socially homogenous diplomatists to arrive at a kind of shorthand 
to help understand a political culture which seemed very different to them, is perhaps 
immaterial. 12 Such ideas can be valuable in framing contemporary ideas, but in this case a 
more detailed and less broad consideration is required.  
  
The present work aims to consider the Anglo-Turkish relationship between 1908 
and 1914 through the eyes of British policymakers, to understand how they saw their 
world, how they appreciated events as they unfolded, and how they conceptualised British 
 
10 Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), p 28-30; 3.  
11 Vertzberger, Yaacov, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy 
Decisionmaking (Palo Alto, CA, 1993); Richardson, James, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 363-7. 
12 Said, Edward, Orientalism (New York, 1978), p. 1. Robert Irwin criticised this approach. He thought that 
attacks on the study of the east were both ‘depressing’ and ‘unnecessary’: id., For Lust of Knowing: The 
Orientalists and their Enemies, (London, 2006) p. 330.  
Ussama Makdisi, suggested that, in the same way that western Powers often regarded Ottomans ‘non-
Western’ despots, ‘incapable of “progress”’, the Ottomans themselves engaged with their own ‘Arab 
periphery’ in a similar manner, id., ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, The American Historical Review, 107(3), 2002, pp. 
768-796. 
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interests in response. 13 In terms of the documentary record, this period is particularly 
fruitful for such an approach. The Foreign Office reforms introduced in 1906 increased 
significantly the role of junior staff, and have left a significant paper trail, not least in the 
form of extended minutes. These, rather than representing what John Tilley called ‘full 
dress’ papers, formed first impressions and preparation for later discussion – following 
which action and further minutes would be added. 14 This allows the historian a glimpse 
into first impressions and opinions of Foreign Office staff, and to come as close as possible 
to uncovering discussions held. However, these are far from perfect. Junior clerks might 
(and often did) write at great length, or in an attention seeking style (for instance Robert 
Vansittart, who often wrote sarcastic or drily amusing remarks15). The nature of the system 
means that the voice of more senior policymakers can be diminished, too. Nevertheless, 
such an approach can bear considerable fruit in understanding the shape of British 
officials’ thoughts, and can be taken as an element in an attempt to understand 
contemporary world views and reconstruct decision-making.  
 
Much of the literature on the Anglo-Turkish relationship in this period has focused 
on the idea that there had been an ‘opportunity’ which was missed by Britain to develop 
better relations with Turkey, in part because she was blind to it as a result of her focus on 
wider European alignments. Contingent on this critique is an element of ‘judging’ history. 
This work contends that this is unhelpful. Although British policymakers were focused on 
 
13 T.G. Otte has written in this vein, seeking to understand the mind of Sir Eyre Crowe: id., ‘Sir Eyre Crowe 
and British Policy: A Cognitive Map’, in Otte, T.G.; Pagedas, Constantine, (eds.) Personalities, War and 
Diplomacy: Essays in International History (London, 1997), pp. 14-37. See also Otte’s ‘Introduction’, same 
volume.  
14 Tilley, John; Gaselee, Stephen, The Foreign Office, (London, 1933), pp. 169; 156-60; Tilley, John, London to 
Tokyo (London, 1942), p. 69; Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock: A Study in the Old Diplomacy (London, 1930), pp. 
324-7. 
15 For instance, reacting to reports that Turkish ships had burned a small Greek ship while it was coaling, he 
commented that ‘The Turkish fleet has at last hit something’ and added that it was ‘something quite small 
too.’ Vansittart minute, Elliot to Grey, tel. no. 6, 15 Jan. 1913, FO 371/1759/2211. 
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more than Turkey, they were not slavishly devoted to a ‘policy of ententes’.16 In any case, the 
‘opportunity’ was in a large part illusory.  
 
A ‘Golden Opportunity’?  
 
Although the position of the Ottoman Empire, and the forces unleashed by its 
gradual disintegration, were an important consideration of European policymakers from 
1912 through to the outbreak of the First World War, there has not been a profusion of 
literature dealing with the relations between the Turks and Britain. This is further 
surprising when it is considered that the seven years from 1908 and the Young Turk 
revolution, formed a self-contained period that seemingly lends itself to a study of relations 
between the two states. Only two book length studies have been produced, along with 
several articles. 17 
During this period, British policy remained stable. Under Sir Edward Grey, Sir 
Charles Hardinge, and later Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Foreign Office followed a largely 
consistent policy, aided by the relative longevity of the Liberal administration. Turkey, on 
the other hand, underwent a turbulent period, with several violent changes of government 
and contested elections. Having fomented an overtly pro-Western revolution, the ‘Young 
Turks’ or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), finished the period entering the lists 
 
16 Wilson, Keith, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 
(Cambridge, 1985). 
17 Temperley, Harold, ‘British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-
1914)’ Cambridge Historical Journal, 4(2), 1933, pp. 156-191; Ahmad, Feroz, ‘Great Britain’s Relations with the 
Young Turks 1908-1914’ Middle Eastern Studies,2(4), 1966, pp. 302-329; Ahmad, Feroz, The Young Turks: The 
Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1973); Heller, Joseph, British Policy towards 
the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914 (London, 1983); Kent, Marian, ‘Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman 
Empire’ in Kent, Marian (ed.), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London, 2nd Edn. 1996) pp. 
172-205; Miller, Geoffrey, Straits: British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the origins of the Dardanelles Campaign 
(Hull, 1997 out of print and reproduced <www.dardanelles.co.uk>); Miller, Geoffrey, Superior Force: the 
Conspiracy behind the escape of Goeben and Breslau (Hull, 1996, Out of print and reproduced 
<www.superiorforce.co.uk>); Miller, Geoffrey, The Millstone: British Naval Policy in the Mediterranean, 1900-1914, 
the Commitment to France and British Intervention in the War (Hull, 1999, Out of print and reproduced <www.the-
millstone.co.uk/>).  
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alongside Britain’s enemy Germany. This drastic turnaround has been the subject of 
interest. Many scholars have characterised the period as a missed opportunity for Britain, 
contending that the British Government could have done more to earn the trust of the 
Turks, and entertained with more interest the two offers of alliance made. All scholars have 
agreed, nevertheless, that a primary reason for British disinterest was that improved 
relations with Turkey would, almost axiomatically, come at the cost of good relations with 
Turkey’s traditional enemy Russia, who still harboured designs on the Straits, although 
there have been differing views as to the wisdom of this priority.  
These accounts are however unsatisfactory. It is clear that British policy went 
further than a slavish devotion to the policy of the ententes. One need look no further than 
Grey’s attempts to work with Turkey during the Bosnian Crisis in 1908-9, or his emphasis 
on cooperation with Germany during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, to conclude that this 
assumption cannot fully explain the course of British policy. Rather than Britain being at 
‘fault’ for the breakdown in relations, no such ‘opportunity’ existed. British optimism in the 
wake of the 1908 revolution was prompted by a misunderstanding of the nature and causes 
of the revolution, and gave rise to inflated expectations of Young Turk administration. 
These could never be fulfilled, and resulted in British officials fast losing interest in the 
Ottoman Empire, a process increased by the appreciation that other policy considerations 
made a policy of friendliness, or more, towards Turkey difficult. Having extracted 
concessions from the Turks which protected British commercial and strategic interests in 
the Persian Gulf, British policymakers focused on other priorities. Furthermore, the 
rupture in Anglo-Turkish relations in 1914 did not, in the considerations of contemporary 
policymakers, result in any particularly negative consequences for Britain. 
 16 
The first attempt to discuss the Anglo-Turkish relationship directly was made by 
Harold Temperley in 1933. 18 He was one of the few historians of the period privy to the 
Foreign Office papers, as a result of his editorship of the British Documents on the Origins of the 
War series with George Peabody Gooch. 19 In discussing the British attitude to 
parliamentary rule and constitutionalism in Turkey, he placed the Young Turk revolution 
and the British reaction to it into a larger perspective. Temperley argued that British 
foreign secretaries from Palmerston to Lansdowne had been against constitutionalism in 
Turkey, in sharp contrast to British policy in many other parts of the world. 20 When the 
constitution was proclaimed, to ‘indescribable public joy’ in Turkey, Grey was in favour of 
the new democratic institutions, in contrast with his forebears. 21 Temperley wrote that he 
might be considered ‘idealistic and humanitarian’ in his ‘earnest’ support for the 
‘parliamentary régime.’ 22 Temperley’s focus on constitutionalism meant that he 
considered neither the reasons behind the collapse of the relationship in 1914, nor the 
possibility of an ‘opportunity’ becoming available, nor more cynical reasons for British 
support of the CUP.  
 In contrast to Temperley, Feroz Ahmad discussed the ways in which the 
Revolution had opened a door for Britain, changing the German dominated diplomatic 
order at Constantinople. 23 He also emphasised the dangers of the revolution for Britain 
more widely, in that a constitutional Islamic regime threatened the status quo in Egypt and 
India, but also that coming on too strong at Constantinople might arouse the ‘jealousies’ of 
other Powers. In this – that the Revolution presented an opportunity for Britain, but that 
 
18 Temperley, ‘British Policy towards Turkey’.  
19 Gooch, G.P. and Temperley, H.W.V, (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (11 vols., 
London: HM Stationary office, 1928-38). See also Fair, John. D, Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the 
Public Realm, (Newark, Del.,1992); Otte, T.G. (ed.), An Historian in Peace and War: The Diaries of Harold Temperley 
(Abingdon, 2016); Eyck, Franck, G.P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics (London, 1983).  
20 Temperley, ‘British Policy towards Turkey’, p. 158. 
21 Ibid, p. 186. 
22 Ibid, pp. 190-1. 
23 Ahmad, ‘Relations with the Young Turks’; Ahmad, The Young Turks. 
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this came with risks – and in his criticism of the Embassy and the Ambassador, who he 
argued ‘looked down’ upon the Young Turks, Ahmad set the tone for the future. 
 
Ahmad discussed the nature of the Young Turk Revolution too, writing that the 
CUP were ‘liberals in a nineteenth century sense’ and looked to Westminster, as the 
‘mother of parliaments’ as a model. 24 This conclusion has often been echoed since, but is 
unhelpful. British officials interpreted the revolution in this way, and this contributed to 
their failure to appreciate that the Young Turks were fundamentally conservative, trained 
within the state system and seeking to preserve the Ottoman state, not to fundamentally 
change it. Ahmad also criticised the British Embassy under Sir Gerard Lowther, another 
regular theme of historiography on this topic.  
Throughout this period Great Britain's relations with the Young Turks were 
carried out at two different levels; on the one hand at the Foreign Office, where the 
policy was actually formulated in the context of British foreign policy as a whole; on 
the other hand there was the British Embassy at Constantinople whose function it 
was to execute as closely as possible the policy of the home Government. The 
Embassy also interpreted prevailing public opinion and explained to its 
Government the arguments and motives of the Porte. Whereas the policy was 
formulated in an atmosphere of considerable objectivity, with the various factors 
carefully weighed and analysed, it was executed in an atmosphere of almost total 
subjectivity where personalities and prejudices played a major part. 25 
Certainly, Lowther failed to perform as well as might have been desired, but this 
and embassy ‘subjectivity’ on their own cannot explain the eventual breakdown in relations 
between Turkey and Britain. Indeed, as early as 1909, it was clear to the Foreign Office 
that Lowther’s reports were sometimes lacking in depth. 26 
 
24 Ahmad, ‘Relations with the Young Turks’, pp. 302-5. 
25 Ibid, p. 309. 
26 On the role of Ambassadors, see Neilson, Keith, `"Only a d____d marionette'?: The influence of 
Ambassadors on British Foreign Policy', Dockrill, M; McKercher, B.J.C. (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power: 
Studies in British Foreign Policy 1890-1951 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 56-78. 
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 The first monograph study of the period is that by Joseph Heller. 27 He noted the 
‘striking’ change in the British attitude from ‘sympathetic’ to ‘one of hostility’ from 1908 to 
1914. 28 His core argument was that improved Anglo-Turkish relations were impossible in 
light of Britain’s commitment to a policy of ententes, in particular the agreement with 
Russia, and that the relationship could not be understood in isolation. 29 Indeed, he added 
that the Foreign Office destroyed the relationship with Turkey through its own actions in 
backing ‘Russia’s friends’ in disputes over Adrianople and the Dodecanese islands. 30 
Unlike many, he did not overtly criticise this development, but instead argued that the 
failure of the Young Turk project presented something of a blessing in disguise for British 
policymakers, who now did not have to make a choice between Turkey and Russia, as they 
would had Turkey been successful in the Balkans. 31 He did, however, criticise this 
implicitly, using emotive language. As with Ahmad, Lowther received much of the blame. 
His Embassy had ‘poisoned’ British policy, and the Foreign Office had failed, in Heller’s 
estimation, to manage this appropriately. 32 
 Marian Kent’s edited volume, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 
appeared a year later, in 1984. 33 Although much of Kent’s work has focused on more 
commercial, rather than purely political matters, she contributed a chapter on the Anglo-
Turkish relationship in general. 34 She argued that Lowther was handed a ‘good chance’ 
by the Revolution, but allowed it to ‘slip’. Noting that by 1914 Germany had returned to 
 
27 Heller, British Policy.  
28 Ibid, p. 158. 
29 Ibid, pp. 158; 162-3. British interests remained entente and Empire – and consequently, she could not back 
the Young Turks, Heller argued. 
30 Ibid, p. 160. 
31 Ibid, p.159. 
32 Ibid, p. 160. 
33 Kent, ‘Britain and the end of the Ottoman Empire’. 
34 See for instance Kent, Marian, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 (London, 1976). 
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her ‘prime position’ at Constantinople, she further entrenched the idea that Britain had 
been handed an ‘opportunity’ of which she had failed to take advantage. 35 
 The other book-length treatment of the period was represented by Geoffrey 
Miller’s trilogy, Superior Force, Straits, and The Millstone, which concentrated on naval matters 
relating to Turkey, Greece and the Mediterranean. The second of these works, Straits, 
discussed British policy towards Turkey in the years before the war. 36 Although written in 
a detailed manner, the analysis was limited by Miller’s aim to produce an overriding 
narrative across his trilogy, which he hoped would demonstrate ‘lost opportunities to foster 
better Anglo-Turkish relations’. 37 In 1908, ‘for one big shining moment, British stock rose 
to unheard of heights’, he argued. ‘The pieces were there to be picked up, but Lowther 
would not stoop. Malign influence from within the Embassy, together with his own 
haughty personality and confusing signals from London, combined to bankrupt the British 
stock and leave the way open for Germany.’ 38 Miller was intensely critical of Lowther, but 
even more so of Gerald Fitzmaurice, the controversial dragoman at the Embassy. 39 More 
generally, Miller criticised Lowther’s ‘pessimism’, which ‘infected’ the Foreign Office. In a 
memorable turn of phrase, he argued that ‘Lowther had sneezed and Grey had caught 
cold.’ 40 
Turning to the final year before the war, Miller regarded the selection of Mallet for 
the Constantinople Embassy as a signifier of a Foreign Office attempt to right the wrongs 
of the Lowther incumbency. In so arguing, he made some doubtful assertions, such as 
suggesting that Mallet was a ‘rising star’ within the Foreign Office. Although this had been 
true in the past, as Mallet went from being Grey’s Private Secretary to Assistant Under-
 
35 Kent, ‘Britain and the end of the Ottoman Empire’, p. 174. 
36 Miller, Straits; Miller, Geoffrey, Superior Force; Miller, The Millstone.  
37 Miller, Straits, ‘Introduction’. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid, Ch. 5; Ch. 10.  
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secretary (AUS), Mallet’s appointment represented something of a disappointment to him 
personally, as he had harboured dreams of the Permanent Under-secretaryship, and he 
had not been considered a success as an AUS. 41 Mallet’s failure to keep Turkey out of the 
war was regarded by Miller as being due to  
a combination of the sinister forces that continued to operate within the British 
Embassy at Pera and a fatal defect in Mallet himself: seeing what he wanted to see. 
The flattery lavished on his hosts was used against him; paternal and gullible in 
equal measure, Mallet’s mission was a failure. Whether it could have been 
otherwise if more support had been forthcoming from London is problematical. 42 
 
This too is a difficult case to make. Miller’s assertion that more support from London 
might have tipped the balance in 1914 is dubious in two ways. Firstly, as Miller himself 
acknowledged, more support from Britain might well not have had the desired effect, since 
Turkey had signed an agreement with Germany at the end of July, when Mallet was in any 
case away from Constantinople. Secondly, by this point, Turkey’s eventual destination in 
the war was not a subject that aroused particular interest in the Foreign Office. Although 
naturally keen to avoid complications in the region, British policymakers had accepted the 
possibility of war, and were not unduly concerned by it.  
 Miller concluded that the reason for Britain’s failure was that ‘there was a lack of 
consensus over the policy to be pursued with regard to the Ottoman Empire and this in 
turn created a vacuum which was then filled by the personal views of the ambassadors and 
other advisers.’ 43 This is not borne out by the evidence. What Miller identified as a ‘lack of 
consensus’ may, with equal justice, be regarded simply as a policy of ambiguity and 
openness to opportunity. During this period, an effort to avoid explicit over commitment 
on the part of Grey was never far away.  
 
41 Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p 106; Otte, Foreign Office Mind, p. 321-4.  
42 Miller, Straits, ‘Introduction’.  
43 Ibid.  
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 G.R. Berridge’s book on the much maligned Fitzmaurice, which appeared in 2011, 
was not, strictly speaking, a consideration of the Anglo-Turkish relationship, but given the 
importance which several scholars ascribed to him, and the period of time in which he was 
active, this is a central theme of the work. 44 As other scholars did, Berridge noted that 
Fitzmaurice, a man who resolutely identified with the ‘old Turk’, undoubtably influenced 
Lowther’s thoughts against the CUP. He noted that Fitzmaurice’s anti-CUP writings were 
sometimes repeated, almost verbatim, in Lowther’s despatches. 45 For Berridge, Lowther 
was a ‘solid’ man, although perhaps lacking in ‘energy and imagination’, a criticism with 
which it is hard to disagree. Berridge also demonstrated Fitzmaurice’s ability to influence 
political events at the Porte: in 1908, for instance, he worked hard to keep the aged 
anglophile Kâmil Pasha in the Grand Vizirate, as he regarded him as a ‘bulwark’ against 
the CUP. 46 Berridge did not see the revolution as being as great an opportunity as some 
other scholars suggested. He emphasised the dangers to Britain, both in terms of Islam and 
Russia, of the new arrangements. 47 By the end of Lowther’s period as ambassador, 
however, Berridge noted that he was seen as a ‘failure’, who had failed to take advantage of 
the ‘flying start’ which he had been presented with, suggesting that the idea of the 
‘opportunity’ was present in the minds of many before the first historical accounts had 
been written. 48 
  
 Unsurprisingly, there has been rather more work written on the Ottoman Empire 
more generally. The final years of the Empire, before the eventual emergence of an 
independent Turkey under Atatürk, have fascinated many. Many of these works have 
 
44 Berridge, G.R., Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939) Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy at Constantinople, (Leiden, 
2007). 
45 Ibid, pp.130-1.  
46 Ibid, pp. 125-32. 
47 Ibid, pp. 121-5. 
48 Ibid, pp. 184-5. 
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mentioned the British connection, at least in passing. They have also discussed the way in 
which the revolutionary period has been seen as a missed opportunity within Turkey.  
Bernard Lewis, for instance, in his 1961 The Emergence of Modern Turkey, noted that 
the revolution was greeted with ‘enthusiasm’ initially, and that it was believed that a new 
era of openness was coming. 49 The Young Turks failed, however, to establish significant 
constitutional reforms, although a number of smaller goals were achieved. Lewis noted that 
such matters as policing were improved and modernised during the Young Turk period, 
and that the strict religious rules governing the lives of women were relaxed significantly. 50 
Feroz Ahmad, in his book length treatment of the Young Turk period, made the valuable 
assertion that the Young Turks were fundamentally conservative, aiming to save the state 
as it was, rather than change it in a fundamental way. 51 Since then, this view has been 
accepted by many scholars of Ottoman History. Erdal Kaynar, for instance, noted that 
British observers, along with their European colleagues, failed to appreciate that the Young 
Turks hoped to save their Empire, as they had understood the Revolution to be in the 
tradition of earlier revolutions such as that of the French. 52 On British policy, Ahmad 
echoed his views of five years earlier:  
manifestations of friendship towards England, though motivated by political 
expediency, were far from insincere. They represented the very basis of whatever 
foreign policy the Young Turks had had since July 1908. The Committee’s desire 
to conclude an alliance with England has already been mentioned elsewhere. But 
Sir Gerard refused to respond in a favourable manner. He adopted a cold and 
patronizing attitude towards the Committee. 53 
 
 
49 Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961), pp. 206-14.  
50 Ibid, pp. 222-5. 
51 Ahmad, Young Turks.  
52 Kaynar, Erdal, ‘The Logic of Enlightenment and the Realities of Revolution: Young Turks after the 
Young Turk Revolution’ in Lévy-Aksu, Noémi; Georgeon, François (eds.), The Young Turk Revolution and the 
Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908 (London, 2017) pp. 40-66. 
53 Ahmad, Young Turks, p 37-8.  
 23 
He added that the failure of Britain to come to Turkey’s aid when attacked by Italy in 
1911 solidified the Turkish view that Britain, along with the other European Powers, was 
not sincere in her commitment to Turkish constitutionalism.  
 More general accounts of the period have also tended to consider an opportunity to 
have existed. Zara Steiner, for instance, considered Lowther to have sold the Young Turks 
short to Hardinge, the Permanent under-Secretary, which contributed to a cold British 
official attitude. 54 More recent work still echoes this sentiment. Sean McMeekin, at the 
time himself based in Turkey, wrote in 2010 that the Revolution represented a ‘colossal 
missed opportunity’ for Britain, and that liberal reformers in Turkey were ‘left in the lurch 
by the liberal power they most admired’. He regarded Britain as having fallen under the 
‘spell’ of Fitzmaurice, which resulted in the British rejection of the Turkish alliance 
proposal in 1908, a decision McMeekin labelled ‘foolish’. 55 Otte suggested that Lowther’s 
peers’ chief criticism of him was his failure to be ‘receptive’ to the adulation with which he 
was greeted on his arrival at Constantinople, suggesting once again that the idea of an 
‘opportunity’ had a contemporary root. 56 
In general, much of the work on Anglo-Turkish relations in this period has, to a 
greater or lesser extent, pointed to the existence of an ‘opportunity’ for Britain to exploit in 
1908. Two reasons have been proposed for the failure to take advantage of this: that 
Lowther was an incompetent or worse, representative who poisoned the Foreign Office 
against the Turks and worked against the CUP, and that external commitments, in 
particular the policy of ententes, meant that Britain could not align herself with the Ottoman 
Empire. Whilst both of these are valid, it is the contention of the present work that such an 
‘opportunity’ did not exist, and that furthermore the Foreign Office was not interested, 
 
54 Steiner, ‘Foreign Office under Grey’, p. 31.  
55 McMeekin, Sean, The Berlin to Baghdad Express (London; Penguin, 2011) pp. 68-9; 74-5.  
56 Otte, Foreign Office Mind, p. 316.  
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certainly after 1909, in a policy of alignment with the Ottomans, favouring agreements 
safeguarding British interests instead. Indeed, British interests in the region at the time did 
not suit a policy of strong support for the Ottomans. British policymakers, although they 
had accepted that change at the Straits would come, were happy to see them remain in 
Ottoman hands. A change in position was not likely to be positive for Britain, as the 
Admiralty made clear in 1908. 57 This was reason enough to hope to maintain the Empire 
as a going concern for as long as possible, and this consideration was true in other regions 
too: a collapse of Ottoman power would result in either instability and war or the 
aggrandisement of Powers that British policymakers would have preferred to see kept 
down as far as possible, such as Russia. Finally, this would also threaten British 
predominance in the Persian Gulf region, which was important both for commercial and 
strategic reasons. In general, although British policymakers might have felt that the 
situation in various Ottoman regions left something to be desired, it was clear that 
whatever followed was likely to be worse. For British policymakers, it was better to stick 
with what they knew, for fear of what they did not.  
 
A Policy of Ententes?  
 
The publication of Keith Wilson’s ‘The Policy of the Entente’ in 1985 marked the 
starting point for a series of works seeking to explain the policy of Sir Edward Grey 
through his supposed reliance on a policy of ententes.58 Wilson argued that Britain was not, 
in a true sense, a great power, and that from the turn of the century policymakers were 
aware that they lacked the resources to behave as such, and sought only to be recognised as 
 
57 The Admiralty held that the worst possible outcome at the Straits would be Russian domination – 
neutrality was held to be a favoured option, if change were to happen. See Slade to Grey, 8 Oct. 1908, FO 
371/551/35002. 
58 Wilson, Policy of Ententes.  
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a power. He wrote that the Liberal Government, with ambitious domestic spending plans, 
was keen to avoid expenditure on defence. Grey was aware that in the absence of 
unlimited military spending, which made policymaking redundant, foreign policy would 
have to be carefully carried out in order to maintain dominance. This was the policy of 
ententes. Following 1909, the much vaunted ‘two power standard’ was tacitly abandoned, 
with naval building now focused only on hostile Powers: the ententes were now built into the 
naval estimates. India was considered a vital aspect of Britain’s Great Power status, and 
defending it, in particular from Russia, was considered Britain’s primary consideration. 59 
The policy of ententes, therefore, became clear, Wilson contended. Britain had to work with 
France and Russia to try to improve relations with the latter, and avoid a threat to India. 
Wilson argued that claims of maintaining a ‘free hand’ in international politics were a 
‘myth’, that the ententes were de facto alliances, and that Grey conceptualised them as such 
himself. 60 Wilson wrote that the external realties of Great Power politics were what locked 
Britain into the policy. Indeed, it is difficult to argue with his conclusion that Britain would 
have been likely to have gone to war, had it broken out, in 1906, 1908 and 1911, and that 
British interests compelled her to intervene in 1914. Britain could not allow France to be 
overrun, and her position would have been seriously eroded had she left Russia and France 
to fight alone. 61 It is here that Wilson’s analysis falls down. The fact that British interests 
compelled her to treat the entente with France, and to a lesser extent with Russia, as quasi-
alliances does not mean that Grey and other policymakers accepted this situation as final. 
While they understood that this was the case, it did not prevent them from exploring other 
ways of managing the great power system. Indeed, a recognition that the agreement with 
 
59 Ibid, 5-16; Grey defended his policy as such long after the event, writing that ‘In its primary and cardinal 
object, the security of the Indian frontier, the Agreement was completely successful. There were no more 
nerves or apprehensions about that. This was the real raison d’être and the achievement of it the real 
justification of the Agreement. But a long train of minor troubles followed.’ Id., Twenty-Five Years v.1, (London, 
1925) pp. 165-6.  
60 Wilson, Policy of Entente, pp. 88-9. 
61 Ibid, pp. 90-7.  
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Russia might be nearing its end in part prompted Grey’s exploration of an agreement of 
some nature with Germany in early 1914. 62 
 John Charmley followed Wilson’s lead in his discussion of British foreign policy. He 
argued that Grey, in a break with tradition, saw diplomatic isolation as a threat to Britain. 
In contrast to Wilson, Germany, and not Russia, was the chief bogeyman in Charmley’s 
version of events. For him, this was a mistake. British policymakers had failed to appreciate 
that the German threat was receding. Weltpolitik lay in ruins, and feverish naval building 
had failed to force Britain into the triple alliance. 63 Germany was not, he said, bent on 
world domination, and it was only that it appeared as though she had been in 1919, 
(following her expansion of aims throughout the conflict) that has suggested she might have 
been. 64 The blame for this, Charmley said, lay with Grey, who remained stuck in 1890. 
The ‘English have always preferred ‘character’ to ‘intellect’, he wrote. 65 Not content with 
blasting Grey’s cognitive abilities, he also accused him of mendacity in failing to reveal 
Anglo-French staff talks to the Cabinet. 66 Grey was never prepared to risk what he had 
 
62 For more on this, see Otte, T. G. ‘Détente 1914: Sir William Tyrrell's Secret Mission to Germany.’ The 
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Ludendorff as silent dictators’ and the sacrifices demanded by the war. Germany’s more aggressive aims were 
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fate would have lain in store for Western Europe, had Germany not been broken in 1918. See for instance 
Kitchen, Martin, The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 
1916-1918 (London, 1976); Angelow, Jürgen, ‘Germany during World War I. War aims, politics, and 
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pp. 105-128; Chickering, Roger, ‘Strategy, Politics and the Quest for a Negotiated peace: The German Case, 
1914-1918’, in Afflerbach, Holger (ed.), The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies 
(Berlin, 2015), pp. 97-116. 
65 Charmley, Splendid Isolation, p. 331.  
66 The question of the Anglo-French staff talks has been controversial, as seen here. Debate has long raged 
over whether they committed Britain to fight alongside France. It seems that, formally at least, they did not, 
although a ‘moral’ commitment probably existed, and in any case British interests more generally compelled 
her to fight with France in a large-scale war. See Hamilton, K.A., ‘Great Britain and France, 1905-1911’ in 
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the cabinet are at least exaggerated: Coogan, John W; Coogan, Peter, “The British Cabinet and the Anglo-
French Staff Talks, 1905–1914: Who Knew What and When Did He Know It?” Journal of British Studies 24(1), 
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with France and Russia to seek better relations with Germany, a power always assumed to 
have ‘hegemonic aims; and to be acting in ‘bad faith’’. 67 This, once again, is demonstrably 
false; Grey worked actively with the Germans in 1913, and a sense of détente had begun to 
emerge as a result, a fact glossed over by Charmley, who suggested that the achievements 
of the Conference of Ambassadors ‘should not be oversold’. 68 While Wilson identified that 
much of British policy was based on fear of Russia, Charmley’s analysis failed to appreciate 
that a concern with Russia was a central preoccupation, arguing that Britain hoped to 
avoid alienating Russia only so that she might not be left to face Germany alone. 69 
 Niall Ferguson also considered the issue of ententes from a similarly critical 
standpoint. Motivated by his conviction that ‘the First World War remains the worst thing 
the people of my country have ever had to endure’ and thus must be deplored and the 
reasons for its outbreak questioned, Ferguson criticised Grey at some length. 70 Following 
Charmley in doubting Grey’s faculties, he labelled him a ‘chronic underachiever’ for 
whom ‘love of fishing’ was ‘almost a character reference’. Stretching the metaphor, he 
suggested that Grey was in fact the ‘fish’ which France and Russia hooked’. 71 Ferguson 
contends that Grey was ‘inflexible’ and that he was too trusting of others. His intellectual 
failings meant that he was unable to appreciate that there were no ‘insuperable forces 
generating an ultimately lethal Anglo-German antagonism’ and that he cherished an 
overriding desire to range Britain against Germany as early as 1902. 72 Towards Russia, 
 
1985, pp. 110–31. For the similarly controversial agreements on naval matters, see Steiner and Neilson, 
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70 Ferguson, Pity of War, p. xxi.  
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Grey demonstrated ‘appeasement’, with all the implications that an historian of Ferguson’s 
stripes would apply to that loaded term. 73 While Wilson had emphasised fear of Russia, 
and Charmley Germany, Ferguson argued that neither of these were as fearsome as British 
policymakers thought. He decried the ‘compulsive Germanophobia’ of the Foreign Office, 
and emphasised that he thought Germany in a financially weak position, and less 
threatening than she appeared. The position of Russia he also played down, glossing over 
her (faster than expected) recovery from the war with Japan and the threat she posed in 
Persia, and suggesting that a war with Russia would not be the natural result of the 
convention coming to an end. 74  
 These arguments suffer from the same weakness, namely that Ferguson is so keen 
to show that the war was unnecessary that he fails to examine his assertions closely enough. 
75 Throughout this period Grey demonstrated flexibility, especially in Turkey, and a 
willingness to explore other options in his European policy. Ferguson fails to appreciate the 
very real threat which a resurgent Russia posed to Britain, and his claim that Foreign 
Office officials were Germanophobic to the point of reflex does not fit with the evidence, 
certainly in the final years before war.  
 Thus, a discernible trend has emerged in the historiography. Many, for instance 
Christopher Clark, argue even today that Grey was wedded to a policy of ententes and that 
these formed de facto alliances, condemning Britain to fighting a war which was against 
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her interests. 76 It is the contention of the present work that this is an unhelpful and even 
inaccurate way of thinking about pre-war Europe.  
In this case, a study of Anglo-Turkish relations is a valuable way of examining and 
discussing this narrative, as the period from 1908 to 1914 saw a number of wider 
European issues impinge on relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. In 
particular, Russia’s antagonistic stance towards the Ottoman Empire meant that British 
and Russian objectives in the area were often at odds. On several occasions, this meant 
that Grey demonstrated that his overall conception of foreign policy went far beyond a 
restricted (and restrictive) reliance on ententes. Furthermore, from 1911 onward, all of the 
major crises which concerned European policymakers had their roots in the Ottoman 
Empire or adjacent areas. A discussion of Anglo-Turkish relations is therefore of value 
both for its own sake, and as a way to explore these wider issues. This work will analyse 
their course through a narrative account of the key events of the period, in order to 
demonstrate both that Grey’s policy was both richer and more complex than he has 
sometimes been given credit for, and that the idea of a ‘golden opportunity’ was nothing 
but illusion.   
 
76 Clark, Sleepwalkers.  
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1. The Eastern Department: A Sketch  
 
 
 By 1908, the Foreign Office was much changed from the department that Salisbury 
or Palmerston would have known. As a consequence of the reforms put in place on 1 
January 1906, the organisation had gone, in the younger Nicolson’s words, from ‘a stuffy 
family business into an efficient Department of State’. 77 The reforms, often attributed to 
Sir Charles Hardinge, although set in motion before his time as Permanent Under-
secretary (PUS), had democratised the policymaking process, for the first time giving more 
junior clerks a more significant role in policymaking, their opinions being actively sought. 
78 Harold Nicolson, who had himself served in the Foreign Office, wrote that the reforms 
made the Foreign Office a far more attractive proposition for juniors. 79  
 Foreign Policy is never made in a vacuum, as a drily academic exercise devoid of 
personality. Cold logic and analysis cannot alone explain the formation of policy. Neither 
is it formed by automation or by impersonal forces. Ideas of great ‘historical forces’, 
shaping long periods of time inexorably cannot adequately uncover the reasons behind 
decisions either. Instead, it takes shape as a result of the views, impressions and prejudices 
of individuals. With this in mind, in conjunction with the increased importance of minor 
staff in the early 1900s, a greater understanding of the personalities involved in 
policymaking can help to uncover more of the realities behind the formation of policy.  
 In 1908, the Foreign Office consisted of a number of departments, most 
corresponding to a geographical area. Each of these would have a handful of permanent 
staff attached to them, overseen by an Assistant Under-secretary, who would have 
responsibility for several such departments. Above these was the Permanent Under-
 
77 Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p. 325. For a fuller discussion, see Otte, Foreign Office, p. 243; Steiner, Foreign Office 
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secretary, the bureaucratic head of the Office, who worked with its political head, the 
Secretary of State. This meant that officials were able (and were indeed encouraged) to 
become specialists in their own right. The department responsible for Turkey in this period 
was the Eastern Department, which also oversaw policy for Russia, Persia and the Near 
East. The Eastern Department had had a certain glamour and considered itself to be 
perhaps socially superior in the latter half of the 1800s, but by the Grey and Hardinge era, 
it had very much been supplanted by the Western Department, a development that was 
somewhat inevitable given the policy ideas and preferences of the Edwardian generation of 
diplomats. 80 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was the British Foreign Minister from 1905 to 1916, and 
therefore the only Secretary of State concerned with the Ottoman Empire from the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 through to the Turkish entry into the war in 1914. 81 Born in 
1862, into a family of Liberal politicians, Grey was educated at Winchester before 
progressing to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1880. Although the young Grey was not 
especially interested in foreign relations, preferring sport and the outdoors, his near 
contemporaries included the future Lord Curzon, viceroy of India and PUS, Cecil 
‘Springy’ Spring-Rice, Ambassador to the United States and prolific correspondent, 82 
James Rennell ‘the Rotter’ Rodd, 83 Ambassador to Italy, and Louis Mallet, AUS at the 
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Foreign Office and Ambassador to Constantinople. 84 Grey had his first experiences of 
government before the turn of the century, working as an Under-secretary under the 5th 
Earl of Rosebery. Even before the Liberal election victory of 1905, Grey had declared 
himself in favour of improving relations with Russia and Germany, and upon becoming 
Foreign Minister in 1905, soon worked to conclude the Anglo-Russia convention in 1907. 
In power, he initially focused on strengthening the ties that bound Britain to the ententes, 
although this faded as a priority as Grey sought improved relations with Germany towards 
the end of his tenure. 85 
Grey has often been considered a simple man, straightforward and honest, keen on 
‘careful steering’ rather than ‘bold strokes’. 86 One scholar remarked that: ‘To nearly all 
observers, he was hardworking, sincere, earnest, forthright, with a sense of detachment 
which kept him from passionate politics.’ 87 In the earlier years of this period, Grey enjoyed 
a close relationship with his PUS, Sir Charles Hardinge, with whom he enjoyed a 
‘relationship of equals’. 88 Indeed, on Grey’s death, Hardinge said that he ‘had the highest 
opinion of his diplomatic skill, which was characteristic of his straightforward nature’. 89 
Grey’s relationship with Hardinge was based both on a strong personal regard and on their 
shared policy outlook, and the years before Hardinge’s elevation to a peerage, which 
accompanied his appointment as Viceroy of India, ran smoothly, with little dissention in 
policy, in part because Hardinge worked to ensure that senior posts were filled by men of 
similar mind to himself. Hardinge’s replacement, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was less of a success 
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as PUS. Grey, having been in post for some time, was more sure of his own mind and 
more confident in its expression, and his desire to look outside the entente structure caused 
friction with the more Russophile Nicolson, with whom he did not share such an easy 
personal rapport. 90 In the Nicolson period, therefore, the focus of policymaking shifted 
more decisively towards Grey, along with others who shared similar views such as his 
influential private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell. 91 
 
Sir Charles Hardinge was born in 1858, educated at Harrow before graduating 
from Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1888, and joined the diplomatic service in the same 
year. By 1903, having married a lady-in-waiting to Queen Alexandra, he was an Assistant 
Under-secretary, and in a position to make his close royal connections count, 
accompanying the King abroad as a representative of the Foreign Office. Hardinge’s 
relationship with the King would be useful to him, as the King retained influence in 
diplomatic appointments. In 1904, he went to Saint Petersburg as ambassador, where he 
hoped to be able to improve relations with Britain, a mission he completed in 1907 as 
PUS, having returned to London in 1906. Having enjoyed a fruitful period as PUS, 
Hardinge went to India as Viceroy in 1910, to the disappointment of Grey (who Hardinge 
remembered in his memoirs as having remarked that if men were ships, Hardinge, with the 
new Peerage which came with his appointment, would be a dreadnought). 92 
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As PUS, Hardinge enjoyed significant influence. Characterised as a ‘smooth 
courtier’ who was ‘forever striving and ambitious’, he was able to be ‘ruthless in his 
monopolising decision-making within the office’. 93 Although not a chief architect of the 
reforms of 1906, he was able to use these to put himself at the centre of the policymaking 
and information management processes, with almost anything of importance crossing his 
desk. 94  
Within the office, Hardinge was a calm, level-headed presence, often reining in the 
more excitable impulses of his junior colleagues, and regularly advocating a middle ground 
on specific issues. During the Bosnian Crisis, Hardinge grew frustrated at what he saw as 
Turkish näiveté. He thought she failed to appreciate that she must seek to make the best of 
what was possible, rather than seeking an ideal situation. 95 He had little interest in Turkish 
feelings, finding a debate about the precise title of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria ‘tiresome’. 
By spring 1909, Hardinge had concluded that Turkish friendship was ‘ephemeral’ and that 
it was not worth Britain’s while to ‘sacrifice’ her interests seeking it. 96 
 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, Hardinge’s successor as PUS, was born in 1849 and 
educated at Rugby school. He joined Brasenose College, Oxford, but left without taking a 
degree, spending a period of time in the Navy. He served as Private Secretary to Lord 
Granville when Secretary of State, and served at Constantinople when Lord Dufferin was 
Ambassador in the early 1880s. Postings to Tangier and Madrid gave him a front row seat 
to the creation of the Anglo-French entente and the Algeciras Conference where it was 
tested. In 1906, he took Hardinge’s place at Saint Petersburg, hoping to continue the work 
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of bringing Britain and Russia together. In 1910, he again replaced Hardinge, this time 
becoming PUS in 1910. It was not a happy appointment, marred by Nicolson’s 
disagreements with Grey over policy, his own distaste for the administrative work of the 
Office, and his failing health. 97 Nicolson’s attempts to secure escape in the form of an 
embassy abroad (which earned him the sobriquet the ‘little blue eyed rogue’ from Sir 
Francis Bertie, who would have been replaced by Nicolson at Paris 98) met with failure, and 
the Foreign Office proved his final appointment. 99 
Nicolson was very much hand-picked by Hardinge as a successor. He hoped to 
install him as PUS as he shared his opinions and would ensure continuity of policy. 
Although Nicolson enjoyed a good relationship with Hardinge and the two men shared a 
similar outlook, Nicolson was perhaps less flexible and pragmatic than his predecessor. 
‘Austere and aloof’, Nicolson failed to establish a rapport in the way that Hardinge had 
done. 100 In general a man of pessimistic bent, Nicolson has often been dismissed as a 
‘Russophile’. Bertie complained that Russia could ‘do no wrong’ in Nicolson’s eyes. 101 His 
own son considered Nicolson to have been a ‘firm believer’ in the German menace, having 
succumbed to that ‘attractive form of charlatanism known as ‘le charme slav’ [sic]. To 
counter this, he hoped that the triple entente would be strengthened. In addition, and with 
some justification, he was afraid of the prospect of Britain being in opposition to Russia. 
Keith Neilson also shared this view, arguing that although Nicolson liked many Russians 
personally, he was not blinded to the negative aspects of the Russian state. Rather, he saw 
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putting up with difficult behaviour from Russia as being worthwhile to counter German 
influence and give Britain freedom of action in Persia. 102  
Perhaps inevitably for one espousing a Russocentric policy, Nicolson was no great 
lover of Turkey. Appeals for an alliance on the part of the Turks in 1911, for instance, 
were both ‘childish’ and ‘naïve’. 103 During the Balkan Wars, he complained that a pro-
Turkish policy would come at the cost of good relations with Russia and France, and 
would run the risk of putting Britain in a ‘most awkward and uncomfortable international 
position’. 104 
 
George Russell Clerk served as a clerk in the Eastern Department, in 1913-14, 
having previously been in the Western Department. Born in 1874, and educated at Eton 
and New College, Oxford, he joined the Foreign Office in 1899. After serving time abroad 
in Addis Ababa, he returned to London. On the outbreak of the war, he was made head of 
the newly formed War Department of the Office. 105 
Clerk was remembered as being in appearance like a ‘stage diplomat’, being ‘tall, 
erect and faultlessly dressed’. 106 In terms of policy, during his brief period in the Eastern 
Department, Clerk exemplified the dichotomy of British policy towards Russia. He was 
cynical about the Liman mission in 1913, considering Russian complaints to be an effort to 
gain concessions in Turkey, rather than a genuine protest. 107 He thought the possibilities 
that it suggested for the future were ‘dangerous’, because he thought that being on good 
terms with Russia, even at the cost of concessions in Persia, would be worth it to Britain. 
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108 Although cynical about some Russian actions, he understood that Russian policy was 
often formulated from a sense of insecurity – for instance, in 1914, he pointed out to his 
colleagues the Russian fear that with Turkey buying ships in Britain, there would be two 
dreadnoughts in the Black Sea, neither of which would be Russian. 109 Clerk was also 
cynical about negotiations with Turkey. When the question of the capitulations was raised 
in the summer of 1914, as Britain tried to keep Turkey out of the war, he warned that this 
was not the kind of question that could be solved ‘in a day’, and that British policymakers 
should act with caution. 110 
 
Sir Eyre Crowe was one of the better known figures of the period, widely 
regarded as an excellent administrator. He was born in 1864, in Leipzig, to a British 
consul-general and his German wife, and was educated in Düsseldorf and Berlin before 
travelling to Britain to study for the Foreign Office exam, entering in 1885. From his early 
time in the Office, Crowe was recognised as ‘one of the most promising officials among the 
Edwardians.’ 111 He served at both The Hague Conference of 1907 and the London Naval 
Conferences, before becoming an Assistant Under-secretary in 1912, taking over the 
responsibilities of Sir Louis Mallet as he moved to Constantinople. He was appointed PUS 
in 1920, serving in that post until his death in 1925. 112 
Harold Nicolson remembered Crowe as being ‘the perfect type of British Civil 
Servant – industrious, loyal, expert, accurate, beloved, obedient and courageous.’ 113 He 
has also been characterised as ‘tall and reticent’, with ‘few close friends and… in some 
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ways isolated from his colleagues.’ 114 In general policy terms, Crowe has often been 
considered a rabid anti-German, in particular as a result of his famous memorandum, 
describing what he saw as German ambitions. This seems, however, to have been 
something of an overstatement. Crowe was in favour of the ententes and suspicious of 
Germany, to be sure, but he advocated managing the German challenge rather than 
meeting it with force. 115 Within the Foreign Office, Crowe’s minutes and memoranda 
were generally lengthy, carefully considered and rooted in the facts of a situation. He did 
not serve much time in the Eastern Department before the outbreak of the war, but his 
expertise was sought out even before his promotion put that department under his 
supervision. In 1910, for instance, he was critical of those advocating an agreement with 
Germany over railway lines within the Ottoman Empire. He feared that to make an 
agreement with Germany would mean only that the Germans were in a better position, 
but still hostile to Britain. 116 
 
Ronald Lindsay would eventually be the first Ambassador to Atatürk’s new 
Turkey, after the war, but he spent a brief part of his earlier career in the Eastern 
Department. Born, as several of his colleagues had been, in 1877, he was a Wykehamist, 
before spending some time studying abroad rather than attending a British university, as 
had become usual. He entered the Foreign Office in 1899, and served at Saint Petersburg, 
in Persia, Washington and Paris before returning to London for a short time as Grey’s 
Private Secretary. He gave the appointment up on his marriage, but remained in the 
Foreign Office until 1911, when he became Head of Chancery at the Hague. After the 
war, he went to Turkey as the first British representative to the new republic, reaching 
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Ambassadorial rank when the post was upgraded. He also served as Ambassador at Berlin 
and Washington. He died in 1945. 117 
Lindsay was remembered as a man of ‘charm’, with lots of friends, and a ‘typical 
diplomat of the old school’. 118 He was nevertheless not afraid to make his feelings clear. 
During the debate on the use of kilometric guarantees in Turkey during 1909-10, Lindsay 
made his opposition to the advice of financiers that they be imposed, believing this 
tantamount to ‘exhort[ion]’, and that Britain was not compelled to follow such a course. 119 
Lindsay’s obituary remarked that ‘his understating of, and tolerance for, opinions that were 
not his own endeared him to all who knew him well'. 120 This was in evidence in 1909, 
when he considered it ‘only natural’ that the Turks would reconsider concessions made 
under the Sultan after the Revolution, especially given the ‘lavish’ manner in which 
Abdülhamid had handed them out. 121 
 
Sir Louis Mallet was an important figure in Anglo-Turkish relations before the 
war, serving as the final Ambassador to Constantinople. Born in 1864, he was educated 
privately before progressing to Balliol College, Oxford, where he studied at the same time 
as Grey. Having joined the Foreign Office in 1885 and spent brief periods in Rio de 
Janeiro and in Egypt, he became précis writer to Lansdowne, Grey’s predecessor. He took 
over from Lindsay as Grey’s Private Secretary until 1907, when he became an Assistant 
Under-secretary, with responsibilities including the Eastern Department. Elevated to 
Ambassadorial rank in 1913 with his appointment to Constantinople, his posting was cut 
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short by the outbreak of war with Turkey. Although he worked again in the Foreign Office 
for a brief period, this marked the end of his career, and he retired fully in 1920. 122 
Mallet had the benefit of having caught Hardinge’s eye early in his career, and 
enjoyed his patronage, being groomed for the PUSship. 123 This was, however, not purely 
based on merit – Hardinge hoped to maintain influence on policymaking after leaving for 
India, and also to increase his chances of getting the Paris Embassy at the end of his career. 
124 In terms of general policy, Mallet was pro entente and has been considered by many 
scholars to be among the more anti-German members of the Foreign Office in this period. 
125  
Mallet has been described as ‘sardonic’, an apt description. 126 He was often cynical 
and active in suggesting policy, unlike Hardinge or Richard Maxwell, for instance, who 
were often more willing to counsel moderation or patience. He was critical of Sir Gerard 
Lowther, Ambassador to the Porte, as early as 1908, and complained that he had failed to 
speak up in the face of unfair tendering practices. 127 That is not to say he had much 
confidence in Ottoman Governance. As early as 1909, he reflected that Turkey would 
always lean upon the ‘strongest Powers’ and that for this reason, it was not worth Britain’s 
while to make ‘great sacrifice[s]’ to improve relations with Turkey. 128 He thought that it 
would be important to attach ‘stringent’ conditions to loans made to the Turks, in order to 
prevent them from wasting the money on armaments and the like. 129 He was frustrated, 
too, that after all that Britain had ‘done for the Turks’ the Ottomans continued not to 
make concessions on the Baghdad Railway, preventing it from reaching Basra. 130 
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Frustration also came from what he saw as the Turks’ poor decision-making in not 
following the wishes of the Powers during the Bosnian crisis. Mallet thought that the Turks 
should have simply attempted to get as much money as possible, and ignore the political 
aspects of any solution. 131 The Tripoli war saw Mallet confident that Turkish weakness 
could be taken advantage of by Britain. 132 In general, however, Mallet had a healthy 
respect for the ability of the Turks to create trouble for Britain. The ‘possibility of Naval 
expansion on the part of Turkey [was] a serious outlook’ for Britain, he said. 133  
 
Richard Ponsonby Maxwell was an experienced clerk, an expert on the East 
who refused promotion to Assistant Under-secretary. 134 Born 1853 and educated at 
Winchester, the young Maxwell travelled Europe, being in Paris at the outbreak of the 
1870 war. He attended St. John’s College, Cambridge, and entered the Foreign Office in 
1877. He spent a period at Constantinople and served as private secretary to Sir Thomas 
Sanderson, Hardinge’s predecessor as PUS, before the turn of the century. In 1913, he 
retired, hoping to see the world, but the war put paid to his plans and he returned to work 
in the Eastern Department. He died in 1928. 135  
Maxwell was remembered as a charming man, close to many, including William 
Tyrrell, Grey’s influential Private Secretary, and Crowe. As an expert and senior member 
of the department, Maxwell’s ‘footprint’ in the documents was less than that of some of his 
colleagues. Although a rare minute writer, he often calmed the more excitable schemes of 
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his juniors, such as Robert Vansittart. 136 Nevertheless, he was sometimes moved to 
comment. He was intensely frustrated at the actions of the Palmer’s firm in 1911 when it 
appeared that they might wreck the negotiations of their rival Armstrong Whitworth with 
the Turkish Government for the building of a dreadnought. 137 
 
Herman Cameron Norman was another of the more junior staff to occupy the 
Eastern Department for a time between 1908-1914. Born in 1872, he was educated at 
Eton and then Trinity College, Cambridge from 1890. He served in a succession of 
postings abroad, having been in Egypt under Lord Cromer, Constantinople, Washington 
and was part of Hardinge’s embassy in Saint Petersburg. Having worked with several of 
the remarkable men of the British Foreign Policy establishment, and possessing an 
impressive array of linguistic skills, Norman was chosen to oversee the peace conference 
between the Balkan belligerents in 1912-1913, which was hosted by the Foreign Office. 138 
Norman was remembered as a man keen on detail, fastidiously neat both in his personal 
appearance and his work. 139 However, where his opinions diverged from those of his 
colleagues, he was not afraid to make them clear. For instance, in 1912, during 
negotiations on Mesopotamian Oil extraction, Norman hoped to support a scheme other 
than that officially supported by the Foreign Office, headed by William Knox D’Arcy. 
Although he appreciated that British support was bespoke, he ‘wish[ed]’ that Britain could 
‘support this scheme’ which was both ‘grandiose and very largely British’. 140 Norman was 
also keen to remain in Turkey’s good books, to maintain British influence. He worried, at 
the outbreak of the Tripoli war, that Italian friendship could be bought only at the cost of 
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acquiescence in her aggressive actions. This, he thought, would ‘alienate the sympathy of 
Turkey and throw her more and more into the arms of Germany’. 141 
 
Lancelot Oliphant had a distinguished diplomatic career, and spent some of his 
early years in the Eastern Department. He was born in 1881, and only entered the Foreign 
Office in 1903. He developed a certain affinity for the East through postings in Turkey and 
Persia. He reached ambassadorial rank upon being appointed British Ambassador to 
Belgium, but found himself incarcerated as a result of the German advance at the outbreak 
of the Second World War. Oliphant was an ‘excellent and correct’ official, with a strong 
eye for detail. Indeed, even in his early work as a member of the Eastern Department, he 
demonstrated this, often making fairly lengthy comments on Turkish matters. Although his 
remarks often showed a strong command of facts, they sometimes betrayed what might 
uncharitably be called a lack of originality or insight. Nevertheless, he was remembered 
fondly as an official who despite his regard for procedure possessed a ‘boyish’ sense of 
humour and ‘many a dull official meeting... was enlivened by the play of his frolicsome 
banter'. 142 
 
Alwyn Parker was another beneficiary of the drive to encourage staff members to 
find specialisms, becoming regarded as the Office’s foremost expert on international 
railway disputes. 143 Parker was born in 1877, and educated at Harrow. Rather than attend 
a university, he spent some time travelling abroad, and entered the diplomatic service in 
1900, being posted to St Petersburg in 1901. After time in London, he left the Foreign 
Office to take up a directorate at Lloyds Bank, in 1920, although he returned briefly to the 
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Office during the Second World War. 144 Parker’s expertise proved to be of great value 
during the long periods of negotiation with the Turks, both on railway matters and other 
issues. He worked closely with the former Grand Vizier Hakki Pasha, who travelled to 
London to negotiate on outstanding questions in 1913. He was well regarded by his 
colleagues, and was congratulated for his ‘strenuous and prolonged labours’ in the Anglo-
Turkish commercial questions which were largely settled in 1913. 145 He was often trusted 
to act in an almost independent manner, and to draft important letters and despatches. 
Nevertheless, Parker was not always shown the same respect outside of the Office. For 
instance, he grew frustrated in 1912 when progress on railway negotiations was ignored by 
the India Office, which had seemingly disregarded the process of negotiation and now 
seemed to be trying to turn back the clock. 146 Indeed, Parker was not afraid to go against 
standard orthodoxies. His specialist knowledge and his clear sighted strategic view meant 
that he ‘never believed that the question of what percentage we get in the fag end of the 
railway – i.e. from Baghdad to the Gulf, is nearly so important as it would be to secure a 
satisfactory preliminary Convention relating to all railways in Asiatic Turkey and definitely 
excluding preferential treatment.’ 147  
Given Parker’s desire for wide ranging agreements, he was quick to appreciate the 
value of Turkey’s desire to raise customs dues by 4%, which required the consent of 
Britain, as a lever. 148 Once identified, he was jealous in protecting this lever. When it was 
suggested, early in the first Balkan War, that Turkey might be permitted to raise her 
customs dues to help her fight, Norman warned that to allow this would mean that 
Britain’s ‘last lever would be gone’. 149 When use of the lever was again contemplated in 
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1913, this time to encourage the Turks to again surrender Adrianople (now Edirne), he 
reacted with horror. He could not see a ‘sufficient reason’ to break off his negotiations with 
Hakki for the benefit of Bulgaria, which was reaping the ‘just reward’ of a policy of 
adventure, and it seemed ‘quite uncalled for’ for Britain to take the lead in ‘checking’ 
Turkey. For various reasons, he thought that there was no reason for Britain to ‘take the 
initiative’ in removing the Turks from Adrianople. He added that although Britain could 
not ‘oppose the ejection of the Turks’, there was no reason why she should ‘promote it’. 150 
 
Claud Russell, a member of the family of Whig grandees, was briefly a member 
of the Eastern Department before the outbreak of war. 151 He was born in 1871, and was 
educated privately before progressing to Balliol College, Oxford. He joined the diplomatic 
service in 1897, and spent only a brief period at the Foreign Office before the war. In 
1914, he was given permission to serve in France but returned to diplomatic service after 
the war, eventually achieving ambassadorial rank before his death in 1959. 152 
Russell was described as a ‘diplomatist of the old school’, with an ‘acute and clear’ 
mind, able to write ‘fluid, but precise and cogent prose’. Unfortunately, he was also a 
difficult personality, who disliked entertaining – a significant disqualification for a 
diplomat. He also cherished an 'almost oriental belief in the danger of haste', which 
unsurprisingly meant that he did not endear himself to Crowe, when parachuted into the 
Eastern Department on the outbreak of war. 153 During his time in the Eastern 
Department, Russell was deeply unimpressed by the Russian attitude during the Liman 
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von Sanders crisis, arguing that Britain should avoid becoming embroiled in a policy of 
‘competing demands’. 154 
 
John Anthony Cecil Tilley was another of those to enjoy a distinguished career 
in the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. Born in 1869 and educated at Eton and 
Kings College, Cambridge, he became a Foreign Office clerk in 1892. Unusually, as the 
Foreign and Diplomatic services were still separate, he spent a period at Constantinople 
under Sir Nicholas O’Conor. 155 After some time in the Eastern Department, Tilley was 
promoted to Senior Clerk in 1910 in the African department. He became an Assistant 
Under-secretary in 1919, and ended his career with an ambassadorial appointment to 
Brazil and Japan. He spent time after his retirement writing an official history of the 
Foreign Office. 156 
Tilley was generally pessimistic about the prospects of Turkey after the Revolution. 
He wrote a lengthy memorandum on the future of Turkey in 1909, concluding in 
particular that Turkish finance should continue to be managed by the Powers, to prevent 
money being ‘wasted’. Hardinge described Tilley as ‘despondent of the future’. 157 He had 
developed this idea during the Bosnian Crisis, when he had feared that should Turkey 
receive money as part of a settlement with Austria, this would undoubtably be wasted. 158 
He had thought the Turks over-confident in their dealings with the Bulgarians in the early 
stages of the crisis, and his belief in Turkish weakness explained in part his support for a 
Balkan confederation, which would include the Turks. 159  
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Robert Vansittart was another ‘big name’ to have spent a part of his early career 
in the Eastern Department. Vansittart was born in 1881 and educated at Eton, where he 
won prizes for French and German. He joined the diplomatic service in 1902, spending 
time in Paris, Tehran and Cairo before transferring to the Foreign Office in 1911. He 
would eventually rise to become PUS in 1930, although his tenure was ended in 1938 with 
the curtailment of his influence via a promotion. 160 
As a young man and a junior staff member, Vansittart was apt to write lengthy, 
often sarcastic or drily humorous minutes, in an attempt to be noticed by his superiors. 
Keen to make his mark, this sometimes spilled over into what might be seen as over-
excitable schemes and ideas. For instance, in 1911, he wondered at the possibility of 
exerting pressure on the Turks to give up Tripoli to the Italians, a scheme on which the 
more experienced Maxwell immediately poured cold water. 161 Vansittart was often 
cynical. For instance, he thought Italian complaints of Turkish action in Tripoli 
exaggerated, though not without some justification. 162 He was also against the idea of 
mediation in the conflict, because he believed it to be doomed to failure. 163 He 
complained that ‘big talk’ was the ‘prevailing tone at Constantinople.’ 164 The Turkish 
reaction to the Italian annexation was ‘much as… [he had] expected, only a little more 
intransigent.’ 165 Vansittart’s views on the Balkan wars were similarly cynical. He remarked 
that Russia found herself in a tricky position, for ‘having made the marriage’ of the Balkan 
states, she now found herself ‘compelled to wage divorce for fear of its first fruits’. 166 He 
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thought that Turkey had little hope of success. Kâmil Pasha, the Grand Vizier’s, 
assumption that Turkey would emerge from the opening exchanges ‘on top’ was a ‘very 
big’ assumption. 167 The ‘chief cause of the Turkish debacle’, when it came, was the ‘vast 
amount’ of misspending of military funds under the CUP, which had left the Turkish 
‘materiel’ a ‘paper one’, he thought. 168 One attaché who suggested that the Bulgarian 
troops might be held outside Constantinople was an ‘optimist’, however much Vansittart 
hoped that he was ‘right’. 169 In 1913, Vansittart doubted the utility of making strong 
efforts on behalf of Russia over the Liman von Sanders case. He regarded the complaints 
to be exaggerated and was mindful of the similar position held by Admiral Limpus. 170  
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2. The Revolution  
 
 
 In July 1908, the Young Turk revolution brought about the end of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II’s domination of Ottoman politics. This event seemed to mark a break in 
the established pattern of diplomatic relations at the Porte. The German-leaning 
Hamidian regime had fallen from grace, replaced by an avowedly liberal, constitutional 
Young Turk government, which professed anglophile tendencies. 171 This presented an 
opportunity for Britain to regain lost political influence at the Porte. This chapter will 
discuss the events of the revolution and consider how these events were viewed and 
approached by British policymakers. It will then consider the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution, and such matters as the loan of a British Admiral to the Turks. Finally, it will 
consider how much of an opportunity truly existed for Britain in the wake of this surprising 
change at Constantinople.  
 
2.1. The Revolution 
 
 
 Before moving on to a discussion of the revolution and the British response to it, it 
is necessary to consider the situation in the Ottoman Empire before the events of July 
1908. Few, indeed, would have considered the end of the Sultan’s reign to be nigh. As 
G.R. Berridge put it, by 1906 Abdülhamid ‘had no visible domestic opponents of whom to 
speak. His spies, for whom he was now infamous, were everywhere; troublemakers were 
being exiled to the nether regions of the Empire; and the press suffered from the strictest 
censorship.’ 172 Even in the final months of his reign, Abdülhamid remained comfortably 
 
171 Ahmad, ‘Britain’s relations with the Young Turks’, 302; 304-5; Kent, Marian, ‘Constantinople and 
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ensconced in his palace, protected, or at least so he thought, by his large army of spies. The 
Sultan’s espionage apparatus, indeed, was kept busy, a secret tribunal always in session at 
the seat of Government, the Yildiz palace, to try those suspected of treason. A paranoid 
character, he was terrified of being usurped or killed, a fear perhaps stemming from his 
removal of his own brother in an 1876 coup. Naturally, so suspicious a character ensured 
that he was at the centre of governance. He worked, it was reported in 1908, ‘day and 
night’, and almost all state business was seen by him. When a break was required, this most 
paranoid of men apparently enjoyed reading French translations of the detective stories of 
Arthur Conan-Doyle. Indeed, the telling of this story represented a surprisingly indulgent 
attitude amongst some British officials towards the Sultan. Colonel Herbert Surtees, a 
British military attaché, concluded that there was  
no doubt that the Sultan Abdul Hamid is sincerely desirous for the welfare of the 
State and has the firmest faith in the efficacy of his system, but it is self evident that 
he has taken upon his shoulders more than mortal men can achieve, and the 
consequence is that Turkey lags behind all the other Powers in Europe in what we 
consider progress of civilization.’ 173  
 
Sir Nicholas O’Conor, the recently deceased Ambassador at Constantinople, had also 
enjoyed a cordial personal relationship with Abdülhamid. 174 Such attitudes towards the 
Sultan were perhaps inevitable, given his position as an absolute monarch. Nevertheless, 
attempts to cultivate friendly personal relations seemed fruitless, and Britain’s position at 
the Porte remained poor. To the concern of the Edwardian generation in the Foreign 
Office, the Germans enjoyed more favour, as demonstrated by the recent award of a 
contract to build the Berlin to Baghdad on favourable terms. In effect, Germany was being 
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paid to increase her own political and economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire. 175 
Sir Edward Grey privately complained that ‘we had no bad disposition whatever towards 
Turkey, but that the Porte did not give us a chance of improving our relations with them. I 
had made an effort last year, in a speech to the Balkan committee, to give the Turks credit 
for what improvement had taken place in the civil administration of Macedonia’. He 
conceded that as ‘long as Turkey was incapable of decent government we could do nothing 
to help her’. 176 In private, officials were less restrained in their assessments. The Chief 
Dragoman at the Constantinople Embassy, Gerald Fitzmaurice, found himself almost 
despairing in April 1908. 177 In a letter to William Tyrrell, Grey’s Private Secretary, he 
complained that ‘our policy, if I may so call it, in Turkey, has been, and for some time to 
come will be, to attempt the impossible task of furthering our commercial interests while 
pursuing a course… which the Sultan interprets as being pre-eminently hostile in aim and 
tendency.’ 178 Problematically for the British, trade was a ‘favour to be bestowed on the 
seemingly friendly, a category in which, needless to say, we are not included.’ The main 
reason for British unpopularity, according to Fitzmaurice, was the British involvement in 
Macedonia. The territory having been gained through the ‘spilling of Moslem blood’, the 
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Turks would be unlikely to give it up without a fight, and British gendarmerie proposals 
were hardly calculated to soothe Turkish fears of a Great Power carve up of their 
territories. 179 Indeed, until this ‘tangle’ had been solved, Fitzmaurice predicted, there 
would be no change in Britain’s position. 180 Macedonia was the main issue of interest for 
British Ottoman watchers, and in the years before the revolution was the question which 
came most readily to mind for British diplomatists when Ottoman issues were discussed. 
This state of affairs leant weight to the (largely accurate) British assumption that the 
apparent breaking up of the Empire had been a significant motivating factor for the Young 
Turk revolutionaries. Plainly, the governance of the Ottoman Empire was chaotic and 
centred on the person of the Sultan. Equally clear is that the British position, politically 
and economically, left much to be desired, had done so for some time, and that this was a 
fact that contemporary policymakers were not only fully aware of, but regretted.  
2.1.a Events of the Revolution  
  
At the basic level, a revolution can be defined as ‘the use of or the threat of the use 
of force either to recover a political system that appears to have been eroded or to bring 
into being a new political system. In many cases, revolution also involves the creation of 
different social or economic arrangements.’ 181 Although often called a ‘revolution’, 
certainly at the time, and being known so in most of the literature, the events which led to 
the Young Turks seizing power in Turkey cannot be termed a ‘revolution’ in the way in 
which it might be understood in the context of the French or the Russian Revolutions, as a 
convulsive, bloody and transformative event, completely upending the established order. 
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182 In 1977, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw concluded that the term revolution did 
not fit the bill, arguing that it was almost bloodless and Abdülhamid remained Sultan. 183 
More recent work has tended to agree. In 2010 Erik J. Zürcher also conceded that the 
Young Turk Revolution had been ‘curious’, again emphasising that it had been almost 
bloodless and that there was little in the way of systemic change. 184  
This section will first explore the events of the Revolution, before moving on to 
consider how these events were experienced and digested by the British Foreign Policy-
making establishment. The events of the Revolution are generally the subject of agreement 
amongst scholars, and have not proved controversial. 185 In the period before 1908, 
opposition to the Sultan and his regime centred around the ‘Young Turks’, a shadowy 
grouping that did not officially exist. Some members, having been open in their opposition 
to the Sultan’s regime, had been forced into exile abroad, often finding succour in Paris. 
These men, generally the more thoughtful and intellectual amongst the Young Turks, 
contented themselves with continuing their subversive activities from abroad, writing 
widely and publishing journals. 186 In Turkey, those not forced into exile had begun to 
organise themselves into an underground body aimed at the restoration of the Ottoman 
constitution, first declared and then suspended in 1876. By 1908, the movement was 
rapidly swelling in size, and all seemed in readiness. The Young Turks were not yet 
masters of the situation, however. Their status as a secret organisation was threatened by 
the large and fast increase in membership, and the meeting of the Russian Tsar with his 
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cousin King Edward VII at Reval (modern day Tallinn), suggested to Turkish observers 
that a Great Power carve-up might be on the cards in Macedonia. Consequently, they 
were compelled to action a few months ahead of their planned date. 187 The Sultan’s 
security services had been aware, on some level, of the Young Turks’ existence since 
September 1907. This provoked action, and the rebels declared their existence in early 
1908, taking the name of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). 188 At this 
juncture, various members of the CUP, including Enver Bey, were invited by the Sultan to 
come to Constantinople and explain the situation. To protect themselves and the 
Organisation, these men, largely army officers, took to the hills with armed bands. The 
CUP soon found itself the master of the situation in the European provinces of the Empire, 
and assassinated those sent by the Sultan to try and calm the uprising. As pro-CUP troops 
seized telegraph offices and demanded that the constitution be reinstated, the Sultan, 
whose espionage network remained impressive, recognised a fait accompli. He reinstated the 
constitution of 1876, and tried to ban political associations in Macedonia, in a final attempt 
to face down the CUP. The Young Turks, however, were too strong, and now firmly held 
the advantage, which they pressed, achieving the removal from office of many who 
remained loyal to the Sultan – the much hated camarilla. By now dominant, the CUP 
prepared for the first elections of the new era in Turkey.  
2.1.b British Views of the Revolution  
 
 
How then did the British see this surprising development, and what did they think 
it would mean for future Turkish policy? G.R Berridge remarked that the Revolution took 
‘almost completely by surprise the entire Constantinople diplomatic corps, including 
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Gerald Fitzmaurice.’ 189 The same is true for the Foreign Office, who were engaged in 
selecting a replacement for Sir Nicholas O’Conor, who had recently died in post. 
Discontent in the Turkish Army first came to the attention of the Foreign Office in June, 
although Lancelot Oliphant remained unconcerned. Throughout ‘European Turkey the 
troops are at present faring badly as regards pay’, he observed, failing to recognise that the 
discontent appeared present in the officer class too. 190 Having later been enlightened by 
the British Press, he soon appreciated that a ‘most serious situation’ existed ‘as regards the 
army’. 191 By the end of June, reports of Young Turk assassinations had filtered through to 
the Foreign Office. George Barclay, charge d’affaires after O’Conor’s death, reported a failed 
attempt on the life of one Nazim Bey, noting that the motivation for this had apparently 
had some connection with what he called the ‘Jeunes Turcs’. Furthermore, Harry Lamb, 
consul at Salonica (modern day Thessaloniki), added that it was openly discussed amongst 
junior officers that should Nazim return, another attempt would be made to kill him. Louis 
Mallet, head of the Foreign Office’s Eastern Department, seemed aware that something 
was afoot, bringing his colleagues’ attention to other murders made in the name of the 
Young Turks. 192 His conviction was by no means universal at this stage. The consul at 
Monastir reported on a further murder, but did not suspect a Young Turk connection. 193 
By the second week in July, it seems that policymakers were aware of the Young Turks’ 
involvement in events in Turkey, having received news of further murders and a report 
that a senior Government Official had been sent to Salonica, to take command of the 
troops stationed there and prevent the spread of Young Turk ideas. 194 Although the 
‘Sublime Porte pretend[ed] to make light of the Young Turk movement… [it was 
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371/544/24038. 
 56 
apparent] that they were extremely anxious about it’, especially as it was at this juncture 
that the Young Turks approached the British Vice-Consul at Monastir, informing him that 
a revolution would take place shortly and asking for the British view, as the Young Turks 
hoped to be on good terms with them once in government. With Barclay’s express 
approval, their overtures were ignored. 195 In London, officials still viewed the situation 
with equanimity. Barclay reported that the Young Turk movement had made ‘real 
headway’ in the army, and Surtees thought that if the movement proved able to mobilise 
Islamic opinion then there might be ‘far reaching consequences’. Herman Norman, a 
junior clerk, did not see the transformative potential of the new movement. Only if it grew 
further would it be ‘an important factor in the Macedonian situation’. Sir Charles 
Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, also viewed the situation 
in this context. If the Young Turks were to join the Bulgarian bands, he thought, the 
proposed ‘mobile force’ might be more ‘palatable’ to the Sultan. 196 Indeed, Macedonia 
remained the frame of reference through which British policymakers were viewing events. 
The information received so far had not been enough to indicate that a change was afoot, 
and consequently officials continued to consider events within the terms of their pre-
existing understanding of Ottoman politics and the British place within it. As the month of 
July went on, the Foreign Office was kept well informed of events as they unfolded, often 
through the consular network. 197 Barclay reported Niazi Bey’s proclamation that the 
Young Turks sought the reintroduction of the 1876 constitution, for instance, although he 
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erroneously labelled him the ‘leader’ of the Young Turks. 198 By 20 July, Barclay’s reports, 
based on those of various consuls, reflected that British diplomats were starting to recognise 
that the Young Turks were gaining ground. Although the Porte still tried to ‘make light’ of 
the uprising, the possibility of events proving the prelude to ‘more serious developments’ 
could not be ‘excluded’. Barclay remarked that the 3rd Army Corps – based in Salonica 
and at the forefront of the uprising – was ‘honeycombed’ with Young Turk propaganda, 
and that a serious organisation was clearly in place, based on the ‘rapid succession of 
murders and attempted murders’ of ‘persons obnoxious to the Young Turkish party’. 
Oliphant remained cautious, emphasising that the movement was limited largely to the 3rd 
Army, which was the ‘most corrupt’, and that Young Turk ideas had not penetrated far 
into ‘Asia Minor’. 199  
The next day saw the arrival of a more detailed account from Constantinople, 
which added more information to the view the Foreign Office had constructed from 
telegrams. Barclay now reported that Young Turk propaganda had made significant 
progress even before the uprising had begun, and was now making steady headway, 
arguing that the Empire must be protected from foreign incursions. Furthermore, the 
‘rebels’ insisted that ‘plunder forms no part of their programme’ and that their motto was 
‘liberty and equality for all’. Finally, he reported that 28 redif, or reserve, divisions were 
being brought from the Asian provinces of the Empire, movements which suggested that 
the Sultan still thought the uprising could be contained. This change of tone on the part of 
Barclay, reporting both that the uprising was more serious and covering the Young Turks 
themselves more favourably, was now reflected in the lower reaches of the Eastern 
Department. Oliphant considered that the calling up of reserve divisions meant that 
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Ottoman authorities had ‘grasped’ the ‘seriousness’ of the situation, whilst his colleague 
Herman Norman expressed sympathy, remarking that the ‘wonder is that the movement 
did not come to a head long ago considering the system of Govt under which these people 
are condemned to live.’ 200 Sympathy aside, British representatives in the Ottoman Empire 
and officials in London both remained largely ignorant of the import of the uprising. 
Barclay, along with some Consuls, reported that pay and promotion were more important 
to some of those protesting than politics. Oliphant concluded that some of the troubles 
were of ‘a professional, and not Young Turk, origin’. 201 
On the 22 July, the Foreign Office learned that the ‘excitement’ had reached 
Smyna (modern-day Izmir), and that demands had been made via telegraph for the 
restoration of the 1876 constitution. The significance of these developments was not lost on 
the permanent staff. Oliphant noted that Smyrna being a focal point for the supply of 
troops to the Ottoman Army meant that the movement had now manoeuvred itself into a 
strong position. Hardinge declared that ‘This is beginning to have a striking resemblance 
to revolution.’ 202 Although, in his view, events were now ‘moving rapidly’, and the Office 
appreciated that the ‘events of the next few days… [would be] interesting’, the uprising 
was not yet having an effect at a senior policy level. 203 Count Alexander von 
Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to London, was concerned about the implications 
of the situation on Macedonia. After a private discussion, he and Grey decided that 
nothing should be done immediately, and that negotiations between the Powers relating to 
the proposed mobile force should continue. Once the Powers had come to an agreement, 
they would then reassess the situation and decide whether the Turkish situation still 
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merited the presentation of a joint note. 204 It seems that British policymakers remained 
unsure whether the uprising would lead to meaningful change, and opted to take a 
watching brief.  
The wait for significant developments lasted just one day, as the constitution was 
proclaimed in various towns around the Empire. 205 Lamb, in Salonica, remarked upon 
the ‘Fraternity and enthusiasm’ that prevailed on all hands, and the ‘practical unanimity 
amongst magistracy, civil service, population, and army’. ‘The order and skill which… 
characterized the conduct of this movement… caused astonishment to all Europeans who 
have witnessed it’, he thought. 206 At Monastir, the new age was greeted with ‘great 
enthusiasm’ and ‘no disorder’. 207 The British consular network was impressed by the 
absence of violence, despite the apparent disappearance of the police force in many places, 
as all ‘nationalities passed… [the day] in manifestations of popular rejoicing’. 208 On the 
advice of his Grand Vizier, the Sultan declared a general political amnesty, and his 
notorious spy system was reported to have disappeared almost completely. 209 The 
population of Constantinople, according to Barclay, realised that the constitution had 
really been revived when they saw that the press had become ‘free’, and gave ‘free 
expression to their joy’ by ‘decorating the town’ and making ‘enthusiastic demonstrations 
outside Government buildings.’ 210 At Salonica, the ‘manifestations’ of support for the new 
order of things continued ‘on an even grander scale’ than before, the Foreign Office heard, 
and were informed that the ‘efforts of leaders’ were being ‘devoted to reconciliation and 
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union of different nationalities’. 211 Oliphant struggled to comprehend the changes that the 
Turkey he had known had undergone in so short a time. Even ‘Armenians are popular and 
spies are a thing of the past’. Of perhaps more interest to most British policymakers were 
Barclay’s observations on the Young Turk attitude to them. He reported that: 
The Turks, who remember that both Kiamail Pasha and the new Grand Vizier 
have at various times sought British protection, and look upon England as the 
chain of constitutional liberty and the traditional friend of Turkey, showed special 
friendliness towards several Englishmen who happened to be circulating in the 
town. 212 
 
They would lose no time in trying to push home their advantage. Barclay was soon 
received by the Sultan privately, as a part of the formalities surrounding his imminent 
departure. He had the impression that the new ministry, appointed in the wake of the 
granting of a constitution, would like him to make a statement that British public opinion 
met the news with ‘sympathy’, and proposed congratulating the Sultan on his granting of a 
constitutional regime. 213 In a sign of their eagerness to establish a good footing with the 
new regime, however, the Foreign Office had already sent him instructions. He was asked 
to avail himself of an opportunity of ‘offering congratulations to the Grand Vizier’ ‘as soon 
as possible’ and assuring him that ‘the warmest sympathy’ had ‘been called forth by this 
event in England’. Given that the British involvement in the Macedonian question was 
likely to remain a source of friction, the new ministry was to be informed that all that had 
been done was aimed at ‘helping Turkey’, and that the mobile force proposal was no more 
than what the Turkish Government itself would do to ‘secure life and property’. 
Furthermore, Britain did not wish to ‘embarrass’ Turkey, and when a new government 
was established and had dealt with the problems, HMG would ‘reconsider’ their 
involvement, although warning that she would have to consult with other Powers before 
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making a final announcement on the subject. 214 Thus, the pattern of British policy 
towards the Young Turks was established - warm words, but little in the way of action, and 
cautious temporising where other Powers were involved. Doubts persisted in Britain over 
the strength of the Young Turks and the shape which the new administration might take. 
Oliphant, reflecting on news of petitions to dismiss previous palace favourites, thought it 
‘almost inconceivable that the party which was strong enough to wring a constitution - 
even if only in name - out of the Sultan… [would] rest until Izzet… [was] definitely 
ousted.’ 215 By the end of July, the aforementioned Izzet Pasha, the Sultan’s former 
secretary, along with other hated members of the Hamidian inner circle, had been 
removed from the scene. Izzet had enquired of Barclay whether he might be protected by 
the British Embassy and been rejected, although the British chargé conceded that asylum 
would not be refused in the event of genuine threat to life. In the event, Izzet was removed 
without British involvement – at least at this juncture. Hardinge complained that even had 
Izzet’s life been in danger, his presence ‘would not have been desirable’ at the British 
Embassy. He had been, for many years, an ‘enemy not only to British interests but also to 
the interests of his own country’ and he regretted even the small concessions Barclay had 
made. Referring to Izzet’s plentiful connections with Germany, he mentioned that there 
were ‘other embassies where persons such as Izzet Pasha should apply for protection.’ 216 
For the avoidance of doubt, Barclay was not to make representations to the Government 
on behalf of any members of the palace camarilla, and not in any circumstances ‘incur the 
odium of receiving them at His Majesty’s Embassy’ as they had ‘no claim whatever’ on 
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Britain and had ‘thwarted continuously’ British ‘reform proposals’. 217 Oliphant observed 
that Izzet’s fall marked a ‘triumph for the reform party’ – and nor was this an event about 
which British policymakers were unhappy. 218 Having had something in common, the new 
Turkish Government now thanked Britain for their message of support, declaring that 
Britain could rely on the new administration doing all it could to establish good 
government throughout the Ottoman Empire. 219 The new ministry had declared its 
intentions and had succeeded in removing many of those it found objectionable within the 
palace, but still felt uneasy in its position. In what Norman saw as a ‘very clever move’, 
they compelled the Sultan, as caliph, to swear an oath on the Quran that the constitution 
would not be suspended again, as it had been in 1878. Oliphant, too, was impressed. The 
Sultan had ‘committed himself by such a step; but no alternative was open to him.’ 220  
The situation at Yildiz having become more clear, attention in London turned 
towards the relationship with Russia. The Anglo-Russian convention being only a year old, 
and the matter of Turkey being a delicate one between the two Powers, meant that Grey 
and the Foreign Office were keen to ascertain Russian views of the new situation, 
particularly with regard to their proposed joint action in Macedonia. Alexander Izvolsky, 
the Russian Foreign Minister, was in agreement with the British view that representations 
for the establishment of a mobile force should be suspended. Although Ottoman 
rejuvenation was far from a desired outcome for many at Choristers Bridge, where designs 
on Constantinople and the Straits were still cherished, Izvolsky declared it ‘essential that 
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Great Britain and Russia should avoid placing themselves in antagonism to a Mussulman 
movement productive of genuine reforms, and that a fair chance of showing what good 
it… [could] bring about should be afforded to that movement.’221 In general, Russian 
officials expressed relief that under the terms of the new constitution, the laws made under 
the old regime would remain until superseded, meaning that there would not be immediate 
changes in Macedonia, and the Powers would retain a modicum of control over the 
process. Perhaps inevitably given their differing interests, Russian diplomats were less 
optimistic about the revolution than their British colleagues. The Russian Ambassador at 
Constantinople, Ivan Zinoviev, for instance, suggested that the Sultan would still be able to 
pull strings behind the scenes, and that the revolution would come to nothing. Hugh 
O’Beirne, chargé at St. Petersburg, meanwhile, expected that Foreign Officers would still be 
required in Macedonia, much to the disappointment of Grey, who hoped that the Turks 
would be able to put things right, rather than the situation remaining one which required 
‘the Powers… [to] continue to keep their fingers in the Macedonian pie.’ For Grey, this 
solution would avoid friction between Britain and Russia, whilst at the same time 
protecting British interests, and preventing Russian incursions into the Ottoman Empire. 
222 
As the immediate crisis receded, Barclay found time to digest what had occurred. 
His conclusions would prove representative of British understanding of the revolution and 
its causes. Firstly, he explained the feeling for Britain which had sprung up: aspirations for 
‘constitutional liberty… [could not] lack the moral support of Great Britain’, a feeling 
‘doubtless strengthened by the fact that the two statesmen whom the Sultan… raised to 
power in this crisis… [had] both at different times enjoyed British protection’. Having 
warned that predictions would be ‘rash at this stage’, he prophesied that the fact that this 
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was an organic development, without foreign involvement, coupled with the profound 
changes throughout the Ottoman State, would mean that the movement had a reasonable 
chance of success. Finally, he situated the movement firmly within what he saw as a 
tradition of Islamic dissatisfaction, which he said had been growing for some years. 223 In 
his final reports before returning home, he adopted a notably positive view of the situation, 
feeling that he could move onto his next post with the satisfaction both of a job well done 
and the knowledge that the Ottomans had taken the first steps towards ‘saving the 
Empire’.  
A notable aspect of the evolving British view of the revolution was the high degree 
of factual accuracy. Although cautious to avoid over committing themselves, British 
officials, both in London and the Ottoman Empire, were well informed about the events of 
the revolution, and seemed quick to draw reasonably accurate conclusions about the 
causes for the unrest. The Embassy’s annual report, issued at the start of 1909, proved 
even more strikingly accurate in its distillation of the events, correctly identifying, for 
instance, Niyazi Bey and Enver Bey as key instigators of the revolution, a fact perhaps 
missed a little at the time. 224 However, they had failed to understand several aspects of the 
Young Turk mindset. The arrival of the new ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, did little to 
improve matters in this respect. 
He arrived to a ‘considerable crowd in a state of some excitement’. A deputation 
greeted him in the name of the Turkish nation. 225 Having previously served in 
Constantinople from 1885 to 1891, he found the changes ‘astonishing’ and ‘difficult to 
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realise for one who had known the country previously’. 226 Grey thought he had ‘reached 
Constantinople at the most favourable and interesting moment’, privately remarking on 
how ‘little we either of us foresaw, when you were appointed, the reception you would 
actually get!’ The joy was not unrestrained, however, and both expressed doubts about the 
new order of things. Grey thought that things could not ‘go on as well as they… [were] at 
present’, and warned of trouble ahead. Even if the Turks did well, he warned, their 
strength would cause Britain trouble in Egypt, as the success of another Islamic power 
would encourage demands for autonomy and a constitution. He concluded that all that 
could be done for the present was to ‘support the better elements’ and wait upon events, a 
point which he also made to Parliament on 27 July, a speech commended to the Embassy 
as a statement of position. 227 Lowther found himself with doubts. Upon arrival, he was ‘at 
once struck with the impression that the Committee of Union and Progress lacked 
responsible leaders of position.’ Although ‘everyone is a Young Turk now’, he complained, 
it seemed ‘too much to believe that they… [would] for long be able to live up to their 
motto of “Liberty Equality & Fraternity”’. 228 Despite his forebodings, Grey was ‘anxious’ 
that Lowther ‘miss no opportunity of letting it be generally known’ that the British attitude 
towards the new Government was ‘entirely favourable’, so long as it made for ‘reform and 
good government in Turkey.’ With an eye on appearances within Turkey, he asked 
Lowther to ensure that the British ‘attitude and views should become as clearly and widely 
known as possible’, suggesting again his speech to Parliament of 27 July as a model. Going 
further, he instructed that the new Government not be bothered with live questions 
relating to the old regime until they had had ‘time to get control of affairs’. 229 Plainly, 
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Grey considered that the success of the new regime would be beneficial for Britain. Failing 
that, a Government claiming kinship with Britain and possessing an apparent desire to 
operate in a more transparent and even-handed manner was at the very least an 
improvement on what had gone before. Grey was willing to make minor concessions to 
allow it to get up on its feet.  
 
‘Unfortunately just as things were going so well’ for Britain, Lowther was presented 
with the first minor incident of his tenure. 230 The so called ‘palace clique’ formed the 
subject of increasingly rancorous discussions within Ottoman politics. Anger was 
particularly focused on the fact that many of its members were being allowed to escape. 
Britain became an inadvertent lightning rod for such discontent when it emerged that Izzet 
Pasha, the Sultan’s erstwhile secretary, had managed to escape Constantinople aboard a 
British-owned vessel. 231 As Norman pointed out, Britain could not give him up, as he was 
not wanted on criminal charges – ‘although he was ‘doubtless a really great criminal’ – and 
no extradition treaty existed between Britain and Turkey in any case. Young Turk 
representatives threatened Lamb with the dissatisfaction ‘of the entire nation’ if Izzet was 
not handed over. 232 Despite ‘rather violent requests’, Louis Mallet concluded that nothing 
could be done. 233 After his escape, it transpired that he had first claimed refuge at the 
German Embassy. Grey complained that it was ‘annoying that the German Embassy 
should have placed Izzet on a British vessel, but we could not help it. He is a political 
refugee.’ 234 Lowther shared his frustration that the British shipowner in question had 
allowed the ‘hope of large profits to momentarily warp his judgement’, and gave him a 
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‘polite headwashing’. He added that he did not believe the German action to have been 
deliberate. With this, the incident was ‘closed’, and Lowther hoped that the ‘bad effect… 
would gradually disappear.’ 235 This unfortunate incident soured the good impression 
which Lowther and Turkey had made on each other, but in the excitement of a new 
government, it soon blew over, and proved not to be a significant stumbling block. 236 It 
did, however, demonstrate the extent to which the British were jealous of their new found 
influence at Constantinople – it is hard to imagine such disappointment at a similar 
incident a year previously, for instance.   
2.2. Perceptions of the Young Turks  
 
 
The changing perceptions of the Young Turk movement shaped Anglo-Turkish 
relations in the months immediately after the revolution. This chapter will consider first the 
British views of the CUP’s plans for government, their views on equality and their 
supposed love for Britain and British institutions. It will go on to outline their impressions 
of the Young Turks in general, for instance the position of Islam within the new 
Government and the causes of the revolution. It will then consider some minor questions 
arising between the two countries in the immediate post-revolutionary period, such as the 
loan of a British admiral, before concluding with a more general discussion of the nature of 
the British view compared to the Young Turks view of themselves, and how matters were 
in fact.  
The new ministry did not take long to release its plans for the future. As Lowther 
understood it, they had a number of key aims. The primary aim was to put the finances of 
the heavily indebted Ottoman Empire in order, and modernise the way in which it was 
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run. 237 Furthermore, they planned to work for an end to the capitulations, and to institute 
a programme of public works. Perhaps more controversially, they intended to reform the 
education and justice systems, and change the eligibility requirements for military service, 
widening it to all, regardless of religion. Although this would suggest an increase in the size 
of the armed forces, Lowther reported a statement on foreign affairs, as follows: ‘the 
Turkish Empire is at present on good terms with all neighbouring countries, and it will 
continue so, as its policy only aims at the maintenance of its sovereign rights and its 
Treaties, and the upholding of its prestige and its dignity.’ This programme seemed a 
modest and reasonable set of plans, and entirely within the bounds of what might have 
been expected, and indeed, entirely unobjectionable. Oliphant considered this a ‘sound’ 
beginning. 238 There was a little more concern about the plans of the CUP. London got its 
first hints in mid-August, when the Salonica branch launched its political programme. 
They indicated their intention, as the new ministry had done, to restructure some aspects 
of the Ottoman State, removing elements of the old regime. They hoped, for obvious 
reasons, to introduce complete liberty of political association. More controversially, they 
suggested a platform of secularisation, and the use of Turkish as the only official language, 
including within the new state controlled education system. Some of these provisions 
proved unpopular amongst Bulgarians, as many of the proposed provisions would seem to 
act directly against Bulgarian statehood and nationality. Indeed, it is hard to see how 
proposals aimed at creating something approximating a unified nation state could fail to 
antagonise Bulgarian opinion, especially in the months before the Bosnian Crisis broke 
out. John Tilley, a clerk in the Eastern Department, found it ‘difficult to know what to 
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believe about the future of things Turkish’, whilst his senior, Mallet, hoped that ‘the Young 
Turks… [would] not make a muddle of the Macedonian Question. 239 At the end of 
September, when the full CUP programme was revealed, such doubts still lingered, 
although Lowther found himself impressed at what seemed to him a ‘moderate and 
sensible document’. The main thrust was broadly similar to that of the Salonica branch in 
its focus on constitutionalism and democracy. The central CUP echoed the call of the 
Salonica branch for Turkish to be made the state language, and for a state education 
system to be created and opened for all. All this, which seemed again to be fairly moderate 
and unsurprising, was greeted cautiously by British officials. Lowther was concerned at 
proposals to rewrite the constitution and thought it better to settle down in government 
first before embarking upon so arduous a task. In addition to this, the CUP expressed its 
determination to stick to the constitutional requirement that no part of the Empire could 
be detached for any reason. This last part, in particular, was naturally antagonistic, once 
again, towards Bulgarians and other minorities. Mallet again found himself concerned that 
it would be ‘shortsighted of the Porte to ignore the demands of the Bulgarian elements.’ It 
seems in the main, however, that British officials were largely supportive of the plans for 
government made by the post-revolutionary ministry and the CUP, and thought them 
largely reasonable. Certainly, with these plans being widely published and discussed in the 
new free Ottoman Press, they were well informed of them, and had ample chance to 
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A notable aspect of the programmes proposed, especially by the CUP, who would 
go on to form the largest party in Turkey’s first elections, was an attempt to develop a 
distinct Ottoman identity and create a situation whereby those of different religions and 
ethnicities would be treated equally. 241 In a world where nationalism was an increasingly 
important force, it was clear to most observers that the Ottoman Empire would struggle to 
stay together in the face of demands for autonomy, if not indeed independence, from many 
of its constituent national groups. This attempt to create an Ottoman identity represented 
an effort to head off this danger before it was too late. The equality of Ottoman citizens in 
particular was widely seen as a likely outcome of the revolution. The Times newspaper’s 
correspondent in Turkey summed up the judgements of many: 242 
All are invited to remember that they are Ottomans and citizens of a great empire. 
The Young Turks are firmly convinced that it is possible for Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, 
Albanians, Vlachs, and Jews, all the warring medley of races and religions, to live as 
“brothers,” and have a common patriotism as Ottomans, without forgetting – and 
it is not proposed to ask them to forget – their own blood, language, or faith. This 
belief in equality and in its magical effects is what the Western observer, who relies 
on his previous knowledge of the Turks, finds most difficult to accept as genuine. 243 
 
Grey remembered that ‘for a moment the subject races in European Turkey seemed to lose 
their hatred of the Turks and each other’. 244 T.E. Lawrence’s comment that the revolution 
 
241 The creation of identity is confused. David Kushner has written that the Young Turks were under the 
influence of a specific kind of Turkish nationalism that grew to become the Turkish nationalism of Atatürk. 
This was, however, largely cultural, and did not interfere with Ottomanism. This can, it appears, be seen as a 
distinct period of identity, a ‘Young Turk Identity’, so to speak. See Kushner, David, The Rise of Turkish 
Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London, 1977), pp 98-99.  
242 There is much debate over when Nationalism can be seen to have emerged, and what constitutes it. For a 
broad synopsis, see Zimmer, Oliver, Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Basingstoke, 2003) pp 18-26. 
Nationalism, as a new, observable force, can be seen to have come into its own at the time of the Congress of 
Vienna, where the relatively new idea of the nation state came to be recognized by the Great Powers as 
something to be resisted. Timothy Baycroft offers a basic introduction to this, see Baycroft, Timothy, 
Nationalism in Europe, 1786-1945 (Cambridge, 1998) p. 13. Benedict Anderson suggested that at its core, 
nationalism is simply the creation of an ‘imagined community’. For the purposes of the present work, this is a 
useful definition, and it holds that these imagined communities becoming fully self-aware, and their 
imagination and sovereignty being turned outwards, marked a significant change in the shape of 
International Relations – for scholars of international history, this development becomes especially marked 
during time of the Concert of Europe, and especially the revolutions of 1848. The Ottoman Empire, in many 
respects including this one lagging behind mainland Europe, this development became especially marked 
towards the end of the 1800s. See Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities (London, New Edn. 2006).  
243 ‘The Young Turks: Their Aims and Successes’, The Times, 19 August 1908. 
244 Grey, Twenty-Five Years v.1, p. 174.  
 71 
marked a moment when the ‘horizon momentarily broadened for the Arabs’, is suggestive 
of a sense, certainly outside British officialdom, of the revolution marking a moment when 
equality was intended and attempted. 245 This impression was largely shared by British 
policymakers, although they were more sceptical of the chances of success of such a policy. 
As early as the end of July, reports from Turkey were emphasising the apparent seriousness 
of the commitment to equality, noting examples such as the punishment of two Muslim 
policemen at Drama, in Thrace, for beating a Christian man whilst ‘in a state of 
intoxication’. 246 The Foreign Office heard that in the Hejaz, ‘no difficulties’ between 
religions had been reported. Lowther reported that local Islamic leaders had been praised 
for doing much to keep things calm and to assuage the fears of Christians who feared 
sectarian violence, by reinforcing the new equality of religions. On a less positive note, his 
report also noted the dissatisfaction of some local Christians with the revolution, as they 
feared that it would mean they were now required to perform military service, from which 
they had previously been exempt. Tilley noted that this would likely be unpopular with 
Christians across the Empire. 247 Indeed, it seems to have been a widespread British fear 
that a policy of equality would have consequences, and that the people of the Ottoman 
Empire were not ready for such concepts. Fitzmaurice privately warned Grey’s Private 
Secretary, William Tyrrell, that he thought bringing all the nationalities together would 
prove to be extremely difficult. Equality as a stated aim would be dangerous without 
careful handling. The risk, he thought, was serious unrest between Christian and Islamic 
groups within the Empire. 248 Lowther focused on what he saw as the problems of 
reconciling the Islamic tradition of Ottoman governance with a new more egalitarian state. 
He remarked upon the fact that in his recent interview with Young Turk leaders, no 
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mention had been made of any spiritual reasons to maintain the Sultan, despite his 
pretentions to the title of caliph. Lowther believed that Islam could maintain ‘dominance’ 
only ‘with the sword’. Consequently, unrest would be likely to result from a regime which 
considered all religions equal before the law, as he believed the new Government did. ‘Of 
the many difficult tasks’ which lay ahead, he opined, ‘one of the most difficult’ would be to 
reconcile ‘Moslem predominance with constitutional government’. At the Foreign Office, 
Tilley agreed that both Muslim and Ottoman ‘predominance’ seemed ‘almost impossible’. 
It underlined the degree to which many policymakers feared the consequences of forcing 
modern constitutional government on to a populace they feared was unready. 249 In the 
Baghdad region, equality of religion had apparently yet to arrive. Trouble with the local 
Jewish population was reported in unflattering terms: ‘a number of the less-intelligent Jews 
seemed to think they were entitled to be treated as equals by Mohammedans’, and this had 
caused a riot. This statement, while symptomatic of the crude racial views held by a large 
number of European elites during this period, also reveals that British fears about rancour 
between religions were not mere prejudice or lazy stereotyping – sectarian violence had 
been ever present in the Ottoman Empire for many years. 250 Crude racial views were also 
in evidence in Armenian regions. It was reported to Lowther that ‘freedom’ was causing 
problems in some areas. Armenians were discussed in strikingly Darwinist language, 
labelled a ‘subject race’. 251 Other incidents of tension between religious and ethnic groups 
were reported. In the suburb of Pera, the ‘European Quarter’ of Constantinople, a 
‘Turkish woman, who had been several times divorced, and who appear[ed] to have been 
of loose morals, having become a widow by the death of her last husband, formed relations 
with a Greek gardener named Theodori, and finally deserted her father’s house to live with 
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him.’ Her Father declared that she had been forcibly converted to Christianity by the 
unfortunate Theodori, and a ‘crowd composed of the ruffianly element of the Mussulman 
population quickly assembled’. The lovers both perished in the ensuing riot. As 
unfortunate as such an incident was, Maxwell saw a silver lining. The Turkish press took a 
notably restrained tone on the incident, which he considered ‘excellent’. 252 The turn of the 
year provided time for reflection. Fitzmaurice was extremely pessimistic. The elections, 
which he claimed had been marred by ‘anti-Christian jerrymandering’, had proved his 
predictions of sectarian strife correct, he said, despite claims of equal treatment. 253 
Lowther’s Annual Report for 1908, meanwhile, commented on the ‘remarkable 
community of enthusiasm on the part of all races and religions throughout the Empire’ 
which marked the early stages of the revolution. Using Greek displays of their national flag 
at Smyrna as an example, he praised the ‘admirable’ restraint shown by Turks in the face 
of what could have been taken as significant provocation. 254  
 
 Plainly, British policymakers believed that equality of religion and ethnicity would 
be a leading feature of the Young Turk regime and the new Ottoman State. 255 This was 
based upon a misreading of Young Turk ideology and intentions, however, and this 
circumstance hampered British policy towards the new regime in Constantinople. Recent 
literature suggests that the nature of Young Turk ideology was rather different from the 
simplistic views taken by British officials. Erik J. Zürcher has written of the ideological 
underpinnings of the Young Turks, arguing that by 1908, they had grown disillusioned 
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with the idea of being the heirs to the ‘Young Ottoman’ movement of the 1860s, and 
rather than being interested in the associated idea of ‘unity of the elements’, saw their 
interests lying instead in what was good for the state and its preservation. The best ways of 
doing this, Zürcher argued, were to construct a shared Ottoman citizenship, and to run the 
state on the basis of a rational, ‘scientific’ order. 256 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu emphasised the 
extent to which the CUP was not a ‘popular constitutional movement’, dedicated to 
freedom and democracy. Indeed, he wrote, it soon became another elite, replacing the 
Yildiz camarilla. Indeed, the confusion of the British (and other European Powers) might 
well have been rooted in the CUP’s first official statement to them, in which they 
emphasised the liberal nature of their programme, in an effort to reassure the Powers. 257 
In so doing, they placed themselves self-consciously in the European liberal tradition 
inspired by the ideals of 1789. This seems to have had some success, as Erdal Kaynar 
attested. He wrote that in Europe, the Powers struggled to make sense of the revolution 
and so concluded that the Army must have been behind it, as this represented an ‘ordered 
element’ in the chaos. He added that it was widely thought that the regime would prove to 
be very liberal in a large part because of the existing Young Turk network of exiles in 
Europe, which had operated press campaigns to spread their views. 258 These men were 
more liberal, traditional thinkers than the younger men of the CUP. This fed in to what 
Kaynar called a ‘classical’ understanding of revolution, seeing political ideas, their diffusion 
and the resultant revolution as part of a continuum, but this failed to explain the full story 
– the ideas being ‘diffused’ in Europe were not in step with the ideas in the minds of the 
revolutionaries in the Empire itself. 259 Indeed, this meant that the perceptions held in 
Europe were inaccurate. As Hanioğlu argued, the CUP saw themselves governing not as a 
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part of a sacred or mystical ideal of ‘the people’, but as an enlightened elite, showing the 
people what was right for them. 260 The actual revolutionaries, as opposed to their 
intellectual cousins in Paris and London, were brought together, and motivated to act, 
largely by their urgency to ‘save’ the Empire. The CUP had studied the French (1789) and 
Russian (1905) experiences of revolution. From this, in particular from the Russian 
example, they had taken the lesson that the battle was only half won once the reins of 
power had been taken. Their achievements would have to be maintained and safeguarded. 
Thus, even the ‘ideologues’ in the party became actively involved in politics, and there was 
a distinct shift towards authoritarianism – a development in any case commensurate with 
the CUP’s self-image as an enlightened elite. Indeed, this helps to explain how 
‘enlightenment’ and ‘authoritarianism’ were able to coexist. Although these appeared 
awkward bedfellows, in the logic and understanding of the Young Turks, the two could, 
and did, go together. 261 Plainly, as Hanioğlu made clear, the philosophical and ideological 
background of the CUP, rooted in positivism, materialism and social Darwinism, was not 
geared towards an egalitarian, constitutional regime, and was more suited to the CUP’s 
real aim – the preservation of the Empire. 262 Hanioğlu further argued that the structure of 
the pre-revolutionary Ottoman state itself had an important impact on the Young Turks. 
As almost all education, and thus intellectuals, were to be found within the state apparatus, 
and almost all of the CUPs members were employed by the state, they tended to have a 
loyalty towards it, and thought in terms of change from within, and a hostility to ideas 
which went against it such as communism or anarchism. Propaganda preaching equality 
was, to Hanioğlu, simply that and not a serious position. 263  
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 It is clear to see that British observers had got the Young Turk revolution wrong. It 
was not based upon highfalutin ideas of equality and liberty, nor yet of French 
revolutionary ideals that elevated ‘the People’ above all else. That the British would form 
this false impression is not surprising, given the general European experience of revolutions 
to date, and the extensive propaganda of the Young Turks. It did, however, make matters 
a little more difficult, and set many in the British policymaking establishment on course for 
significant disappointment when the Young Turks proved to be more interested in the 
preservation of their Empire than ‘good government’ and reform for its own sake.  
2.2.b Turkish Views of Britain.  
 
Another perception of the revolution widely held amongst British Officials was that 
the Young Turks were very keen on Britain generally, and would follow an anglophile line 
of policy. Sir Charles Hardinge, for instance, later asserted that the Revolution was not 
greeted warmly in Germany or Austria, as it was known there that the Young Turks were 
now in favour of Britain. 264 Contrasting with the belief in the liberalism of the Young 
Turks, there was more substance to this belief, although perhaps for the wrong reasons, 
and it led to a British expectation of favourable treatment which was not matched in 
reality.  
One could hardly condemn British policymakers for having their heads turned by 
the revolution, especially given the weaknesses of their previous position at Constantinople. 
Partiality towards Britain was visible at the earliest stages of the convulsion. At the end of 
July, a ‘large and enthusiastic crowd’, formed largely of medical students, made a 
demonstration in favour of Britain outside the British Embassy. 265 Although no embassy 
staff were present, they being in Therapia, as was customary during the summer months, a 
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speech was made. 266 The students declared the purpose of their demonstration to be to 
‘tender the sincere sentiments of… [their] free hearts to Great Britain’, and to express their 
earnest desire for the new Turkey to be raised up by and with her. It was small wonder 
that Edward Grey found the address ‘rather touching’, as, indeed, did Lowther. He told 
Grey that the ovation on his arrival had been a ‘remarkable sight’, and, he believed, ‘quite 
spontaneous’. Britain, he believed from his contact thus far, was regarded as a ‘natural 
friend’ of Turkey. 267 Discussing his arrival in more detail, he added that a CUP member 
had greeted him with a speech suggesting that the ‘constitutional movement’ depended ‘on 
the old friendship of England’. Upon presenting his credentials to the chastened 
Abdülhamid, he found him in a more positive frame of mind than might have been 
expected. He ‘gave expression to his sincere friendship for Great Britain and said he 
warmly appreciated the congratulatory message which… [Lowther] conveyed to him.’ 
Abdülhamid twice declared his intention to govern according to the constitution, and 
emphasised that he would depend on ‘material and moral’ support from Britain. Foreign 
Office officials were purring. Mallet recognised ‘a most unlooked for opportunity’ which 
‘every endeavour’ should be exerted to maintain. Significantly, Grey was worried about 
the implications on his wider strategy. He recognised that the ‘delicate point’ would be 
‘Russia’. Identifying the dichotomy which would trouble him for several years to come, he 
said that Britain could not ‘revert to the old policy of Lord Beaconsfield’, but instead would 
have to be ‘pro-Turkish without giving rise to any suspicion’ of being ‘anti-Russian.’ 
Nevertheless, he proposed to make hay at home while he could. Grey wanted to ‘circulate 
to the Cabinet’ a selection of despatches which would ‘give a good impression of recent 
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events at Constantinople’. These tended to suggest that pro-British feeling was to be found 
across the Empire, and that Grey’s utterances in Parliament had taken advantage of such 
feeling. 268 Grey was keen to show that his policy towards Turkey could be a success, and to 
convince his Cabinet colleagues, not to mention sceptical Liberal backbenchers, of the 
strength of pro-British feeling. Later in the year, Lowther reflected upon the domestic 
British reception of the revolution. He remarked that the press had been cautious until it 
became clear that the movement would be successful, at which point the acclamation was 
widespread. His comment that the ‘general argument was to the effect that sympathy… 
[had] always existed between the people of Great Britain and the population of Turkey’ 
and that problems in the past had been a result of the former Government suggested that 
the policymaking establishment were far from unhappy at the conclusions at which the 
press had arrived. Publicly, Lowther went on, Russia had been welcoming of the 
revolution, although her Ambassador had ‘barely concealed his opinion that the Young 
Turk movement was for one reason or another doomed to failure.’ 269 Lowther’s brief 
discussion of the Russian position disguised grave misgivings within the Embassy. 
Fitzmaurice privately thought that the Revolution must have been a ‘bitter pill to Russia to 
see her cherished hopes jeopardised by a revolution’ which could make Turkey a ‘strong 
and aggressive’ Power. He thought the Young Turk movement represented ‘a virtual 
challenge to Russian policy… [of] the last 130 years’, and considered it not unlikely that 
Russia would become involved in a future civil war. 270 Lowther’s Annual Report was 
more verbose on the subject of Germany, discussing with some relish attempts made by the 
German press to explain away the previous ‘complete reliance on the Sultan and his 
corrupt Camarilla’, and to try to cast aspersions on the stability of British rule in Egypt and 
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India. 271 Indeed, much to the delight of many officials, the German press seemed to 
struggle to find a positive angle on the situation. One piece, seen in London in September, 
suggested that the Young Turks could not, in reality, be as anti-German as they had often 
been presented, seeing as it was a movement dominated by military officers, the majority 
of whom had been trained by Colmar von der Goltz, a Prussian Field Marshal. Louis 
Mallet accepted that this argument contained some truth, as many army officers cherished 
a certain sympathy for Germany. 272 Although this had some basis in fact, the Turkish 
fondness for Goltz Pasha was not to come between her and Britain. Although it was 
proposed that von der Goltz return to Turkey, on a similar basis to other international 
experts helping to reorganise the rejuvenated state, Lowther was approached and asked 
whether his appointment might provoke ‘resentment’ in London. 273 Certainly, it appeared 
to Lowther that the Turks were keen to massage the British ego by denigrating Germany. 
Having received a telegram of congratulation from the King, the Sultan was reported to be 
‘very gratified’, and to have said that it meant more to him than the ‘Black Eagle’ recently 
awarded to him by Germany. 274 The flattery continued as the Ottoman Parliament 
underwent its official opening in December 1908. The entire Constantinople diplomatic 
corps was invited, and Lowther believed that ‘no doubt special applause was reserved for… 
[him] as representing Great Britain… [that] country certainly enjoying the largest share of 
popularity at the present moment’. Hardinge believed that this would provide a ‘fitting 
close’ to a Blue Book on the revolution. 275 
It is plain that from the first, both the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in 
Constantinople were largely convinced that the new Turkish regime was pro-British. 
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Certainly, the evidence suggests that this was a not unreasonable conclusion. The Turks 
saw Britain as the Power most likely to be supportive of her, and consequently took steps to 
gain the sympathy of the Power that had considered itself most neglected under the 
Hamidian regime, perhaps aware not only that their previous position meant that they 
would be most receptive to such overtures, but that Britain was not tarred by a strong 
association with the Yildiz Camarilla, as Germany was. Having established that the British 
saw the Turks as being keen to establish friendly relations, this chapter now turns to the 
British impressions of the Young Turks regime itself, and will consider how the nature of 
the regime was perceived in London.  
2.2.c British Impressions of the Young Turks  
 
Although Lowther had been positive about the new situation on his arrival, and 
remained so in his official correspondence, at least in the early days of the regime, he 
began to express doubts in private. He told Grey that upon arrival, he was ‘at once struck 
with the impression that the Ottoman League of Union and Progress lacked responsible 
leaders of position.’ He thought it a ‘wonder’ that all had gone off as well as it had, without 
bloodshed. 276 After a few weeks, his views had solidified. He thought that things were 
going ‘pretty well’, especially considering that the country was being run ‘by the 
committee, a collection of good intentioned children’. 277 Significantly, the term ‘children’ 
was also used frequently by Fitzmaurice to refer to the CUP, suggesting that after a few 
weeks in his post, Lowther and his Dragoman were at the very least of similar mind. 278 
Grey tried to keep Lowther in a more positive frame of mind. On the 11 August, he 
remarked that events in Turkey had already been so ‘marvellous’ that it was ‘not 
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impossible’ that she would establish a working constitution, although he conceded that ‘the 
habit of vicious and corrupt government’ might prove too strong. Despite this, he thought 
good influences were ‘uppermost’, and the prospect of a new regime ‘genuine’. Britain’s 
course was ‘clear’, she ‘must welcome and encourage this project as long as it continue[d]’. 
279 With this in mind, he gave Lowther some talking points for a future meeting with 
Ahmed Riza, in many ways a spiritual leader of Young Turk intellectualism and a 
prominent member of the CUP: 
1. The Young Turks should not try to go too fast; if they do they may either create 
confusion or provoke reaction. The first important point is to get the Government 
in the hands of honest and reliable men. If they do that then the rest will follow; 2. 
Sound finance is the basis of all good Government… 3. We shall do all in our 
power to encourage them so long as they do well and we will not embarrass them 
by demands of our own; just as we used all our influence, when the Turkish 
Government was bad, to press reforms from outside, so now if reforms are being 
developed from inside we shall use all our influence to prevent their being 
interfered with from outside. 280 
 
Grey’s views were clear. Although rather more positive about Turkey’s future prospects 
than Lowther, he remained cautious, and aware that matters could change for the worse 
very quickly. While he considered the Young Turks to be the ‘better elements’, that is not 
to say that he cherished a strong faith in their ability to reform the Ottoman State and save 
its Empire. Lowther, on the other hand, had only grown more pessimistic about the Young 
Turks since arriving at Constantinople, and viewed them as naïve and idealistic.  
When their meeting finally took place, Lowther was unimpressed with Riza. He felt 
Riza’s prominence in Young Turk circles was ‘hardly justified’, thinking him ‘too 
loquacious’, with ‘immature’ views, and apt to make statements ‘without sufficient 
ponderation’. ‘He does not seem to be a very great man’, complained Tilley, whilst Mallet 
found the despatch ‘most disappointing’, and hoped that this interview was not 
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‘representative of the Young Turkish intelligence.’ He added that Riza was ‘not much 
listened to’, and was ‘considered an “idealist” – a euphemistic expression’. 281 Mallet’s 
intuition was correct, as far as Riza’s position was concerned. Erdal Kaynar characterises 
him as a leading ideological figure in the Young Turk movement, certainly before the 
revolution, but far from a typical member of that organisation. He was very much a man 
of letters, who conceptualised the post-revolutionary Ottoman State as being run by an 
enlightened class of Ulema, religious leaders who would dominate the situation. Since Riza 
was in exile, he played no significant role in the actual revolution. Indeed, as Kaynar 
states, the revolution had come as more of a surprise to him than to Abdülhamid, and he 
had been being gradually removed from his position of power within the party since 1905 
– his value, by 1908, lay in his reputation as an iconic Young Turk rebel, forced into exile 
by a tyrant. 282 His belief in an enlightened ruling class, directing policy to the mass of the 
people, would be maintained, to some extent, however. In the context of the Ottoman 
State in 1908, it did not seem appropriate for the Young Turks themselves to take power 
directly. Seeing as statesmen were culturally seen as older men (Kâmil, for instance, was in 
his eighties, although this was used against him on occasion283), and of a higher social class, 
the largely youthful, professional, CUP saw themselves as being unsuited to Government. 
As a result, they became a ‘watchdog’, the power behind the throne that Lowther so 
deplored, complaining that ‘the real Committee, of which so much is talked, remains 
plunged in the utmost mystery, so that no one is able to say of whom it is composed’. 284 
He thought that the CUP, rather than working in tandem with the Government, 
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‘dominated’ it. 285 Fitzmaurice, a man who had been very much at home in the old system, 
was also critical of the secretive nature of the CUP, and thought by the end of 1908 that it 
would be best if the Committee were now to disappear. 286 John Tilley, too, offered similar 
reflections in his memoirs. The ‘new leaders’ after the revolution were not worthy of their 
position, he thought, and it would not be until the emergence of Kemal Atatürk that a ‘real 
man’ took power. 287 Charles Hardinge worried that the Committee might, in time, 
become similar to, and even as ‘dangerous’ as, the old palace camarilla. 288 
In general, British officials were largely ignorant of the aims and ambitions, let 
alone the origins of those loosely described as ‘Young Turks’. Other than the fact that 
these men were largely army officers, their background aroused little interest. The Annual 
Report for Turkey for 1908 detailed some of the more high profile members. Space was 
given over to complaints about the ‘occult’ and secretive nature of the CUP, and the 
paucity of recognisable (to the British) leaders other than Ahmed Riza, Niyazi Bey and 
Enver Bey, all of whom had largely become figureheads by 1909, icons of revolution and 
heroes of hurriyet (‘the freedom’). 289 Discussion of the backgrounds of the revolutionaries 
was limited to the (in)famous 3rd Army Corps of Salonica, which was considered to be in 
favour of the revolution, although largely for professional reasons, such as arrears in pay 
and unfair promotion. 290 Understandably, the focus remained on the policy of the CUP 
and the plans they hoped to enact. In terms of the CUP itself, Lowther’s focus remained on 
its lack of obvious leadership, and its close connection with the army, a fact which led him 
to dark predictions of a ‘military dictatorship’. 291  
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A clear view of the British perception of the Young Turks thus comes into view. 
They saw them as idealistic and a little naïve. In terms of background, they were clear that 
a large part of their support came from the army. This view was accurate, to a point, but it 
seems that officials had been a little hasty in their desire to understand the new forces 
reshaping the Ottoman Empire. As Erik Zürcher has shown, the assumption that CUP 
members were military men was broadly correct – the CUP membership was 
approximately made up of two thirds men in the armed forces. In keeping with their name, 
the membership was largely younger men, at an average age of about 29, as well as being 
well educated for the time and place, and largely Muslim. 292 On the other hand, however, 
the military connection can be taken too far. Zürcher argues that the movement was not as 
military as many thought, especially in the earlier stages. Although Niyazi and Enver were 
officers, when they took to the hills very few of their own troops followed them, with the 
vast majority choosing to stay behind, loyal to the Sultan. 293 Kaynar has argued that the 
willingness of the European Powers, including Britain, to see the army as the dominant 
factor lay in their difficulty to understand a chaotic event outside the typical frame of 
reference of an early twentieth century official. The army, he argues, represented an 
ordered element, which explained why it was considered responsible for fomenting the 
Revolution. Further to this, as a result of their general experience both of Young Turks in 
Europe, and their understanding of revolution in general, it was widely considered that the 
new regime would be very liberal and ideological. This came about, Kaynar argued, as a 
result of a ‘classical’ understanding of revolution – political ideas, their diffusion and then 
political revolution all acting as a continuum. 294 In the case of Britain, officials educated 
on a diet of enlightenment principles and the French Revolution would be susceptible to 
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such beliefs, and likely to follow the line of reasoning set out by Kaynar. In reality, what 
European diplomats of all nationalities failed to appreciate was that the Young Turks were 
neither particularly liberal nor constitutional in their outlook, being instead ideologically 
influenced by positivism and social Darwinism. They saw themselves, as Hanioglu has 
argued, as an enlightened elite, ruling according to scientific laws. Feroz Ahmad 
characterises the revolutionaries as ‘fundamentally conservative’, bringing in a constitution 
in order to save the Ottoman state, not to change it. 295 From this, it is plain that in terms 
of fact, the Foreign Office and the Embassy were largely accurate in their understanding of 
what had gone on in Turkey in 1908. In terms of interpretation, however, it appeared that 
they missed the mark a little.  
2.2.d Causes of the Outbreak  
 
 
 While the longer term causes of the revolution – dissatisfaction with the autocratic 
regime of the Sultan, and a desire to save the Empire - are clear, there is more debate 
about the more immediate causes. The revolution was launched earlier than planned; 
indeed, Lowther speculated that it had been planned as a ‘birthday present for the Sultan’ 
in September. 296 The reasons generally given for this are, as discussed above, fears of 
Great Power involvement in Macedonia, but also fear that the Young Turk support was 
growing too fast, and that the Sultan might take steps to neutralise the growing threat.  
  It would be remiss, however, not to mention in passing another factor that 
contributed to the Young Turk’s confidence: the recent success of Japan in the war with 
Russia. The Japanese success in the war of 1904-5, which marked the victory of an 
‘Oriental’ power over a Great Power had sent shockwaves throughout the European 
establishment, but also prompted a renewed surge in confidence amongst others outside 
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the ranks of traditional Powers, including the Ottomans. 297 The success of Japan, both in 
winning the War and in successfully reorganising and modernising the state, ‘greatly 
impressed’ the Turks, Tilley thought. 298 Fitzmaurice felt that the success of Japan over 
Russia, the ‘traditional enemy’ of Turkey, had caused ‘every fibre’ of the Turkish ‘body’ to 
‘tingle’. 299 Hanioglu argued that the Japanese victory energised the Young Turks, and 
encouraged them to adopt European ideas of race and social Darwinism. 300 Indeed, the 
success of Japan seemed to light the way ahead for Turkey, and gave the Young Turks 
hope that the country was not doomed to be absorbed by the European Powers.  
 The prospect of the Empire being broken up was considered by the British to be 
the main reason for the timing of the revolution. The recent meeting between Nicholas II 
and Edward VII was seen to have brought these fears to a head. Lowther wrote that the 
news ‘wafting down’ from Reval led the Young Turks ‘to believe that if the Anglo-Russian 
plan were to be put into effect, they might say good-bye to Macedonia, and probably ere 
long to the whole of Turkey in Europe.’ He thought that Young Turk pride could not 
stand the acceptance of the principle of European control, and labelled this a ‘justifiable 
and commendable feeling’. 301 Fitzmaurice, too, was convinced. He remarked that the 
Turks felt the situation before the revolution to be a ‘desperate one that required a 
desperate remedy’. ‘The meeting at Reval…quickened their decision which was to attempt 
their coup before the British proposals born at Revel were presented to the Porte.’ 302 At the 
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end of the year, having reflected on developments since the revolution, he remained 
certain that it ‘was the Reval meeting which made them quicken their pace and evolute 
[sic] before the appointed time.’ 303 Hanioglu wrote that the Macedonian question was 
central to Young Turk thinking before the Revolution, and that it presented both 
opportunities and problems. While justifiably worried at the prospect that a Governor and 
the removal of Ottoman troops would lead to the loss of the territories, the Young Turks 
were able to use these fears to add force to their propaganda, and it allowed an 
opportunity to get Macedonian elements, such as the Albanians assembled at Ferisovitch 
considered so important by Lowther, on board. 304 The Reval pact, as important as it was, 
added to a sense of urgency amongst the ranks of dissidents in Turkey. The rapid success 
of the Young Turk message in 1908, and the consequent increase in the size of the 
organisation, meant that the Sultan’s much feared security services were closing in, and it 
seemed likely that revolution could be stopped before it had begun. 305 Fitzmaurice 
explicitly linked the two events together. The increase in pace following the Reval meeting 
had raised palace awareness of the plot. 306 According to Zürcher it seems clear now that 
the Reval pact was the primary reason for the earlier than planned date of the revolution. 
307 Indeed, the evidence of British sources would also suggest that Reval was considered a 
key reason for the revolution in official circles, both in Constantinople and London. 
Although this was broadly accurate, it is also suggestive of the British habit of viewing 
Turkey through a European, strategic lens, and perhaps giving wider developments greater 
weight in what was often a more local matter.  
2.2.e. Islam  
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Another element of the Revolution worth discussion is the role played by Islam. 
Before the Revolution, the Young Turks hoped to remove religion from public life. Young 
Turk ideology being based on positivism and scientific rationalism, religion was seen to 
have little place. Islam, the dominant religion in the Ottoman Empire, was strongly 
associated with the Sultan’s regime, and the Sultan maintained a claim to be the Caliph, or 
leader, of Islam. Furthermore, religion was a major fault line and cause of conflict in the 
Empire, in a large part because of its being an important aspect of group identities. For all 
these reasons, the CUP hoped to establish a more secular and equal society. 308 
 This was grasped by the British. In October, during the Islamic holy month of 
Ramadan, Lowther reflected that many Muslims were uncomfortable with the new 
regime, and that if Ramadan could be got through without ‘serious disturbances’ between 
traditional Muslims and others, then this would reflect ‘great credit’ on the Government. 
He considered that the idea of equality with Christians ‘more than foreign… abhorrent’ to 
Muslims. Tilley reinforced Lowther’s opinion, remarking that ‘this despatch… [was] very 
important … it.. [called] attention to the Moslem character, to which the idea of equality 
with Christians… [was] abhorrent’. 309 On several other occasions, too, Lowther reflected 
that pious and conservative Muslims were unhappy with the more liberal aspects of the 
CUP programme. 310 It is plain to see that whilst British policymakers were fully cognisant 
of the secular intentions of the CUP, they were also aware of how things might look.  
 Britain was, in the early 20th Century, the power with the most Muslims within its 
territories. This meant that developments within Islam were naturally of interest to the 
Foreign Office. From the off, it was clear to British observers that a revolution, followed by 
 
308 Hanioğlu, Preparation for Revolution, pp. 214-5. 
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a regeneration of the Turkish state, would appear to Muslims in the British Empire as a 
sign that the time had come for them too to stand alone as strong, independent Islamic 
countries. Although the truth of the matter was not so clear cut, Grey was especially aware 
of the risks vis-à-vis India and Egypt, where Britain ruled over large Muslim populations. 
311 He urged Lowther to say as little as possible to the Khedive of Egypt, notionally an 
Ottoman official who was in Constantinople, on the subject of any possible constitution for 
Egypt. 312 Over time, too, the CUP resistance to Islam lessened. Islam was used as a kind 
of shorthand in propaganda aimed at creating a unified sense of identity in the Ottoman 
Empire, and in both 1908 and 1909, the CUP used religious instruments in their dealings 
with the Sultan. 313 It seems clear that although religion was intended to be kept out of 
public life, it remained a part of the Young Turk toolkit, as well as being an important 
consideration for the British. 314 
2.2.f. Views of the administration  
  
A factor of particular interest to British policymakers was the administrative ability 
of the new regime. It was generally thought across Europe, with justification, that the 
Ottoman Empire was badly run, and that the Sultan’s Government maintained very little 
control. The revolution seemed, to British observers, to have rather improved the picture. 
In the autumn of 1908, as the new regime became more firmly established, things began to 
return to normal. Grey exulted at positive reports from the Asiatic provinces, where things 
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were ‘quiet’, and ‘corrupt’ officials were removed from their posts. He thought this a ‘great 
contrast to the reports we used to have from these Provinces & were having up to two 
months ago.’ The improvement of order in the provinces was one aspect of the new regime 
that Grey could wholeheartedly support, and he ensured that this despatch in particular 
would be seen by the Cabinet, emphasising that the Young Turks were heading in the 
right direction. 315 The Foreign Office remained optimistic even when the news was less 
good. In November, for instance, an increase in ‘Brigandage’ was reported, as a result of 
‘inefficient’ local leadership. Although John Tilley, who maintained in his memoirs, with 
some justification, that he had always been vocally sceptical of the Young Turks, 
complained that this was ‘far from satisfactory’, his superiors were not so despondent. 316 
Hardinge reminded his colleagues that: ‘One must not expect too much in a short time. 
The new Govt. has to settle down in the saddle, & one should look at the general aspect of 
affairs rather than at the disorders accruing at isolated & distant points. There can be no 
doubt that there has been a general improvement’. 317  
Although order in the more remote provinces of the Empire was seemingly being 
restored, the revolution did not prove a panacea for all ills. Corruption seemed alive and 
well in some areas, for example arms procurement. In November 1908, the German 
armaments producer Krupp was awarded a contract to supply the Turkish Army with 
300,000,000 cartridges, following a bidding process that seemed to have been unfair. 
Herbert Surtees, Military Attaché in Constantinople, believed that the Ordnance Service 
in Turkey was in the pay of Krupp. Mallet was concerned, and thought it reflected 
‘discreditably on the new régime’. 318 
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 A key aspect of the Young Turk Revolution had been their keenness to save the 
Empire. A significant element of their programme would be devoted towards solving the 
various problems that had bedevilled the Ottoman State, most of which were matters 
requiring modernisation, but there were other issues too, for instance the huge amount of 
debt that the Ottoman Treasury had run up. 319 
2.2.g Turkish Finance after the Revolution 
  
After the revolution, it was clear that the new Turkish Government would need 
ready cash to pursue its modernisation plans. As early as September, a loan from the 
Ottoman Bank to help the new regime to meet its immediate needs was being discussed. 
London was clear that such a loan would most likely be ‘settled in Paris’, as the Ottoman 
Bank was dominated by its French directors. Still, Grey, in a departure from the Foreign 
Office’s usual policy, was keen that a loan was offered to Turkey on reasonable terms, and 
quickly, in order to prevent the Turks from looking elsewhere, for instance Germany, for 
funds. Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to open 
communication on the subject, both for these reasons and because ‘the constitutional 
cause… [might] suffer if money… [was] not forthcoming’. 320 Despite this, it appeared that 
the terms offered by the bank would be ‘onerous’, and Kâmil asked Lowther whether 
Britain might not be able to interest other parties in the question and create competition. 
To add an incentive to his request, he mentioned German offers of finance, but claimed 
that neither he nor his finance minister wanted to accept them. It was clear to the Foreign 
Office that finding those willing to compete with the Ottoman Bank was unlikely, and that 
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the best route to a loan for Turkey would be in discussions with the French. 321 From the 
French, at first, little more than warm words was forthcoming. The Ottoman Bank 
apparently desired to see the new regime succeed, and would make arrangements for some 
money to be advanced on good terms. 322 In terms of a larger loan, however, matters were 
less clear. Stephen Pichon, the French foreign minister, expressed the view that Anglo-
French cooperation in Turkish finance was important, to counterbalance the German 
dominance of the Army, and, further, that as a joint Anglo-French institution the Ottoman 
Bank was the ideal instrument to achieve this. Tilley worried that such words were 
‘satisfactory’, but that they did not bring a loan to the Turks on favourable terms any 
closer. 323 In the meantime, the Turkish Government had instructed its representative in 
London to seek out the best possible terms for a loan, raised in London. This request 
presented problems. Mallet worried how this could be reconciled with the French desire to 
work together, and considered the request to be part of a strategy aimed at extracting 
better terms from the Ottoman Bank. He recommended informing the French, in 
confidence, of the development, and telling them that they felt bound to accede to the 
request. Grey agreed that the Ottoman Bank should be kept informed, but also suggested 
making direct contact with Lord Rothschild, of the banking dynasty, and asking him if he 
would be willing to open negotiations with the Turks himself – as Britain could not 
negotiate with him on their behalf. 324 The answer was disappointing. Although the 
Rothschilds were ‘always very anxious to meet the views of the Government’ they did not 
see their way to entering into negotiations, as floating Turkish loans tended not to prove 
economically competitive. With this reverse, the matter receded somewhat from 
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importance at the Foreign Office, as focus turned to the Turkish desire for Sir Arthur 
Chitty, a customs official working in Egypt, to be seconded. 325  
2.2.h External Experts  
  
 The leaders of the new regime ‘appeared fully to realize [sic] that outside 
experience was indispensable to enable them to put their house in order’. A number of 
foreign experts were engaged, including Sir James Willcocks, a British engineer, to assist 
with public works, and a Frenchman, Charles Laurent, as a financial advisor. 326 Of 
particular interest were the appointments of an admiral and a customs specialist, both of 
whom were appointed from Britain.  
 Britain being the world’s preeminent naval power, it seemed logical that a British 
Admiral would be appointed to oversee the regeneration of the Turkish Navy, which was 
in a moribund state, and in dire need of modernisation. Its large number of ‘social’ officers 
needed training in their profession. A report by a British Admiral in 1908 revealed that the 
Turkish Navy suffered from a shortage of ships, many of which were not in a seaworthy 
condition. Those that were, were now so outdated as to be useless in fighting terms. The 
report recommended the selling of the majority of the Turkish fleet – or at least that which 
would fetch any money at all – and reform to be commenced ‘from the very foundation’. 
327 Other reports were no more encouraging, emphasising the poor state of the 
organisation, dockyards and ships. More positively, however, it was noted that many 
Turkish Naval Officers were convinced of the superior workmanship of British shipyards, 
and it was widely believed that when the time came for new vessels to be built, they would 
be built in Britain. Maxwell was pleased that this would offer a ‘good chance for English 
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Ship-builders.’ 328 To capitalise on this, as well as Britain’s improved standing in Turkey 
after the revolution, the Foreign Office moved quickly to grant the Turkish request naval 
assistance, although, as Tilley recognised, they were almost overreaching themselves, as the 
Turks had thus far asked only for information, and communication would have to be 
‘rather carefully worded’. The Admiralty was told that Grey considered the issue one of 
‘the highest political importance’, and the Lords Commissioners were asked to select, with 
as little delay as may be convenient, an officer of high reputation and ability, whose name 
could be submitted to the approval of the Sublime Porte as soon as their formal 
application’ was received’ 329 The Admiralty, for their part, lost no time, and Admiral 
Douglas Gamble had been offered the job by 7 October. 330 Gamble, who was afraid that 
the cost of living and entertaining would be very high at Constantinople, had accepted on 
the basis of an agreed salary and certain reassurances about his rank in Turkey. 331 
Hardinge emphasised that the Turks had not yet asked for an Admiral, although this was 
‘no doubt… implied’ and proposed that Gamble’s conditions be sent to the Turks. He 
could then be appointed if they agreed, and Rifat, the Turkish Ambassador in London, 
could be privately informed that an Admiral was ready. 332 All seemed lined up nicely, 
from a British point of view, but the new Turkish Minister of Marine was worried that a 
full Admiral would be too much, given the poor state of the Turkish navy, and suggested 
that a Captain, Commander or even Lieutenant might be more suited to Turkish needs. 
The Minister seemed to have little idea of what needed to be done, it was reported, but he 
was aware that almost all of the ships at his disposal had to be replaced, and that there 
were huge numbers of officers who would need to ‘retire’ and therefore be paid off. Instead 
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of an officer with an agreed period of service, he suggested that a group of officers assemble 
on an ad-hoc basis, to help him prepare a report to present to the new Ottoman Parliament. 
Such views caused disquiet in London, where it was hoped that Britain could achieve the 
strategic and moral coup of having an officer loaned, on a solid fitting, to counterbalance 
the traditional German domination of the army. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was 
prepared to declare Britain willing to ‘reconsider’ any elements of the proposals that the 
Turks were unhappy with. 333 The reason for the Turkish reluctance became more clear in 
November. Kâmil suggested the shelving of the proposal, as the Ottoman Treasury did not 
have the funds at its disposal to begin a wholesale naval reorganisation. This development 
provoked a surge of frustration in the Foreign Office, where it was felt that Lowther had 
not been as active as he might have been in pushing the British case. Tilley thought his 
actions ‘most unsatisfactory’. Maxwell thought the ‘main thing’ would be to make it clear 
to the Turks that Britain was ‘willing and able’ to supply a Naval advisor of any rank they 
chose, whilst Mallet thought Lowther must do all he could to ‘keep the matter open’. 
Hardinge was all the more frustrated, having privately suggested to Lowther that he should 
move in the question, some days before. 334 These views were conveyed to Lowther, and he 
was instructed to ‘see that the question… [was] not allowed to drop’. 335 The Turks 
continued to press for a more temporary arrangement, claiming cashflow difficulties. The 
Minister of Marine’s plans for a new force, including six dreadnoughts, caused 
consternation in Whitehall. Tilley thought the idea ‘grotesque’, and criticised Lowther for 
allowing such ideas to develop without a rebuttal. 336 In December, however, the Turks 
crumbled, and Gamble was appointed, at a salary of £3,000 a year. 337 Lowther thought 
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Gamble was a reasonable appointment, but ‘useless’ without money being available for 
development. The saga had revealed two facets of the Anglo-Turkish relationship after the 
Revolution. The Turks were shown to be somewhat muddled in policy terms, but clear in 
their preference for Britain, not to mention willing to lay the flattery on thickly. Britain, on 
the other hand, was shown to be very keen to capitalise on the unlooked for advantage she 
had been handed, and was willing to press naval officials onto the Turks without much 
thought for their utility.  
 It was also to Britain that Turkey turned for an official to overhaul the customs 
system. They hoped for Sir Arthur Chitty, known as Chitty Bey, who had been Director-
General of the Egyptian Customs. He, convalescing from surgery, turned the offer down, 
much to the disappointment of the Turks. 338 Eventually, Richard Crawford emerged as a 
favoured candidate, and after some wrangling over his salary, he was accepted. 339 Lowther 
hoped that this was not a decision that Britain would ‘live to regret’. He thought Crawford 
had been ‘forced down’ the Turkish throat, and that if they had had time to ‘swallow him 
slowly’, he would have been as ‘appetizing’ as anyone else, and he would have to show 
‘great tact’ on arrival. In an interesting side note, he thought Sir Adam Block, the British 
representative on, and president of, the Council of Ottoman Debt to blame, a ‘bull in a 
china shop’ and ‘frightfully unpopular with the Turks’. 340 This demonstrated further how 
close his views had come to those of Fitzmaurice, who detested former Dragoman Block as 
a rival, in so short a time. 341 The case of a customs officer, as with the case of an Admiral, 
showed Britain’s willingness to push for representation in the corps of Foreign Experts 
being employed by the Young Turks, and demonstrated her desire to make the most of the 
advantage she had been handed. 
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2.3. The Young Turk Revolution  
 
  
The revolution of 1908 has been much misunderstood. The British view suggested 
two aspects of the revolution were important. Firstly, British policymakers concluded that it 
had reshuffled the deck at Constantinople in their favour; and secondly, they considered 
that the revolutionary movement had been one animated by liberalism and a desire to 
establish a semi-democratic, constitutional regime based on the principle of equality – in 
short, a revolution that looked very similar to that of France at the turn of the previous 
century, or that in Britain in 1688. There is little doubt that in the first case, they were not 
wrong. Following the revolution, the position of Britain could hardly have failed to 
improve. So low down the diplomatic pecking order had she been, any change would be 
likely to be beneficial. Furthermore, the German Embassy, under Baron Adolf Marschall 
von Bieberstein, was so associated with the hated Hamidian regime that it was inevitable 
that any regime wanting to distance itself from this would have seek different company. In 
this case, it might as well have been Britain as any other – indeed, it could not be Austria, 
which remained closely connected to Germany, nor Russia, the traditional enemy of the 
Turks. France was connected to Russia by recent alliance, and had significant financial 
interests in the Ottoman Empire, making her a threat to Turkish independence. Britain, 
really, was the only one of the Great Powers that could reasonably be approached by the 
Young Turks, and so she was. Indeed, aside from these practical considerations, many of 
the more ideologically inclined Young Turks had a genuine admiration for British 
institutions, and the ‘Westminster System’ of constitutional monarchy was seen as the ideal 
model to follow in the creation of representative institutions.  
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On the second point, as has been shown above, they rather missed the mark. There 
seemed something of a tendency in the Foreign Office to understand revolutionary 
movements through the cognitive lens of the familiar French revolution. 342 The revolution 
in Turkey had appeared suddenly, and all that most British officials knew of ‘Young Turks’ 
were the idealists in exile in Europe, who were not representative of the movement that 
swept away the absolutist regime in Turkey. A certain sense of superiority, too, suggested 
itself amongst some officials, who saw the Young Turks as inferior peoples ‘playing’ at 
western style government. 343 The revolutionaries, far from being flushed with idealistic 
enthusiasm for liberty and love for their fellow man, were men educated within the state 
system, and proved themselves unable to operate outside this comforting structure. They 
acted out of a desire to save their Empire, which seemed to be under imminent threat. 344 
They hoped to show that the moribund empire still had vitality, to shock it into life. The 
profession of liberal, ‘European’ values, would, they knew, prove to be beneficial to them 
in their dealings with some of the European Powers. This point, certainly at first, British 
officials failed to grasp. 345 
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2.3.a. Did a ‘Golden Opportunity’ exist?  
 
 
 Such analysis leads on to the question of whether an opportunity existed for Britain 
in the wake of the revolution. Feroz Ahmad considered the revolution to have opened a 
door for Britain, not only removing an anti-British regime but also seeking encouragement 
from a constitutional monarchy. 346 Certainly, this is true. But this essay does not seek to be 
‘judge and jury’ on the matter of historical fact. It is well and good to make judgements, 
with the benefit of hindsight, on what could and should have happened, and better courses 
that should have been followed, but in the final analysis, what matters is how the situation 
was seen at the time by those involved, in order to understand how and why they acted as 
they did. 347  
 British policymakers grasped that the changes at Constantinople could present 
opportunities. Fitzmaurice exulted that the ‘ball is at our feet’, and suggested that a ‘golden 
opportunity’ lay before Britain to increase her influence at the Porte. 348 Lowther, soon 
after his arrival, saw ‘great openings for bona fide British business’ and hoped that the 
‘shyness regarding Turkey in financial circles’ would disappear, as there should be ‘no 
reason why their finance should not very easily be put right’. He added that the Turks 
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understand nor to explain the past. Nevertheless, the ‘interaction between the historian and his facts’, as E.H. 
Carr had it, is important, and the present work seeks to reconstruct the views held by contemporary actors, in 
order to understand and interpret the way in which they saw their own world, much as James Joll called for 
with his ‘unspoken assumptions’, even if, as Zara Steiner remarked ‘Any complete answer involves areas 
beyond the historian’s normal terms of reference. These include psycology, sociology and, one occasionally 
feels, the craft of the astrologer.’,  In this way, one can ‘find out how it happened and reach some tenable 
although always less than final conclusions about what it all meant’. See Boldt, Andreas, ‘Ranke: Objectivity 
and History’, Rethinking History, 18(4), 2014, pp 457-474; Carr, E.H., What is History (London, Second Edn. 
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Richard, In Defence of History (London, New Edn. 2000), p 253; Vertzberger, World in Their Minds.  
348 Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, Private, 25 Aug. 08, BD v, no. 210. 
 100 
would ‘surely want to buy ships’. 349 Grey agreed that the revolution had presented 
financial opportunities for Britain. He had been ‘distressed’, he told Lowther privately, on 
taking office, to find ‘how completely’ British commercial enterprises had been ousted from 
Turkey, and he thought that the revolution offered a chance for Britain to increase her 
influence in ‘things like the Ottoman Bank’. 350 This cautious optimism, however, soon 
faded. By the end of August, Lowther complained that the reputation of Turkey was so 
bad ‘in the City’ that it would be some time before British money flowed into the Ottoman 
Empire. 351 Regardless, he still saw the opportunity as existing. Visions of a political 
opportunity were less in evidence. Hardinge hoped that the revolution would provide an 
opportunity to kill off the German Berlin to Baghdad Railway project, perhaps in favour of 
a project geared more towards British influence. 352 An attempt was made to make political 
capital on the opening of the new Ottoman Parliament. The British Parliament sent a 
message of congratulation, ‘from the oldest of Parliaments’ to the ‘youngest on the 
auspicious occasion of its opening’. 353 Nevertheless, on the political side, threats were seen 
more readily than opportunities. Grey was alive to the risks to British rule in India and 
Egypt posed by a strong, constitutional Islamic regime in Turkey. As he explained to 
Lowther, it would ‘never do’ to supress by ‘force and shooting’ an uprising in favour of a 
constitution in Egypt whilst supporting constitutional government in Turkey. 354 More 
widely, Grey also saw problems for his wider policy. He worried that support for Russia, 
with whom he had recently signed a convention, and support for Turkey, her traditional 
enemy, was incompatible: ‘We must be careful not to give Russia the impression that we 
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350 Grey to Lowther, Private, 23 Aug. 1908, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 7. 
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are reverting to the old policy of supporting Turkey as a barrier against her and should 
continue to show willingness to work with Russia when possible.’ 355 
Here lay the nub of the matter. British policymakers saw that matters had changed 
at Constantinople, and that there were chances for Britain. These were, however, largely 
of a financial nature, rather than political. The revolution had the potential to cause 
problems as much as it promised their solution. Britain, although she was willing to 
support the Turks and to try and increase her influence there, had not lost sight of her 
wider ideas of policy, and was not prepared to throw them over in favour of gaining a 
foothold in the Ottoman Empire. The ‘golden opportunity’ was, perhaps, a little less 
lustrous than the turcophile Fitzmaurice had declared.  
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The Bosnian Crisis proved to be the first test of the new optimism which had been 
engendered by the Young Turk revolution, both in Turkey and Britain. Initially, British 
policy towards Turkey was indulgent, hoping to maintain the strong position which 
Whitehall believed was being established in the wake of the Revolution. The fact that no 
particularly cherished British interests appeared to be at stake only encouraged this policy. 
However, as the crisis continued, and as it became clear that the future direction of Great 
Power politics was increasingly intertwined with events in the Balkans, British policymakers 
became increasingly frustrated at a perceived tendency to indecision and at 
Constantinople’s ‘difficult’ attitude. Throughout the crisis, Russia remained firmly in the 
minds of Foreign Office officials, and it became clear that whilst Britain was willing to 
curry favour with the Porte, she was not willing to do this at the expense of her new ties 
with Russia. This chapter will first consider the events of the crisis, with a focus on those 
elements relating to Turkey and Britain, such as the negotiations with Austria and 
Bulgaria, and the discussions of the Straits. It will then consider the implications of this 
crisis on the relationship between Britain and the new regime in Turkey, and what this 
meant for the idea of a ‘Golden Opportunity’.  
The history of the Bosnian Crisis is classically related from early October 1908 
when Bulgaria declared her independence, closely followed by the Austrian annexation of 
the (nominally Ottoman) provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.356 The roots of the 
incident lay in the infamous meeting at Buchlau, at which Alexander Isvolsky, the Russian 
 
356 Whilst two classic works on the crisis - Bernadotte Schmitt and D.W. Sweet – touch upon the railway and 
birthday questions they are not dealt with in depth. However, in keeping with their nature as general 
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Turkish focused view. Schmitt, Bernadotte, The Annexation of Bosnia (Cambridge, 1937); Sweet, D.W., ‘The 
Bosnian Crisis’, in Hinsley, Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 178-192. 
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Foreign Minister and Alois von Aehrenthal, his opposite number, had agreed that if Russia 
did not oppose Austria-Hungary’s annexation of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina then Vienna would be supportive of, or at least not block, Russian demands 
to change the status quo at the Turkish Straits. Russia, naturally, had no great love for the 
Ottoman Empire, the preservation of which formed a significant barrier to pan-slavist 
ideas of the future in the Balkans. Furthermore, she had long nursed designs on the Straits, 
or at the least on them being opened for warships, and had made various failed attempts to 
capture Constantinople. Indeed, it was her success in war against the Ottoman Empire 
which had precipitated the Congress of Berlin and the resulting Treaty, which still formed 
the basis for the situation in the Balkans. When Aehrenthal called Isvolsky’s bluff and 
annexed the provinces without a warning, earlier than Isvolsky had expected, and 
seemingly coincidentally, the day after the long feared Bulgarian declaration of 
independence, this action set off the crisis that was to engulf Eastern Europe for the next 
six months. Britain was to discover the challenges of a closer working relationship with the 
Turks. 
3.1 Early Rumblings  
 
 
3.1.a The Geshov incident 
 
 
It is useful to begin the narrative slightly earlier, with two incidents which 
demonstrated the increasing tension between Turkey and Bulgaria, the latter still a 
notional Ottoman possession. The first of these, relating to a perceived diplomatic slight, 
was ‘trifling in itself’, but demonstrated an increasingly assertive policy on the part of 
Bulgaria. 357 The second, which was provoked by the Bulgarian seizure of sections of the 
Oriental Railway, was more serious, and proved to be one of the main bones of contention 
 
357 Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, p. 77.  
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between Turkey and Bulgaria throughout the crisis. These incidents, although perhaps 
seeming minor on their own merits, were brought to an added pitch by the British 
impression that Bulgaria contemplated a declaration of independence, a matter that had 
already been in discussion a year previously. Indeed, Grey had gone so far as to authorise 
Sir George Buchanan, the British minister to Bulgaria, to consult with his Russian and 
French colleagues, in order to be prepared for a sudden declaration. 358  
 
The initial incident, in mid-September 1908, was provoked when Bulgaria’s chief 
diplomatic representative at Constantinople, Ivan Geshov, did not receive an invitation to 
a dinner being put on by Tevfik Pasha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in honour 
of the Sultan’s birthday. As Turkey maintained suzerainty over Bulgaria, the Turkish 
Government was entitled not to recognise the representatives of Bulgaria as Ministers, and 
thus not to treat them as they would the representatives of a fully sovereign nation. It being 
confirmed that this was not an oversight, Geshov returned to Bulgaria, in accordance with 
his instructions. Lowther believed that this represented a deliberate slight on the part of the 
Turkish Government and Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Anything suggestive 
of recognising Bulgarian statehood, after all, could only encourage other parts of the 
Empire in their own national aspirations. Adding insult to injury, it was proposed that 
another dinner take place, to which Geshov would be invited, and ‘at which he would find 
his proper place amongst Turkish officials.’  
In London, Foreign Office officials were in no doubt that the Turks were in the 
right, from a legal perspective, but were concerned at the possible consequences of the 
incident. Although the Porte was ‘no doubt right in principle’, Permanent Under-Secretary 
(PUS) Sir Charles Hardinge mused, it was a ‘great pity’ that the incident ‘was not avoided’. 
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Prophetically, he remarked that Britain had ‘not heard the last’ of the incident. 359 Despite 
such foreboding, the mood in Constantinople remained optimistic. Kâmil Pasha, the 
Grand Vizier, told a supportive press that there was little to worry about, pointing to the 
unofficial position of the Egyptian representatives in the country. He added that he was not 
afraid of a Turco-Bulgarian dispute, as he believed in the presence of ‘friends to reconcile 
us’, in effect suggesting that Britain might be called upon to help maintain order within the 
Ottoman Empire. From the British perspective, this was a mistake. J.A.C. Tilley, a junior 
clerk in the Foreign Office’s Eastern Department, worried about the over-confidence of the 
Turks, and thought it unlikely that Britain would be supportive of a Turkish attempt to 
regain control of Bulgaria. 360 Buchanan, for his part, argued that such Turkish tactlessness 
might ‘bring… home to the Bulgarian nation the disadvantages attaching to the position of 
a Vassal State’. 361 Others had a similar view. On 22 September, the Russian Acting 
Foreign Minister, Nikolai Charykov, suggested to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Russia was ‘willing’ to join in a joint, simultaneous 
communication at Constantinople and Sofia, counselling moderation. He suggested that 
Bulgaria be told that she would not be helped if she pushed matters to war, and claimed to 
have told the Bulgarian chargé d’affaires that strictly speaking, the Turks were in the right. 
To compel the Turks to cooperate, meanwhile, he proposed that the European Powers 
should threaten not to agree to the withdrawal of the international Macedonian 
Gendarmerie officers.  
It was this latter point which proved controversial in London. Louis Mallet, the 
head of the Eastern Department, was ready to join in the proposed communication to 
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Bulgaria, but felt that the note, which he considered ‘petty’, was too much of a ‘threat’. 362 
Sir Edward Grey, too, was uncomfortable with the idea and thought that if Britain 
informed the Turks of what had been done at Sofia, whilst emphasising the confidence in 
Turkey which the planned withdrawal of Gendarmerie Officers demonstrated, then 
Britain might be able to prevail upon the Turks to avoid future incidents of this nature. In 
the event, it was decided to seek out the opinion of Lowther before anything was done. 
The mood remained bleak. Mallet found the situation ‘very disagreeable’, and worried that 
it presented an ‘opportunity for the Germans to squash the Young Turks’. Indeed, the 
Ottoman Government seemed to have decided not to give way, and Lowther speculated 
that elements within it might ‘welcome extreme measures being forced upon the country, 
as tending to produce unity and providing a means whereby troubles in Turkey may be 
avoided. 363 The communication made to the Bulgarians by the Turks, the details of which 
did not reach London until about a week afterwards, bore this out, there being no attempt 
to ‘smooth over matters or express regret’. To prove his point, Kâmil had claimed that 
other envoys had expressed ‘surprise’ at the presence of Geshov at those diplomatic 
gatherings that he had attended. Lowther cast doubt on this story and stated that his 
colleagues had denied making such remarks. Tilley noted that Kâmil’s language seemed to 
‘wander a good deal from the truth.’ 364 Despite this, when asked the next day, Lowther 
thought it best to avoid a communication as proposed to the Turks, as she was both 
‘technically’ in the right and in a seemingly ‘conciliatory’ mood. He thought that Turkey 
would be happy to adopt a ‘face saving’ solution that allowed her not to sacrifice the 
principle. In London, Tilley disagreed, worried about the consequences of not warning the 
Turks. Although the effects of making representations at Constantinople would ‘no doubt 
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be bad’, war, if it came, ‘would be worse’. He thought Britain would not be able to ‘allow’ 
Turkey to crush Bulgaria. In contrast, Richard Ponsonby Maxwell, another Clerk in the 
Eastern Department, emphasised that representations at Constantinople had never been 
British policy, and had been suggested by the Russians. Hardinge tried to tread a middle 
road, explaining that while Britain had decided to ‘abstain’ from a joint representation, 
Lowther had been instructed, unofficially, to urge a conciliatory attitude. He instructed 
Nicolson that while the Bulgarian communication would be made, the Turkish one would 
not. Furthermore, to avoid difficulties with Russia, he decided that the Turks should not be 
told of the joint action at Sofia until it had been completed. 365  
At this juncture, the outline of British policy throughout the crisis was 
foreshadowed. There was a clear desire to give the Turks a sympathetic ear in order to 
maintain the position gained by the revolution. The intention to work with the Russians, 
too, was equally obvious, as were the gently diverging paths on which Russian and British 
policy found themselves. While keen to work with the Russians, Foreign Office opinion 
seemed keener on the idea in principle rather than practice when it became clear that 
Russia hoped to back Bulgaria. Britain already faced the difficult realisation that she might 
be forced to choose between two Powers with which she had recently established better 
relations.  
On this occasion, she was not forced into making a decision, as the situation took a 
‘more hopeful’ turn. 366 Perhaps motivated by the seizure of the railway (see below), the 
Turkish Government expressed their regret at the incident to the Bulgarians, but 
maintained that Geshov should never have been treated as a full envoy, and also stated 
that he would be welcomed on the same terms as before when he chose to return. 
Although this was a half-apology, British policy remained to support Turkish amour propre, 
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and to prevent further escalation. Buchanan welcomed this development, but nevertheless 
told the Bulgarians unofficially that they could not expect help from Britain were they to 
‘push matters to a rupture’. 367 Kâmil, his mind perhaps focused by the ongoing railway 
incident, indicated to Lowther that Turkey had expressed her willingness to restore 
friendly relations with Bulgaria over the incident of the birthday party. 368  
The spat over Geshov’s status seemed to be winding down. The spectre of Russia, 
however, once again reared its head. Tilley had remarked on St. Petersburg’s ‘strong’ 
support for Bulgaria over the incident. Indeed, it transpired that Russia had advised the 
Bulgarians to say that when a representative returned, they hoped that he would be treated 
on the same ‘courteous’ lines as before, and suggested that it might be desirable to send a 
new man in place of Geshov. 369 This was not met with delight by Britain. Nicolson 
suggested that the proposed joint communications be dropped, and confidentially 
explained to London that despite claiming that he wanted to act in step with the British, 
Charykov was pursuing his own lines of policy. He proposed waiting for further 
developments, and ‘intimating this in a friendly way’ to Charykov, who agreed to stop the 
joint note. This matched the views of the Foreign Office. Britain did not ‘especially wish to 
make representations at Sofia other than those already made’, and in any case this would 
mean that the Porte would have ‘no reason to complain’. Grey agreed that it would be best 
to let the question of joint communications drop, as he hoped to avoid being ‘forced to 
make’ representations at Constantinople. 370 This, indeed, is what was done, as the 
question of the railway pushed itself ever more to the forefront of policymakers thoughts. 
By 29 September, with no further communications from the Bulgarians, Kâmil considered 
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the incident to be ‘satisfactorily at an end’. 371 The diplomatic tightrope that Britain would 
have to walk in the Near East for the next half a year had thus already been revealed. 
London hoped to support the Turks, as far as was practical and reasonable, in order to 
maintain and press home the advantage that the revolution had given her. However, it was 
fast becoming clear that Bulgaria was likely to be Turkey’s main rival in the Balkans in the 
near future. This put Britain in direct conflict with Russia, her freshly minted convention 
partner, who hoped to restore herself to the position of primacy she had previously held 
there, and ward off recent Austrian attempts to gain the admiration and loyalty of the 
Bulgars. The choice between ties with Russia and a ‘golden opportunity’ in the Near East 
would animate the next six months of Britain’s European diplomacy.  
3.1.b The Railway Incident  
 
 
The railway incident proved to be more serious than a wrangle over diplomatic 
etiquette. A dispute over something concrete, combined with the very real threat of armed 
confrontation, fed into an already febrile atmosphere, in which Bulgaria, it was speculated, 
continued seriously to consider the possibility of independence.  
 
London learned that Bulgarian troops had seized sections of railway in Eastern 
Rumelia on 26 September. Tevfik immediately asked Britain that something be done 
about it at Sofia. Tilley counselled caution. He thought it best to wait and see how the 
other Powers reacted. In this, he was to be overruled by Grey who decided that the Turks 
had done the ‘conciliatory thing about the Bulgarian Agent’, and that they should be 
supported over the railway. He proposed action at Sofia ‘at once’, provided the Russians 
agreed. 372 London’s initial response captured British policy in microcosm. Although 
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broadly supportive of Turkey, this was filtered through Grey’s wider worldview and the 
strategic realities of his wider conception of foreign policy – in this case, this meant that the 
position of Russia had to be considered. As events developed, Lowther reported that there 
remained a fear in Turkey that the Bulgarians might declare independence, and worried 
what he should say. Tilley summed up the difficult position that this put Britain. ‘We could 
not encourage the Porte to take any active steps’, he wrote, but nor would Britain ‘wish to 
be the first to tell it to accept the situation’. 373 The Bulgarians, for their part, seemed 
willing to try and deescalate the situation, stating officially that the reports had been a 
misunderstanding, and that they had merely taken over the working of the sections of the 
railway that were in Bulgarian territory. They added that there had been no intention to 
‘infringe… proprietary rights or material interests’ and that they did not believe that this 
question would ‘disturb’ the ‘good relations’ that they hoped to maintain with Turkey. 374 
As it transpired, this was broadly accurate. The seizure had taken place after a decision, 
‘injurious’ to Bulgarian economic interests, was made in Constantinople by the directors of 
the Railway, but Bulgaria had maintained that the proprietary rights of the company 
would be respected. 375  
 
The Bulgarian Government nonetheless came under intense domestic pressure 
over the matter, so that its fall could not be ruled out. Despite this, Buchanan still believed 
that the aims of the Government were limited to taking over the working of the line to 
prevent it from being used against their interests. Since only Austria and Germany had 
made any official representations at Sofia, he suggested it would be best for Britain to 
refrain from action for the time being, and wait and see what happened. 376 Tilley 
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bemoaned the complications of the situation. Both Austria and Serbia wanted to be 
‘friends’ to Bulgaria, he wrote, a position which Russia ‘no doubt’ wished ‘to occupy also’. 
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, meanwhile, had recently been received in Budapest by the 
Emperor Franz Joseph, and speeches of a flattering nature had been exchanged. This 
suggested that Bulgaria might be disposed to follow a pro-Austrian line on the matter. 377 
This was an added complication to an already difficult situation, but little more could be 
done until the Russians had clarified their position. The next day, Hardinge met the 
Turkish Ambassador in London. He reassured him that Britain hoped to clear obstacles on 
the path of reform, and counselled the Turks that it would be ‘unwise’ to raise questions, 
especially those of ‘mere form’ with Bulgaria, especially as she was at the ‘peak of her 
power’. 378 He also spoke to the Bulgarian agent, warning him that if Bulgaria took any 
action that ‘hampered the new régime’ she would forfeit the sympathies of both the British 
Government and Public. 379 Having thus sought to moderate the ambitions of both sides, 
the British waited to hear further from Russia.  
 
On 28 September Nicolson reported that Russia favoured joint action by the 
Powers, in particular because the Turks had applied jointly to the signatories of the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin. Charykov, however, went further, minimising the action that Bulgaria 
had taken and suggesting that in the light of recent changes in the Near East, there was 
scope for changes to the 1878 settlement. Tilley broadly agreed with the procedure 
suggested by the Russians, but suggested that it would be as well to decide what British 
policy would be when the note was received. The best solution seemed to be that Bulgaria 
would return the Railway to the operating company, and then negotiate with the Turks for 
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its official hand-over. Hardinge agreed that waiting was the best policy, although he 
predicted that the Turkish note would not contain anything that Britain did not ‘already 
know’, and thought that consequently the Foreign Office ‘should be ready’ to state their 
views. He appreciated, too, the proposal for handing the line back to Turkey as being 
engineered to soothe Turkish ‘amour propre’ and suggested that Britain would exert pressure 
on the Turks not to ‘make difficulties’ once this had been satisfied. As so often, Grey was of 
the same mind as his PUS. In the meantime, he decided that ‘the first step’ would be to 
‘discreetly’ find out whether the Turks and Bulgarians would be likely to accept a proposal 
of this nature. 380 Serendipitously, the Turks were already thinking in this vein. Kâmil 
floated the idea of selling or leasing the Railway to Bulgaria, following its formal return to 
Turkey. 381 This solution seemed to be the perfect compromise. Bulgaria would get what 
she wanted and be satisfied, but this would not come at the cost of Turkish amour propre. 
British representatives in Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin and Paris were asked to 
push this solution on their host Governments. Sensing a chance of an early negotiated 
settlement, Britain seemed keen to strike while the iron was hot.  
 
By early October, a sense of foreboding had settled in. Hardinge wrote privately to 
his protégé Nicolson that the ‘relations between Bulgaria and Tukey’ were ‘causing us 
some anxiety’, and predicted that although the situation was ‘not at present critical in any 
way’, a declaration of independence by Bulgaria might prove to be the perfect moment for 
Austria to annex Bosnia. 382 On 2 October, the Foreign Office found itself in receipt of 
information from an ‘unnamed but trustworthy’ source which suggested that the Bulgarian 
Government was preparing itself to declare independence and call up 40,000 reservists. 
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Maxwell was cynical, and emphasised that a telegram containing assurances that 
independence was not contemplated had been received only two days before. Hardinge 
accepted that this ‘disquieting’ news might ‘not be true’, but thought that ‘inaction’ would 
be open to criticism if the news was accurate. He promptly circulated this information to 
the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, and urged these Powers to deprecate this course of 
action at Sofia. He also took notice of the Bulgarian assurance that independence was not 
contemplated. The instructions to Lowther, meanwhile, were forceful. British support was 
promised, but the urgent need to avoid a war, both for the benefit of Turkey internally and 
for wider European reasons was made explicit. 383 Independence, however, was not 
mentioned. Through promising support, Britain hoped to buy enough influence with the 
Turks to restrain them from taking active measures that would make it even harder for 
Britain to manage the situation. As rumours swirled, Buchanan reported that it seemed as 
though Russia would be the first to recognise the Bulgarians, should they declare 
independence, and that Russia was keen to show the Austrians who was the ‘mistress’ of 
the Balkans. Tilley also found himself worried about the implications of these comments. It 
was ‘unfortunate’ for Russia and Austria that they could not both ‘hold the same cards’, he 
wrote, but perhaps the present moment might present an opportunity to ‘settle Balkan 
Affairs in their own interests not unamicably.’ This would suggest that they might ‘give 
Bulgaria a free hand’. 384 The tensions implicit in British policy in the region then became 
apparent, as Russian attempts to regain influence in Bulgaria appeared increasingly at 
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3.2. The Crisis Begins 
 
Soon, it would be more than just Bulgaria giving European statesmen cause for 
anxiety. British policymakers were aware of the meeting at Buchlau by September, and by 
the beginning of October, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was being 
widely rumoured. 385 It came as little surprise then, when, on 3 October, Count Mensdorff, 
the Hapsburg Ambassador in London, paid a private call to Hardinge and informed him 
of Vienna’s intentions. He added that in compensation, Austria would abandon the 
Sandjak of Novi Bazaar, territory that remained contested following the Treaty of Berlin. 
386 The annexation was announced the same day, on much the same lines, and couched in 
careful language that avoided the term ‘annexation’ and tried to give the whole proceeding 
a temporary air. 387 There was little time to react. Days later, Bulgaria declared her 
independence. 388  
 
With that, the two poles of the crisis were established. The brief delay between 
announcements gave rise to some suspicion. Grey privately informed Sir Edward Goschen, 
about to be appointed ambassador at Berlin, but still at Vienna, that he could not believe 
that there had been no prior communication, at the very least, between Austria and 
Bulgaria before dropping their respective bombshells. 389 This belief, indeed, was widely 
held at the time, although it seems that the Bulgarian action was opportunistic rather than 
a part of an Austro-Bulgarian plot. 390 As for Turkey, Kâmil thought it a ‘severe blow’ to 
the prestige of the new regime, and asked Lowther for advice. Lowther suggested 
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remaining calm, and trying to pin the blame for what had happened on the old regime, as 
far as was possible. 391 In Whitehall, his chief was tendering similar advice to Rifat Pasha, 
the Ottoman Ambassador in London. Grey laid out the British approach to Turkey’s 
problems. Turkey needed ‘time and money’, both of which could be got through 
diplomatic means, if she avoided war. 392 In this advice, he was consistent throughout the 
crisis, and senior officials were confident that Turkey would follow it. On hearing that 
Serbia planned to mobilise her troops if Turkey did so, Hardinge mused that ‘fortunately 
Turkey is not going to give Servia the opportunity of taking up arms against Bulgaria.’ 393 
‘The general feeling’ in London was that Turkey had met with ‘bad treatment’ and that 
the new regime was ‘worthy of consideration’. 394 Consistently with this, Austria was told 
that Britain could not recognise the annexation as it was contrary to the Treaty of Berlin, 
and that Vienna ought to reconsider. 395 The Turks, meanwhile, took matters into their 
own hands and issued a telegraphic protest to the Powers, asking that their interests be 
safeguarded. For the moment, Turkey would abstain from military measures. 396 The 
Turkish ‘official’ protest was met with already familiar words by Grey. Britain would not 
recognise anything without consulting all of the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin, 
although what form such ‘consultations’ might take remained open. 397 Seeing as the ‘most 
important’ element of the crisis would be the ‘settlement of some form of compensation for 
Turkey’, and to shore up the position of the new regime at Constantinople, Grey proposed 
a loan to Turkey, guaranteed by the Powers. 398 Whilst the Turks turned this down, 
perhaps fearing yet more external control of their financial affairs, they did ask Britain to 
 
391 Lowther to Grey, no. 294, tel., 5 Oct 08, FO 371/550/34514. 
392 Grey to Lowther, no. 284, tel., 5 Oct 08, FO 371/551/34595. 
393 Whitehead to Grey, no. 7, tel., 5 Oct 08, FO 371/550/34523, Hardinge Minute.  
394 Grey to Nicolson, no. 432, tel., 5 Oct 08, FO 371/551/34597. 
395 Grey to Goschen, no. 96, tel., 5 Oct 08, FO 371/551/34596.  
396 Lowther to Grey, no. 300, tel., 7 Oct 08, FO 371/551/34753.  
397 Grey to Lowther, no. 428, 9 Oct 08, FO 371/552/35410.  
398 Grey to Lowther, no. 335, tel., 12 Oct 08, FO 371/552/35412. 
 116 
help them in securing a smaller loan, not guaranteed by the Powers, in order to meet their 
immediate expenses. 399 Grey feared that the moment was not ‘favourable financially’ but 
he was ‘anxious to give such support as may be possible’. 400 There were limits to British 
support. When a territorial guarantee to Turkey was raised, Grey was opposed: ‘It would 
not be an acceptable proposal’, and ‘would raise more difficulties than it would solve’. 401 
As the initial shock wore off, the Turkish attitude stiffened, provoking frustration in 
London. Hearing that Turkey now claimed to be unable to accept the loss of Eastern 
Rumelia, a province that had been gradually assimilated into Bulgaria and now formed 
part of the land claimed by the Bulgarian Government, Hardinge exclaimed that the 
Turks must be ‘made to understand’ that it was ‘quite impossible to put back the clock’ and 
that the ‘fait accompli’ must ‘eventually be accepted on Austria’s terms’. He went on 
complain of Turkish naiveté. A war, even if successful, would still end up with Turkey 
losing the territory as Europe ‘would not allow it’, International forces protecting it for 
them would be a ‘burden that no Power could tolerate’, and if the clock were to be wound 
back to 1878, then Russia would be in occupation – a situation ‘obviously objectionable’ to 
Turkey. 402 It was clear that the attitude of the Turks was already proving irritating to the 
British, who were trying to support the new regime whilst keeping more than one eye 
firmly on the wider international implications of their actions.  
 
From this point onwards, the crisis diverged into several different strands, as 
different issues emerged. The next section will take those strands which relate specifically 
to Turkey and British policy towards her. In this manner, rather than taking a synoptic 
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view of the crisis, the British approach to Turkey can be analysed, by considering, in turn, 
the Turkish negotiations with Austria and Bulgaria, discussions for a conference, and 
finally the Russian financial proposal to the Porte that eventually formed the basis of the 
settlement between Turkey and Bulgaria.  
3.2.a Military Posturing Between Turkey and Bulgaria  
 
In the first months of the crisis, both Bulgaria and Turkey made military 
preparations, seemingly in response to actions by the other, a perfect illustration of the 
‘security dilemma’. 403 Britain wished to avoid such escalation. War would be of no benefit 
to Turkey, even if she were to win it. With this in mind, London took steps to calm the 
situation, by suggesting reciprocal Bulgaro-Turkish assurances. Circumstances seemed 
propitious as Prince Ferdinand had intimated to the French that Bulgaria was willing to 
countenance Turkish claims for compensation. 404 In any case, senior policymakers were 
not unduly concerned for the present. Hardinge thought it ‘very improbable’ that Bulgaria 
would declare a war in the winter. 405 Grey informed Goschen, in private, that the winter 
season would prove a ‘likely sedative’; a not unreasonable view. 406 Nevertheless, military 
movements continued to take place in Turkey, in a manner that Lowther found ‘difficult’ 
to ‘reconcile… with purely pacific intentions’. 407 He suggested that a minor mutiny might 
be the cause for the movements, but this was dismissed by Tilley as ‘insufficient to justify 
the military measures taken’. 408 When some 50,000 Bulgarian troops were stood down, 
Buchanan had a crisis of conscience. If Turkish preparations continued, Britain would 
incur a ‘grave responsibility’ towards Bulgaria. Tilley was less moved. He saw the 
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responsibility, but he could not believe that the Bulgarians would have taken the risk 
merely to be ‘in the right’. 409 Certainly, the situation was becoming unbalanced, with one 
military attaché suggesting that the Turks were ‘almost on a war footing’. 410 By the start of 
November, Hardinge privately admitted that the Turks were very much dominant, a 
situation about which he was not unhappy, seeing as it allowed Turkish interests to 
predominate without obvious British involvement. 411 Nevertheless, Lowther was 
instructed to join the French and Russian Ambassadors in informing the Porte of the 
Bulgarian troop reductions. 412 In Bucharest, a Turkish attaché suggested that the 
Bulgarians had ‘wasted’ their chance, and that the Turks were now the masters of the 
situation. Grey dismissed such ‘bragging’, but found ‘indiscreet’ comments unhelpful. 413 
Not for the first time, Lowther was pessimistic. Although he thought ‘pacific assurances’ 
would be forthcoming, he doubted that anything further was likely. 414 His predictions 
proved to be accurate. The Turks claimed that they would reciprocate the Bulgarian 
action, but only after their own troops had finished their training. This ‘valueless’ 
assurance provoked a certain frustration in the Foreign Office, and the Turks were invited 
by the Powers to supply a date by which they would have carried out these steps, and 
warned that if this was not done, then there would be no further help from Britain at Sofia. 
415 The Turkish response to the joint French, British and Russian representation was 
lukewarm. The Turks made various excuses about where their troops were needed, and 
promised that some would soon be let go again, explanations that nevertheless seemed to 
satisfy the Bulgarian representative at Constantinople. From here, matters seemed to cool 
a little, as negotiations between Bulgaria and Russia directly, on a financial basis, began. 
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Whilst it was clear that Britain had no desire to see a war, and in fact had tried to calm 
matters and prevent a conflict from breaking out, it was also clear that she was far from 
unhappy at the advantage that the Turks seemed to enjoy. At this stage of the crisis, 
London remained consistent to her policy of pursuing a peaceful settlement that would 
prevent, so far as possible, both war and damaging changes to the 1878 order. However, 
Grey also adhered to the idea that this would not come about at the cost of the Turks, and 
by extension, not at the cost of the new British position in Turkey. 416 However, this fragile 
equilibrium could not last when also faced with complications from other Great Powers.  
3.2.b The Straits: Early Negotiations between Russia and Turkey  
 
Russia was a central element of British thinking during this period. That in the 
early stages of the crisis, questions arising between Russia and Turkey would be of 
significant interest is of little surprise. The British emphasis on financial assistance for 
Turkey seemed to present an opportunity for Isvolsky to save face by using such weakness 
to force concessions at the Straits, negating his defeat by Aehrenthal at Buchlau. In early 
October, Charykov sounded Nicolson out about the possibility of the Turks allowing the 
Straits to be opened to Russian, Bulgarian and Romanian warships in return for the war 
indemnity still owed by Turkey after the war of 1877 being waived. Britain was reluctant to 
acquiesce in this proposal, as Hardinge pointed out: ‘It must be remembered that we are in 
no way bound to give Russia our support for this particular proposal which gives her 
advantages while denying any to us.’ Mallet took a mediating position by suggesting that 
any agreement could take the shape of the Porte renouncing the neutrality clause in the 
Berlin Treaty, thus not only opening the Straits up in a way which was less objectionable to 
Britain, but also relieving Britain of the responsibility of pressing for the Straits to be 
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opened to all. Grey was unsure how to proceed, but felt that there was time to wait until 
more facts became clear, and military opinion had been sought. 417 He was not anxious for 
the question to be raised. Mallet hoped that Isvolsky could be persuaded not to raise the 
question for the moment. A ‘great point’ would ‘have been parried’, if it was avoided for 
the present. 418 Russian control of the Straits was the one outcome which the Admiralty 
wished to avoid, as it would allow the Russian fleet to hide in the Black Sea, sallying out 
when desired, making her a ‘formidable Mediterranean Power’. From a strategic point of 
view, neutrality of the Straits was seen as being a more attractive option for Britain than 
the current status quo, as Britain would then be able to use the Straits against Russia, if 
required – a preferable state of affairs to Russia being prevented from the use of the Straits 
by only a few Turkish forts. 419 This suggests that in the Admiralty, the Anglo-Russian 
convention was viewed as a temporary arrangement, or at least one which was likely to 
end. This expert opinion went unchallenged by the Foreign Office, characterising the 
convention as an attempt to put on ice Anglo-Russian competition in Asia, rather than the 
beginnings of a fruitful working partnership. This preference for neutrality, combined with 
the British desire to maintain good relations with the Russians (at least for the moment), 
meant that Britain was not entirely averse to discussion on the future of the Straits, as Grey 
told Isvolsky during his visit to London in October. However, deflecting the Russian 
Foreign Minister’s desire for change, he cited the opposition of the Press, Cabinet and 
public opinion to any arrangement that might appear one-sided. Emphasising to Isvolsky 
that he had not given the flatly ‘negative answer’ which he was sure that the Russian 
feared, he entreated him to focus on ‘settling the… crisis in the Near East satisfactorily 
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without seeking advantage for Russia or England’. 420 Gradually, the question of the Straits 
receded from view. The problem was, from the British perspective, the intense (and 
historically, justified) suspicion of Russia in Turkey. Tilley doubted whether the Turks were 
‘yet prepared’, nor would be for ‘some time’, for ‘friendly and neighbourly relations with 
Russia.’ Mallet did not disagree, but he thought that it was Britain’s role to do everything 
possible to promote more friendly relations. 421 This would remain a problem at the close 
of the crisis, almost half a year later, when the Russian financial offer was initially greeted 
with scepticism in Turkey. This central element of the crisis – the antipathy between 
Russia and Turkey – was to remain a challenge for Britain. The British would consider 
various options to extricate themselves from this difficult position. One of these, the idea of 
a Balkan Alliance, will be considered next.  
3.2.c. A Balkan Alliance  
 
One of the solutions suggested during the crisis was the proposal to create a general 
defensive Balkan alliance, to maintain the regional status quo.422 This, indeed, became a key 
aim of British diplomacy, for as long as it continued to appear possible. The appeal of the 
scheme was obvious – this was a low-cost method of preventing war, putting the Balkans 
back on ice, and of protecting the interests of the Turks. The idea was floated by Kâmil at 
the end of October. Seeing that the Austrians hoped to keep Bosnia out of the programme 
for a conference, he suggested that Bosnia be set up as an independent principality, and 
that Turkey, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria could all join in an alliance. The idea of an 
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independent Bosnia was considered to be a ‘childish’ scheme by Hardinge, but he wanted 
to avoid the ‘odium’ of being considered a ‘wet blanket’. Although the idea of a Bosnian 
principality was considered ‘out of the question’, British policymakers seized on the idea of 
a Balkan confederation. Though there were concerns that the idea amounted to an ‘anti-
Austrian confederation’, some welcomed the proposal, Tilley because he saw it as the best 
option for the short term, and Mallet with the proviso that it would remain defensive in 
nature. 423 Grey and Hardinge were cautious, but both saw the value of a defensive 
alignment. Lowther was instructed to encourage the idea, but to warn that Britain would 
not support an aggressive grouping. 424 In short, Britain was in favour of an alliance, so 
long as it remained fundamentally conservative rather than revisionist. Weeks later, the 
Turkish ardour had cooled, at least so far as alliance with Bulgaria went. According to 
Kâmil, it was not a ‘political possibility’, although the idea had not been abandoned 
altogether, and Turkey was engaged in discussions with Serbia. Tilley offered a useful 
summary of British intentions. Turkey might last only another twenty years, but an  
‘alliance with the Balkan states would give her as good a chance as anything, would 
help to secure her moral independence, and for us would have the great advantage 
of being a bar to Austrian and German expansion South Eastwards’. 425 
 
The Foreign Office therefore continued to keep a close eye on the course of 
negotiations. Serbo-Turkish negotiations did not run smoothly. On 13 November, 
Beethom Whitehead, the Chargé d’affaires at Belgrade, reported that the latest Turkish 
amendments to the draft, aimed at the dismemberment of Bulgaria, were so ridiculous that 
the Serbs suspected that they had been introduced deliberately to sabotage negotiations. 
This did not concern Tilley, who dismissed such discussions of post-war indemnities as 
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‘humorous’. He noted with approval that the Serbs saw the convention as a framework for 
a wider Balkan alliance, and expressed the hope that it would be achieved. 426 Hardinge 
was worried about the offensive aspects of the convention, and Whitehead was to inform 
the Serbs that Britain could not support anything which contained aggressive elements, but 
would ‘regard with favour any arrangement of a purely defensive character, come to by the 
Balkan States with Turkey, for their mutual defence and against possible future 
encroachments.’ 427 A few days later, although there seemed to be an ‘air of unreality’ 
about their discussions, and the Foreign Office believed that the point was arriving at 
which an agreement would be signed. Tilley was doubtful about the value of such a 
convention, as he thought that it would be of little use without Bulgarian adhesion. 428 
Mallet noted, with relief, that Lowther had reported that so far as he knew, the offensive 
parts of the proposed convention had been dropped, although this seemed to devalue the 
proposed alliance further, as the defensive aspects were said to be aimed towards Bulgaria. 
429 Negotiations continued to be difficult. 430 A stumbling block was the hostility of Isvolsky 
to any agreement aimed against Bulgaria. Instead, he favoured a Balkan-wide defensive 
confederation. That Russia and Britain shared the same view on an aspect of the crisis 
gave cause for some celebration in the Eastern Department, but their hopes were to be 
dashed. 431 By 10 December, Mallet surmised that the ‘negotiations had come to nothing’, 
and that it was ‘short sighted’ of the Turks not to conclude a defensive alliance. Grey was 
more sanguine. He thought that Serbia had been a ‘poor horse to back’ for the Turks in 
any case, so long as they still stood alone. 432 By the end of the year, the Serbian delegates 
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had returned home empty handed, and no dead had been concluded. Officials thought 
that Turkey had merely been using the negotiations as a tactic to increase the pressure on 
Austria. Hardinge doubted whether the Turks had ever seriously contemplated signing a 
deal with the Serbs. 433 So ended British hopes of an easy method to exert control over the 
Balkans. As much as they had hoped for, and worked towards the conclusion of an 
alliance, Turkey failed to see a need. Indeed, British influence had actually been used as an 
excuse for not signing by the Turks, making the matter worse. Other methods would need 
to be tried to get the situation under control.   
3.2.d Suggestions for a Conference  
 
Whilst the idea of a Balkan alliance was popular with British policymakers and 
received their support, it was not the only method tried to bring about an end to the crisis. 
Almost as soon as the crisis began, Isvolsky, smarting from being played so effectively by 
Aehrenthal, was calling for a conference to settle the questions – a conference at which he 
hoped to be able to secure the rights at the Straits which remained his goal. Days after the 
annexation was announced, Russia unofficially suggested to Britain that a conference of 
the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin should be called, in light of the changed regional 
situation, to amend the Treaty. Hardinge was open to a conference, but only with prior 
agreement that it would not be used to extract more from Turkey. Grey, consistent in his 
views on conferences throughout his time at the Foreign Office, thought that it should only 
take place if there was a preliminary agreement on topics of discussion and their likely 
shape. He wanted an agreement on Turkish compensation for ‘advantages gained by other 
Powers at her expense’ to be made in advance. 434 Nicolson was informed that the question 
of how best to support Turkey would receive careful consideration in any planning for a 
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conference, and suggested that money was what she needed more than anything. 435 The 
French, hearing that Russia contemplated calling a conference as early as 8 October, 
wanted it to be proposed jointly by Britain, Russia and themselves, as this would have a 
‘great moral effect in Europe’. 436 Grey was less keen, trying to delay the French, pointing 
out once again that without preliminary agreements, ‘the conference would inevitably fail.’ 
437 The Russians, in the face of British appeals not to jump the gun and announce a 
conference alone, responded that their proposed circular would still go ahead, largely to 
keep up appearances, but that it would say that the programme, date and place of the 
conference would be the subject of later agreement by the Powers. 438 Grey was relieved, as 
this meant that Britain need not say anything until after Isvolsky’s planned visit to London. 
He mused that if the conference were to be held at Constantinople, then that would be a 
‘solution’ to the amour propre of the Turks, although this would make it all the more 
important that the programme was not objectionable to them. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, 
the Balkan expert and anti-Russian chief foreign policy spokesman in the Lords, poured 
cold water on this embryonic idea. He thought that the ‘oriental intrigues’ of 
Constantinople might prove to be ‘unfavourable to honest diplomacy’. 439  
Oriental intrigues or not, the French remained worried at the prospect of war, and 
pressed the British not to delay a conference for too long. Bertie, who although an 
Ambassador was an informal member of the senior policymaking establishment, presented 
Grey’s case strongly, arguing that the Congress of Berlin had succeeded only because of 
pre planning, and had itself come perilously close to ‘disaster’. 440 The French, although 
still worried, agreed to work with Britain to delay a conference for as long as possible, to 
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allow such negotiations to take place. Turkey, although she had called for a conference, 
was concerned that such a meeting might give rise to other issues being discussed, such as 
the Straits, and hoped that discussion could be limited to the questions raised by Bulgaria 
and Austria. 441 Hardinge summed up the difficulties of this question. If the conference 
were to be limited to these questions, then Austria would refuse to attend and Russia would 
be in opposition too. On the other hand, if the conference were opened and Russia won 
concessions at the Straits, there would be an outcry in Britain unless something could also 
be done to support the Turks and improve their position. His solution to this conundrum, 
first suggested by William Tyrell, Grey’s private secretary and ‘eminence grise’ of the Foreign 
Office, was to offer a loan to the Turks, guaranteed by Russia, France and Britain. This 
would allow the Turks to discuss concessions, as she would be materially and morally 
strengthened. Hardinge felt sure that other Powers had already agreed to modification at 
the Straits, and so this seemed to him to be a way out of the difficulty. Grey thought that 
such a plan, if it proved practical, was a good one. 442 Although this plan eventually came 
to nothing – as discussed above, the Turks turned down the idea of a loan guaranteed by 
several Powers - this discussion shows British policymaker’s clear view of the tightrope 
upon which events had forced them to walk.  
Matters moved apace. A matter of weeks after the crisis had broken out, Isvolsky, 
whilst in London, communicated his proposed programme for a conference to the British. 
Along with the obvious discussions of Bulgaria, Bosnia, the Sandjak and ‘advantages to be 
acquired by Servia and Montenegro’, he proposed wide ranging discussion of Macedonia 
and the Armenian question, as well as discussion of the rights of the Balkan states on the 
Danube, and the capitulations. Such a wide ranging programme was not welcomed by the 
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British. In particular, Tilley suggested that if Bulgaria were to make a financial proposal to 
Tukey, then the whole conference could be avoided – indeed, this was to become British 
policy. 443 Despite this, the programme was thought acceptable, largely because the Straits 
question was omitted, and Grey informed Rifat so. 444 The Turks had a similar view of the 
situation. They hoped that the Straits question would not be discussed, and they were in 
favour of full opening, if they were to be opened at all, rather than, as the Russians had 
suggested, being opened only to the riverain states in the Balkans. Unsurprisingly, they 
were against discussions of the capitulations, preferring to resolve such matters themselves. 
On the Bulgarian question, they were against the province of Eastern Rumelia going to 
Bulgaria, as this would be a stepping stone towards Macedonia. Having seemingly come to 
the conclusion that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be reversed, they 
were in favour of not discussing it, and therefore not formalising it, with the matter allowed 
to rest as it was, with a standing Turkish protest. Mallet was unsurprised that the Porte had 
failed to arrive ‘at the same conclusion’ that the British had, that is to say, that Turkey 
should accept the situation as it had been created by Bulgaria and Austria, in return for the 
‘financial and moral support of the three Powers to the new regime’. It was the question of 
Eastern Rumelia which he thought was the most important. He thought that Bulgaria 
would not yield on this point, and that it was foolish to ‘risk the future of reform in Turkey 
for the sake of insisting on a claim that is mainly sentimental’, especially as the it was 
difficult, legally, to consider Eastern Rumelia as separate from Bulgaria under the terms of 
the Treaty of Berlin. Maxwell went even further, remarking that if the Turks insisted on 
this point, then a ‘peaceful solution will be impossible’. 445 Grey summed up government 
policy on these points to Rifat. Turkey should not focus on ‘matters of form’, and instead 
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get significant financial compensation from Bulgaria, and allow discussion of Bosnia in 
order to get the Austrian evacuation of the Sandjak solemnised. The Turkish arguments 
about Macedonia, meanwhile, were given short shrift. Whilst Grey ‘understood’ the 
Turkish concerns, he reminded Rifat that the best way to protect Macedonia was ‘good 
government’ and military strength. 446  
Grey showed the draft programme to Rifat. He took the opportunity to urge, once 
again, that Turkey did not press on questions of ‘form’, although he asked Rifat to 
communicate his sympathy to his Government on these matters. Indeed, the whole 
communication was geared towards Turkish sensibilities, and he emphasised to Rifat that 
on many questions, such as the Straits, nothing would be done without the approval of the 
Turks. Rifat was concerned that were the Straits kept out of discussions, relations with 
Russia would suffer. On this score, Grey was sympathetic, and suggested that they would 
not, so long as the answer was couched in careful terms, suggesting that the question might 
be reopened in future. 447 Planning seemed to be going well until mid-October, when 
Austria announced that she would not allow Bosnia to be discussed at a conference. This 
meant that the annexation could not be discussed by the Powers. With some concern, Rifat 
reflected that this development made a conference ‘very unlikely’. Grey, irritated, said that 
Austria could not put difficulties in the way of the only possible peaceful settlement if the 
Powers and the Porte had agreed to it. He advised Rifat not to give any answer, and said 
that the Turks should not remove their protest unless the Austrians agreed not to act 
against them at the conference and to support pro-Turkish proposals. 448 Austria tried to 
buy off the Turks, offering them guaranteed possession of the Sandjak in return for keeping 
Bosnia out of the programme. Ironically, as Grey and Hardinge were aware, the Sandjak 
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had been promised to Turkey after the annexation in any case. 449 Unsurprisingly, this 
gambit failed, although not until Austria had asked Britain to help her in pressuring the 
Turks to accept. 450  
After consideration of the various questions, the Turks presented their preliminary 
views on the proposed programme. Believing that Austria would pay compensation for 
Bosnia, they proposed leaving it out of the programme. They also indicated that they 
would not ask the Powers for a territorial guarantee of their Empire. Indeed, their version 
of the programme was limited almost exclusively to the discussion of Bulgaria. Hardinge 
thought that the Turks were ‘still wrong’ in their attitude to Bosnia, and that the matter 
needed to be discussed to regularise and guarantee the return of the Sandjak to them. Grey 
was more understanding, suggesting that the Turks were ‘afraid of a conference’. 451 
Nevertheless, the draft remained the same as that presented to Grey by Isvolsky after their 
discussions in London, at least so far as the Foreign Office saw it. 452 This version of the 
heads of conference would gain further strength when Germany, after discussion with 
Russia, agreed, subject to certain reservations, to the holding of a conference. The most 
notable exception was that they insisted, no doubt at the behest of their ally Austria, that 
the annexation of Bosnia should be treated as a fait accompli and indisputable. Nevertheless, 
Britain welcomed this move towards fixing a set basis for negotiations. Mallet thought it 
’very satisfactory on the whole’. 453 The Turks, on the other hand, were becoming worried 
about the possible implications of a conference. They wanted the Conference to be strictly 
limited in scope to the questions ‘which necessitated its meeting’. They planned to 
communicate this to the Powers, but sought British views first. Hardinge thought that this 
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was foolish. Once the Powers had assembled a conference, they should be able to discuss 
any and all matters pertaining to the crisis. 454 Indeed, in general, the Foreign Office 
thought that the new situation had to be discussed, in order to settle the various questions.  
The Bulgarian negotiators in Constantinople, too, were worried about a 
conference. Lowther thought that they hoped to reach a deal with the Turks through 
direct negotiations, but were concerned that at a conference they might be forced to make 
further concessions. With this in mind, the Bulgarian negotiators had asked Lowther for 
assurances that a conference would not reopen the question in a manner prejudicial to 
Bulgarian interests, as they did not want to give all the concessions they were able if 
negotiations were to be reopened at a later date. Though Mallet believed the situation put 
the Turks at an advantage, Hardinge thought that assurances should still be made that if 
the Turks and Bulgars came to an agreement, Britain would do all it could to guarantee its 
ratification.455 Certainly, the Foreign Office was happy for arrangements to be made that 
would settle the issue outside of a conference, despite Lowther’s assertion to the Bulgarian 
negotiators, on 18 November, that Britain regarded a conference as ‘essential’. Hardinge 
had the agreement of his subordinates in stating that Britain certainly did not ‘regard a 
conference as essential’. 456 Indeed, Britain had been insisting on this throughout. At the 
outset of the crisis Grey had privately told Nicolson that he was ‘not at all wedded to a 
Conference about the Near East if any other solution is easier later on, and acceptable to 
France and Russia.’ 457 His staff in the Foreign Office agreed. Mallet thought, as early as 
mid-October, that there seemed a reasonable chance of Turkey and Bulgaria coming to an 
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agreement, and that it would be better for Britain to ‘lie low’ about the programme. 458 
This seemed to be a pragmatic position, particularly as Austria continued to insist that the 
annexation could not be discussed at the Conference. 459 This continued to prove a 
stumbling block as the year drew towards a close, despite the Russian willingness to pledge 
that compensation for Serbia and Montenegro would not come at the cost of Turkey. 460 
This angered Grey. He told Mensdorff that ‘form mattered’, and that the conference 
would be pointless and achieve nothing if Bosnia was on the programme and not discussed. 
He hoped that Austria and Turkey would be able to come to an agreement that would 
allow discussion at the conference. 461 Privately, Hardinge thought that if participants were 
to be ‘gagged’, then it was unlikely that a conference would take place at all. 462 Towards 
the end of the year, Mensdorff sought out Grey, to ask his opinion on preliminary 
agreements before they both left London for the Christmas break. Grey, who had been in 
favour of these throughout, was supportive, and suggested that France, Germany and 
Britain were unlikely to cause difficulties if the other Powers had made agreements before 
the conference. 463  
The possibility of a conference hove more firmly into view in the new year. Turkey 
and Austria had come to an arrangement, which removed one source of danger, but a 
conference presented danger to the Anglo-Russian convention. Grey had promised 
diplomatic support to Russia over the question of compensation for Serbia and 
Montenegro, and this seemed likely to split Britain and Russia at a conference. Hardinge 
thought it important that Britain worked closely with Russia to avoid the risk, as this would 
force France to act in concert, unwilling to work with Austria and Germany. Luckily, 
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Tilley thought that there now seemed a ‘good chance’ of a conference being avoided 
altogether. 464 As Russian and French aims at a conference continued to diverge, Britain 
seemed to be even more keen than before on avoiding one. 465 
In March, Bülow, the German Chancellor, offered Britain a way out of a 
conference, suggesting that the matter could be solved with an exchange of notes. 
Although proposed for the benefit of Austria, it was greeted with enthusiasm in the Foreign 
Office, as albeit for different reasons, Anglo-German interests coincided. Maxwell was 
keen, as it would avoid Britain having to discuss the difficult subjects of the capitulations 
and customs increases. Mallet was also supportive. Whilst he cautioned that it was for the 
Russians to agree or disagree, he thought that the fact of the proposal being made by 
Bülow was ideal for Britain, as it avoided the appearance, in Constantinople, of Britain 
having been the one to sink the conference idea. Despite the general excitement, Hardinge 
poured cold water on such hopes. Britain could not do anything but follow the Russians, as 
she was committed to giving them diplomatic support in some questions, and he thought 
that Isvolsky would turn down the suggestion. 466 Unsurprisingly, Aehrenthal was keen on 
the idea, but Hardinge again dampened his hopes. Whilst he believed that a conference 
held ‘many dangers’, he thought that the question could wait in any case for the Austro-
Serbian crisis to come to an end. 467 From here, the conference question receded, the 
general unpopularity of the idea having caused its end. 468 The Turks, hoping for 
relaxation of the capitulations, were one of the last to hold out, even making an abortive 
attempt to force one by making their agreement with the Russians contingent on a 
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conference for ratification. This was a question of some delicacy for Britain. It was 
important not to irritate the Turks, as Britain would have then gone through the crisis and 
‘incurred the enmity of Austria’ and the ‘distrust of Bulgaria’ for nothing. Hardinge 
suggested that when the time came, Britain could point out that the Turks had received 
substantial amounts of compensation largely through the efforts of the British. 469 Privately, 
however, he accepted that the non-running of a conference would ‘irritate’ the Turks. 470  
This marked the end of another scheme for solving the crisis. In contrast to the 
Balkan alliance proposal, Britain had never been keen, and was not unhappy to see the 
death of the proposal. The building of a Balkan alliance and the proposal for a conference 
had both, in the end, come to naught. Direct negotiations now seemed to point the way 
out of the crisis. 
3.2.e Direct Negotiations with Austria  
 
Austria, as the offending party in annexing nominally Turkish territory, was a 
central antagonist for the Turks. For present purposes, the negotiations between the two 
proved to be one of the main elements of the crisis. From here, this section will consider 
the course of Austro-Turkish relations and the British approach to these. 471 The 
annexation of land which, officially at least, still belonged to Turkey caused a predictable 
level of outrage in a country that had just undergone a revolution motivated, at least in 
part, by the concerns of the army that the Empire was becoming weak. The Young Turks, 
having instigated such change, fanned the flames, by encouraging a boycott of Austrian 
goods and appealing to Turkish patriotism. In Constantinople, large crowds formed, 
 
469 Lowther to Grey, no. 94, tel., Confidential, 22 Mar 09, FO 371/755/11069, Minutes Mallet, Hardinge; 
Lowther to Grey, no. 204, 22 Mar 09, FO 371/755/11847; Minutes Mallet, Hardinge. 
470 Hardinge to Lowther, Private, 6 Apr 09, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 84.  
471 For more, see Bridge,. F.R., From Sadowa to Sarejewo: The Foreign Policy of Austria Hungary 1866-1914 
(London, 1972); Bridge, F.R., The Hapsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (Oxford, 1991).  
 134 
blocking access to the principal Austrian shops. 472 The Austrian response was predictably 
furious. After five days, the Turkish Government was being warned darkly that it would 
‘not be tolerated’ for much longer. Mallet disapproved of such ‘bullying’, and suggested 
that something be said at Vienna. Indeed, the British reaction to the boycott seemed to 
rather minimise it, although it should be pointed out that she stood to benefit from a 
boycott of the goods of a competitor. Hardinge thought that if ‘the Turks prefer to wear 
white fezes (sic) instead of red ones made in Austria, the Austrian Govt. have no cause for 
complaint.’ Even so, he felt that Britain should not intervene for the benefit of the Turks 
unless sure that nothing illegal had been done. 473 Grey agreed that it was not in 
‘accordance with international comity that one Government should be held responsible by 
another for the existence of an ordinary trade boycott.’ 474 It seems, however, that the 
action was not merely an ‘ordinary trade boycott’, and had been organised and 
encouraged by the Young Turks – not the Government, but very close to it. The boycott 
proved to be a significant stumbling block in relations between Austria and Turkey. By 
mid-November, it continued to gather pace, having spread even to the porters who worked 
at Constantinople’s custom houses. Kâmil claimed that the Government had ordered them 
to cease, but ‘popular feeling’ proved to be ‘too strong’ for his orders to have any effect. 
The Austrian Ambassador maintained that he would not enter negotiations on the 
annexation until the boycott had ceased. British opinion remained calm. 475 Indeed, in the 
early days of the crisis Britain stood behind the Turks. Lowther was told in October that it 
was not for Britain to press Turkey to accept the Austrian action. If ‘an inducement’ was 
offered, it was up to Turkey to decide whether to accept it. 476 Privately, Grey told Sir 
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Francis Bertie that the Austrians had created the situation, and it was for them to make an 
arrangement to ‘condone’ what they had done. 477 The inherent logic of this eventually 
worked on the Austrians, and having long refused to negotiate because of the Boycott, 
showed signs of being ready to come to an agreement of a financial nature with the Turks 
at the start of December. Isvolsky thought that the damage done by the boycott, along with 
internal pressures, had brought Aehrenthal to the point where he was willing to consider 
paying Turkey to end the dispute. 478 This was just what Britain hoped for. Though paying 
compensation to the Turks would be an ‘extraordinary humiliation’ for Austria, Britain 
‘need not mind that’, as it would not affect their hopes of bringing Turkey and Bulgaria 
together – indeed, Tilley thought that it made it more likely, as the Austrians would want 
revenge in the future. 479 The Turkish position also seemed to be softening. Port workers 
employed to unload Austrian shipping had been attacked by their colleagues for breaking 
the boycott, and in a bid to calm matters, Kâmil offered them protection whilst they were 
occupied in this task. Although this offer was unsuccessful in persuading men to work, as 
they argued that they could not be protected when at leisure, it was indicative of the 
Turkish Government’s real attempts to bring the boycott under control. Despite his efforts, 
Kâmil feared the boycott would not cease until the an offer of pecuniary compensation was 
received from Austria. 480 The moment seemed right for an attempt to solve the problem. 
Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the British Ambassador in Vienna, suggested to Aehrenthal that 
the time had come when Austria could make a financial offer ‘without loss of prestige’. 481 
A solution on financial grounds was the preferred solution of Britain, and Grey would 
‘welcome’ a solution of this nature. 482  
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Two days later, the Austrians officially announced their willingness to reopen 
official negotiations with the Turks, claiming that as both sides now wanted the boycott to 
cease, talks could begin. 483 The Austrian Ambassador, Johann Markgraf von Pallavicini, 
suggested that a portion of the debt might be apportioned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
along with a number concessions that Austria could make to the Turks, such as allowing 
them to increase customs import rates to 15% and abolishing Austrian Post Offices in the 
Empire. Such suggestions, particularly the customs increase, were not met with 
unrestrained joy in Constantinople or London. As Kâmil pointed out, such concessions 
were not really concessions at all. Under the various complicated instruments of European 
control over Ottoman affairs, the suggestions would require the consent of all the Powers, 
not just Austria. Worse, the Austrians contemplated charging the Turks for losses caused 
by the boycott, seeming to rather undermine any offer of compensation. Despite the 
gloom, Mallet, tried to focus on the positives. Although he thought that Aehrenthal would 
have to ‘climb down’, he saw the Austrian admission of the principle of Bosnia taking on a 
portion of the debt as a ‘hopeful symptom’. Hardinge soothed his colleagues, pointing out 
that this marked ‘only the first proposal’. In the end, a ‘financial basis’ would be essential to 
any agreement. 484 The Turks agreed. The new Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, Reshid 
Pasha, confidentially informed Cartwright that the Turks thought of referring the debt 
question into arbitration, and asked the British view. Cartwright rejoined that such a half-
baked idea would ‘greatly annoy’ Austria, and she should be given time to make further 
suggestions. London agreed. Tilley thought that ‘even the Turks cannot propose seriously 
to refer a question to an arbitration court without the consent of the other party’, adding 
that the dispute did not seem one suitable for arbitration. 485 Grey thought it would simply 
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make the chances of any settlement less likely, as it would alienate the Austrians, who had, 
after all, only just returned to the table. He told Cartwright this, although he did not add 
his private thoughts that arbitration might be used as a last resort. 486  
The Germans, too, were worried about the course of negotiations, and urged their 
Austrian allies to come to some arrangement with Turkey. It was suggested that Austria 
did not want to appear to pay for the provinces, and therefore a formula needed to be 
found which would ‘save her dignity’. Britain was not keen to help. Having already 
suggested that a portion of the debt be allotted to the provinces, Hardigne thought that the 
Austrians should be left to find their ‘own formula’. Grey agreed with his assessment that it 
would be ‘unwise’ to make any further suggestions. 487  
As the new year began, negotiations continued. The French, mindful of the 
apparent impasse, suggested joint action of the Powers to urge Austria to end the crisis 
with a financial offer. This seemed premature, as Hardinge suggested. Tilley was worried 
about the implications of such a move on the wider world. He could not, he said, help 
feeling that it would be ‘undesirable’ for what amounted to the European Concert acting 
for an Asiatic Power against a European one. Grey took a more practical view. Turkey was 
willing to receive money, and Aehrenthal was willing to give it, but the Hungarian side of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government was blocking the move. In terms of Austria, he 
thought that, given the present attitude of animosity towards Britain in the Austrian press, 
any move to press for compensation would be resented and would possibly stiffen the 
reserve of the Austrians. Finally, he reminded his colleagues that it was important to avoid 
giving the impression of working against Slav interests, and therefore antagonising the 
Russians, although he qualified this by saying that the situation was so ‘ominous’ that ‘in 
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the interests of peace’ whatever seemed to be the first practical means of a settlement 
should be encouraged. 488  
Britain still hoped that Turkey would get compensation. Negotiations continued on 
the basis of the Austrian proposals, leading Kâmil to ask for British views on the terms 
relating to the raising of customs duties. Mallet feared this was an attempt on the part of 
Austria to ‘rush’ Britain on the question of customs duties. While the British were happy to 
give their assent for Turkish raises, the question of the Baghdad Railway loomed large – 
Britain could not allow further funds to go to this German project. 489 Consequently, 
Britain expressed her willingness to listen to any proposal that might be made, so long as 
Rifat’s ‘formal assurance’, made the previous November, that any customs increases would 
be spent on the general needs of the country and not pre-existing commitments (for 
instance, the Railway) would be adhered to.  
Aehrenthal was confident that a solution was getting closer. He told Cartwright 
that he had managed to get Hungary on side, intimating to Cartwright that he hoped for 
British support in getting the Turks to accept the offer of cash. He added that he had 
‘washed his hands’ of the Austrian press that had been so antagonistic to Britain. Grey 
remarked darkly that Aehrenthal had ‘let his hands go unwashed for a long time’. 490 
Despite his sarcastic asides, Grey hoped that the Turks would take up a financial 
settlement. They lost ‘nothing but shadow’ by the deal. 491 This time, the Turkish 
Government agreed with Grey’s assessment, and negotiations were soon proceeding 
without a hitch, with Turkey and Austria going so far as to begin drafting protocols. 
Although the British were concerned by the continued discussions of raised customs duties, 
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and made some preparations for its discussion, they were glad to see that one of the main 
points of conflict appeared to be nearing a conclusion. 492  
When the full draft of the protocol reached London, it was plain that many of the 
concessions agreed by Austria were dependent ‘upon the consent of the other Powers to 
divest themselves of very large and valuable rights’. 493 Tilley expressed his doubts at some 
length. He was pessimistic about the future course of Turkey, and suggested that the 
money raised would likely as not be wasted. Despite his cynicism, born of experience in 
Constantinople, he concluded that Britain must consent to the increases if she wished to 
retain her position in Turkey. 494 These discussions revealed the negative view which some 
Foreign Office officials held of the Turks, and of the way in which concerns about this 
were put to one side to remain in Tukey’s ‘good books’ and to find a peaceful solution to 
the Austro-Turkish dispute. By the end of January, the protocol was almost ready to be 
signed, with only a few details still being haggled over. 495 Cartwright warned Grey that 
parliamentary approval would be required to ratify the deal in Austria, and this would not 
be forthcoming if the boycott had not ceased. 496 In response, Grey instructed Lowther to 
‘do anything in… [his] power to discourage maintenance of the boycott, though… [he] 
fear[ed that] the power of the Turkish govt itself… [was] limited in this respect.’ 497 On this 
front, the news was less promising. The boycott had continued, despite Government efforts 
to stop it. Lowther was cynical. He thought that the boycott would continue until those 
goods that ‘could not stand Austrian competition’ had been sold off. For Hardinge, this 
latter remark added a ‘sordid aspect to the proceeding’. 498 In the end, the boycott proved 
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counter-productive in any case in that Turkey appeared to have been the principal loser in 
financial terms. 499  
Despite this, the protocol was eventually signed on 26 February. 500 Although 
delays were caused by political turbulence in Turkey, a version of the protocol almost 
identical to the version which had been signed in February passed the Turkish Parliament 
at the start of April, and the dispute was at an end. 501 Attention now turned to the 
Bulgarian question.  
3.2.f. Negotiations for a Financial Compensation Package for Turkey from 
Bulgaria 
 
The negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria were the longest running element 
of the crisis. Furthermore, the final steps taken by Russia to solve the crisis meant that 
there was significant Great Power involvement in this element of the question. For present 
purposes, this element of the crisis is instructive in the way in which it shows Britain caught 
between Bulgaria, supported by Britain’s supposed convention partner, Russia, and 
Turkey, demonstrating that Britain would always favour Russia over Turkey. The 
negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria largely revolved around the question of a 
financial compensation package from Bulgaria, covering the seized section of the Oriental 
Railway and the lost territories of Bulgaria itself. Indeed, mere days after the declaration of 
independence, Bulgaria sent Stoyan Danev, Prime Minister in 1902, to Constantinople, 
apparently with the intention of negotiation for independence herself rather than getting it 
through the actions of the Powers. Foreign Office officials, although sceptical of the value 
of such a move, welcomed anything tending to promote peaceful relations. 502 Personally, 
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Lowther thought that the Turks would take money in settlement of the situation. He 
thought that perhaps a hundred million francs would be what was looked for. For such an 
early prediction, this proved to be strikingly accurate. 503 Tilley thought that it would be 
wise to investigate what a fair sum for an indemnity might be, as this would enable Britain 
to avoid a conference, if they decided to. 504 The question began to take more definite 
shape, and payment for the railway and compensation for the Tribute paid to Turkey on 
account of Eastern Rumelia was being discussed informally by the end of October. Mallet 
thought that a lump sum for these two questions would not be considered sufficient 
compensation by Turkey, and returned to Tilley’s proposal of seeking a professional 
opinion on a suitable sum. 505 The Turkish claims against Bulgaria soon followed, asking 
for compensation for both the Bulgarians and a grossly overestimated Eastern Rumelian 
tribute. Mallet found the claims ‘preposterous’, but reassured himself that if Turkey asked 
for too much at first, then their chances of fair compensation increased. 506 Indeed, so 
outlandish were these claims that they were soon withdrawn, on the protest of the Austrian 
member of the Debt Commission. Hardinge was relieved. The figures were ‘too fantastic 
to be of any practical use’, as they suggested that Bulgaria owed Turkey Fr 26,700,000, on 
annual revenues of Fr 5,000,000. 507 Although the figures seemed to be exaggerated, the 
Foreign Office believed that Turkey had a case, since neither Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece nor 
Montenegro had taken on any share of the Turkish debt in 1878, despite this being a 
stipulation of the peace treaty. Grey thought that Serbia and Montenegro, ‘who maintain 
themselves aggrieved parties’, would resist, but felt that the Bulgarians should pay ‘for 
getting their own way’. 508  
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In the meantime, the Bulgarian negotiators had left Constantinople, their mission 
at an end, having informed Kâmil that they could not discuss compensation beyond the 
railway. In Sofia, Buchanan heard that the Turks had proposed independence in return for 
a sum derived from capitalising the tribute for Eastern Rumelia. 509 Hardinge believed this 
sum to be, if based on recent payments of the tribute, to be about Fr 3,000,000. In light of 
this, Buchanan was authorised to make joint representations with his French and Russian 
colleagues, calling for peace and a solution to the dispute. 510 By now, the Bulgarian 
position had hardened. There were, Buchanan reported, voices in the Cabinet ‘strongly 
opposed to the idea of paying for independence in hard cash’. Bulgaria went so far as to 
suggest that since they had paid for Eastern Rumelia since 1878, they would not pay for it 
now. Ominously, they added that ‘while they had neither the wish nor the inclination to 
attack’ Turkey, they knew ‘how to defend themselves if attacked’. Buchanan thought that 
the ministers were trying to strike a bargain ‘oriental fashion’, refusing the idea of 
compensation in the hope of paying the smallest possible amount. 511 Tilley, recently 
returned from Constantinople, agreed and added that the Porte not only understood but 
would use such tactics itself. 512 Rifat, meanwhile, complained that Bulgaria had 
deliberately spent all the money that could have been paid as compensation on military 
build-up, in the hope of avoiding paying it to Turkey. Hoping to get Grey on side, he told 
him that Turkey placed ‘more confidence’ in Britain than other Powers, and that they 
would seek British advice before acting in the present question. Finally, he named the sum 
Turkey hoped to get from Bulgaria: 10m ‘pounds Turkish’ (lira). 513 Grey thought it 
unlikely that Turkey would succeed in getting Bulgaria to pay this much, and told them so. 
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514 Despite the break in negotiations, the Turks remained confident, expecting delegates 
from Bulgaria to return in the near future. 515 The Bulgarians, it seems, did not agree, 
complaining to the Powers that Turkey’s attitude had been so unhelpful that Bulgaria 
would soon have no choice but to mobilise her troops. Buchanan remained optimistic, 
reporting that:  
‘In appraising [the] above statements, it is necessary to make allowance for Eastern 
methods of bargaining employed on either side. It is nevertheless a fact that 
Bulgaria will pay for no compensation except on account of the railway and of the 
tribute for Eastern Rumelia.’  
 
This seems to have had some weight in the Foreign Office, where officials did not seem 
overly concerned. Hardinge thought that the joint demarche at Constantinople on 5 
November, calling on the Turks to demobilise and show a conciliatory attitude, was all that 
needed to be done. 516 While Turkish Government continued to discuss their hopes for 
compensation, Grey warned Rifat ‘personally and unofficially’ that he should focus on 
what could actually be achieved. The sum eventually paid was likely to come down to what 
Bulgaria could afford to pay, rather than the large sums that Turkey had suggested. 517 
Such warnings, combined with the realities of negotiations still at an impasse, persuaded 
senior members of the Turkish Government that a lower amount would have to be 
accepted. Lowther thought that Kâmil was resigned to the final sum being named by the 
Powers, which would allow him to deflect the negative attention that this would attract 
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from the Turkish press and public. 518 Whilst the Turks were becoming more flexible, the 
Bulgarians remained set in their demands. They thought that too much money was being 
asked for, especially for the railway, the value of which was ‘overstated’. Tilley was angry, 
suggesting that it was clear that Bulgaria thought very little of the Turkish armed forces, to 
be acting in such a way. He added that the ongoing debates over the value of the Eastern 
Rumelian tribute were ‘worthy of the bazaar’. 519 
The Turks continued to argue for wide ranging payments. They suggested that it 
was unfair for her to be unable to recoup the losses caused by the Bulgarians having failed 
to pay their share of the Turkish Debt. Although the natural justice of such a claim was not 
doubted in Britain, officials were less convinced that it would stand up legally. In any case, 
British policy had hardened on the financial question. They thought Turkey had a right to 
claim for various things, including the Bulgarian and Eastern Rumelian tributes and the 
Bulgarian share of the debt, but that the final sum must be reduced to what Bulgaria could 
reasonably afford to pay. 520 In financial terms, British officials saw between Tk£ 5m to 
Tk£ 10m to be a fair settlement. 521 Events would prove that even this figure seemed 
optimistic. Mallet was disappointed to learn that Bulgaria was even ‘worse off than we 
were aware’. Hardinge thought it was ‘hard’ on Turkey but that it was ‘useless to press 
Bulgaria for more than she can pay. 522 
Although numbers were being discussed, Bulgaria and Turkey had not yet come to 
agreement on what Turkey would be compensated for. Stefan Paprikov, the Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister, complained that public opinion prevented him from discussing and 
paying either a Tribute for Bulgaria itself or a Bulgarian share of the Ottoman debt. 523 
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Mallet suggested that the best way out of this difficulty, for all concerned, would be for the 
Bulgarians to pay a lump sum to Turkey, without detailing what it was for specifically. 524 
Hardinge was supportive of this idea, and Buchanan was instructed to urge the Bulgarians 
to offer a lump sum, in settlement of all claims. 525 Paprikov was bellicose. He doubted that 
Bulgaria could afford a lump sum that Turkey would accept, and he added that Bulgaria 
would not submit to the discussion of a tribute or share of the debt without force. 526 
Lowther thought that Kâmil would listen to proposals for a lump sum, and reported that 
Constans, the French Ambassador, in a foreshadowing of what was to come, had told 
Tevfik that Bulgaria could afford only Tk 4m. 527 A few days later, Grey set down British 
policy. Britain would ‘certainly not discourage any arrangement’ that Turkey was inclined 
to accept, but they would not pressure her to take what Bulgaria offered and ask for no 
more. 528 Buchanan, meanwhile, interceded on behalf of the Bulgarians. He informed 
London that the Bulgarian financial system was not as strong as it might appear, and that 
it would be foolish to ruin one of the more promising Balkan states. 529 Maxwell found the 
conclusions ‘pertinent’, whilst Hardinge thought that the figures contained within the 
despatch suggested that Bulgaria persisted in offering rather less than she could afford to 
pay. 530 British policy was clear. She favoured a financial compensation package to settle 
the Turco-Bulgarian question, ideally without a conference. She hoped to see a lump sum 
paid, at a rate less than Turkey was demanding but about as high as Bulgaria could afford.  
 At the end of November, negotiations again broke down. The Bulgarians left 
Constantinople, leaving behind them an offer for Fr 82m (About Tk£ 3,280,000 by 
Tilley’s calculation), not including the vexed tribute and debt questions. This last offer was 
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‘absurdly small’, according to Hardinge, especially considering that Lyapchev, one of the 
negotiators, had told Lowther that if the Turks wanted more, they would have to go to 
Sofia to get it. 531 Grey spoke to the Bulgarian charge d’affaires at some length, warning him 
that Bulgaria’s attitude was unhelpful and arguing that the controversy could be ended by 
a payment of a lump sum, without too much discussion of the details. He stressed the 
importance of compromise, and emphasised that this was a good one. 532 To help inform 
future interventions, the British requested an estimated figure from the French, the Power 
most financially interested in Bulgaria. At the same time, the Russians were asked to help 
in pressing the Bulgarians to come to an agreement. 533 
London learned of the initial French estimate on 12 December. It put the figure 
just below Tk£ 10m, including the raising of a loan. 534 Britain continued to consider how 
best she could facilitate an agreement. Grey told Alexander von Benckendorff, the Russian 
Ambassador in London, that Britain would be willing to guarantee a loan to Bulgaria to 
help her pay, but only as a last resort. 535 Tilley worried at the possibility of having to fight 
a war with both Austria and Bulgaria in Turkey’s defence. In the meantime, British policy 
followed a Micawberish line, hoping that ‘something will turn up’ between Bulgaria and 
Turkey in the new year. 536 Grey found himself at an impasse. He could not ask the Turks 
to accept the Bulgarian offer, nor, could he remain passive if the Bulgarians continued to 
refuse to ‘budge’. 537 As 1909 dawned, the clouds appeared to be lifting. Kâmil planned to 
begin negotiation again on the 12th, after the end of the Bulgarian holidays. Tilley was 
encouraged that he was now talking about a sum of Fr 140-150m, whilst the Bulgarians 
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had apparently mentioned 120 to him. 538 As the figures converged, the Foreign Office was 
increasingly resigned to Fr 125m.539 Mallet again emphasised that Turkey should drop any 
mention of the tribute and get a lump sum agreed to. Kâmil would then be left to say 
whatever he liked about the tribute for domestic consumption. 540 With British policy fixed 
in this direction, Hardinge suggested that Turkey might use various railway questions in 
Macedonia as ‘bait’, to induce the Bulgarians to offer a little more, an idea which Grey 
thought ‘a very good move’, as even if it failed to bear ‘direct fruit’, would show the Turks 
that Britain was serious about a settlement. 541 As negotiations reopened, Grey thought 
that the Bulgarians would offer the Turks five million lira, a sum which he would advise 
them to accept. On 8 January, Kâmil told Lowther that Turkey would accept Tk£ 6m, 
despite claiming to be owed Tk£ 20m. Hardinge was heartened by this news. If the ‘two 
estimates’ were Tk£3 ½ million and Tk£ 6 million, it should be possible, ‘with a little 
good will’ to arrive at a settlement. 542 The Bulgarians, again, were to throw a spanner in 
the works, unwilling to be seen to pay for independence, and claimed that they could 
negotiate no further on a financial basis. 543 Mallet and Hardinge, frustrated by this, 
thought that the Bulgarian negotiators should avoid travelling to Constantinople until they 
were ready to offer Fr 125m to Turkey, as a further breakdown in negotiation would make 
it even harder for Bulgaria to ever climb down. 544 More bad news was to follow. The 
French recommendation, which the Foreign Office had been relying upon to shift the 
obstinate Bulgarians, was indicated privately to Britain as being Tk£ 5,680,000. ‘Financial 
interests have prevailed’, complained Mallet, reflecting the general belief that France, who 
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had significant financial interests in Bulgaria, hoped to profit from a smaller payment. 
Hardinge recommended that the Varna Railway junction, which had been suggested as a 
sweetener, would have to drop out of the negotiation if only Fr 100m was to be offered, but 
Grey disagreed, arguing that Britain should hold out for the Turks to get 125m, with the 
railway junction included. 545 In the meantime, Austria and Turkey had come to terms, 
settling their dispute with a financial settlement. This left Bulgaria isolated, and it was 
decided to follow the Austrian example and settle, with the sum of Fr 100m being 
suggested at Sofia. 546 Hardinge and Grey thought that negotiations should be left alone for 
the time being, as they still hoped to hold out for 125m. 547  
Upon receiving the full French financial recommendation, Grey made a statement 
of British policy on the question:  
‘I think it will take some pressure to get the Turks to accept 125 million francs. We 
must let the negotiations begin at 100 millions & say nothing ourselves: if the Turks 
do accept that that so much the better, but if not we must hope that the real desire 
of Russia & France to see a settlement will induce them to combine with us in the 
figure of 125 [million] francs’. 548  
 
He restated his views, this time to the French, when they announced suddenly that 
previous figures had been estimated, and that now they could not back more than one 
hundred million. 549 Britain’s position seemed less stable. Isvolsky, having seen the French 
numbers, suggested that one hundred millions could now be fixed, and that Turkey might 
well be compelled to accept this. Hardinge was aware that Britain was in a ‘minority of 
one’ on this question, but he thought Britain was still following the ‘right line for the time 
being’. 550 The Turks, meanwhile, continued to try and find a way to make a deal. The 
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suggestion of a rectification of the Eastern Rumelian frontier was resurrected. Kâmil 
thought it ‘useless’, but thought it could be useful to soothe public opinion if Turkey were 
forced to accept less than she hoped for. 551 In any case, the Foreign Office was not keen 
on opening a question such as this, and discouraged it. 552 Kâmil also suggested that the 
Turks could take 100m from Bulgaria in settlement, with an additional twenty five million 
promised in the future, perhaps under the control of the Powers. The Foreign Office 
disliked this suggestion too. It would simply form a bone of contention between the two in 
the future, thought Hardinge, although Grey, becoming desperate, thought that it could be 
kept in mind, as any ‘means of bridging the gap’ between Turkey and Bulgaria was worth 
considering, he thought. 553 As negotiations continued, without much movement, 
Hardinge thought that the moment would soon arrive when the Powers would have to 
impose a solution on to Turkey and Bulgaria. 554 Grey, by now rather frustrated, 
upbraided the Bulgarian Chargé for Bulgaria’s selfishness. While she thought only of her 
own interests, Turkey had several times changed what she would accept in the search for a 
solution. He said that Bulgaria could certainly pay more than Fr 82m , and they should do 
so. 555 Privately though, he was beginning to accept the realities, and he began trying to 
prepare the Turks to accept one hundred million, suggesting that it could be imposed by 
the Powers if they would prefer it for domestic reasons. 556 As the Bulgarians complained 
yet again of Turkish delays, and said that their offer of eighty two millions was time 
limited, Grey despaired. He saw ‘no chance of arriving at a solution by discussing details, 
till the Powers decide whether they will in principle take the matter in hand & force 
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Turkey & Bulgaria to refer it to them.’ 557 Little did he know that a solution was nearer 
than he thought.  
3.2.g Russian Funding for a Financial Solution 
  
It was at this point that the final solution of the question was first floated, in the 
form of the Russian offer to fund the Bulgarian payment. The Turks would show some 
reluctance in accepting the deal, in part due to a subpar performance from Lowther, but 
eventually, and after a change in Turkish government, the deal was accepted. The idea 
was that Russia would write off some of the war indemnity owed to her by Turkey after 
1877, which would then be made up to them by Bulgaria, in instalments.  
 The idea of writing off a section of the indemnity was not a new one. It had been 
discussed in October 1908 in St. Petersburg, as a possible inducement for the Turks to 
open the Straits. 558 The Russians, too, were worried about losing their position with 
Bulgaria. They had been concerned that Austria might step in to offer her a loan to cover 
the indemnity, and were loath to press her too hard, in case this pushed her into the arms 
of Austria. 559 Britain first heard of the Russian proposal at the end of January 1909, when 
it was suggested that Russia loan the money to the Bulgarians, in the interests of an end to 
the deadlock. Naturally, this was welcome news, and Buchanan was told to cooperate with 
his Russian colleague. 560 The details, when they appeared, were even more welcome to 
Britain. Russia would charge Bulgaria interest on eighty two million francs, whilst 
cancelling sections of the war indemnity to the Turks. As Tilley put it, Bulgaria was to pay 
less, whilst Turkey got more, and all at the Russian expense. 561 Grey told Nicolson that the 
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Foreign Office were ‘very keen on the proposal’. 562 The only British figure not delighted 
appeared to be Lowther, who complained that the proposal would result in a financial loss 
to the Turks. 563 Mallet and Tilley quickly surmised that this was because he was not in 
possession of all the figures, and he was put right. At the same time, Britain expressed the 
British hope that the Turks would accept the proposal in principle. 564 Despite this, Kâmil 
and Tevfik were worried about the details, suspicious that it meant Russia would expect 
concessions at the Straits. 565 Hardinge, in a state of some irritation, pointed out that 
Britain had already secured the assurances of Russia that the Straits question would not to 
be raised, and that this proposal offered more money than any other to the Turks. 566 
Lowther was still unsatisfied. The proposal came ‘just as the clouds had begun to break’, 
and he disliked it. 567 Grey again tried to allay all of these concerns, suggesting to the Turks 
that they should accept, as it was the best deal they could get financially, and reassuring 
them that it was a ‘clean bargain’ that would not expect any more of them. 568 Despite 
these reassurances, the Porte remained dissatisfied. The proposal had not yet been 
communicated officially to them, and thus they could not examine it. Furthermore, they 
were unhappy that this solution would not limit the future aggression of the Bulgarians. 569 
The ‘real Turkish objection’, therefore, was the ‘fear of Bulgaria’. 570 The Porte also 
complained that the proposal would not supply ready money, and that Bulgaria would fall 
under Russian influence. 571 The Foreign Office found such complaints frustrating, and 
Lowther was told to try and allay these fears, by pointing out that it was a purely financial 
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transaction. 572 When the Russian Ambassador finally presented the proposal officially to 
the Porte, albeit verbally, Lowther, who remained personally unconvinced, but followed 
instructions, thought that the ‘tide was turning’. 573 British policymakers thought that ‘It 
would be excessively unwise for… [the Turks] in their own interests to wreck… [the 
proposal].’ 574 By the 8th, Russia indicated to Britain that she was aiming to settle on the 
basis of presenting the Turks with Fr 125m. 575 The Turks, meanwhile, continued to try 
and negotiate. They countenanced a counter proposal, which would solve all outstanding 
political questions between the two countries, and in return, the Russians would write the 
war indemnity off entirely, instead of giving up only enough to be worth Fr 125m to the 
Turks. 576 They asked for British support, which Grey was willing to give in principle, 
although he reserved the right to see it first. Nicolson was given permission to support it, so 
far as was possible ‘without giving offense’. 577 Privately, Grey wrote to Lowther criticising 
him for his lack of support for the Russian plan. Grey explained that had he failed to 
support the proposal, then Britain would have lost Russia’s support, and triggered a 
reconfiguration of the Powers. He added that he believed the proposal to be in Turkey’s 
best interests. 578 This statement exemplified British policy throughout the crisis. Britain 
supported the Turks, and certainly wanted to be seen to have done her best for them, but if 
she had to choose, Russia (and therefore wider notions of strategy) would always be her 
preference.  
 In February, the Kâmil ministry, which had been very positive towards Britain, fell, 
and he was replaced as Grand Vizier by Hilmi Pasha. 579 Upon taking power, Lowther 
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advised him to settle, and reported that he seemed inclined to do so. 580 Aehrenthal too, 
was of the opinion that Hilmi would accelerate matters and get a deal done. 581 
Accordingly, the proposal was offered again. Hilmi accepted in principle, but once more 
proposed a capitalisation of the indemnity. 582 Bulgaria, meanwhile, worried about the 
situation, proposed a return to direct negotiation, in order to secure independence more 
quickly. Grey thought this meant Turkey might accept 80 million francs, to see an end to 
the crisis. 583 In this he was wrong. The Turks rejected Bulgarian overtures as being likely 
to irritate the Russians, now that a deal in principle had been agreed. Hilmi added that he 
would accept almost anything that would end the deadlock and remove the indemnity 
question. Hardinge, by now significantly irritated by this latest hitch, complained that ‘M. 
Isvolsky seems incapable of any statesmanlike action at present & fails to recognise the 
urgency of an immediate agreement with Turkey.’ 584 The Turks asked for British support 
for the capitalisation proposal. Grey stopped short of full support, but said he would say 
what he always had – that he could think of nothing better. 585 The Porte used this 
assurance, to Nicolson’s irritation, to claim that they had British support for the proposal at 
St. Petersburg. 586 After being put right, they again proposed to Russia a capitalisation, of 
which they would receive Fr 125m. 587 On this occasion, they had more luck. Lowther 
heard that Rifat was on his way to St. Petersburg, to discuss the proposals. He suggested 
that as Rifat had said that he would not go to St. Petersburg until he would not have to 
leave empty handed, this meant a deal was probably in the offing. 588 Sadly, matters were 
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not as simple. Rifat was greeted with yet another Russian counter proposal – that while 
they would agree to wipe the whole indemnity clear, they asked some small political 
concessions such as changes to the Turco-Persian frontier and a railway for Serbia to the 
Adriatic, although to the relief of British officials, the Straits were not mentioned. 589 By 
now, the Foreign Office was tiring of the negotiations. Although Tilley admitted that 
Britain would have rather let the Turco-Persian border wait, Grey told Nicolson that he 
could support anything which would get the indemnity cleared and the agreement made. 
590  
Another week dragged on. Rifat announced that he was leaving St. Petersburg in 
response to yet another Russian proposal, just when the Porte had indicated acceptance of 
the agreement he had made. A despairing Mallet thought that both sides were being ‘very 
unbusinesslike’. 591 This stumbling block, however, was overcome, and the Turks agreed 
not to delay their recognition of Bulgarian independence, as they had been threatening to 
do, and the protocol was initialled ad referendum on 16 March, just before the German move 
to threaten Russia, and St Petersburg’s subsequent capitulation brought the risk of war 
between the Powers to a close. 592 Constantinople and St Petersburg had agreed that 
Russia would renounce 40 years-worth of the indemnity, and Turkey would recognise 
Bulgaria and renounce the railway. 593 The protocols were now ready to be ratified, but 
the Turkish Parliament, still suspicious of Russia, delayed its acceptance. 594 This further 
slowed matters just as Turkey underwent the failed counter revolution. 595 The delay went 
on so long that Bulgaria threatened war if their independence was not confirmed soon, 
leading Britain, France and Russia to press the Porte to ratify the agreement as soon as 
 
589 Nicolson to Grey, no.117, tel., 4 Mar 09, FO 371/752/8578.  
590 Grey to Nicolson, no. 275, tel., 5 Mar 09, FO371/752/8578, Minutes 
591 Nicolson to Grey, no. 144, tel., 15 Mar 09, FO 371/753/10008; Mallet Minute. 
592 Nicolson to Grey, no. 145, tel., 16 Mar 09, FO 371/753/10156.  
593 Lowther to Grey, no. 90, tel., 18 Mar 09, FO 371/754/10403.  
594 Buchanan to Grey, no. 49, tel., 9 April 09, FO 371/756/13419.  
595 Lowther to Grey, no. 114, tel., 15 Apr 09, FO 371/757/14176.  
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possible. 596 Indeed, Britain even discussed recognising Bulgaria against Turkey’s wishes in 
order to avoid war, providing yet more evidence of Grey’s priorities. 597 By this time, 
however, the heat had gone out of the international situation, as a result of the Russian 
capitulation. Despite another final hitch, caused by a Turkish request for thirty days after 
signing before ratification, the protocol was finally signed and completed on 21 April. 598 
Bar a minor dispute over the royal title of Prince Ferdinand, which Hardinge dismissed as 
‘tiresome’, the crisis was over. 599  
3.3 Bosnian Annexation  
 
   
The Bosnian Crisis both revealed and set the future course of the Anglo-Turkish 
relationship. It demonstrated that whilst the British hoped to maintain the advantage 
which they saw the Yong Turk revolution as having given them, they were not willing to 
compromise their wider strategy by being too favourable to the Turks. The initial result of 
this was an indulgent and supportive policy towards Turkish aspirations. This did not last, 
as many in the Foreign Office began to lose patience with the Turks, and by the end of the 
crisis, a palpable sense of frustration towards the Porte had developed.  
 
 There is no doubt that British policy aimed to support Turkey, or, at the very least, 
to give the Turks the impression of British support. Indeed, most scholars have asserted as 
much. 600 Grey regarded himself as having still been in ‘the stage of hope and sympathy 
 
596 Nicolson to Grey, no. 198, tel., 15 Apr 09, FO 371/757/14192; Lowther to Grey, no. 118, tel., 15 April 
09, FO 371/757/14197. 
597 Nicolson to Grey, no. 204, tel., 16 Apr 09, FO 371/757/14324.  
598 Buchanan to Grey, no. 26, tel., 21 Apr 09, FO 371/757/15381; 757/294 Buchanan to Grey, no. 63, tel., 
22 Apr 09, FO 371/757/15153.  
599 Communicated by Rifaat, 7 May 09, FO 371/758/17469, Hardinge Minute. 
600 Bernadotte Schmitt wrote of Britain having ‘much sympathy’ with Turkey. It having been so long since 
such ‘consideration’ had been shown her, she ‘naturally tried to exploit’ this: Schmitt, Annexation of Bosnia, p. 
101. D.W. Sweet referred to Turkey as Britain’s ‘protégé’, although he was more circumspect on the material 
underpinnings of such support, noting the contradictions inherent in a policy aiming to support both Turkey 
and Russia: Sweet, ‘Bosnian Crisis’, pp. 181; 179. From the Ottoman Perspective, Hasan Ünal characterised 
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with young [sic] Turks’ when the crisis broke out. 601 From the very beginning of the crisis, 
Britain asserted the right of Turkey to be heard, and repeatedly insisted that she would not 
try to compel the Turks to accept anything that they did not want to. 602 The Foreign 
Office was willing to guarantee that any advantages gained by Serbia and Montenegro 
would not come at the cost of Turkey, for instance, and the sentiment that Turkey was not 
to blame for the difficulties in finding a solution and that she should be kept strong was 
easily found in the Foreign Office in the later months of the 1908. 603 Even junior members 
of the Foreign Office, such as Tilley, were fully aware of the need to appear sympathetic 
towards the Turks, even when the realities of European politics meant that it might not be 
possible. 604 British support persisted into 1909, demonstrated by the refusal to accept the 
French estimate of what Bulgaria could pay and the attempt to try and find support for a 
higher figure.  
Although support for the Turks persisted, both in words and deeds, until the 
conclusion of the crisis, frustration built amongst British policymakers at the Turkish 
attitude. As early as October, the Turkish prioritisation of the Eastern Rumelian question 
caused disquiet. Hardinge thought that the Grand Vizier ‘must be made to understand’ 
that it would be ‘quite impossible to turn back the clock’ and that he must accept ‘the fait 
 
British support as a ‘godsend’ for the weak Ottoman Government, although he too was cognisant of the 
‘strict limits’ within which British support operated: Ünal, Hasan, Ottoman Foreign Policy during the Bosnian 
Annexation Crisis, (University of Manchester PhD Thesis, 1992) pp. 240-1.  
601 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, v. 1, pp. 174-5.  
602 The British public response to Bulgarian independence suggested that nothing should be done until the 
views of the Powers were known, not least those of Turkey, ‘the Power most affected’: Grey to Buchanan, no. 
51, tel. en clair, 6 Oct 08, FO 371/550/34528. Grey personally informed Mensdorff that Britain would not 
compel the Turks to accept an offer that they were not happy with, and Lowther was informed that this was 
British policy: Grey to Goschen, no.123, 26 Oct 08, FO 371/554/37547; Grey to Lowther, no. 448, 26 Oct 
09, FO 371/554/37601. 
603 Minutes on note communicated by the Turkish Ambassador, 19 Nov 08, FO 371/556/40467; For 
instance, see Grey to Bertie, no. 591, 16 Dec 08, FO 371/558/44365, or Memo of 21 Nov 08, FO 
371/556/40705.  
604 Speculating on the possibility of having to advise the Turks to accept less in compensation from the 
Bulgarians than they might have otherwise desired, Tilley remarked that Britain would not want to be the 
first Power to propose a low sum: Tilley Minute on Rodd to Grey, no. 195, Confidential, 15 Dec 08, FO 
371/558/44131.  
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accompli’. 605 By the time that the agreement with Austria was on the table, this frustration 
had increased. Mallet was irritated at the ‘unreasonable’ Turkish demand that the 
agreement be made unconditionally. 606 As the Bulgarian negotiations dragged on, British 
annoyance at Turkish prevarication reached a peak. Lowther was told, as it appeared that 
the Turks might reject the Russian financial proposal, that it ‘would be excessively unwise 
for… [the Porte] in their own interests to wreck it.’ 607 
 Some of this frustration at the Turkish refusal to act in accordance with British 
wishes owed something to the fact that Britain was trying to reconcile two fundamentally 
unreconcilable lines of policy – closer cooperation with Russia, alongside supporting the 
Turks. From the start, British policymakers kept in close touch with their Russian 
counterparts, and tried to act in concert with them. 608 At the end of the crisis, the British 
greeted the Russian financial suggestion with enthusiasm, and part of their frustration at 
the Turks stemmed from the desire to accept a Russian focused solution to that aspect of 
the crisis, and found Turkish suspicion of Russia to be tiresome. 609 When Britain’s policy 
towards Turkey and Russia showed signs of clashing, it was Russia which won out. As keen 
as he was to make the most of the opportunity that he had been handed, Grey was not 
 
605 Hardinge Minute on Lowther to Grey, no. 55, tel., 15 Oct 08, FO 371/552/35667. Lowther was 
instructed to bring this home to the Porte in forceful language, taking credit for the removal of the Straits 
from the programme and emphasising the importance of taking ‘material advantages’ before ‘empty forms’, 
an early use of an argument which became something of a favourite for Grey throughout the crisis: Grey to 
Lowther, no. 358, tel., 16 Oct 08, FO 371/552/35667; Grey to Lowther, Private, 13 Nov 08, Private 
Correspondence of Lowther, no 26.  
606 Rather than being conditional on the acceptance of the concessions by the other Powers. Hardinge 
remarked that this was partially the fault of the Austrians, having initially suggested that the concessions 
would be unconditional before changing their minds: Minutes on Cartwright to Grey, no. 25, Tel., 26 Jan 
09, FO 371/748/3484.  
607 Grey to Lowther, no. 82, Tel., 6 Feb 09, FO 371/750/4882. Frustration was widespread in the Foreign 
Office. Tilley bemoaned the Turkish attitude after a settlement had been almost arrived at ‘enormous pains’: 
Tilley minute on Lowther to Grey, no. 66, 30 Jan 09, FO 371/750/5066. The request of the Turks to delay 
ratification of the Russian agreement by 30 days also drew an exasperated response from the Foreign Office: 
Buchanan to Grey, no. 57, Tel., 18 Apr 09, FO 371/757/14500.  
608 In September, before even the declaration of Bulgarian independence, Maxwell worried about the 
implications of acting without the Russians: Lowther to Grey, no. 282, Tel., 29 Sep 08, FO 371/550/33785.  
609 Not least, in time, because of the Russian collapse in other aspects of the question. D.W. Sweet hit the 
mark when he described the British as ‘enchanted’ by the proposal: Sweet, Bosnian Crisis, p. 184.  
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going to allow it to disrupt his wider strategy of loose working arrangements with France 
and Russia. 610 
 The Turkish counter revolution of April 1909 also proved an annoyance to the 
Foreign Office. Having almost found a solution to the crisis, negotiations were delayed by 
the change in the Turkish Government. This event, which also accelerated the feelings of 
frustration being felt by Britain towards the Turks, forms the subject of the next chapter.  
  
 
610 For more on Grey’s policy of ‘studied ambiguity’ and his use of alignments with other Powers, see Otte, 
‘‘Postponing the Evil Day’.  
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4. The Counter-Revolution of 1909 611 
 
 The Bosnian Crisis demonstrated that the good feeling engendered by the Young 
Turk revolution was likely to be short-lived. Turkish intransigence at the close of the crisis, 
along with the collapse of the Kâmil ministry, had led policymakers to doubt the possibility 
of a close working relationship with Turkey. The counter-revolution of April 1909, which 
delayed the final acceptance of the Russian offer, compounded British frustrations. It 
suggested that Turkey could not be a reliable partner to Britain, and that the Young Turk 
regime was not a significant improvement on what it had replaced. These events also laid 
bare the growing rift between the Foreign Office and the Ambassador, Sir Gerard 
Lowther, who subtly followed his own lines of policy during the reactionary spasm. This 
chapter will first consider the views of key British policymakers, both in London and 
Constantinople, as the Bosnian affair drew to a close. It will then relate the events of the 
crisis, focusing again on the views of British statesmen, before discussing the period of 
reflection which followed these events.  
4.1. Views of CUP Government in the light of the Bosnian Crisis 
  
In March 1909, as the great Bosnian crisis drew towards its conclusion, John Tilley 
penned a lengthy memorandum, reflecting on events in Turkey since the revolution of 
1908. His conclusions would not have made pleasant reading for the Young Turks. He 
argued that the revolution had not been as ‘profound’ as the Foreign Office had originally 
thought and hoped. Reflecting racial attitudes shared by almost all of his contemporaries, 
he remarked that having shaken free from Abdülhamid, Turkey had reverted to the level 
of ‘normal misgovernment and backwardness’ that was, he said, natural to Turks. Since 
 
611 There is no accepted terminology for the events of April 1909. In Turkey, it is known as the ‘31st March 
Incident’, as the Ottoman Empire had not yet adopted the western calendar. This essay will use the terms 
Counter Revolution, or Counter-Coup. See Zürcher, ’31 Mart’.  
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then, matters had got worse. Being ‘suspicious by nature’, the Turks had not accepted the 
Russian offer until they had come under significant pressure from Britain, something 
which seemed to be held against the Turks. The fall of the Kâmil government was seen, 
with some justification, as ‘a great blow’ to Britain’s influence in Turkey, but it was also 
bad for the Ottoman Empire. Kâmil was considered an atypical Turkish statesmen, which 
Tilley ascribed to his Jewish heritage. ‘His fall meant the establishment of the despotism of 
the committee, which governs the country without taking responsibility, and is accused 
already of developing Hamidian methods.’ Such developments did not auger well for the 
future, Tilley thought. If the Turks were to become a ‘regenerate race’, he ventured to 
think it would be after their long prophesied exit from Europe. After some fourteen pages 
of pessimistic commentary on recent events and doom-laden predictions on the future of 
the Ottoman Empire and Britain’s position in it, Tilley summed up his thoughts with some 
understatement: ‘The outlook, therefore, is bad’. 612  
 Tilley’s pessimism seemed to owe something to the negative reports by Lowther. 
He quoted various despatches approvingly, apparently sharing Lowther’s sentiment that 
‘the Turks have not ceased to be Turks’. Lowther used this turn of phrase to add force to 
his argument that the Turkish state had not developed very far since the revolution. The 
relaxation of the capitulations would be ‘absolutely out of the question’ for the present. It 
would be ‘safer’, furthermore, for the Turks to be kept short of money, as that which was 
not ‘altogether wasted’ would be spent on ‘extravagant’ military measures. 613 Lowther had 
not always felt this way. His arrival in Constantinople in 1908 had been greeted by a 
‘considerable crowd in a state of some excitement’, a manifestation of the pro-British 
sentiments created by the revolution. 614 By September, Lowther had met several members 
 
612 Tilley Memorandum, 1 Mar. 1909, FO 371/770/13516.  
613 Ibid.  
614 Lowther to Grey, Tel., No. 204, 30 July 1908, FO 371/544/26560. 
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of the CUP privately, and had been cautiously impressed by their ‘moderate’ tone. 615 It 
would not be long, however, before his optimism evaporated. By October, he felt he had 
detected an undercurrent of dissatisfaction in Turkish politics. This was particularly 
‘unwholesome’ in that it suggested a lack of respect for the Sultan. 616 Lowther’s respect for 
traditional values, as demonstrated here, seems compatible with assessments of his 
character. He was apt to act as a ‘grand seigneur’, who saw the firmly professional CUP as 
beneath him, and disliked the sometimes grubby realities of politics at Constantinople. 617 
1909 found him further disillusioned. In February, he complained to Sir John Eldon Gorst, 
Consul General in Egypt, that despite 90% of the country being against them, the CUP 
had won the support of 95% of the Turkish Parliament. Although the truth of these figures 
may be doubted, 618 Lowther himself had little doubt how they had been achieved – with 
the aid of ‘threats and revolvers’. He concluded that it was not a ‘happy state of affairs’. 619 
His discomfort remained. In March, he ‘hardly knew what to tell’ of the situation, except 
that it was ‘bad’, and that the only surprise was that it ‘did not get any worse’. He feared 
that despite the committee’s protestations that they merely hoped to develop a 
parliamentary system, they hoped to dominate Turkish politics and ‘get all the billets filled 
by their own men’. Although he still cherished ‘hopes’ that things would get better, he 
admitted to feeling discouraged. 620 By the end of the month, encouragement seemed in 
short supply. ‘No one I see has much hope for the future unless the Committee goes and I 
do not believe in the likelihood of that’, he told Hardinge, adding that the best he could 
 
615 Lowther to Grey, Confidential, No. 541, 2 Sep. 1908, FO 371/559/31787. 
616 Lowther to Grey, No. 670, 14 Oct. 1908, FO 371/560/36131. 
617 Otte, Foreign Office Mind, p. 316. Otte notes that by 1912, Lowther was widely considered to have been a 
failure at Constantinople, and ‘rather a dull dog’. Geoffrey Miller too criticised Lowther’s inflexibility and his 
distaste for the Young Turks: Miller, Straits, ch. 4. Ahmad also highlighted Lowther’s disdain for the Young 
Turks: Ahmad, ‘Britain’s relations with the Young Turks’, p. 310.  
618 A possible explanation for this may come from Feroz Ahmad, who suggested that in the wake of the fall of 
Kâmil in early February, the opposition in Turkey courted him, informing him that 80% of the country was 
against the CUP: id., ‘Britain’s relations with the Young Turks', p. 312. 
619 Lowther to Gorst, Private, 26 Feb. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 64.  
620 Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 10 Mar. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 70. 
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hope for was that the worst elements of the CUP would be weeded out, with the better 
becoming a part of the Government proper. Lowther’s concern about the unofficial nature 
of Committee governance was very real, 621 but he comforted himself with the belief that 
even the ‘worst elements of the Committee’ felt that they ‘must lean’ on Britain. Turning 
boastful, he added that  
in spite of some unpleasant remarks on the part of the violent papers our position 
remains the same. Indeed, I am on the best of terms with many members of the 
committee and have kept my disapproval of their methods to myself, but they are 
common folk, and they have consciences and know that they are disapproved of by 
all respectable members of society. 622 
 
 In March, Hardinge had declared himself unaffected by the general gloom. He was 
not, he said, so ‘despondent of the future as Mr Tilley’, but he was already deeply 
concerned by the shape events in Turkey were taking. 623 He professed himself ‘entirely 
[to] share’ Lowther’s views on the Committee, and thought it ‘desirable’ that it disappear 
in the near future, lest they become a new ‘Palace Camarilla’. 624 Naturally, the fall of the 
Kâmil government caused him disquiet. The Foreign Office was ‘not very happy’ about 
the turn of events, and Hardinge feared that matters were ‘gradually tending to a military 
despotism of a nationalist and chauvinist character’, an eventuality to which he was not 
entirely opposed, if it reduced the Committee’s influence. 625  
4.2. Divergences of view between Lowther and London  
 
Hardinge was supportive of Lowther in private, even going so far as to tell him in 
February that the Foreign Office was ‘quite satisfied with the way in which… [he was 
 
621 The committee was not, officially, a part of the Government, but exercised a strong influence. See: Shaw, 
Stanford J.; Shaw, Ezel Kural, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II (Cambridge, 1977), p. 
274. Lowther believed that the Government was ‘not allowed to act without the dictation of the Committee‘ 
(Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 31 Mar. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 80.)  
622 Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 31 Mar. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 80. 
623 Tilley Memorandum, 1 Mar 09, FO 371/770/13516, Hardinge Minute.  
624 Hardinge to Lowther, Private, 29 Dec. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 43.  
625 Hardinge to Lowther, Private, 23 Feb. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 60; Hardinge to Lowther, 
Private, 6 Apr. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 84.  
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running affairs] in Constantinople, and everybody seems pleased.’ 626 His colleagues in 
London, on the other hand, had grown increasingly frustrated with him, even before the 
Bosnian Crisis had broken out. By November 1908, the wheels were in motion for the 
selection of a British Admiral to go to Constantinople to begin the task of rebuilding the 
Turkish Navy. The Turks having made tentative contact, the Foreign Office was frustrated 
by Lowther’s lack of energy in pressing the matter. Tilley urged that he ‘should be told to 
arrange that’ any officer, not necessarily an Admiral, ‘shall be accepted at once’. Maxwell 
agreed, hoping that it would be made clear to the Turks that Britain was ‘willing and 
anxious’ to provide an officer of any rank. Hardinge was disappointed to find that 
‘Lowther… [was] not helpful in suggestions’. 627 Later on, Tilley reflected that it was 
‘extraordinary’ that Lowther had sat and listened to the ‘grotesque’ schemes of the Turkish 
Minister of Marine without making ‘any sort of reply’, and compared him to Lord Raglan, 
of Crimean fame, who had allowed a French commander to talk him into making a 
tactical error which resulted in a heavy defeat. 628 Lowther’s taciturnity further frustrated 
the Foreign Office when it became clear that the German firm Krupp was winning arms 
contracts with the Turkish Government after a tendering process which appeared unfair. 
Tilley considered Lowther’s reporting on the case to be unhelpful as he had neglected to 
add any of his own comments to the despatch. Mallet, reading between the lines, felt that 
the greater sin was Lowther’s failure to say more to the Turks about the unfairness of the 
tender. 629 Other matters brought a similar response. For instance, a report on conditions 
 
626 Hardinge to Lowther, Private, 23 Feb. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 60. It would be remiss not 
to mention that Lowther had been a Hardinge appointment, and something of a surprise at that. It would 
seem only reasonable that Hardinge would wish to support his man, particularly in the context of what Otte 
calls an ‘uninspired’ set of appointments in 1908: See Otte, Foreign Office Mind, p. 315.  
627 Tilley minute, Lowther to Grey, Tel., No. 397, 19 Apr 1908, FO 371/559/40474; Maxwell and 
Hardinge minutes. 
628 Tilley minute, Lowther to Grey, No. 790, 21 Nov. 1908, FO 371/559/41688. 
629 Tilley minute, Lowther to Grey, Confidential, No. 845, 8 Dec. 1908, FO 371/560/43482; Mallet minute. 
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in Baghdad garnered the complaint that ‘Lowther as usual makes no comment’ – not only 
to the Foreign Office but also to the Consul in question, who deserved a response. 630  
The Bosnian Crisis would make these tensions worse. Lowther’s failure to transmit 
information in a timely manner would be criticised during the Counter-Revolution, but 
this was already cause for comment in January. He had reported by despatch, rather than 
by telegram, that military stores were being transported to Adrianople (now Edirne), near 
the border with Bulgaria. Mallet complained that Lowther ought to have telegraphed this, 
as it justified the recent Bulgarian mobilisation, and the British Government’s ignorance of 
this had put them in an awkward position. Hardinge, who was supportive of Lowther in 
private, also became more critical:  
I think this should have been sent to us by telegraph. Ignorance of facts such as 
these places us in a false position in our commu[nication]s with other Powers. On a 
previous occasion when the Turks were making Mil[itar]y preparations Sir G. 
Lowther gave us no information until they were completed. I think he should be 
warned against this. 631 
 
Disappointment with Lowther would intensify later on during the crisis. Lowther was far 
from happy at the Russian financial proposal of February 1909, and complained that it 
had come at a time when the ‘clouds seemed to be clearing away’, and had done nothing 
but arouse suspicions in all quarters. He added that he feared he would be unable to 
produce convincing arguments in favour of its acceptance. 632 As this letter made its way to 
London, its author was unaware that a ‘private and friendly hint’ from Hardinge was 
travelling in the opposite direction. He informed Lowther that his despatches had 
prompted ‘remarks’ in the Foreign Office, as a result of his neglecting to report the lines of 
argument he used in discussion with Turkish leaders, and suggested that he report in a 
fuller manner in future. Although couched in careful terms, with references to the ‘good 
 
630 Tilley minute, Lowther to Grey, No. 796, 23 Nov. 1908, FO 371/560/41694. 
631 Mallet and Hardinge minutes, Lowther to Grey, No. 37, 19 Jan. 1909, FO 371/748/3124.  
632 Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 3 Feb. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 51.  
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and effective spadework’ being done by Lowther, and entreaties for him to consider this in 
his own self-interest, this rebuke speaks volumes about how the Foreign Office saw the 
ambassador settling in at Constantinople. Hardinge also took the opportunity to express 
his opinion that the Turks were living in a ‘fool’s paradise at Constantinople’, if they 
seriously thought to reject the Russian proposal, further underlining the divergence of 
views between Lowther and his chiefs. 633 Lowther remarked that in the confusion which 
reigned on the Bosporus, he thought that neither his French, Russia nor German 
Colleagues enjoyed the full confidence of their respective foreign ministries. It would not 
have been unreasonable to include himself in this undistinguished list. 634 As Lowther 
mused on the failings of his ambassadorial colleagues, Grey wrote to him, explaining his 
reasons for supporting the Russian proposal despite the fact that Lowther had ‘grudged’ it. 
635 Lowther’s performance as a representative, and his ability to understand British policy, 
were both in question. The Counter Revolution, coming as it did before the Bosnian Crisis 
had been concluded only added to the febrile atmosphere, and would again lay bare the 
divergence between Britain and the occupants of her Constantinople embassy.  
4.3. The Counter Revolution of April 1909  
  
The Counter Revolution proved to be a brief interlude in Turkish politics. 
Reactionary elements in Constantinople succeeded in returning Sultan Abdülhamid to full 
power, before CUP elements, raising a large force as they went, marched from Salonica 
(now Thessaloniki) to the capital, regaining their grip on power after some minor 
skirmishing. In the longer term, the significance lay in the deposition of the Sultan and the 
 
633 Hardinge to Lowther, Private, 6 Feb 09, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 52.  
634 Lowther to Grey, Private, 8 Feb 09, Ibid., no. 54.  
635 Grey to Lowther, Private, 8 Feb 09, Ibid., no. 55. Underlining still further the differences in opinion, 
Hardinge wrote that it was ‘absurd’ to claim that the clouds had been lifting at the time of the Russian 
proposal: Hardinge to Lowther, Private, no date ‘Sunday’, Ibid., no. 61.  
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tightening of the Committee’s grip on power. 636 For present purposes, however, the 
significance lay in Lowther’s support for the reactionary forces, which meant that for a 
while his actions ran counter to stated British policy.  
 The Foreign Office first became aware that something was afoot in Constantinople 
on 14 April, when Lowther reported that Kâmil had been appointed Grand Vizier by the 
Sultan, in response to a military uprising. Alwyn Parker, a junior clerk, met the news with 
cautious optimism, being of the opinion that his return to power might mean that all would 
yet ‘be well.’ 637 This was not to last. The arrangements fell through, and Ahmed Tevfik 
Pasha, Foreign Minister in the previous Kâmil Government, was made Grand Vizier 
instead, much to the disappointment of Louis Mallet. He thought that Tevfik was a 
‘cypher’, appointed by the Sultan to allow him to govern again. 638 Lowther too was no fan 
of Tevfik, remarking that he was ‘not the man’ to deal with such a ‘dangerous’ situation. In 
a ‘hurried scrawl’, Lowther gave Hardinge a sense of the chaos at Constantinople. It was 
‘all very bad’, he said, and he worried what this might mean for the future attitude of the 
Turkish Government. He added that Rifat, recently returned from the Ambassadorship at 
London, was ‘speechless’ and had ‘no idea’ what to do. 639 The atmosphere of confusion at 
Constantinople left officials in London uncertain how to respond. 640 Suggesting further 
evidence of Lowther’s shortcomings, Parker found that The Times provided ‘much more’ 
information than Lowther. 641 At this point, Lowther made his first of several requests for 
British ships to be sent, at first to Beirout, Smyrna and Salonica, to try and keep matters 
 
636 The Counter Revolution saw the CUP gain almost absolute power, as Abdülhamid was replaced with his 
brother, Sultan Mehmed V, who was a mere puppet. As G.R. Berridge demonstrated, Turkey was now 
practically a military dictatorship: id., Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 137.  
637 Lowther to Grey, No. 108, Tel., 13 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/13942; Parker Minute.  
638 Lowther to Grey, No. 109, Tel., 14 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14033; Mallet Minute.  
639 Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 14 Apr. 1909, FO 800/192. Lowther, although he later appeared to favour 
the reactionaries, at least when the alternative was Committee domination, thought that ‘we must look in the 
future for a violently chauvinistic attitude’.  
640 Lowther to Grey, No. 109, Tel., 14 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14033, Cocks Minute.  
641 Lowther to Grey, No. 112, Tel., 14 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14049, Parker Minute: ‘all this & much 
more is in the “Times”’.  
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calm. These requests would take on greater importance later, as Lowther tried to dissuade 
the CUP from taking back power forcibly. At this juncture, the Foreign Office was 
supportive of the request. Mallet had heard from Sir Adam Block, British representative on 
the Ottoman Debt Council, that violence seemed likely in the areas around Smyna (today 
Izmir), and that British ships might help to pacify the situation in the provinces. 
Accordingly, a squadron was held in readiness to sail to Smyna, if required. 642 Lowther 
took the moment to take stock and pen his report. He reflected: 
It is premature to forecast the ultimate results of the events of the last twenty-four 
hours, but on main lines it is a distinct defeat for the Committee of Union and 
Progress and their ultra-liberal ideas, for which the country as a whole is not ripe. It 
also means a restoration of the Sultan and Caliph’s prestige and authority, which 
the Committee of Union and Progress had practically annihilated. This will 
perhaps work for a diminution of the anarchy at present prevailing in the 
provinces, though the attainment of the result by revolted  
soldiery and the clergy is somewhat disquieting. 
 
Although this did not reach London for some days, it shed valuable light on Lowther’s 
thought process at the time. He was not unhappy at a defeat for the Committee, especially 
as it seemed to represent a resurgence for traditional, conservative values. Indeed, his 
characterisation of the CUP as ‘ultra-liberal’ spoke volumes. He saw the Sultan’s renewed 
power as a positive, and likely to bring calm to the Ottoman Empire. 643  
 Meanwhile, the new Cabinet and the Sultan declared their intention to adhere to 
the constitution, and asked for British support for their new regime. Smartly, the vessel for 
this appeal was Rifat, who had been popular in London during his Ambassadorship. 644 
Grey privately indicated to him, that evening, that he was satisfied to learn that he had 
retained control of the foreign affairs portfolio in the recent changes. 645 Rifat, in delivering 
 
642 Lowther to Grey, No. 111, Tel., 14 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14035; Mallet minute.  
643 Lowther to Grey, No. 264, 14 Apr 09, FO 371/770/14544.  
644 Grey informed Lowther that ‘Rifaat was a great success and I am very sorry to lose him.’: Grey to 
Lowther, Private, 8 Mar 09, Private Correspondence of Lowther, No. 69. Hardinge too, considered him an ‘able’ 
man who was too independently minded to put up with the committee for too long: Hardinge to Lowther, 
private, 23 Feb 09, Private Correspondence of Lowther, No. 60.  
645 Grey to Lowther, Private, Tel., 15 Apr 09, FO 800/79.  
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the message, said that he hoped his government could rely upon the ‘sympathy and 
goodwill’ of the British Government. After some discussion, the Foreign Office decided 
that assurances would be given, albeit with caveats. Mallet drafted the reply, which read: 
‘We shall continue to extend our hearty sympathy to any Government in Turkey which 
proves itself zealous in the safeguarding of the public interest and which honestly 
endeavours to secure a good and just administration and to adopt a policy of reform.’ 646 
British support was thus conditionally pledged. The line of policy being followed, though, 
was clear – Britain would remain aloof, and offer only limited support to any government 
which seemed capable of offering a genuine chance of progress in Turkey. Although not 
delighted with the way in which events had transpired in Turkey, it might be said that for 
Britain, anything was better than the situation as it had been before 1908, and therefore 
she was keen to support anything which suggested a change.  
4.3.a. A divergence in policy  
 
Lowther, meanwhile, was following a slightly different tack. His attachment to the 
new Government was less conditional, and he took it upon himself to telegraph to 
Salonica, the hotbed of CUP support in the Empire where the committee had been 
formed. He reassured the Consul there, Harry Lamb, that all was tranquil in the capital, 
and that the few casualties incurred had been accidental. 647 The Committee at Salonica, 
unhappy with events in Constantinople (where they in fact enjoyed only scant support648) 
demanded the reinstatement of the previous Hilmi ministry, or else the 3rd Army, based at 
Salonica, would march on the capital. Mallet thought that this ultimatum ‘looked bad’, but 
there seemed ‘nothing’ Britain could do to prevent the troops from marching. Better then 
 
646 Lowther to Grey, No. 115, Tel, 15 Apr 09, FO 371/770/14182; Mallet minute. 
647 Lowther to Salonica Consulate, Tel., 15 Apr. 1909, FO 294/44.  
648 See Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 133; Berridge, Dragoman Fitzmaurice, p. 133; Palmer, 
Alan, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1992), p. 203.  
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to ‘await events’. 649 The reactionary Government was less afflicted with such a sense of 
powerlessness, and called upon the Council of Ulemas, the body which represented the 
Islamic clergy, to declare that the constitution was in accordance with Sharia law and 
appeal for calm. This being done, Lowther judged that it had had a ‘good and calming 
effect’. 650 He was wrong. Lamb reported from Salonica that public opinion there thought 
that the Sultan had been behind the coup, and that he intended to undo the constitution. 
651 This strengthened the CUP’s already strong hand there, and significant numbers of 
troops were observed leaving Salonica, seemingly intent on joining the march to 
Constantinople. 652 In light of this, Lowther again tried to intervene. Telegraphing to 
Lamb at Salonica, he asserted that the ‘real bearing’ of the ‘present movement’ in 
Constantinople was against the ‘ultra-liberal and anti-Mahomedan tendencies of Cabinet 
and prominent Committee men’. 653 Not content with playing down the threat of the 
reactionary uprising to the committee, he took more drastic steps. Another telegram to 
Lamb gave him explicit instructions to play down the uprising, for the benefit of the 
Salonica Committee members: ‘As the Committee is apparently stopping government 
 
649 Lowther to Grey, No. 120, Tel., 16 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14223.  
650 Lowther to Grey, No. 122, Tel. en clair, 16 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14318; Lowther to Grey, No. 124, 
Tel., 16 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14320.  
651 The question of the Sultan’s involvement remains a little unclear. At the time, Lowther seemed convinced 
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371/770/14797. After the Committee had returned to power, he conceded that the Sultan might have 
‘condoned’ the uprising, but maintained that no evidence had yet come to light which suggested active 
support: Lowther to Hardinge, Private, 25 Apr. 1909, Private Correspondence of Lowther, no. 88. Later on, he was 
further convinced, arguing that evidence would have come to light, if it existed, and that the decision of the 
CUP not to hold an enquiry further suggested that there was little to find. Tevfik, the former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, was apparently convinced of the Sultan’s innocence: Lowther to Grey, No. 322, 
Confidential, 5 May 1909, FO 371/772/17613. Shaw and Shaw found that the Sultan did not participate in 
planning, but that funds and help came from inside the palace, including from one of his sons: Shaw and 
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 280-1. Alan Palmer agreed that the Sultan’s fourth son was involved 
with conservative groups, and noted rumours of money coming from inside the palace: Palmer, Decline and 
Fall, p. 208. Berridge noted that suspicions that Abdülhamid was involved were symptomatic of the 
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uprising, although there can be little doubt that he took full advantage once it began.  
652 Lowther to Grey, No. 124, Tel., 16 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14320.  
653 Lowther to Salonica Consulate, two Tels., FO 294/44.  
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Telegrams, it would be well that you should discreetly and unofficially suggest to the 
malcontents to agree to send a small deputation to Constantinople to assure themselves 
that the constitution is not in danger.’ 654 Having tried to use Lamb to dissuade the 
Salonica committee from action, Lowther requested that British ships be sent to calm 
matters. Repeating his belief that, in Macedonia, the CUP was spreading the story that the 
constitution was threatened, he informed London that ‘several prominent Turks’ had told 
him that Turkey would lose her confidence in Britain if ships were not sent. Mallet was 
against such a proceeding, arguing that the sending of ships could be misconstrued as 
intervention. His chief, Grey, saw the merits of this argument. He also worried that it 
might appear as though Britain hoped to gain something out of the troubles for herself, 
and that such an action might therefore provoke similar actions from other Powers. He 
decided that such risks should be run only if British subjects were in danger. 655 Lowther 
would be presented with a further opportunity to try and put the brakes on the CUP, 
whose forces had now reached the outskirts of Constantinople. Although massed outside 
the city walls, the troops had agreed to remain there, unless attacked. The Turkish 
Government requested that Gerald Fitzmaurice, 656 the influential and controversial first 
dragoman, join a deputation of religious figures and members of Parliament seeking to 
persuade the troops that there was no danger and that they should disperse. According to 
Lowther’s telegram, Fitzmaurice was seen as something of a trump card by the reactionary 
Government:   
[The] Turkish Government believe that an independent authority, especially 
English, is more likely to influence these men than anything they can say. I am fully 
aware of the danger of our immixtion [sic] in internal politics, but Rifaat Pasha 
assured me that it was [the] unanimous wish of [the] Cabinet that this effort should 
 
654 Lowther to Salonica Consulate, Tel., FO 294/44.  
655 Lowther to Grey, No. 127, Tel., 17 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14471; Mallet and Grey minutes.  
656 Fitzmaurice was influential, as one of the most experienced men at the Constantinople Embassy, and in a 
position of significant power as first Dragoman. However, he was personally opposed to the CUP, and 
believed it to be dominated by what he saw as the malign influence of Freemasons and Jews. For more, see 
Berridge, Dragoman Fitzmaurice.  
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be made to save the situation, which was fraught with danger not only to Turkey 
but to the whole of Europe. 657 
 
Although Fitzmaurice’s assistance was eventually rejected by the Government, Lowther’s 
action was significant. In allowing him to act, along with requesting a ship and playing 
down the situation in his communications with the Salonica Consulate, his policy 
regarding the counter-revolution had diverged from that of London, however subtly.  
4.3.b. A march on Constantinople  
 
The crisis in Turkey continued to worsen. On 19 April, Lowther reported that the 
number of men massed outside the city walls had again increased. He estimated their 
number at 10,000, and reckoned that this could double within a day. To combat this, the 
Government had sent some of their own troops outside the walls to camp, in the hope that 
some kind of ‘joint feeling’ might spring up and convince those loyal to the CUP to 
disperse. Lowther took this opportunity again to press London to send ships, as there was 
‘naturally some danger of a collision between the two forces.’ Given that there seemed a 
real prospect of conflict, Hardinge and Mallet agreed that a naval force be sent to Lemnos. 
658 Although ships had already been sent to the general area, this was the first time during 
the period of tumult that there had been a British naval presence so close to 
Constantinople. 659 As the uncertainly dragged on, thoughts in London turned towards the 
fall-out from Bosnian Crisis. Before their respective removals, neither the Hilmi nor the 
Kâmil Governments had ratified the Turco-Bulgarian agreement which would officially 
bring to a close that aspect of the question. Alwyn Parker, a junior clerk, voiced his hope 
that events in Turkey would not delay the ratification of the protocol. He suggested that 
 
657 Lowther to Grey, No. 129, Tel., 17 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14474.  
658 Lowther to Grey, No. 139, Tel., 19 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14560; Mallet and Hardinge minutes.  
659 Lowther to Grey, No. 138, Tel., 18 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14604; Admiralty to Grey, 19 Apr 09, FO 
371/770/14723.  
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Britain might be able to use Lamb or Lowther to ‘influence the committee on the subject’ 
in some way. His more senior colleagues rejected such interference as futile at best or 
inappropriate at worst. 660  
The British Government thus resolved to wait matters out. The uncertainly of the 
situation provided fertile ground for rumours. One such rumour, which gained some 
traction in the confused days before Committee troops entered the city, was that the 
Turkish navy might fire on foreign embassies in order to cause further complications and 
force a solution. In a revealing aside, Parker was sceptical: it was ‘doubtful whether the 
guns would go off’. 661 This eventuality would not come to pass. Admiral Douglas Gamble, 
the British officer loaned to the Turkish Navy, took the fleet out to sea, away from 
temptation. 662 On dry land, the CUP entered the city, sweeping away the reactionary 
Government, much to Lowther’s despair. Writing while his ‘blood was still hot’, he told 
Hardinge that he found the events ‘nauseating’, and gave a one-sided account of events, 
taking great pains to emphasise the superiority of the CUP’s forces, and the apparently 
excessive force which they had used. He remained convinced that the ‘so-called 
reactionary movement could have been dealt with in a milder and more satisfactory 
manner’, but the ‘Young Gentlemen’ were determined to put their own stamp on 
proceedings. 663 A period of time to allow his blood to cool found Lowther in a more 
reflective mood, if no better disposed towards the CUP. He was not, he said two days later, 
‘favourably impressed with the appearance of the guardians of public security’, in part 
because ‘in many cases the patrols included Albanians and Bulgars of the wildest types’, 
but he was forced to ‘confess that there… [had] been nothing to complain of in their 
 
660 Lowther to Grey, No. 143, Tel., 19 Apr. 1909, FO 371/770/14797; Parker, Mallet and Hardinge 
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conduct so far.’ The better than expected behaviour of the troops had not calmed 
Lowther’s fears for the future. He noted that ‘younger men and irresponsible hot-heads’ 
were calling for the Sultan’s deposition, and he thought that the National Assembly was 
‘very hostile’ to the Sultan too. 664 In this, at least, Lowther proved to be an astute 
observer, and the Sultan was removed on 27 April, replaced by his otherworldly brother, 
crowned Mehmed V. This development caused disquiet in London; Hardinge fretted 
about the matter of protocol and in the end it was decided that a simple acknowledgement 
would suffice. 665 The Ex-Sultan, his days of absolutism now firmly behind him, was 
conveyed to exile in Salonica, ‘accompanied by two sons and eleven ladies’. 666 Lowther 
suggested that ‘Right-minded Moslems’ thought his treatment to have been unjust, and 
reported the rumour that the Sheik-ul-Islam, the foremost spiritual authority in the 
Ottoman Empire, had refused to issue a fatwa stating that the Sultan had broken his oath 
to the constitution, and had consented only to say that it was legal, under Islamic law, to 
remove the Sultan or invite him to abdicate. 667 
Having had more leisure to reflect upon the deposition of the Sultan and the 
position of Britain with the new Government, Grey indicated to the Turkish Chargé his 
favourable impressions of the way in which order had been restored and civil interests 
protected. To drive home the point, he added that he hoped Britain could rely on good 
government and justice winning out in the Ottoman Empire. Lowther was instructed to 
make similar comments at the Porte, rather, one might well speculate, to his dismay. 668  
4.3.c. A period of reflection  
  
 
664 Lowther to Grey, No. 303, 28 Apr. 1909, FO 371/771/16537. The ‘National Assembly’ here referred to 
was a sort of rump Parliament, made up of those members who had retreated to San Stefano during the 
recent uprising.   
665 Communication made by Turkish Charge d’Affaires at Foreign Office, 27 Apr. 1909, FO 
371/771/15929; Hardinge minute.  
666 Lowther to Grey, No. 173, Tel., 28 Apr. 1909, FO 371/771/16053.  
667 Lowther to Grey, No. 171, Tel., 27 Apr. 1909, FO 371/771/15930.  
668 Grey to Lowther, No. 288, Tel., 288, 29 Apr. 1909, FO 371/771/16324.  
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The speed of events, and the subsequent confusion which reigned at 
Constantinople, meant that the attempted counter-coup had a lengthy afterlife in 
correspondence between London and the Embassy, as the meaning of the events was 
digested. This process began even before the crisis reached its denouément, when Lowther 
made his report on the revolt, attempting to justify those actions he had taken which ran 
counter to the stated British policy of conditional support for the new Government. After a 
lengthy treatment of events, during which he cast doubt on various CUP assertions and 
praised the conduct of rebel troops, he turned to his telegrams to Salonica. These had been 
sent, he said, in the light of ‘barefaced distortions’ sent by the CUP to the provinces. 
Although he had hoped that he would be able to distribute his own version of events via 
British consuls, he conceded that it had done little good. Lowther also defended giving 
Fitzmaurice permission to join the deputation sent to parley with the CUP forces camped 
outside Constantinople. Although anxious to avoid official interference in the internal 
affairs of Turkey, he claimed that a ‘collision’ seemed likely, and that Fitzmaurice’s 
presence was meant to avoid it. 669 Lowther then turned to the initial causes of the revolt. 
He proclaimed the Sultan blameless, and instead pointed the finger of blame at ‘bigoted 
mussalmans’. Pessimistically, he added that the incident was a ‘bad omen’ for the future of 
Turkey, if it suggested that party rivalries would have to be solved by the army. 670 In 
London the fast and decisive intervention by the CUP, in response to the threatened loss of 
their influence in the capital, elicited admiration. Maxwell remarked that the Young Turks 
had acted with ‘remarkable foresight… [and] promptitude’, and also found much to praise 
in the ‘discipline of the Salonica troops’. 671 Indeed, the Foreign Office as a whole were 
rather less inclined to gloom than Lowther. Commenting on a discussion of the Sultan’s 
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culpability, Hardinge remarked that this was a matter of purely ‘historical interest’; of ‘real 
interest’ was the fact that he had been dethroned, which he ‘richly merited’. As for 
Lowther, he noted that he seemed ‘depressed by what… [had] taken place’, and added 
that he would like to see ‘signs in him of a more hopeful spirit.’ 672 Grey did not take so 
sanguine a view. Following the conclusion of the counter-coup, he sent Lowther a lengthy 
private letter, gently rebuking him for his conduct. He began in a sympathetic tone, 
discussing recent events. He said that he felt no sympathy for Abdülhamid, and expressed 
his doubts about whether the Turks would be able to ‘put things right’. Grey then moved 
to discuss Lowther’s views, noting that he saw he had become ‘pessimistic’, and admitting 
that he had become so too, but that he ‘could not help but be impressed by the decision, 
purpose, discipline, and strength which have characterised the leaders of the Army now in 
power.’ He thought it was ‘clear’ that Britain had ‘greatly under-estimated the strength of 
the force at the disposal of the committee.’ He conceded, too, that he did not like the fact 
that the CUP remained a shadowy body, and that they had made plenty of mistakes. It was 
though, he said, clear to him that ‘the best elements’ in Turkey were on the side of the 
Young Turks, and that Britain must back those elements. Grey thought that Britain had 
been too critical of the CUP. Recent events had shown that they had ‘real stuff’ in them, 
and they should therefore be supported. Besides, there seemed to be little choice: ‘Whether 
the chance of really permanent reform is great or small, we must back the chance as long 
as it exists, and I should like you to do everything in your power to keep in touch with the 
best men and to retain their confidence.’ Signing off, he delivered a final rebuke, arguing 
that Britain needed to be on ‘the side on which there is hope for Turkey’. 673  
Although couched in careful terms, Grey’s letter was clear evidence that the 
Foreign Secretary was aware of Lowther’s deviations from official policy, and that he was 
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determined to bring him back into line. Lowther remained gloomy. He even regretted that 
Turkey was not under a military dictatorship. On the news that the Army was to keep the 
money confiscated from the ex-Sultan, he remarked that this did ‘not sound very 
constitutional but [was] perhaps prudent’. He did not want to be ‘a pessimist but… [he 
feared] that we have many troubles before us.’ 674 Indeed, his views on the committee did 
not undergo much change. The counter revolution had taken place, he said, because of the 
actions of the CUP who had ‘jerrymander[ed]’ the elections and dominated Parliament 
from the shadows. Having thus provoked the coup, they used it as an excuse to remove the 
Sultan and establish their own ‘salutary despotism’. He complained about having to go 
behind the backs of the Government to deal with the real power in Turkey, and thought 
that ‘in itself the Committee… [was] not a great positive material force.’ 675 In this case, 
time did not prove a healer. Almost a year later, in his annual report for 1909, Lowther 
devoted significant space to a discussion of the strong Jewish elements within the CUP, 
going as far as to suggest that the Committee was dominated by Zionists. Although it is 
likely that Fitzmaurice, who has been shown to have held strongly antisemitic views, had a 
hand in drafting this section, the fact of its appearing in the final report is evidence enough 
that Lowther did not dispute this. Indeed, he went on to complain that the ‘net result’ of 
the year had been nothing, and that equality, ‘so much spoken of in the early days of the 
revolution, remains a dead letter’. Worse, a ‘violent nationalist feeling’ had ‘permeated all 
ranks, amounting often to a violent chauvinism’. 676 It is this view which has generally 
come to be remembered. In his memoirs, Hardinge suggested that the counter-coup was a 
largely positive event, insofar as it removed the Sultan, but argued that in the aftermath, 
Turkey was left in the hands of a ‘corrupt committee’ made up of Jews. Later scholarly 
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assessments also have emphasised that the counter-revolution had set a dangerous 
precedent in heightening the role of the Army in politics. 677 
4.4. A Constantinople Coup  
  
The Turkish counter-coup revealed a significant divergence in thought and action 
between the Foreign Office and the embassy. The events of March-April 1909 changed 
British views of the Turkish regime. After the revolution of 1908, British attitudes towards 
the new leadership were largely positive, and there was a distinct sense of future 
possibilities in Foreign Office assessments of Ottoman affairs. This was reflected in the 
indulgent stance adopted in the early stages of the Bosnian crisis. As has been shown, 
British patience had been much tried by the spring of 1909, and it rather seemed as though 
the scales were beginning to fall from British eyes, as was demonstrated by the increasing 
irritation at what appeared to be Turkish prevarication.  
 Despite this, British policy remained supportive of the Young Turk regime. It was, 
after all, better than what had gone before, being less in hock with German interests and 
not reliant on the Sultan’s elaborate and extensive system of spies. The coup did not 
change London’s attitude. Almost as soon as possible, Grey declared support for the 
reactionary Government. Upon their overthrow, British support was again pledged to the 
CUP. This revealed that Britain was not committed any specific type of regime as might be 
expected from the protestations of Young Turk enthusiasm, both in Turkey and Great 
Britain, that had broken out in 1908.  
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 Sir Gerard Lowther and his staff at Constantinople, perhaps inevitably, were more 
interested in the minutiae of Turkish politics. Indeed, the ambassador took active steps 
against official policy in April 1909. That is not to say, as has been suggested, that the 
embassy was in some way involved in actually bringing about the coup in the first place. 
There is no evidence to suggest this was the case, and that consequently it either did not 
happen or Lowther went to ‘great pains’ to cover his tracks. 678 If anything, the rushed and 
incoherent nature of Lowther’s reports rather suggests he and his staff were caught by 
surprise. This story, indeed, may well have had its roots in anti-British sentiments at 
Constantinople in the years afterwards. Indeed, what is of more significance for the 
position of Britain in Turkey, as ever, was that people thought that it had happened. 
Although the embassy was not likely to have been behind the coup, it certainly did 
intervene in it once it had begun. Lowther took three active steps in favour of the 
reactionary Government. Firstly, in repeatedly requesting ships, he hoped to discourage 
violent resistance. Secondly, in allowing Fitzmaurice, a figure well known and well 
connected in pre-revolutionary Constantinople, to throw his weight on the side of reaction, 
he sought to prevent the CUP from entering the city, where it seemed inevitable that they 
would prevail. Finally, and perhaps most drastically, in telegraphing to Salonica, he tried 
to prevent troops from marching to Constantinople in the first place. All of these marked 
deliberate actions against the CUP, and ran counter to stated British policy of supporting 
any Government which at the least paid lip service to development and good government.  
 Ironically, the coup simultaneously weakened and strengthened British faith in 
Turkey. The coup suggested that Turkey was an unreliable partner, thus deepening the 
impressions already formed during the Bosnian incident. However, as Grey’s letters to 
Lowther demonstrated, the coup, and the efficient manner in which it was disposed of, had 
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impressed him. The Foreign Office had concluded that the CUP were the right horse to 
back, and that they presented the best chance of Turkey being effectively modernised. 
However, their faith that Turkey could be effectively reformed was hit, and much of the 
optimism of the previous year had evaporated.  
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5. The Railway, and other Commercial Questions 
 
 
5.a. From Berlin to Baghdad  
  
In 1909, Louis Mallet reflected that Turkey would always lean upon the ‘strongest 
Powers’ and that for this reason, it was not worth Britain’s while making ‘great sacrifice[s]’ 
to improve relations with Turkey. More senior policymakers agreed. Sir Charles Hardinge 
thought that Britain must not ‘sacrifice’ her interests in search of ‘ephemeral’ ‘Turkish 
Friendship’. Grey thought that the ‘test’ of Turkish attitudes would come when Britain 
asked for ‘some concession on an honest basis’. Only then would British policymakers 
know if the Turkish regime now tried to act in an even-handed way. 679 These statements, 
coming soon after the Counter-Revolution, proved prophetic. Throughout the period 
1908-1914, British policymakers remained cautious in their approach to commercial 
matters in Turkey. Before the revolution in 1908, Britain had been singularly unsuccessful 
in the Ottoman commercial sphere. As Fitzmaurice complained in 1908, commercial 
success had been largely dependent on personal success with the Sultan. 680 Indeed, before 
the revolution, there were no published accounts for the Empire, instead published as the 
personal accounts of the Sultan. As Britain had generally been unwilling to overlook the 
Macedonian situation or the abuses of the Sultan’s system of government, she found 
herself, by 1908, a long way behind other Powers, especially Germany. 681 This mattered, 
as several scholars have pointed out, because Egypt, still notionally an Ottoman possession, 
had become the focus of British policy and strategy, supplanting the previous dominance of 
the Straits. India, too, was a key interest for Britain, which meant that in strategic terms 
Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf were also key to British strategy. These areas, too, were 
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largely under the more or less nominal control of the Ottoman Empire. 682 Unsurprisingly, 
they were the focus of British commercial policy in the Ottoman Empire, and commercial 
interests were used as the fundamental language of British strategy. 683 For an avowedly 
‘free trade’ state such as Britain, ‘commercial policy’ was difficult, and meant that she had 
few economic levers to influence other countries. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, 
however, she had more power, on account of the capitulations and the level of control 
which she and other Powers had forced the Ottoman Government to give up over fiscal 
policy. 684 With such clear strategic aims, and such clear methods available to deal with 
them, the various commercial questions which faced Britain in this period were in a large 
part interconnected, and were dealt with as a whole during negotiations with Turks in 
1913.  
The first major commercial matter in this period proved to be the 1910 loans issue, 
when an abortive attempt on the part of Britain to work in conjunction with France 
resulted in disaster, as the loan was offered by Germany. After this, attention turned to the 
central commercial issue of the period: the Berlin to Baghdad Railway. This project, which 
had in 1903 marked the zenith of Turco-German economic collaboration, was the 
preeminent threat to Britain by 1909. By 1913, after extensive negotiation, Britain was 
able to come to a solution with Germany and Turkey which left her in a far stronger 
position. She had used the Ottoman desire to increase customs rates (which required Great 
Power consent) to negotiate with the Turks, and negotiations had also involved the 
concession for river traffic on the Euphrates and Tigris (which competed with the Railway) 
being renegotiated. Furthermore, Britain had made arrangements with the Sheik of 
Kuwait which went further towards protecting her vital interests in the Persian Gulf, and 
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which offered a degree of protection against the land routes to India being dominated by 
foreign Powers. Finally, this period saw extensive negotiations on oil concessions, and saw 
the Foreign Office helping the British Armstrong Vickers group to secure a contract to 
build dreadnought class battleships for the Turkish Navy.  
By the end of the period, it was clear that although Britain was keen to help Turkey 
(and moreover improve her own position), she was not willing to jeopardise her own 
interests and standing relative to other Powers to do so. Nevertheless, by 1913, the Foreign 
Office had negotiated a position for Britain that was far superior to any that she had had 
for some time. The threat of the Baghdad Railway had largely been negated, and relations 
with Germany had thawed as a partial result. 685 Furthermore, she seemed likely to achieve 
a reasonable degree of control of the Mesopotamian Oilfields, and Turkish warships were 
being built in British yards. All this had been achieved despite (or perhaps caused) the 
deterioration in the political relationship between the Young Turks and the British 
Government. 686 
5.b. 1910 Loan Question  
  
 
 As soon as the dust had begun to settle from the Young Turk revolution, British 
policymakers were aware that the new Government would need money for reforms, and 
that it would need to take out loans to achieve this. Britain had been willing to help the 
Turks, contrary to usual practice, to meet their immediate needs, but it became clear that 
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more significant funds would be required. 687 Towards the end of 1909, there was an 
increasing sense that it might be in Britain’s interests to help the Turks find money on a 
reasonable basis. In September, Sir Adam Block, British representative on the Ottoman 
debt council and former dragoman, suggested that Britain might take advantage of the 
Turkish need for money by offering a loan on good terms, perhaps almost foregoing profit, 
which could then be used as leverage to extract concessions on the Berlin to Baghdad 
Railway. 688 Sir Charles Hardinge recognised that the Turkish priority was to ‘get money’. 
689 Although British policy in this period was generally against becoming involved in the 
decisions of financiers, Grey told Sir Henry Babington Smith, a director of the largely 
British National Bank of Turkey, that for ‘political reasons’ he ‘should gladly see 
cooperation between British and French finance, if it could be on equal terms’. 690 The 
Foreign Office could not rely upon the patriotism of the financial sector, however, as 
Alwyn Parker was aware: he doubted if ‘gratitude’ was the ‘return most desired by Sir 
E[rnest]. Cassel’, the Prussian-born British banker. 691 As the loan issue began to take 
shape, Block warned that should the Turks fail to secure a loan floated on the Paris market, 
then the prestige of both Britain and France would suffer, and the Turks would begin to 
feel that the Powers of the triple alliance offered them better prospects in the future. 692 
This being so, the next few months would see Grey working closely in conjunction with Sir 
Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, to cooperate with the French Government 
for mutual benefit and to reduce the threat of Germany returning to her pre-revolutionary 
position. 693 By May 1910, both the British and French foreign ministries were in 
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agreement that Turkey would struggle to get any loan if she continued her ‘reckless’ 
spending. 694 By June, Hardinge was complaining that the Turkish financial situation had 
become ‘deplorable’. Lowther reported that ‘the need for money… [was] growing acute’, 
in part because of the Turkish tendency to ‘waste’ what money they did have on the Army. 
Although the Finance Minister was on the point of departing for Paris to try and conclude 
a loan, Lowther worried that the French might delay negotiations, to increase the needs of 
the Turks, allowing the French to extract more concessions. 695 
 Initially, it seemed that Lowther’s gloomy predictions had been too negative. By the 
end of August, Mehmet Cavit Bey, the Ottoman Finance Minister, was able to agree a 
loan for £T10,000,000, to be offered to investors in October. Louis Mallet, however, did 
not think that it would be so easy, and wondered what the French would ask for in the 
shape of a quid pro quo. 696 Such concerns soon passed through the Turkish Government, 
and Lowther reported that he had been gently sounded out about the possibility of a loan 
being made through Cassel in Britain, should the French offer fall through. The Foreign 
Office was not to be separated from France so easily, however. Parker thought that if 
Cassel was approached, then he should make conditions relating to the Baghdad Railway 
sufficient to satisfy both British and French interests. 697 Talk of such conditions was 
already reaching the Foreign Office. It seemed likely that that in addition to conditions 
relating to the Railway, the French would attach other conditions aimed at maintaining 
Turkish ‘financial stability’. Foreign Office officials were concerned that, now that Cassel 
was involved in the negotiations, his group might offer the Turks money under less onerous 
conditions, undercutting the French. Parker worried that ‘a most awkward situation’ would 
be created, especially as he knew that Cavit had recently spent a weekend at Cassel’s 
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house. Richard Maxwell thought that the French were alive to the danger, and suggested 
the time had come to speak to Cassel and bring him into step with the Government. 
Mallet, although less worried, thought that Cassel should be asked, at the least, to consult 
with the Government if it seemed that the money might be used to fund further 
development of the Railway. 698 As September went on, it seemed that these fears were 
likely to be realised. Negotiations with France seemed to be falling through, and Lowther 
believed that Cavit was looking towards Cassel’s group for the loan. Paul Cambon, the 
French Ambassador in London, was also concerned. He pointed out the importance of 
Anglo-French cooperation in the Balkans and worried that if Turkey managed to get the 
money from elsewhere, without the French conditions, then she would likely use it to start 
a war with Greece. Grey took this solemnly. It was a ‘serious warning’, as the Foreign 
Office could not urge Cassel to adopt the French conditions. 699 To add to the tension, 
reports suggested that Cassel had agreed to arrange the loan in London, and that 
furthermore he would work with Arthur von Gwinner, the German president of the 
Baghdad Railway Company in issuing the loan. 700 Worse, Gwinner’s group would 
apparently take on a larger percentage than the British concerns. Officials, however, 
avoided panic. Both Hardinge and Mallet doubted the veracity of the reports, while their 
chief mused that if true, this arrangement would ‘not suit us at all’. 701  
 The logical solution was a meeting with Cassel. When it took place, he told 
Hardinge that he remained undecided on which course of action to take, and he had 
informed the Turks that they would get better financial terms from the French. On the 
other hand, the French terms were onerous, Hardinge heard, involving protection for 
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French industry and the French dominated Ottoman Bank becoming the Empire’s de 
facto treasury. Cassel was, however, willing to work with the French to find a compromise 
arrangement. Grey greeted this news with pleasure, but in a sign of converging priorities 
between London and Paris, thought that something should be added to any agreement to 
prevent the funds being used to launch aggressive action against the Greeks. 702 Cassel, 
indeed, seemed sympathetic to the Foreign Office position. He told Hardinge that he knew 
the French were not keen on him being involved, and pledged not to follow up on the loan 
should the Turks reject conditions that the British Government had approved. Grey hoped 
that his assurances would carry some weight. It was ‘most desirable that he should 
cooperate with the French’, as it would be ‘very awkward’ were he to do ‘the business after 
the French [had] declined’. 703 A couple of days later, more detail on the French position 
emerged. Bertie understood that the French ‘best case’ was that both British and French 
groups would abstain from making the loan until it appeared that the Turks would spend it 
more wisely, and were less likely to use it to fight with Greece. Stephen Pichon, the French 
Foreign Minister, privately held that this was safe, as the German market would not be 
able to produce the cash required. He therefore thought that Cassel was indirectly working 
in the German interest. 704 More publicly, he went on a charm offensive towards Britain, 
flattering Bertie by praising Anglo-French cooperation thus far, adding that he was sure 
that French interests would eventually get the loan. He was anxious, he said, to avoid 
giving Turkey money which would be spent on armaments and ‘other extravagant 
expenditure’. Mallet and Hardinge responded as Pichon would have hoped. Mallet agreed 
that ‘stringent conditions’ would be required, whilst Hardinge, by now a Lord and soon to 
depart for his viceroyalty, trumpeted a likely ‘opening of a new era in Anglo-French 
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finance’ which ‘we should do our utmost to encourage’. 705 With such enthusiasm for 
Anglo-French economic cooperation, it was not surprising that a later proposal for the 
amalgamation of the Ottoman Bank with the struggling, British-backed, National Bank of 
Turkey was met with pleasure in Whitehall. Both Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson, the new 
Permanent Under-secretary, were keen on this proposal, and Grey was willing to support it 
‘warmly’ at Paris. 706 In the light of the news that a preliminary agreement had been made 
on a loan, Grey emphasised that Cassel’s ‘fusion scheme’ would need to be supported if it 
was the ‘only way to avoid future trouble’. 707  
 Despite reports, the Turks had on this occasion decided against accepting the 
French conditions. 708 A particular sticking point was the demands of the French to be 
given a right to be involved in appointments to positions within the Ottoman Financial 
machinery. Reportedly Cavit was not averse to French officials being given roles in 
Turkey, but he hoped to retain control over personnel himself, in part, Lowther 
speculated, because he cherished a strong dislike for Charles Laurent, the French financial 
adviser appointed in the wake of the revolution, and wanted to prevent his appointment. 
709 The French negotiations having seemingly failed, Cassel hoped, having worked in 
tandem with the Government, that he might be allowed to act as he wished. He wrote to 
Nicolson that Cavit now looked towards the National Bank, with which he was involved, 
but that it was for the Bank to make the first move. 710 Nicolson had in fact already 
proposed giving the National Bank their freedom of action, and Grey agreed that if 
negotiations had failed, then the French should be told, and informed that if they had no 
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further proposals to make, then Britain must put her support behind ‘‘independent action 
on the part of the National Bank’. 711 In the meantime, an offer had been made from 
Germany. Parker was unconcerned, and believed the terms to be too poor for the Turks to 
be tempted. 712 Unfortunately for Cassel, Parker was mistaken, and terms were reported to 
have been agreed a week later. Unwilling to give up, Parker sought solace in the fact that 
the terms had not yet been signed. 713 Grey warned the French that although he was ‘still 
most anxious to secure Anglo-French financial cooperation and [would] use any influence 
[he had] to support any reasonable proposals, which may now come from the French side’, 
he would now have to allow the National Bank to take independent action, although he 
had, even at this late stage, asked them to keep the door open for French cooperation. 714 
This had still not taken place a couple of weeks later, when Babington Smith asked 
Nicolson when the National Bank might expect freedom of movement to be restored. 
Germany, having completed the loan, had made a strong position stronger, he remarked. 
715  
 
 Babington Smith was not wrong. In trying to cooperate with the French, Britain 
had left the door ajar for Germany – a door which she pushed open with enthusiasm. 
Scholars such as Marian Kent have been critical of this, seeing the restriction of the 
National Bank as a failure of British policy. Although allowing the loan to pass to Germany 
was no doubt unfortunate, this is an unhelpful characterisation. Kent argued that the 
National Bank had been held back to allow the French to take the loan, but it seems that 
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Grey’s aims were more cooperative. 716 A clear Franco-British plan existed to better their 
mutual position with regard to Turkey, and to reorganise the Turkish financial system. 
Furthermore, policymakers in Whitehall and at the Quai d’Orsay believed that the 
Germany would be unable, financially, to compete for the loan. British policymakers were 
nevertheless clear that the National Bank would get a chance, if negotiations failed, and 
warned the French as such. In the context of the time, with Britain trying to extract 
concessions from the Young Turk Government but with minimal levers with which to do 
so, it is far from surprising that they should attempt to make hay when an opportunity 
presented itself. More widely, cooperation with France was always likely to be treated as 
being of greater value than a good deal for the National Bank. Throughout this period, 
British dealings with Turkey were always influenced by and reflected through Grey’s wider 
sense of strategy. The partnerships with Russia and France were at the forefront of his 
mind, and he would be unlikely to allow a chance to work with the French in this way slip. 
Regardless, the matter soon receded. Commercial attention turned towards the key 
question in Ottoman diplomacy in the pre-war period – the fabled Berlin to Baghdad 
Railway.  
 
5.1. Strategy and Commerce 
 
5.1.a. The Railway: A threat to Britain 
 
The Railway has often caught the imagination of scholars. This grandiose project, to 
construct a railroad from Berlin to the Persian Gulf, ‘opening up’ Mesopotamia to 
European trade as it went, was being built in partnership by the German and Turkish 
Governments. Through a complicated system of kilometric guarantees, the Ottoman 
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Government funded the building of the railway by German engineers. The most recent 
agreements, in 1903, had arranged for the construction of the railway as far as Baghdad at 
very generous rates. 717  
Construction of the line carried a wide ranging threat to Britain. Marian Kent sketched 
out the problems that the development would cause for Britain. It would cross an area, in 
Mesopotamia, that had traditionally been dominated by Britain. Worse, the concession 
came with ‘mineral rights’ – giving Germany a head start in extracting the fuel of the 
future, oil, from an area where it was believed to be plentiful. Once constructed, it would 
threaten the long-standing British concession for waterborne transport on the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers, as well as the increasingly lucrative transport of Indian Pilgrims to 
Islamic holy sites, such as Mecca. It would also threaten British maritime trade in the 
Persian Gulf. Finally, it would make the land journey to India easier, and would damage 
British prestige across the Middle East. 718 With such risks, and with the change in 
Ottoman Governance seeming to present an opportunity to change the future of the line, 
the question became one of special importance to British policymakers.  
 
Initially, the Foreign Office considered supporting the building of a competing 
railway to manage the damage. In March 1909, William Willcocks, a British engineer 
working on a project to irrigate Mesopotamia, suggested that a line built in the Tigris 
valley could be linked with a proposed line from Tripoli to Homs, competing with the 
German line. This idea found favour in London. Mallet could not contemplate a ‘more 
serious blow’ to the British position in the gulf than the German line reaching Basra, and 
could not see why, in return for all that Britain had ‘done for the Turks’, she should be 
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allowed to connect the line to the Mediterranean. Hardinge speculated that if Britain were 
able to build into Mesopotamia first, then she would be far enough ahead of Germany that 
the latter might not find it worth her while to extend the line beyond Baghdad. 719 This 
proved a popular idea, and following an interdepartmental report, Lowther was instructed 
to ask for a concession to build the line. 720 In time, however, as the question developed, 
the British focus turned instead to using the customs increase as a lever to try and secure 
British involvement in the building of the existing railway. In pursuing such a strategy, the 
Foreign Office had been emboldened by warm words from the Grand Vizier, Hüseyin 
Hilmi Pasha, who had suggested to Lowther that the line needed British involvement. Grey 
thought that this augured well, and wondered whether this might be used to come up with 
a formula that could be offered in return for consent on the customs question. 721 
5.1.b. ‘In what other way are we to secure any conditions?’ The Customs 
Lever 722 
 
An important aspect of the Capitulations, which enshrined the privileges of the 
Great Powers in Turkey, was the right of the Great Powers to veto or approve any change 
to the customs duties charged on foreign goods coming in to the Empire. This was used as 
a ‘weapon’ by Britain, and indeed other Powers, throughout the pre-war period. 723 
Although this was a powerful lever for Britain, it was not without risks. Most 
fundamentally, as the Foreign Office was well aware, any additional funds gained could 
easily be used to fund further development of the Baghdad Railway. John Tilley noted 
that, in 1909, the money provided by customs duties (in their unadjusted form) was almost 
completely used to provide for the building of the railway. In effect, the majority of 
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Turkish customs receipts found their way into German pockets. Understandably, the 
British Government were not keen to increase the size of this pool without strong 
assurances that the money would be spent on other projects. Grey knew that Britain would 
‘have to make a stand about the Baghdad Railway and resist any increase of customs [until 
she] got [her] way.’ 724 Sir Adam Block warned that there must be no movement on the 
customs question until there was a written assurance that the raise would not go to the 
Railway company in any way – although he was aware that Britain would run the risk of 
being accused of blocking Turkish progress. 725 The Ottoman Government hoped for 
permission to increase the customs duty by 4%, made more urgent by the continued 
budgetary struggles it faced. This was not lost on Alwyn Parker, who appreciated that a 
‘large deficit’ would mean the Turks were ‘all the more anxious for the customs increase’. 
726 Ottoman officials seemed to understand the situation. In September 1909, Britain was 
asked to take a ‘favourable view’ of the customs increase, in return for a willingness to 
make assurances on the Railway. 727 With the beginnings of an understanding on the 
horizon, British requirements for her half of the bargain became clear. Lowther was given 
permission to discuss the question at Constantinople. He was told that the Railway, the 
right to navigate the Euphrates and Tigris, and oil concessions in Mesopotamia were all 
areas of interest to the Government. British officials also hoped to secure the removal of 
the Turkish Government veto on Egyptian borrowing powers. In addition to their power 
relating to the customs increase, Grey sought to remind the Turkish Government that 
Britain had given Turkey much support during the recent Balkan crisis. The despatch also 
noted that British trade was at a ‘disadvantage’. 728 This last point suggested that British 
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officials felt that they had a special position relating to the customs increase, compared to 
other Powers. Upon Pichon suggesting that the 4% rise should not be used as a lever for 
special interests, Ronald Lindsay complained that Pichon failed to see that Britain was 
‘specially affected by the rise in customs’. 729 On a superficial level, this was not an 
unreasonable claim, and also reflected the British awareness that in the absence of the 4%, 
she had no lever whatsoever to influence Turkish policy. Hardinge had argued, pointedly, 
in May that:  
Sooner or later we shall have to agree to the Turkish import duties being raised… 
and as the raising of these duties will inflict a certain loss on British trade it seems 
only right that we should endeavour to obtain from the Turkish Govt. something 
that might be regarded as compensation for our commercial losses. 730  
 
Grey argued that he was not interested in ‘special advantages’ for Britain so much as he 
was in preventing damage to British interests by the construction of the railway. He did 
‘quite see how’ Britain could protect herself unless she took advantage of ‘of such 
opportunities as the increase of the customs dues may give… for making conditions’. 731  
 Negotiations moved slowly. By October, Lindsay and Mallet thought that there 
had been no progress in discussions on Egyptian borrowing powers, and that there had 
been little in the way of commitments on the railway. Mallet questioned whether Lowther 
had made the point on Egypt forcefully enough. 732 Thoughts turned to possible 
alternatives to a commitment on Egypt. Hardinge speculated whether an arrangement 
with France not to block Egyptian financial manoeuvres might fit the bill, while Grey 
thought that if a formal commitment proved politically impossible for the Turks, then a 
written undertaking not to block Egyptian loans might suffice. In any case, there was no 
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rush. Hardinge thought that Britain must ‘move very slowly about the extra 4%’. 733 In any 
case, events would be moved forwards by a surprising move from Germany.  
5.1.c. A German Offer  
 
 
 In November, London heard that the Baghdad Railway Company (and by 
extension, the German Government) were willing to allow British participation in the 
building of the next stage of the Railway, from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. Struggling to 
finance the building, the Company sought additional capital from Britain. Arthur von 
Gwinner, president of the Company, suggested that negotiations might begin on the lines 
of British control of the section once built, but without their participating in other sections. 
The offer was met with caution in London. Mallet and Lindsay were circumspect, given 
Britain’s application for another line. Hardinge agreed that some thought was required, 
but thought that Britain could not go far wrong in wresting some control of the line from 
Germany. 734 Indications soon suggested that this offer was genuine, as Sir William 
Whittall, an associate of Gwinner, made his way to London to discuss the matter with 
Cassel. Mallet and Hardinge, whose views had softened a little, thought that Britain should 
seek construction and control of the relevant section, and the former observed that Britain 
was in ‘a very strong position for a good bargain and must act with great reserve’. 735 The 
Turks were also keen on the proposal. It would help them to get the Railway built, possibly 
at a lower cost to themselves, and would please both Britain and Germany, reducing the 
likelihood of their blocking the customs increase. 736 Rather overzealously, Grey was 
promised that Rifat had succeeded in persuading the Railway company to admit Britain 
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on equal terms. Seeing as this went beyond the construction and control deal they hoped 
for, Hardinge and Grey doubted the truth of this, although they were keen to discuss the 
proposals. 737 A more realistic assessment of the situation was provided by Whittall, who 
explained to Hardinge that the proposed arrangement would see Britain have a 50% share 
of the controlling body of the new line. Both men agreed that this was insufficient, but 
Hardinge thought that this represented a good start for negotiations. The British position 
was a ‘very strong one’ and she ‘must now take care to get all that’ she wanted. Grey took a 
similarly pragmatic view. He saw the negotiations as a way to secure control of the line 
after Baghdad, to be taken in return for the customs increase. 738  
 As the year drew to a close, the German Government seemed to be getting cold 
feet. Wilhelm von Schoen, the German State Secretary, had told Sir Edward Goschen, 
British Ambassador at Berlin, that should Cassel and Gwinner come to an agreement, the 
German Government would likely still require a ‘quid pro quo’ for the purposes, he said, of 
public opinion, in part because of the bad feeling caused by H.F.B. Lynch’s recent renewal 
of exclusive riverain rights on the Euphrates. Hardinge was furious. He complained that 
this was ‘very typical of German methods’ and if Cassel were to come to terms with 
Gwinner, this would be a matter for them. That Britain would have to make a concession 
to Germany, as a result of a this and the Lynch concession was not ‘logical’. Grey was 
similarly irritated. To him, the case was the other way around, and any agreement 
between Cassel and Gwinner would serve as compensation for the damage which the 
Railway would do to established British interests below Baghdad. 739 British irritation was 
compounded by the belief that the German Government had been aware of the proposals 
before Gwinner had made them, and that Britain had not made the first move, or even 
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sought an arrangement. 740 In part, this reluctance was because, as Charles Marling, chargé 
in Constantinople reported, the Germans were struggling to get their views on the matter 
across to the Turks. He speculated that Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the German 
Ambassador, feared British competition – if the proposed line from the Mediterranean to 
Baghdad were constructed, then this, along with the Lynch concession on the Euphrates 
and Tigris would make the chances of the German line being finished unlikely. This report 
was greeted with pleasure in Whitehall. Herman Norman found it ‘satisfactory to learn 
that the Germans [were] having difficulty in regaining their influence at Constantinople’. 
Mallet thought that it was ‘quite unnecessary to accept the first terms offered’, but that he 
was quite content to cooperate with Germany, if Britain could secure the construction and 
control of the Gulf sectors. 741 Despite the optimism, the sticking point remained the 
percentages. Hardinge maintained that 50% would be insufficient, as it would not give 
Britain full control. He also expressed opposition to the use of kilometric guarantees in the 
funding of the new section, although he thought that the political value of the line meant 
that this question could be put aside, for the present. 742 At this point, Grey thought it wise 
to take stock and get the views of France and Russia, Britain’s entente partners, along with 
those of the Board of Trade and the India Office. 743 Although Alexander Isvolsky, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, had been angry upon learning of the plan, he had since come 
into a more sanguine frame of mind, and his opposition was much reduced by a British 
assurance that nothing would be agreed without the approval of Russia and France. 744 It 
also contributed to the Russian’s own talks with Germany at Potsdam. 745 The French, too, 
 
740 Mallet minute, Goschen to Hardinge, 15 Dec. 1909, 15 Dec. 1909, FO 371/765/46381. 
741 Marling to Grey, No. 966, 13 Dec. 1909, FO 371/765/46060; Norman and Mallet minutes.  
742 For more on Kilometric Guarantee, see Feis, Europe, the World’s Banker, pp. 342-3.  
743 Cassell memorandum, 20 Dec. 1909, FO 371/765/46237, Hardinge and Grey minutes; India Office to 
Foreign Office, 1 Jan. 1910, FO 371/991/287.  
744 Nicolson to Grey, No. 497, Tel. 27 Nov. 1909, FO 371/765/43445; Hardinge memorandum, 18 Dec. 
1909, FO 371/765/4635; Hardinge memorandum 21 Dec. 1909, FO 371/765/47012; Grey minute. 
745 The Potsdam accord of 1910 (ratified in 1911) saw Russia, worried that Britain might come to her own 
terms on the railway with Germany, make an agreement of her own on Persia with Germany. See Sweet and 
 197 
were not delighted, and hoped that they would be able to gain concessions in Syria. 746 
Before the views of the Board of Trade or India Office could be ascertained, Mallet heard 
that Cassel had indicated British acceptance to Gwinner, on the condition that Britain had 
60% control of the line. Grey and Hardinge both thought that this went beyond what 
Cassel had been told, Hardinge emphasising that he had remained non-committal in 
recent meetings. This also implied British acceptance of the Kilometric Guarantee system. 
Mallet thought it impossible to finance the undertaking without them, but British policy 
was officially against their use. 747 Indeed, senior policymakers remained critical. Hardinge 
referred to such guarantees, whereby a certain sum per completed kilometre was 
guaranteed to the company building the line by the Turkish Government, as a ‘vortex’, 
which, were they to be used on the same terms as they had been in 1903, when the current 
concession had been finalised, would be ‘indefensible’ in front of both press and 
Parliament. He added that the system incentivised corruption and poor administration, as 
the best course of action, financially speaking, was often to run as few trains as possible. 748 
Mallet suggested that the best course of action would be to draw up a memorandum of 
suitable conditions which could then be communicated to Cassel, who could then 
informally let Gwinner know the limits within which they could negotiate. Grey agreed. 
Once the views of the Board of Trade and India Office had been received, this would be 
drawn up. 749 
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In the new year, the views of the other departments became clear. The India Office 
was strongly against the plan. It failed to see the advantage to helping Germany to threaten 
British political supremacy in the Gulf when it appeared that she was financially unable to 
do so alone. 750 The Board of Trade was similarly unenthused, albeit for differing reasons. 
Its view was that 50% was insufficient, and that 60% or at the very least 55% would be 
needed. Furthermore, it was hoped that if kilometric guarantees were used, they could be 
adjusted to in a way that would avoid the appearance of either demanding excessive funds 
from Turkey or directly funding German enterprise. On this point, Lindsay agreed. While 
Gwinner and Cassel, the financiers, thought it best to ‘exhort’ the full guarantees from the 
Porte, it did not follow that Britain should have to do so, especially as she had already 
expressed her opposition. 751 Hardinge accepted that momentum was ebbing out of the 
project, and reluctantly concluded that perhaps, for the Turkish Government, the time was 
not right to make this agreement. 752 Given his belief that the German offer had been 
made out of weakness, he thought that Britain should encourage other projects and 
irrigation, both of which would minimise the importance of the Railway in any case. 753 
From a German perspective too, the proposals were difficult. As Parker remarked, the 
railway was a political project in Germany – he warned that whatever the difficulties, it 
would eventually be completed. With all this in mind, Hardinge doubled down on his idea 
of developing British interests in order to put further pressure on the Railway. Resurrecting 
the idea of a line following the Tigris valley, he suggested that Lowther officially request 
the concession as soon as he saw the moment being suitable. 754 
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The prospects of another railway project were unclear. The Foreign Office took 
serious steps to organise it, seeking information from various engineering companies as to 
what terms on which they might be willing to build such a line. 755 The news that the 
Turkish Government was ‘on the point’ of awarding significant sums to Germany to build 
the line as far as Baghdad added impetus to discussion of the Tigris line. Lowther was 
instructed to communicate British frustration to the Porte, informing the Turks that they 
had embarked upon a course that Britain had tried to ‘protect them’ from, and reminding 
them that without British satisfaction in the Tigris and Baghdad Railway questions, assent 
to the 4% increase was ‘unlikely’. 756 Parker complained that all Britain said was that she 
could not ‘be a party to the increase of the customs if it is to be used, directly or indirectly, 
for damaging British interests by facilitating a railway which [would] deal a serious blow’ 
to her interests in Mesopotamia. If they wished, the Turks could easily render the railway 
‘harmless’ to Britain by granting a Tigris concession. 757 He believed that this concession 
was the best way forward for the British Government, as it seemed unlikely that Britain 
would now get into the Baghdad Railway, and the Tigris scheme would safeguard British 
interests. 758 Reports from Germany continued to suggest that she was unwilling, after all, 
to work with the British on the line. Goschen reported that the German Government 
would find making concessions to Britain ‘very difficult’, on account of ‘public opinion’. 
Mallet considered that this put on ‘public record’ that Germany was ‘unable or unwilling’ 
to grant any participation in the southern part of the line. Personally, he thought this 
marked the moment where Britain should abandon the idea of coming to terms with 
Germany. Hardinge and Grey were in agreement that the Tigris concession was now the 
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best way forward, and appreciated that if Germany opposed such a concession, Britain 
could now point to a German ‘monopoly’ in Mesopotamia. 759 Sir Eyre Crowe, often 
suspicious of German motives, warned that a ‘bargain’ made with Germany would not see 
better relations with the two countries as Germany would be in a better position but ‘as 
hostile as before’. Unless the advantages of an agreement, on its own terms, were ‘very 
substantial’, Britain would probably fare better without one. Amidst general agreement, 
Hardinge and Lowther plotted the way forward: Britain must pursue the Tigris valley 
concession. 760 By 11 April, Parker was writing that ‘Since [sic] the intimation of Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg that Germany would only admit our participation in the Baghdad 
Railway provided she received in turn compensation from some other quarter, the 
question of the cooperation of this country in the undertaking has been ruled out for the 
present’. He remarked that Babington Smith, then on his way back to London, would be 
irritated to hear that the ‘enterprise is at an end for the moment.’ 761 With this in mind, 
Lowther was given another strongly worded despatch to communicate to the Porte. This 
was to be read to both Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Vizier, asking for a swift 
reply to the concession, and reminding them that the 4% relied largely upon this. The 
despatch concluded:  
In the face of these considerations, His Majesty’s Government are reluctantly 
constrained to believe that the Ottoman Government, oblivious of the services 
rendered by Great Britain during the Near Eastern crisis of 1908-1909, are 
deliberately promoting at all costs the progress of the Baghdad Railway on its 
present basis and thereby undermining the commercial position of this country in 
Mesopotamia which has been firmly established for the last 200 years: they can 
only conclude that the Ottoman Government have allowed themselves to be 
influenced by prejudiced and unworthy suspicions in regard to British designs in 
that region.  
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Britain was interested, it went on, only in the preservation of the status quo in 
Mesopotamia, and the Government was prepared to ‘furnish’ the Porte with ‘the most 
binding assurances to this effect’. 762 This communication provoked little movement. At the 
end of April, Mallet found the Turkish response ‘disappointing’, given that she had not 
shown the ‘slightest indication’ that she might try to meet British wishes or even to suggest 
that she was perturbed by the British attitude. 763 Lowther was again called into service to 
remind Turkey that she was ‘ignoring’ the wishes of His Majesty’s Government. 764 Some 
clerks gave way to cynicism about German aims. Parker was ‘sure that the anti-British 
nature of the Baghdad Rly enterprise [would] be emphasised wherever possible.’ 765  
Further bad news was to come, as Rifat communicated that the Turks did not 
intend to give Britain a railway concession, largely, it seemed, due to fear of Germany. 766 
In mitigation, Rifat suggested that the final part of the Railway, to the Gulf, could be built 
by Britain. Although Grey and Hardinge thought it unlikely that such a concession would 
be made by Germany, this idea became a part of British thinking in terms of the strategic 
situation as a whole. 767 In the summer of 1910, Parker committed his views on the 
situation to paper, producing what Grey called a ‘most timely and useful memorandum’. 
In it, he clearly expressed the British position: that in return for consent to the customs 
increase, Britain should aim to get the removal of the veto on Egyptian borrowing powers 
and either the Tigris Valley concession or participation in the southern part of the 
Baghdad Railway on acceptable terms. This should include the terminus being at Kuwait 
and that a port built to serve it should be constructed by Britain. He concluded that: ‘we 
have every ground for refusing to allow British trade to be burdened by further customs 
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duties, when the yield of the additional duties is to be employed, not in developing trade, 
but in lining the pockets of foreign financiers for constructing a railway which will be a 
drain upon the resources of the country.’ 768 Grey and Hardinge again emphasised to Rifat 
that they could not consent to the 4% increase without some movement on the part of 
Turkey. 769 As negotiations went quiet for a period, Officials began to feel more relaxed 
about the situation. In December 1910, Parker thought that the 4% would be ‘likely to 
prove a powerful lever’, and that Britain was now able to wait for a ‘reasonable’ proposal 
to be made. The official position remained that if a detailed scheme was put before Britain, 
which Rifat hoped to do so soon, she would be happy to consider it. 770   
5.1.d. The German Surrender from Baghdad Onward 
 
In the first months of 1911, the British position was further weakened by the 
Potsdam Agreement between Russia and Germany, by which Russia made her own 
arrangements on railways in Persia. 771 To make matters worse still, the Turks finally 
signed an agreement with Germany to build the railway as far as Baghdad in March. This 
agreement did, however, provide a ray of light. Germany had given up her rights to build 
the line beyond Baghdad, including the right to build ports, but reserved the right to match 
the holdings of any other power. 772 This represented a good chance for Britain to 
safeguard her interests in the Persian Gulf.  
In the meantime, Parker stated the position as he understood it. He thought that 
the line would be built eventually, with or without British involvement, and so Britain 
should be involved. If she was not, then she would likely lose her position with the Sheik of 
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Kuwait, as she would be unable to defend him from Turkish aggression. 773 Crowe took a 
strong anti-German view, but thought that negotiations with Turkey were the most 
important aspect of the situation: 
It seems to me important steadily to keep in mind the main object we have in view, 
namely, the safeguarding of British interests in the Persian Gulf and, subsidiarily, in 
Mesopotamia. It was because we considered those interests threatened by the 
German monopolistic railway scheme that we have declined to assist Turkey, or 
German financiers, in carrying out that scheme. Our attitude has resulted in 
impressing Turkey with the necessity of obtaining from Germany a freer hand in 
regard to the Baghdad-Gulf section of the railway, so that Turkey now has 
something to offer us in return for which we are expected to consent to increase of 
customs and to allow British money to be made available for the railway. It is the 
customs, and our hold over Kowait, which have been the lever by which we are 
beginning to secure some success. This lever is available as against Turkey, and it is 
from Turkey that we want a satisfactory agreement respecting the position at 
Kowait and generally on the littoral of the Gulf. Therefore we should do well to 
continue negotiating with Turkey… This presupposes that, as a preliminary, we 
have made it quite clear to our own minds what British requirements are, and I 
would strongly deprecate entering into any further discussion with Germany, unless 
we have reached that state of clearness. 774 
  
 Crowe’s call for conditions to be agreed was answered, and a meeting was held at 
the Foreign Office where Britain’s conditions for the 4% increase was agreed. This marked 
a significant step forward, on the British side, in being clear about what was being asked 
for. Britain would ask that a Railway Company be formed to manage the line south of 
Baghdad, when built, which would be funded by 50% British capital, and would have 
British participation on the Board safeguarded. As an addendum, the whole railway would 
be protected from discriminatory rates, guaranteeing equality of treatment for the goods of 
all countries. The terminus of the line should be at Kuwait, and the harbour there should 
be built by British contractors on land leased by Britain. The Sheik of Kuwait would be 
recognised as the administrator of his lands, but Turkish suzerainty would be recognised by 
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Britain. Finally, the restrictions on Egyptian borrowing power would be removed. 775 Of 
these conditions, the one which officials were least wedded to was the requirement for the 
terminus to be at Kuwait. The Committee of Imperial Defence concluded on the 22 July 
1911 that it might in fact be easier for the railway to terminate at Basra, assuming that the 
Tigris and Euphrates confluence, called the Shatt al-Arab, could be adequately controlled 
and made navigable. The committee did find that Kuwait should remain as the planned 
terminus should the Railway ever be extended all the way to the Persian Gulf. 776 
Memoranda were prepared for the French and Russian Governments, informing them of 
the situation as it stood. It confirmed that a recent Turkish proposal for Britain to have 
40% of the shares, with other Powers having 20% was insufficient, and that Britain needed 
at least 50%, including protection from differential rates. 777  
In March 1912, the Turks proposed a division of 50%, to be shared between 
herself and Germany, and 50% to be split between other interested parties. The Foreign 
Office was more keen on 20% for Germany, Turkey, France, Russia and Britain, therefore 
guaranteeing 60% being in the hands of the entente Powers. For Parker though, the 
percentage question was a distraction. He had ‘never believed that the question of what 
percentage we get in the fag end of the railway – i.e. from Baghdad to the Gulf, is nearly so 
important as it would be to secure a satisfactory preliminary Convention relating to all 
railways in Asiatic Turkey and definitely excluding preferential treatment.’ 778 British 
officials were confident that they would be able to negotiate themselves into the position 
they wanted by taking advantage of Turkey’s involvement in the war with Italy. Mallet 
thought that Britain could ‘afford to be stiff, because Turkey must be anxious to come to 
terms with H.M.G. at this critical juncture in her foreign relations’, and that Britain would 
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‘never have a better opportunity for negotiation’. 779 A difficult aspect of the situation 
remained the German position. Although she had given up her rights to the line south of 
Baghdad, she maintained the right to an equal share of any line eventually built. For 
Britain, there were two ways out. Firstly, Turkey could build the line – which would be not 
be an acceptable outcome, Parker concluded – or preferably, Turkey could buy Germany 
out. If Germany tried to negotiate with Britain for concessions in return for standing aside, 
then Britain would tell her it was a matter to discuss with Turkey. 780  
In considering the percentages of lesser importance, the Foreign Office faced 
opposition from within Britain. The India Office continued to insist on Britain having at 
least 50% of the shares. Parker felt that their attitude had been unhelpful, recounting that 
Sir Arthur Hirtzel, the Secretary of the India Office’s Political and Secret Department and 
with whom he had been working closely during the negotiations, had joked that he should 
put Turkish proposals in the fire without reading them. ‘If the questions is to be 
approached in this spirit all negotiation is futile’, he complained. In a ‘prodigiously long’ 
minute, he pointed out that the India Office had previously been willing to entertain the 
20% proposal. Nevertheless, Mallet thought that to wind the clock back an ask again for 50 
or 60% would be a foolish mistake, given that Britain had been working on the 20% 
proposal. Grey, on the other hand, seemed willing to entertain the prospect. After all, he 
said ‘France and Russia have really no claim to be included if we do not want them, 
especially France whose interests lie elsewhere.’ 781 In India itself, the Viceroy, Hardinge, 
expressed support for his former colleagues, personally backing the 20% proposal. 782 
India, however, remained difficult. Parker bemoaned the apparent failure to see the facts 
and accept the situation as it stood. It was ‘perfectly easy (though rather inconsistent) of the 
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Govt. of India to express FORMALLY [sic] views in favour of British participation of 50%’ 
he wrote, but ‘no amount of expression of views’ could ‘overcome the terms of existing 
conventions.’ 783 Even Germany seemed more reasonable. The German Ambassador in 
London, Marschall, reassured Grey that Germany did not dispute much of the British 
position, and said that Germany had accepted that British consent would be required for 
the extension of the Railway into the Gulf region. 784 By July 1912, however, the prevailing 
mood had changed. It now seemed as though Britain might not seek direct involvement in 
the Baghdad to Basra section, although she was still interested in protection for her traffic. 
785 By now, the question had become subordinated into wider negotiations on Britain’s 
strategic position in Mesopotamia and the Gulf, and negotiations with Turkey would in 
any case soon be put on ice as the Balkan Wars consumed her attention and resources.  
5.1.e. The British Position Renegotiated 
 
 
 From the point of view of negotiations with Turkey, British officials saw the Balkan 
Wars as an opportunity. Alwyn Parker, who was by now recognised as the Foreign Office 
authority on the negotiations, remarked that they would have to wait until after the war. 
He thought that the war would improve the British position. Having incurred significant 
financial losses through the war, Turkey would be even more desperate for further funds in 
the shape of the customs increase, increasing the value yet further of the 4% lever to 
Britain. To make use of the break, he decided to put various memoranda and similar 
together, in to ‘carry out negotiations more expediently when they [were] reopened’. 786 
Mallet was optimistic. There were ‘indications that another opportunity’ might be given to 
Britain to improve her position in Turkey, unless the war caused a ‘general conflagration’, 
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and much would depend ‘upon the handling of the situation.’ 787 Although Turkish 
financial weakness was seen as cause for optimism in Whitehall, this was overstated, and it 
seemed this had gone too far. Struggling badly for cash in the face of Balkan conflict, the 
Turks contemplated asking for an emergency customs increase. By October 1912, they had 
secured the agreement of Austria, Germany and Italy. Vansittart was philosophical. The 
Turks were badly off, he thought, and after the war it would be very hard for Britain to 
‘stand out’ for the 4% if the other Powers had given consent. Parker, the expert, was less 
concerned. He thought that the Russia would refuse to agree in any case, as such a move 
would represent favouring Turkey against her protégé Balkan states. He was concerned 
that the 4% represented ‘our only lever for obtaining a settlement of our negotiations with 
Turkey’, but thought that Britain might seize the initiative. As the Turks needed the 
money for ‘immediate war expenses’, Britain might consent, in return for a Turkish 
acceptance in principle of British demands. 788 When it transpired that the raise was being 
considered in Turkey as permanent, any such scheme was quickly abandoned in Britain. 
In any case, Parker knew that without the 4% the ‘last lever would be gone’. Grey noted 
that Russia had declined consent. This constituted both an excuse and a reason for Britain 
to do likewise. 789 When the request came from Turkey, Grey was ready to refuse it; 
Britain pleaded neutrality, despite Parker’s research suggesting that to agree would not, 
strictly speaking, constitute a breach of neutrality. 790  
 
 As predicted, the war saw a break in negotiations. In the spring of 1913, the 
Railway returned to prominence. Germany now proposed to build the Gulf section herself, 
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but under certain conditions. Parker met Richard von Kühlmann, Counsellor at the 
German Embassy in London, who told him that if Britain agreed to Germany building the 
line, she would be willing to delay this ‘indefinitely’. The terminus would be Basra, with 
British involvement in the building of the port there, and Britain would be offered the 
chance to manage the line once built, assuming reasonable safeguards for equality of 
traffic. Parker was delighted, eyeing the ‘elements of a bargain’. The British lost no time in 
striking a deal on these lines, initialling an agreement ad referendum on the 21 May 1913. 791 
The line would not extend beyond Basra, and although Britain would not be involved in 
the construction of it, she would have significant representation on the board of directors. 
792  
 
 With the Railway now some way towards a settlement, at least from an Anglo-
German perspective, attention turned towards the navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers. At the end of May 1913, the Cabinet was told that the ‘main object’ of British policy 
was to ‘secure effective competition between river-borne traffic and the Railway’. 
Originally, it had been intended that this would be done by adding three more ships to the 
concession already held by H.F.B. Lynch. However, British policy had evolved and it was 
now proposed that another concession would be applied for, with the two interests 
amalgamated, and holding exclusive rights to transport on the river. Lynch would not be 
in control, but he would be permitted to keep his flag flying as a part of the new concern. 
Instead, the ‘head’ concessionaire would be Lord Inchcape, who was considered more 
sympathetic to the desires of the Government. 793 Unsurprisingly, Germany was not likely 
to let this go, especially given the openness she had recently displayed over the railway 
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question. Having first suggested 10% of the new company and one director being German, 
she suggested 20% and two directors in July 1913, although 10% remained the most that 
Britain was willing to offer. 794 In the meantime, Lynch, angry at the diminution of his 
business, had been trying to derail the negotiations, claiming at the Turkish Embassy that 
his right to navigation was being damaged. Seeing as Lynch held his concession from the 
British Government, rather than directly from the Turks, Grey and Parker were 
uninterested in his protestations. Hakki Pasha had been sent to London to work for the 
Turks on the conclusion of the Balkan Wars and had remained there afterwards to work 
on settling the commercial question between Britain and Turkey. He was told not to see 
Lynch or any of his associates, and Grey added that British support for the new concession 
was given to Inchcape, and would not be given to Lynch. 795 Lynch remained unwilling to 
take this calmly. Parker heard from von Kühlmann that confidential information had been 
leaked to the press in Germany, which was stirring up feeling against the concession (even 
though Germany was now involved in it). Grey was extremely angry. If such an accusation 
was true, then ‘all support’ would have to be withdrawn from Lynch, and nothing 
confidential could be communicated to him again. 796 For his part, Lynch claimed that the 
information had been distributed by a sometime associate of his – an excuse that left 
Parker not entirely convinced. He concluded that the best way to ‘draw the claws’ of 
Lynch would be conclude the agreements with Inchcape as soon as possible. 797 This was 
done on 1 September, and the necessary agreements with the Turks had already been 
initialled in mid-August. 798 Parker thought that the agreements represented ‘from the 
point of view of British interests, a very advantageous settlement of a question which [had] 
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been a frequent source of trouble for over seventy years.’ His colleagues were grateful to 
him for his long period of work on Anglo-Turkish questions. Herman Norman wanted to 
congratulate him on his ‘for his strenuous and prolonged labours’ which had come to a 
‘satisfactory termination’. Amidst the agreement of other colleagues, Grey ‘entirely and 
cordially’ endorsed these views. 799 The negotiations had by now more or less come a 
satisfactory conclusion. Grey had expressed consent for the 4% rise at the end of July, 
subject to various negotiations being completed, and the river and railway agreements now 
existed substantively. 800 
 Unfortunately for Britain, Lynch was not ready to accept a fait accompli. Delays to 
the concession mounted, and Parker saw his hand behind the problems. He believed that 
Lynch was still committed to ‘wrecking’ it. 801 Crowe remarked that Lynch suffered from 
an ‘incapacity for straight dealing’. 802 Lynch decided, in mid-November, to make his way 
to Constantinople, against the advice of his solicitor, who later claimed to be unaware that 
he had travelled. 803 Grey was angry about this, while Hakki turned to the wisdom of the 
orient. Parker took up the story: ‘Hakki Pasha said to me today that there is a Turkish 
Proverb: “do not tie yourself up in a sack with a dog”, and that Mr Lynch would block the 
working of the new company at every turn, even if his own interests suffered; it was 
therefore far better to exclude Mr Lynch from the new company now’. 804 As negotiations 
continued, the Turks remained unhappy at the prospect of German influence on the river. 
Parker was unconcerned. This was not a problem for the Foreign Office to deal with, he 
said, as Britain was compelled only not to oppose German participation, and this was now 
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a matter for the Germans. 805 The difficulties would soon disappear. In a rather ‘dramatic 
denoucement’, Lynch contracted pneumonia on his return journey, and died at Calais. 806 
In his absence, his successors ran the firm in a way that the Foreign Office found more 
‘reasonable’. 807 In the meantime, the Turks had accepted the principle of German 
participation, which looked to be fixed at 20%. 808   
 By the end of 1913, Britain had therefore gone some way towards securing her 
position in Mesopotamia and the Gulf. She had significantly reduced the danger posed by 
the Railway in gaining a measure of control of the Gulf section, and in making agreements 
over the terminus and the construction of the port. She had, in increasing and confirming 
her presence on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, further secured her position by providing 
competition for the Railway. All this had been achieved for very little cost to Britain. 809 
Matters would finally be tied up in 1914, when an agreement was made with the German 
Government on the matter too. 810 During the same period, Britain had also gone some 
way towards guaranteeing herself access to the Mesopotamian Oilfields. These 
negotiations form the contents of the next section.  
5.2. Mesopotamian Oil 
 
 
The early 1900s were a time of technological change. For a naval power such as 
Britain, the rapid development of battleship technology was of particular importance. 
Vessels of the future, both military and civilian, would be powered by oil-based fuels, 
rather than coal. At the same time, oil-based fuels were increasingly being used on land. 
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Consequently, the extraction of oil was a matter of increasing importance to British 
Officials. 811 The fact that large amounts of it were believed to lie beneath Mesopotamia, 
therefore, was significant. Furthermore, as Britain was interested in increasing her trade in 
the region, ideally at the cost of Germany, it was axiomatic that she would be keen on 
capturing at least some of the oil. 812 British policy in this regard focused around the person 
of William Knox D’Arcy, a colourful businessman who had grown up in Australia, 
following the bankruptcy of his British father. He had already been successful in finding oil 
and gaining concessions in Persia in the early 1900s. He also had a strong claim to a 
concession to search for and to work oil wells in Mesopotamia, although his rights to it 
were debated, and there was competition with a German concern. Nevertheless, he was 
the favoured candidate of the Foreign Office, in a large part thanks to having been there 
first.  
 The situation after the revolution left the D’Arcy claim on rather weaker ground. 
He faced competition from several quarters, including America. Ronald Lindsay thought it 
‘natural’ that a new regime would hope to reconsider concessions generally, especially 
given the ‘lavish’ manner in which some, such as the Baghdad Railway concession, had 
been handed out. However, he remained confident that D’Arcy’s group would succeed in 
gaining the concession eventually, given patience and strong advocacy from Lowther. 813 
The cause received a boost in June 1909, when the Ottoman Council of Ministers formally 
took the decision that the concession would go to D’Arcy. 814 D’Arcy himself was soon 
examining gift horses. Having heard that the Turkish Government would maintain its own 
access to certain specified wells, he complained that if this was for any reason other than to 
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facilitate their handover, he would not be able to accept it, as his group could not tolerate 
others working in their area. 815 British minds were soon turned to more important issues, 
as the Shell company expressed its interest in applying for a concession in the Baghdad and 
Mosul area. 816 Being pledged to D’Arcy, this put the Foreign Office in a difficult position. 
Shell stated that as there was now American competition, D’Arcy’s chances had 
meaningfully diminished. The Foreign Office was non-committal, and suggested that 
D’Arcy might communicate with Shell himself, if so inclined. Mallet warned that if Britain 
was to support any concern, it would have to be majority British. 817 This presented 
D’Arcy with an opportunity to defend his position. He informed Mallet that he did not 
want to assimilate with Shell, and that the company was in any case not majority British. 
He added that he was taking steps (although he didn’t detail them) to deal with the 
increased competition, and expressed the hope that he would still be able to rely on the 
support of the Foreign Office. To drive his point home, he enclosed a memorandum, 
listing his competitors, their countries of origin, and the details of their applications. 818  
 This was by no means the only problem faced by the Foreign Office in securing the 
oil concession. Germany was also hopeful of securing for herself a slice of the 
Mesopotamian pie. The Deutsche Bank were preparing to arrange a ‘regie’ for petroleum, 
which would centralise the production, creating a monopoly, the proceeds of which would 
go towards service of the Ottoman Debt. They noted that a previous Sultan had granted 
them certain mineral rights. Hardinge was unconcerned. ‘The Turks’ could not ‘establish a 
petroleum regie’ without British consent, and he saw no reason to agree to a monopoly 
which would form an ‘inconvenient precedent.’ 819 The suggestion faded into nothing. By 
 
815 D’Arcy to Mallet, 1 Jul. 1909, FO 371/777/24868. 
816 Sir Marcus Samuel to Grey, 28 Jul. 1909, FO 371/777/28640.  
817 Mallet – D’Arcy, 30 Aug. 1909, FO 371/777/32838. 
818 D’Arcy to Mallet, 8 Sep. 1909, FO 371/777/33985.  
819 Lane to Grey, 6 Nov. 1909, FO 371/777/41111, Hardinge minute.  
 214 
1912, the British position was that D’Arcy had Foreign Office backing. Parker remarked 
that Britain ‘did not want to encourage another competition, as against Mr D’Arcy, for the 
Mesopotamian oil concessions’. 820 Britain was tied to the D’Arcy group, but this was not 
an outcome welcomed by junior officials. In August 1912, Sir Henry Babington Smith had 
proposed the involvement of his National Bank of Turkey in Oil extraction. Oliphant 
noted that he hoped for British support, but to Norman’s regret, ‘obligations towards Mr 
D’Arcy … [could not] be overlooked.’. Norman ‘wish[ed]’ that Britain could ‘support this 
scheme’ which was both ‘grandiose and very largely British’, but before anything could be 
done, the group would have to bring D’Arcy into the project. 821 It was clear that British 
support for D’Arcy was rooted firmly in strategic rather than commercial factors. 822 
However, D’Arcy seemed amenable to the National Bank’s overtures. His group informed 
Grey that they would be willing to join with the National Bank, assuming they got at the 
least a half share, but that they remained willing and able to work alone too. Oliphant 
thought that fusion now seemed ‘most improbable’, and reminded his colleagues that their 
obligations to the D’Arcy group meant that support could not be offered to Babington 
Smith. Norman thought that the time had come to inform Babington Smith of the truth of 
the matter. 823  
Seeing as a primary motivation for the Foreign Office in trying to secure the 
concession for a British firm was to secure fuel for the Navy, Officials had to cooperate 
with the Admiralty in formulating British policy. The Admiralty was concerned that, 
should foreign interests gain a level of influence in oil extraction, they might be able to use 
this against Britain in a time of war. As a consequence, control of the oilfields should 
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remain in British hands as much as possible. 824 This finally made up the Foreign Office 
mind. Babington Smith was informed that he could not be supported, a decision reached 
in part because his National Bank led project would include finance from the Deutsche 
Bank, among others. 825 The fuel question now became the focus of discussions. On 19 
November 1912, Charles Greenway, a representative of D’Arcy’s group and later 
Managing Director of his the Anglo Persian Oil Company, attended a meeting with 
Foreign Office and Admiralty staff, which discussed how, and on what terms, fuel would 
be provided to the Navy in the event of the concession being finally gained. 826 Methods of 
keeping the company British and safeguarding the Navy’s fuel supply were discussed – 
conversations getting so far as to formulate a rough plan whereby an annual payment from 
the British Government and help in securing the concession would be considered a quid pro 
quo for the company remaining fully British, although the Admiralty opposed a payment of 
this kind. 827 British officials remained focused on finding a way to secure the concession 
and keep the resulting company British. In January 1913, Parker concluded that despite 
German claims, the ‘Validity’ of her rights were ‘far from being incontestable.’ In addition, 
one of the competing companies for the concession, Shell, was ‘predominantly foreign’. In 
the face of all this competition, and to help secure the concession, Parker concluded, 
D’Arcy should send an agent to Constantinople. Not for the first time in the pre-war 
period, Mallet felt that Lowther had not done enough. Despite the ongoing Balkan Wars, 
he complained that it looked as though ‘the Embassy were too much occupied to give 
attention to this matter, but it [was] a very important one for British interests’. He thought 
that Lowther should increase his efforts to secure the concession for D’Arcy. 828 Efforts 
 
824 Admiralty to Foreign Office, Confidential, 26 Sep. 1912, FO 371/1486/40516. 
825 Grey to Marling, No. 672, Tel., Confidential, 28 Sep. 1912, FO 371/1486/40516.; Mallet minute, 
Babington-Smith to Maxwell, 29 Aug. 1912, FO 371/1485/36674. 
826 Parker Memorandum, 19 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1486/49500. 
827 Nicolson Minute, 20 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1486/50815.  
828 Lowther to Grey, No. 8, Tel., 6 Jan. 1913, FO 371/1760/810, Parker and Mallet minutes. 
 216 
were also redoubled in London. Officials took the line with Hakki (who was in London 
dealing with both the Balkan Wars and commercial questions with Britain) that the 
concession had been promised to D’Arcy in 1909, but that this had been interrupted by 
the counter-coup. Although the Turkish Government now claimed that it would be ‘illegal’ 
to award the concession, Hakki was told that legal avenues did exist, and that in the light of 
this, the concession should be awarded as soon as possible. 829 Hearing that the Germans 
were simultaneously straining to get the concession, Grey instructed Lowther to ‘urge [the] 
Grand Vizier in the strongest manner to fulfil assurances given in the past, and support 
Stork [D’Arcy’s agent] in every way’ that he could. 830  
5.2.a. Amalgamation  
 
 
The Turkish Government found itself in something of a bind. It faced two rivals, 
both desperate to secure the Mesopotamian concession. Both had a reasonable, but by no 
means watertight, claim to be awarded it. Consequently, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the 
Grand Vizier, sought to encourage the two competing interests to amalgamate and work 
the claim together. By way of argument, he told Lowther that the ‘most valuable districts’ 
already fell under the Baghdad Railway concession, and were under German control. 831 
Amalgamation had, Maxwell pointed out, already been turned down by D’Arcy, and was 
not a favoured outcome for the British Government; Mallet said that it was the ‘very thing 
we wish to avoid’. 832 As time went on, however, Foreign Office opinion began to soften 
towards amalgamation. Shevket proved evasive on what basis, precisely, the German 
claims rested, but repeatedly pressed the idea. In April 1913, he promised that if 
amalgamation was effected, he would ensure that British interests were preponderant. 
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Mallet, so critical a month previously, now thought that amalgamation with British control 
‘would suit’ Britain. 833 Lowther’s worries that Shevket was increasingly erring towards the 
view that Germany was more entitled to the concession seemed to focus minds in London. 
‘As the question develops’, wrote Herman Norman, ‘amalgamation if it can be secured 
with British control seems more and more indicated as the proper solution’. 834 The 
D’Arcy group was also willing to contemplate amalgamation, so long as they retained 
control, however, having been in communication with Babington Smith, whose National 
Bank backed group remained interested, they feared it might prove impossible. 835 In 
Constantinople, Lowther thought that the best strategy would be to put more pressure on 
Hakki in London. Parker considered that this could be incorporated into the negotiations 
then ongoing around the 4% customs increase. Hakki could be told that the British 
Government relied upon the Ottoman Government giving them control over the oil wells. 
836  
In the meantime, the National Bank had continued its efforts to secure involvement 
in Mesopotamia for itself, much to Parker’s frustration. He thought that in making an 
arrangement difficult, they had been ‘most unpatriotic’. 837 The National Bank even 
complained that they had not been treated fairly by the British Government, an accusation 
which Parker denied with vehemence. As soon as the Foreign Office became aware that 
the National Bank was interested, Babington Smith was told in a letter of 30 June, they 
informed them that Government support was pledged elsewhere. The letter, signed by 
Mallet but written by Parker, went on to say that ‘for naval and political reasons, H.M.G. 
attach great importance to an arrangement [amalgamation]… they earnestly trust that the 
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National Bank will, from patriotic motives, assist in reaching such an arrangement’. Both 
the National Bank and D’Arcy’s Anglo-Persian Oil company should, it went on, follow the 
instructions of the British Government when matters affecting British interests were 
involved. At this time, the proposed distribution of shares would see the Anglo Persian 
group taking 35%, with the National Bank and Deutsche Bank having 25% each. The 
final 15% would be held by Shell. 838 While the National Bank was seen as obstructive, 
relations with Germany were improving. Reflecting a more general trend of thawing 
relations between the two Powers, von Kühlmann told Parker that his Government was 
willing to see the Anglo-Persian Company take a 50% share of the eventual amalgamated 
concern. 839 Indeed, obstruction came more readily from within the British state. In July, 
Parker complained that it was the Admiralty holding up progress. Although the time was 
right to negotiate with Germany and Turkey, he was being prevented from doing so 
meaningfully because the Admiralty ‘would not say what they wanted in the light of what it 
was possible to get. The F.O. was thus placed in an impossible position, and that solely 
owing to the lack of clear thinking and to indecisions at the Adm[iral]ty.’ At Parker’s 
request, Grey spoke to Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, directly, who 
assured him that his department would have no objection to an agreement that saw 
Germany having access to some of the supplied fuel oil. 840 With this, matters became 
clearer. They became clearer yet in September, when Babington Smith’s National Bank 
group decided to drop out of the negotiations, criticising the methods of the D’Arcy group 
– criticism that was not, according to Parker, entirely unwarranted. 841  
The oil question had therefore been stabilised. Although satisfactory agreement was 
never reached, with negotiations being overtaken by the outbreak of war, Britain had 
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manoeuvred herself into a fairly strong position. While cooperation with Germany was 
perhaps not ideal, the signs augured well for British control of any eventual enterprise. On 
a less positive note, however, it confirmed to British observers that any period in which 
Britain was a favoured power at Constantinople had now gone, and Britain had had to use 
strong arm tactics and negotiation with other actors to force herself into a reasonable 
position.  
5.3. Shipbuilding  
 
 
Shipbuilding was another commercial area where Britain had hoped to make strides in 
the aftermath of the revolution. On his arrival, Lowther had speculated that the Turks 
would ‘surely want to buy ships’. 842 A primary motivation of the Young Turks in 
overthrowing the Hamidian regime had been to ‘save’ their moribund Empire. For the 
Young Turks, steeped in Social Darwinism, their Navy was a source of embarrassment, 
and a priority for development, demonstrated by the despatch of Admiral Douglas Gamble 
as naval advisor. 843 
Initially, it was assumed by most observers that the Turkish fleet would be strengthened 
by the purchase of existing ships from more established naval powers. For instance, ‘most 
improbable’ rumours suggested in 1909 that the Turks contemplated the purchase of two 
dreadnought class battleships being built in Britain for Brazil. 844 Although the Brazilian 
Foreign Minister dismissed the rumours as ‘ridiculous’, Lowther reported that there was in 
fact substance to the reports. 845 Although the ships would be expensive and not in 
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Gamble’s planned programme, he apparently contemplated inspecting them, especially as 
it appeared that they were for sale. The possibility of a drastic increase in the firepower 
available to Turkey promoted some concern in Louis Mallet, who thought that the 
‘possibility of Naval expansion on the part of Turkey [was] a serious outlook’ for Britain. 
846 The shift in the balance of power in the region provided by two dreadnoughts would 
indeed be dramatic, especially as the revolutionary warship herself, HMS Dreadnought, had 
only been launched in 1906, and the navies of the world (including, it must be said, that of 
Great Britain) were scrambling to update their fleets to reflect the new standard in 
seagoing firepower and speed. Such vessels could control the Straits, menace Greece or 
threaten British seagoing dominance of the Persian Gulf. In this case, however, the danger 
receded. The Brazilians were not disposed to sell after all, and question subsided. 847 
Such fears for the strategic balance receded when, in 1910, the Turks reached an 
arrangement with Armstrong and Vickers to purchase two ships. Reflecting the lack of 
professional expertise in Turkey, the Turks asked that Britain would arrange an expert to 
oversee that the ships were of reasonable quality and that the prices being charged were 
fair. Hardinge was keen that this request be accommodated. He could ‘imagine the alacrity 
with which these demands would be met by Admiral von Tirpitz if the order were given to 
German firms.’ 848 His urgency was increased by the news that Germany had offered a 
battleship to the Turks. This made it all the more urgent, Maxwell argued, that the request 
be acceded to. 849  
 The situation became more complicated over the summer of 1910, as other British 
companies asked for British support in getting a contract to build the Turkish ships. One 
firm for instance, the Fairfields Shipbuilding Company, requested that the Government 
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would treat them on an equal footing with Armstrong with regard to assurances of 
specification and similar. Parker worried that this was a difficult request to refuse, but that 
it might open the door to German competition. Grey, for his part, informed the company 
that the Armstrong contract was too far along, and that Britain could not take action that 
might ruin it. 850 This development reflected wider problems at Constantinople. Lowther 
reported that the negotiations with Armstrong had run into problems, and that Fairfields 
and another British firm, Palmers, were now pushing for the ships to be put to tender. A 
German firm, Vulkan, was apparently encouraging this, as they thought that they would 
have a good chance of winning. 851 Officials were perhaps not surprised to learn that the 
applications of other firms had been encouraged by the Porte, which hoped to bring down 
the price of Armstrong’s offer. Mallet took this news to mean that Britain should now 
consider the original request for support from Fairfields, but Hardinge overruled him. He 
thought Armstrong still the strongest British bidder, and that without Government support, 
the order would likely go to a foreign power. 852 The difference of opinion in the Foreign 
Office continued when Fairfields submitted plans for warships at a lower price than that 
asked by Armstrong. Norman thought that a combination of the firms would be best, 
whilst Mallet again pressed his view that Britain should give Fairfields approval. Hardinge, 
however, stayed firm to his original argument that Armstrong and Vickers represented the 
best chance of success. 853 His stance was justified by news from the Admiralty that 
Fairfields had made ‘improper use’ of Admiralty plans, whilst the other competing British 
firm, Palmers, would be unable to build guns themselves, and would have to work in 
partnership with an American firm. This meant that Armstrong was the only firm eligible 
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to receive an ‘Admiralty certificate’. 854 British policy was now clear – Armstrong should 
get the order. More important than this, however, was that the order ‘should not be placed 
abroad’. 855  
 At this juncture, the Foreign Office discovered that the Turks had agreed to 
purchase two existing battleships from Germany. This was widely believed to mark the 
conclusion of the negotiations with Armstrong. Norman believed that Armstrong would 
have got it, if they had been ‘left alone in the field’, and complained that the Turks had 
been playing a ‘double game’. In a final broadside, he pointed out that the Germans would 
be unlikely to sell anything that would be ‘worth their while’ to keep. Grey was more 
philosophical. He thought that recent acquisitions by the Greeks had probably encouraged 
the Turks to think more about speed of delivery than utility, and added that he was ‘not 
sure that the Turks would ever have made up their minds to give any order’. 856 Admiral 
Hugh Pigot Williams, who had replaced Gamble, suggested that the situation might be 
rescued by the offer of two British vessels to the Turks. He noted that the German vessels 
were slow, and that Britain might be able to offer faster vessels which would be more suited 
to Turkish requirements. Grey thought there could be no objection. If Britain did not sell, 
then the Germans would. 857 The Admiralty was rather less flexible, and suggested ships 
older than those that had been mentioned to the Turks, although they claimed that these 
remained superior to those offered by Germany. 858 The Turks were not keen on this offer, 
but expressed an interest in ‘Warrior Class’ fast armoured cruisers. 859 ‘As expected’, the 
Admiralty decided that it was unable to spare any vessels of that nature. Mallet speculated 
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that this was perhaps not a bad outcome, as it might restrain warlike posturing towards 
Greece. 860  
 Despite this, the negotiations to buy new vessels continued. Tevfik, at that time 
Turkish Ambassador to London, had asked for information on the reasonableness of 
Armstrong’s prices in August, after many had assumed that negotiations were at an end. 861 
In January 1911, as discussions continued, the British position was much the same. The 
Admiralty still favoured Armstrong over Palmers, as they had more knowledge, which 
would entail less supervision and a lower price, and because their bid saw the guns for the 
ship manufactured in Britain rather than America. 862 This time, the armament of the 
ships proved a sticking point. Lowther warned the Turks against using Krupp guns to 
equip the vessels, pointing out that in a majority of cases, Powers using ‘customer’ guns, 
rather than building them themselves, used British. He worried that the recent purchase of 
German ships meant that German guns were now favoured in Turkish Naval circles. 863 
Although Tevfik had promised that the guns would be bought in Britain, the Turkish 
Government remained undecided. 864 Maxwell thundered that Tevfik had ‘misled’ the 
British, whilst Grey concluded that ‘what the Turkish ambassador says does not appear to 
be reliable’. The question of guns, although appearing minor, threatened quite serious 
consequences. As Mallet pointed out, ‘German guns’ meant ‘German officers’, threatening 
the British domination of the Ottoman Navy. Furthermore, if the hulls of the ships were 
built in Britain, with the guns added in Germany, this would mean British plans falling into 
the hands of the Germans. 865 Armstrong were concerned that this might form an 
 
860 Admiralty to Grey, 20 Aug. 1910, FO 371/1005/30567, Norman and Grey minutes; Lindsay had 
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unwelcome precedent, and Maxwell was informed that, in deference to the political 
circumstances, they would be willing to lower their price for the work. 866 Lowther was 
now instructed to support Armstrong so far as he could, although to remain open to other 
British offers of complete vessels, and to complain strongly about the Turkish 
Government’s creating of a commission to decide upon the armament of the new ships. 867 
Maxwell was in no doubt where the delay over armament had come from, certain that it 
represented the work of Palmers, the competing firm. Mallet called them ‘unscrupulous’, 
and hoped that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would ‘take notice of it’, 
preventing them from receiving British orders in future. 868  
 The Turkish Government was also struggling with the demands of the process. In 
the face of strong criticism from their Parliament, a vote of confidence was called and won. 
869 Emboldened by this, a provisional agreement for hulls was concluded with Armstrong 
in May 1911, and although the question of guns awaited the report of the commission, it 
eventually reported in favour of the complete ships being built in Britain. 870 Although 
there was some delay, owing to Turkish financial problems, a firm order was made for a 
single complete battleship in June 1911. 871  
 As a coda to the saga of the ships ordering, in February 1912, the Turks requested 
British inspectors to confirm that ongoing work was to specification, and of equivalent 
standard to that carried out for Britain. The Admiralty initially refused to do so without 
being given detailed technical specifications; the Turks argued (justifiably, according to 
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Parker) that they did not have such information, hence their request for it to be done for 
them. A frustrated Foreign Office requested the Admiralty to change their mind, as no 
work would be forthcoming in the future if such a state of affairs were allowed to continue. 
872 Grudgingly, the Admiralty accepted, but fired a parting shot: they would not afford the 
Turkish Government facilities for testing the armour plating on the new ship. This, 
Herman Norman noted, did not matter very much, as the Turks had not asked for this in 
any case. 873 
The Turks therefore had their dreadnought, while the British had Turkish business. 
However, the negotiations had been lengthy and convoluted, and there was a palpable 
sense of frustration in the Foreign Office at both the tactics of the Turks and the 
unhelpfulness of the Admiralty in helping them to secure Turkish orders for British firms. 
Although Britain had beaten the Germans to the order, the Germans had sold some ships 
to the Turks. Indeed, the purchase of ships from Britain is perhaps not reflexive of any 
great favour. As the preeminent naval power, and the innovators of the new class of fast, all 
big gun battleships, it was perhaps inevitable that any power looking to improve her naval 
strength would look towards Britain. The question of ships would once more prove an issue 
in Anglo-Turkish relations, as well as complicating relations with Russia, when, at the 
outbreak of war, this vessel and another, originally being built for Brazil but destined for 
Turkey, were seized by the British navy, leaving the Ottoman delegation sent to receive 
them empty-handed.  
5.4. Finance, Railways and Oil  
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Britain’s position by the end of 1913 was a strong one. 874 She had secured herself a 
much improved position regarding the Baghdad Railway, significantly reducing the threat 
it posed to her position in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. She had manoeuvred herself 
into a strong position with regard to the Mesopotamian Oilfields. In addition, the first 
Turkish dreadnought was being constructed in a British yard.  
Although British policy had managed to secure all of this, it had come at a cost. 
Although the obvious expenses, such as loosening of various capitulatory rights and 
consent to the 4% were slight, Britain had appeared obstructionist to Turkish observers, 
and had driven a hard bargain. Indeed, the British position became increasingly hard-line 
as time went on, and she seemed less and less willing to take Turkish wishes into account. 
This reflected a growing feeling that Turkey was not a British priority. Relations with other 
Powers were more important than securing Turkish favour (see the 1910 loan, for 
instance), and Turkey increasingly seemed an unreliable and unstable country. When 
British strategy and global interests were the price of improved relations with the Turks, 
Britain was unwilling to pay it. In the final analysis, British commercial aims in Turkey 
were fundamentally strategic, rather than commercial, and her commercial victories came 
at the cost, rather than benefit, of the Turks.  
  
 
874 Kent, Oil and Empire p. 11. Briton Cooper Busch considered the British position in the Gulf to be even 
stronger in 1914 than it had been in the 1890s – he considered the challenges faced in this period had helped 
to strengthen the British position. Id., Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 388. 
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6. Wars before the War: Tripoli and the Balkans 875 
 
6.a. A period of conflict 
 
The final years before the outbreak of the First World War were tumultuous ones 
for Turkey. From September 1911 to August 1913, she was involved in an almost constant 
series of wars which saw her lose large chunks of her African holdings, along with the vast 
majority of the European provinces of the Empire. Moreover, the wars proved a significant 
mental shock to Turkey, and suggested to her that she would be unable to rely on the 
Great Powers any further. 876 The Powers, for their part, had come very close to war over 
the Balkans, and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire seemed to suggest that 
further upheavals were likely. 877 
 By 1911, Italy had long coveted colonial possessions with which to underpin her 
fragile claims to Great Power status. Following the Agadir crisis in April 1911, Ottoman 
North Africa was the last part of the continent untouched by the Colonial Powers. 
Furthermore, Italian influence was already strong, as a result of the ‘peaceful penetration’ 
of Libya, and the Italian Government saw a ‘relatively cheap’ colonial war as likely to 
prove politically useful. 878 Consequently, various complaints about Ottoman treatment of 
Italian subjects and businesses were made. Following the delivery of a forcible ultimatum, 
war was declared on 29 September. The Powers, keen to avoid falling out amongst 
themselves and largely disinterested in the conflict, allowed the Italians to get on with the 
war. In this, the Italians were helped by the slightly odd position they occupied in 
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international politics, being a member of the Triple Alliance but largely on friendly terms 
with the Triple Entente Powers. By late autumn, the war had already reached a state of 
stalemate. Italian troops had landed in several locations, but had found themselves unable 
to move far inland. Embarrassingly for the Italian Army, they suffered heavy losses in 
asymmetric fighting with local irregulars.  
 Frustrated by the inability of the Army to progress, Italian strategy moved further 
afield, threatening the Straits and attacking the Turkish held islands in the Aegean, 
resulting in a panicked Ottoman Government closing the Straits to all traffic by the setting 
of minefields. This provoked Great Power action. Most of the Powers suffered from the 
restrictions on trade that this step caused – the British Foreign Office received numerous 
communications from irate merchants, concerned about their perishable cargoes – and the 
Russians were naturally anxious at any movement in the delicate diplomatic situation at 
the Straits. Eventually, following Great Power pressure, the Straits were reopened, and the 
war continued, coming to a close only on the outbreak of the First Balkan War in Autumn 
1912, as the Turks realised that they faced an existential threat to their European lands. 879 
  
The islands question proved longer lasting. Britain was unwilling to allow Italy to 
maintain possession of the Dodecanese, some of which presented excellent naval bases and 
might be used to significantly alter the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean. 
Although British diplomacy aimed to remove the Italians from the islands, the Italians 
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remained in possession of them at the outbreak of the First World War, holding them as a 
guarantee of the treaty of Ouchy, which ended the war. 880  
  
Meanwhile, in the Balkans, the newly minted Balkan League prepared to attack 
Turkey and secure the territories historically considered theirs. This grouping, which 
consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, had been established at first with 
the encouragement of Russia, who saw it as a bulwark against Hapsburg incursion into the 
Balkans. 881 In the Spring and Summer of 1912, the Ottoman State suffered a number of 
setbacks. Significant unrest in Albania, the war with Italy and the fall of the CUP in a 
coup, all weakened Turkey, and suggested to the Balkan League that the time was ripe to 
put their plans into action. The explosion of a bomb in the Macedonian town of Kochana, 
and the heavy handed Turkish reprisals which followed it, provided an ideal pretext to 
launch the war. The conflict presented significant risks to the Powers, in particular Russia 
and Austria-Hungary, which both had significant ambitions of expansion in the region. 
That these two Powers might come to blows was an eventuality never far from the minds 
of European policymakers. 882  
The Balkan states, in particular Bulgaria, proved remarkably successful, and 
advanced rapidly towards Constantinople, eventually being held at the Çatalca lines 
outside the city. 883 With winter setting in and cholera wreaking havoc amongst the troops, 
Grey was hopeful of giving Europe a ‘christmas [sic] present of peace’. 884 To this end, and 
to avoid the problems inherent in communication via telegraph and despatch, he proposed 
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the assembly of a ‘conference of Ambassadors’, who would be able to talk freely about the 
situation and come up with a solution acceptable to all. As a starting point, it was agreed 
that Adrianople (today Edirne) would have to be given up by Turkey. This city, a former 
capital of the Empire and the site of the tombs of several former Sultans, held significant 
sentimental and religious value to the Turks, in addition to its status as an important aspect 
of the defences of Constantinople. The Turks were extremely reluctant to hand it over to 
Bulgaria, especially as the Bulgarian Army was yet to take the city, which still held out as 
1913 dawned. Finally, after significant pressure from the revived concert of Europe, the 
Ottoman Government seemed ready to surrender the city. However, in a dramatic 
development on 23 January, CUP figures burst in on the Cabinet, engaged in drafting the 
submission to the Powers, and forced them to resign, shooting and killing Nazim Pasha, 
the general blamed for Ottoman defeats. The new Government soon discovered that the 
problems constraining their predecessors did not magically disappear simply by replacing 
them, and restarted the war with Bulgaria. Given the exhausted and disorganised nature of 
the Ottoman Forces, this could not but go badly, and this came to pass, with Adrianople 
itself falling in March.  
This seemed to clear the way for the Powers to impose a solution and end the crisis. 
Negotiations soon centred around the borders of the new independent Albania that was to 
be created, specifically the town of Scutari (today Shkodër), which remained for some time 
in Ottoman possession, until being surrendered to the Montenegrins by its commander, in 
return for a large bribe. The Montenegrins, too, refused to leave for some time, making the 
work of the Powers difficult and again threatening a general war. Eventually, they were 
persuaded, and peace seemed guaranteed.  
At this juncture, in the summer of 1913, the Balkan League broke up amidst 
tensions between the members, and fighting broke out once again amongst them, soon 
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joined by Romania, which had remained neutral during the first war. The Turks, too, 
seeing an opportunity to regain some of their lost territories, joined the conflict, advancing 
into Thrace and regaining Adrianople. When peace was made, Bulgaria had lost much of 
her gains from the wars. Turkey, although having lost much of her European provinces, 
now had a defensible toehold in Europe. In terms of the Great Powers, Russia and Austria 
in particular had been raised to a high pitch over their Balkan interests. Russia had been 
handed a diplomatic defeat, forced to act to defend its ally Serbia from Austria, thus 
alienating Bulgaria and causing her influence in the Balkans significant damage. 885 The 
simmering resentments and unsolved questions in the region stored up trouble for the 
future. 886 
  
In terms of Anglo-Turkish relations, the period demonstrated that the cooling of 
the relationship that had begun in 1908 had continued. British policy in this period was 
focused on internationalisation, and on keeping in touch with other Powers – for instance 
Grey’s invocation of the Concert in 1912. This left little room for Turkey, where it was felt 
that the British had rather let her down, leaving her to the mercy of her enemies. Turkish 
behaviour, for instance over Adrianople, and the enactment of yet another coup in 1913, 
was not calculated to gain the favour of Britain, and direct approaches for an alliance 
during this period were rebuffed by Britain. 887 
 
885 Buchanan, perhaps inevitably given his position, disagreed. Grey’s policy had allowed ‘Russia to withdraw 
without losing too much prestige’, id., My Mission to Russia, p. 136-7.  
886 Eyal Ginio’s work on the ‘culture of defeat’ suggested that the Balkan wars were experienced as a 
traumatic event by many Ottomans, and prompted a period of soul searching. This lay the groundwork for 
the more assertive foreign policy of the war years, but also the Turkish state which emerged in the aftermath 
of the First World War. Id., The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath (Oxford, 2016). 
887 Discussions of this period are numerous. Classic accounts Include Crampton, R.J. The Hollow Détente: 
Anglo-German relations in the Balkans, 1911-1914 (London, 1980); Helmreich, Ernst, The Diplomacy of the Balkan 
Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge, MA, 1938); Thaden, Edward, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University 
Park, PA, 1965). More recently, see Hall, Balkan Wars; Ahmad, Feroz, The Making of Modern Turkey (London, 
1993); Jelavich, Barbara, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge, 1991); Macmillan, Margaret, 
The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War (London, 2014); McMeekin, Sean, 
The Ottoman Endgame (London, 2016). The Balkan Wars also produced a profusion of literature describing the 
horrors of the conflict, proving influential on a young Leon Trotsky. See Durham, Mary Edith, The Struggle for 
 232 
6.1. Tripoli  
 
6.1.a. Tensions and Discussion of Mediation  
 
 
 British Officials were aware of Italian frustrations and tensions in Tripoli for some 
time before the outbreak of war. 888 In July 1911, Grey expressed sympathy to the Italian 
representative in London. If his complaints were true, he said, then it was very difficult for 
the Italian Government to obtain satisfaction in a place so far from Rome. In a move that 
would have been unimaginable two years earlier, he informed him that should the hand of 
‘Italy be forced, [he] would, if need be, express to the Turks the opinion that, in face of the 
unfair treatment meted out to Italians, the Turkish Government could not expect anything 
else.’ 889 Crowe was less sanguine. If other Powers gained ‘special advantages’ in Morocco, 
then Italy might feel ‘compelled… to seek compensation in Tripoli – a dangerous policy.’ 
890 Robert Vansittart, then in the early years of his long career at the Foreign Office, 
thought that Italian complaints were perhaps not as serious as suggested. 891 For instance, 
once such complaint suggested that an Italian girl had been influenced by the Vali of 
Adana to convert to Islam. Under Italian law, being younger than sixteen, she was not 
permitted to change religion. As a result of Italian protest, she was to be shipped to 
Constantinople for a full examination for the case, but she had gone missing on the way. 
Unsurprisingly, in the main, British officials considered such complaints as insufficient 
cause to provoke a war. 892 Rifat Pasha, still Foreign Minister, complained to Lowther that 
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the Italian press was ‘most violent’ in reaction to every incident, and Sir Rennell Rodd, 
British Ambassador at Rome, confirmed that both Government and Opposition leaning 
organs were strongly in favour of a forward policy in North Africa. 893 Nor was this limited 
to Italy. Norman noted in early September that the press on both sides were taking up 
‘aggressive’ lines on the issue. 894 
 Despite this fevered atmosphere, matters moved slowly. Rome had taken up its 
‘usual deserted summer aspect’, reported Rodd, as ministers assembled for monthly 
Cabinet meetings, before dispersing back to the ‘baths and mountain stations’ as quickly as 
possible. Although taking their time, the Italian Government was aware, he said, that it 
was ‘almost impossible’, in the face of the press campaign and public opinion, for any 
administration to allow French gains in Morocco without making some efforts in the 
direction of Tripoli. Rodd warned that the attitude of the Powers would be important: 
‘Should the Tripoli question become a material one, there is no doubt that the crucial 
moment will have arrived in which the definite orientation of Italy will be settled, and that 
it will depend on the attitude assumed by the Powers towards which group she will 
permanently gravitate in the future.’ Norman was concerned that this meant that the 
goodwill of Italy could be bought only by acquiescence in her ‘designs on Tripoli’, an 
action which would ‘alienate the sympathy of Turkey and throw her more and more into 
the arms of Germany’. Nevertheless, the decision was largely made. Mallet pointed out 
that France, Britain and Germany had already ‘disinterested’ themselves in Tripoli. 895 
The signs from Rome remained disquieting. When invited to by the Turkish Embassy, the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marchese di San Giuliano, refused to disassociate 
the Italian Government from the press campaign. 896 His Secretary General, meanwhile, 
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thought that it would be difficult for Italy to resist the calls of the Press, and suggested to 
Rodd that should a pretext for action present itself, there would be no warning. 897 The 
Turks were starting to be concerned. A week before the outbreak of war, Nicolson was 
asked to issue a warning to Italy against ‘dangerous’ actions. In a sign of the limited 
sympathy cherished for Turkey, Nicolson replied that there was little that Britain could do, 
as she had not spoken for Italy at Constantinople, and thus could not speak at Rome for 
Turkey. Although true, this diplomatic excuse clearly demonstrated the ways in which 
British policy towards Turkey had changed since the Bosnian crisis of 1908, when Britain 
would not have sidestepped so mild a step. 898 Later on, Mallet would muse that the Italian 
‘case’ for war was so weak that it would have been better had it not been made public at 
all, further underlining the extent to which British policy took an indulgent attitude 
towards the Italians. 899 Lowther reported growing nervousness in Turkish Government 
circles, and that many worried that any small event might be used as a pretext for action 
by Italy. 900 Privately, he remarked that such ‘nervousness’ was not extreme. He found 
Hakki Pasha, then the Grand Vizier, to be ‘much perturbed about the possibility of Italy’s 
action in Tripoli, so much so that he thought he might lose his holiday!’ 901  
 On 22 September, the Foreign Office heard from Genoa that Italian warships were 
being prepared to transport troops to Northern Africa. 902 The next day, the semi-official 
press in Rome carried a non-denial of this development. 903 By the 26th, Britain was asked 
by Italy to express her moral approval of Italian action in Tripoli. Grey thought that moral 
support was perhaps going too far, and that Britain could not support an annexation by 
force without Turkish provocation, but that should Italy feel compelled to take 
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‘proportionate action’ to redress wrongs, Britain would be neutral. Italy could consider this 
‘benevolent’, if she so chose. 904 Days later, Italy would deliver an ultimatum to Turkey, 
the ‘brutality’ of which came as ‘rather a shock’ to Lowther and the rest of the diplomatic 
establishment at Constantinople. 905 Although the Turks proposed transferring Tripoli to 
Italian possession, maintaining Turkish suzerainty, the Italians rejected this proposal and 
to the ‘panic’ of the local population, Italian warships were soon visible off the coast of 
Tripoli. 906 Grey warned Guglielmo Marchese Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador to 
London, that although Britain was friendly to Italy, and would allow her to defend her 
interests in line with an agreement made with her in 1902, the contemplated annexation 
was an ‘extreme step’ which could cause other Powers (particularly Britain with her large 
Muslim population, he might have added) significant ‘embarrassment’. He hoped that Italy 
would refrain, so far as possible, from action likely to provoke such embarrassment. 907 
Lowther thought that this was unlikely. He did not think that the war would ‘cause 
[Britain] any trouble’ and that it would likely be ‘confined within reasonable limits’, an 
eventuality that the Turks hoped for too. 908 Nevertheless, the Turks approached the 
Foreign Office, and asked that a ‘friendly word’ be said to Italy to this end, but to no avail. 
Nicolson repeated the line used earlier that Britain could not act at Rome having not acted 
at Constantinople. 909 The British position was clear. Although policymakers hoped that 
the Italian leadership would keep their war localised, they were not willing to intercede on 
Turkey’s behalf. British policy at this time aimed at managing the position of Italy within 
the international state system. While hoping to maintain reasonable relations with the 
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Italians, Grey also thought it best that Italy remained a part of the Triple Alliance, in order 
to avoid the risk of a realignment of the Powers, and a resurrection of the Dreikaiserbund. 910 
At this juncture, it is clear that Grey’s wider conception of foreign policy did not leave 
room for Turkish sensibilities, and that he was not keen to seek her favour in the way he 
had done in the past.  
 With war underway, Grey looked to another core tenet of his strategy: the ententes 
with France and Russia. He informed them that Britain would declare neutrality in the 
conflict, and both confirmed that they would follow suit. 911 In terms of British neutrality, 
the position in Egypt was an anomaly. Although formally an Ottoman Province, it was a 
de facto British possession, and this meant that the Italian Government declared that they 
intended to treat the waters of Egypt as neutral, and hoped that the British Government 
would make a similar undertaking. As Vansittart noted, the Turkish fleet was ‘discouraged’ 
from using Egyptian ports, even in peacetime, and consequently it was declared that the 
use of Egypt as a naval base would not be consistent with neutrality. 912 Another issue was 
that of the British subjects employed by the Ottoman Navy. Lowther hoped that they 
would be able to remain in Turkey during the war, as should they leave, ‘we [should] 
never get them back again’, and furthermore, Germans employed in the Army were to 
remain. 913 Grey was happy for them to stay, so long as they took no part in hostilities, but 
the issue would again rear its head at the end of October. 914 Nicolson privately admitted 
to Lowther that strictly speaking, British officers in the Turkish Navy could not be 
considered neutral, as any advice they offered would naturally be used to improve 
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Ottoman performance. Indeed, the Italians had complained, but seeing as German officers 
still remained, and the Italian complaint was specifically against British officers being 
afloat, it was again decided that British subjects could remain in the employ of the Navy. 
915  
 
 As soon as hostilities commenced, the Turks sought help in bringing the war to a 
negotiated close. On 30 September, they asked the British Government if they would be 
willing to intervene, in order to produce a peace settlement. Lowther thought there seemed 
little point at the present time, as the Turks still desired a settlement in which the territorial 
integrity of the Empire would not suffer, whilst the Italians were clear that they were not 
prepared to give up Tripoli. 916 Vansittart complained that the British Government had 
already made its ‘feelings clear’ on intervention in the war. 917 While the Italians remained 
willing to limit the war to Tripoli, and apparently did not plan to launch a full attack on 
the Ottoman Navy, British policymakers were happy to allow the war to play out for the 
time being. 918 Although Turkey would offer armed resistance to the Italian attack, matters 
drifted. The Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, had resigned in the wake of the Italian 
declaration, and the formation of a replacement cabinet took some time, as few Turkish 
statesmen were willing to take on the poisoned chalice of government at this difficult time 
for the Empire. 919 Kâmil, an incumbent of the Sublime Porte on several occasions, refused 
to consider becoming Grand Vizier again without assurances that he could govern with 
freedom of action from the CUP. 920 It would not be until the 5th that a new cabinet was 
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formed, under the tutelage of Said Pasha, taking the reins for the eighth and final time. 
Even this was considered to be a placeholding ‘Cabinet d’Affaires’ by Lowther. 921 
Meanwhile, the Turks continued to ask for mediation, suggesting intervention by Britain 
once the Italian occupation had been effected, on the basis that Italy had not declared that 
permanent occupation was the aim of the war. This was a naïve proposal. Vansittart 
remarked that mediation would be ‘difficult’ for a third party such as Britain, so ‘long as 
the ideas of the principals [were] so far apart’, whilst his colleague Maxwell was in 
agreement that there was ‘no basis’ for mediation at that moment. 922 The Turks were 
again told that intervention would be considered a hostile act by Italy, and could not be 
attempted. 923 Across the Channel, the French were more keen to act, concerned that 
inaction would allow Germany to make capital by assuming the role of ‘honest broker’. 
While Grey agreed with the sentiment, and that promoting an arrangement was desirable, 
he warned that any action would involve asking Turkey to abandon Tripoli, a move that 
could only anger the Porte. Grey was unwilling to risk irritating the Ottomans for the 
benefit of the French, and counselled patience, with the full agreement of Mallet, who 
remarked that it was ‘clearly too soon’ for mediation to have any hope of success. 924 
Lowther thought that the time when any mediation might be attempted was still some way 
off. The Turks would wait and see what resistance they could be offer, in conjunction with 
local Arab irregulars, before deciding on the next steps to take. 925 As the French feared, 
German diplomats made efforts at Rome in the direction of mediation, attempting to 
encourage their ally to come to terms and pointing out the risk that the conflict could 
spread to the Balkans if it went on for too long. Mallet, however, was unmoved, and 
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expressed himself against joining in such actions, worried that it was not sufficiently clear 
what precisely was planned. 926 Policymakers remained cautious, but the official position 
remained that Britain was keen on mediation ‘in principle’, but that for this happen, there 
would need to be more clarity on Turkish desires, to form a basis for negotiation. 927 
Nicolson, never an optimist, complained to Lowther that he had ‘rarely seen such 
exceedingly vague proposals’ as those put forward by the Turks, and he was unclear as to 
what it was she wanted. 928 Grey was ‘anxious to make no proposals’ he informed Rodd, as 
they were ‘sure to be futile and unacceptable.’ He wished ‘merely to ascertain facts’. 929 In 
mid-October, Vansittart took stock of the situation:  
The position, then, is that Turkey will not make a tangible proposal, while Italy 
wants the whole of Tripoli without restriction, probably, in the opinion of the 
Russian M.F.A., without the suzerainty of the Sultan which seems to be the plan of 
the Austrian M.F.A. meanwhile the Germans seem to be dropping the idea of an 
armistice, which Sir R. Rodd considers disadvantageous to Italy and which the 
Russian M.F.A. considers w[oul]d be resented at Constantinople. 930 
 
Mallet and Grey agreed that there was ‘nothing to be done for the present’, and Britain 
would have to ‘wait for the development of the situation at Constantinople’. 931 Grey was 
happy that Britain ‘sit still’ for the moment, as was Mallet, who thought that there was ‘no 
advantage’ to be gained through mediating. He would rather, he said, leave it to Germany 
to ‘try her hand first’. 932 Even the much feared Muslim backlash did not appear at this 
juncture. Maxwell noted that petitions from Muslim subjects in India had been very few. 
933 
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 Opinion in Britain was critical of the Italian action in instigating the war. Rodd 
complained that critical press made his job in Rome much harder. He argued that Britain 
must look to the future. With territory in North Africa, Italy would have a stronger 
presence on the Mediterranean, meaning that her ‘friendship’ would be more important. It 
made sense, he concluded, that Britain should try to improve her relationship with Italy. 
His arguments did not find much favour in Whitehall. Nicolson agreed that the press was 
‘one sided’ and Vansittart argued that those responsible for translating the British press 
into Italian should put more emphasis on the more ‘sober’ articles, rather than the more 
‘violent’ examples which, he conceded, made ‘better copy’. Mallet disagreed with Rodd’s 
final analysis. Although he thought Germany might make short term gains from being the 
first to make mediation proposals, he believed that Italy would not ‘commit herself, when 
the European Conflict [came], until she [saw] which side [was] winning.’ 934 Having 
determined that waiting would be the order of the day, British officials turned their focus 
towards pressuring the Turks to relight the Red Sea lights used for night time navigation, 
which they had extinguished for military reasons. 935 
 
 Grey did, however, continue to assure the Italians that Britain would not intervene 
in the war, and that she would not oppose annexation. He informed Imperiali that 
mediation had not been discussed on any basis other than annexation, ‘pure and simple’. 
936 The Turks continued to appeal to Britain for mediation or intervention, going so far as 
making an appeal for an alliance, which was turned down. Nicolson thought the proposals 
‘childish and naïve’. He could ‘not imagine’ a ‘more absurd proposal’ than one in 
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particular, that Tripoli would be put under the control of Egypt, with Britain allying herself 
with Turkey and fighting Italy to achieve this. 937 Others, such as Count Alois Aehrenthal, 
the Austrian Foreign Minister, continued to make proposals for intervention and a 
mediated end to the conflict. 938 Grey stood firm. ‘At present, mediation seems to have 
little chance of success’, he informed Lowther, but instructed him, in the light of the 
Austrian proposal, to keep in touch with his colleagues at Constantinople, with a view to 
finding a suitable moment for a solution. 939 The Italians, meanwhile, grew frustrated with 
the slow progress their armed forces were making, and complained to Britain that Turkish 
officers and troops were crossing Egypt to get to Tripoli and fight. Naturally, they hoped 
that Britain would take steps to stop it, but the Foreign Office was unimpressed. It was 
hard to police the border, especially considering that much of it was in large areas of 
unoccupied desert, and Maxwell believed that ‘everything possible [was] being done’ to 
prevent Turks using this land route. 940 Having made this complaint, the Italian 
Government thought the time right to declare sovereignty over Tripoli, despite the fact 
that their armed forces had achieved minimal penetration. Vansittart remarked that this 
was ‘rather a case of “first catch your hare”.’ 941  
6.1.b. Tension over the Straits  
 
 
 With the war settling into stalemate, it was clear to all observers that the Italians’ 
best chance of a breakthrough would be to expand the scope of the war. Vansittart 
remarked that the Italian Government was in ‘something of a quandary’, as bringing 
pressure to bear on Turkey would mean either ‘giving offence to other Powers’ or attacking 
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somewhere where they could ‘strike without offence but without effect’. 942 The logical 
place to attempt such a stroke, despite the risks it posed, was the Straits. Rumours that this 
was contemplated reached London as early as November, much to Nicolson’s concern. He 
could not see how Britain could ‘prevent’ Italy from attacking the Straits, if she were ‘so 
foolish as to attempt to do so’, as ‘no Power would use force against her’. 943 That the 
Straits were an obvious target had occurred to the Turks too, and they saw that this 
presented an opportunity to call for help from the Powers. Consequently, they appealed to 
Britain, pointing out that if the war were to spread, Turkey might be compelled to take 
measures that would impact upon the commerce of all Powers – by this, they meant 
closure of the Straits. With this in mind, they requested the Powers to prevail upon Italy 
not to act. Policymakers were, at this time, agreed that Turkey should be allowed to take 
defensive measures, if required. 944 Amidst nervousness in commercial circles, however, 
both sides declared that fighting at the Straits was not on the agenda for the present. 
Vansittart noted with relief at the end of November that if ‘the Italian Govt. [did] not 
contemplate attacking [the] Dardanelles, and Turkish Govt. do not contemplate closing 
them, no action is… necessary’. 945  
 In February 1913, the question was again opened. Lloyds of London, the insurance 
underwriting exchange which specialised in marine insurance, had heard that a closure of 
the Straits was contemplated. 946 They hoped to reassure financiers that this was not the 
case, and asked for information. 947 This prompted another round of international hand-
wringing over the issue. To protect trade, Grey contemplated action at Rome, in 
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conjunction with the other Powers, asking for assurances that they would not take any 
action which might cause the Straits to be closed. 948 Grey’s proposal was met with a 
lukewarm response. In early March, Maxwell laid out the situation for his colleagues: ‘The 
position is now that Russia refuses to agree, Austria will probably refuse. Germany has not 
answered; the French have agreed but want to include Syria.’ Nicolson, ever the 
Russophile, admitted that the Russian attitude was ‘not easy to explain’. 949 The German 
reluctance was perhaps easier to understand: she was unwilling to act against her ally. 
Austria, meanwhile, was believed to be involved in what Mallet called a ‘childish’ plot with 
Italy to compel Turkey to make peace. 950 Emboldened by the eventual refusal of all the 
Powers, other than France, to work with Grey’s proposal, Italy now declared that she 
would be unable to give assurances, claiming that she had to keep a potentially war ending 
option open. Vansittart concluded that the ‘idea [was] at an end’. 951 
 In April, in the light of Italian operations against the Dodecanese islands, the 
Ottoman Government completely closed the Straits. Russia stood to lose the most from 
this, as all her so-called warm water ports were on the Black Sea. The Straits were 
therefore her only thoroughfare to the outside world, at least in winter. 952 She requested 
that the Straits be reopened as soon as possible, and threatened to claim an indemnity 
from Turkey if this were not done so. 953 Despite the damage to British commerce, the 
Italian action (in conjunction with the seizure of the islands) saw a change in the British 
attitude. Nicolson refused to go further at Constantinople than asking that a way for 
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commerce to pass be found, despite a request from Imperiali. 954 The British attitude had 
hardened towards Italy, and Whitehall was not inclined to go in to bat for Italy on the 
Bosporus. Nevertheless, a solution still needed to be found for the problem of the merchant 
ships now congregating on both sides of the closed waterway. The German Foreign 
Ministry was in favour of a brief armistice being declared by Italy and Turkey to allow 
ships waiting to pass through. This proposal maintained Turkish security whilst also 
allowing vessels carrying perishable cargoes to continue on their voyages. Vansittart was 
pleased to note that the German attitude was ‘much more satisfactory’ than the Russian. 
955 Nicolson found it ‘a great bore’ that the Turks did not ‘feel disposed to open a passage 
through the Straits as the closure [was] causing great losses to shipping companies’, and 
rather more to the point, he feared that Russia might ‘take strong measures towards 
Turkey’, complicating the situation. 956 For their part, the Russians were not keen to be 
involved in a demarche at Rome, as it was feared at Choristers’ Bridge that it would irritate 
Italy. 957 Vansittart complained that the Russian attitude had been neither ‘fair’ to Turkey, 
nor ‘solidaire’ with Britain. It transpired that this was the result of a misunderstanding – 
Grey had not meant to ask for Russian support, rather he had intended only to keep 
Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, aware of this latest development. 958 
Nevertheless, the pressure told. The Straits would be opened to merchant vessels, who 
would have to take on board a pilot to get them through the defences. Although Lowther 
had reported that the first ships would pass on 6 May, this date came and went. 959 By the 
13th, with no sign of movement, Parker found the situation ‘unsatisfactory… [and] 
uncertain’, especially as Whitehall would be ‘pestered by shipping companies still more’. 
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Lowther was instructed to do all he could to ‘expedite’ matters. 960 By the 20th, shipping 
was finally moving smoothly. For the time being, the question was closed.  
 
6.1.c. The Italian Proclamation of Annexation and Further Mediation 
Proposals 
 
 From a military perspective, the Italian declaration of annexation had been made 
prematurely. Unsurprisingly, the Turks made an official protest. This presented Britain 
with a dilemma, as acting on the basis of either could suggest a commitment. In the end, it 
was agreed to take formal note, but to do nothing else in both cases, thus ensuring equality 
of treatment. 961 Turkey continued to act with indignation, declaring that if the Powers 
recognised the Italian annexation, she would consider herself lifted from treaty 
commitments (by this she meant the capitulations) and she would demand a conference to 
be held, to decide on compensation. Vansittart thought this premature, as the Powers had 
not recognised the annexation. Furthermore, he added, Turkey was almost certainly 
bluffing: ‘She w[oul]d not possibly be so foolish as to quarrel with all the Powers because 
they had recognised a fait accompli.’ Maxwell noted that in any case, nothing could be 
done in this vein until the war came to an end. 962 This did not seem likely to come about 
soon. Lowther wrote to Nicolson that the war had reached a state of ‘status quo’, and that 
he could think of ‘nothing’ that would make the Turks ‘throw in the sponge’ until they ran 
out of ammunition. 963 Indeed, what Vansittart called ‘big talk’ seemed the ‘prevailing tone 
at Constantinople’: the Turkish Government claimed that nothing would induce them to 
accept Italian demands, even if the Straits were forced and Constantinople itself were 
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reduced to ‘ashes’. 964 In early December, 1911, Lowther met Hilmi Pasha, a former 
Grand Vizier, whom he believed to represent ‘moderate’ thought in Turkey. Hilmi 
considered the Italian declaration of annexation to have hardened resolves in Turkey. 
Many of those engaged in the war were fighting out of choice, he said, rather than for 
money or by coercion. Bringing these elements under control would be difficult. To make 
matters worse, the current administration was being criticised for being ‘too Ottoman’, 
making the prospect of giving up an Arab province unappealing. 965  
  
 At this inauspicious moment, Sir Alan Johnstone reported from The Hague that 
the Dutch Government wanted to know when they might be able to open mediation, 
proposing that they might approach Italy and Turkey with the ‘moral support’ of the 
Powers. Vansittart was unimpressed. ‘War spirit’ was in the increase both in Turkey and 
Italy, and Turkey had ‘nothing to lose’ by continuing the fight. Proposing mediation would 
be likely to irritate, at the least, one or both parties, and it would not be to the British 
advantage to take the lead on such proposals. Norman agreed that the proposal was 
‘doomed to failure’. Nevertheless, there was a widespread agreement in London that the 
opinions of ambassadors should be sought. 966 Grey thought that the most important aspect 
of any pressure exerted at Constantinople would be to ensure that the Powers acted 
collectively, or at least simultaneously, in making proposals. If not, the ‘three [entente] 
Powers’ might run the risk of their overtures being rejected, allowing Austria and Germany 
to take advantage and offer a slightly better deal. 967 The Turks, for their part, let it be 
known that any negotiations would have to be initiated by Italy, and that they expected her 
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to make the greater sacrifices in the interests of peace. Vansittart thought that the moment 
for mediation had not arrived, and thought that it was unlikely to do so until after the 
upcoming elections. 968 Parker ‘agree[d]’ that it was better to wait for the elections before 
‘encouraging the idea of mediation’. 969 A general gloom settled. Grey thought that if 
anything were to be proposed, it had better be that ‘Turkey should put her case in the 
hands of the five Powers… but… this is premature.’ 970 Parker remarked that Britain 
should not encourage mediation when ‘all efforts seem[ed] foredoomed to failure.’ With no 
end in sight, Mallet agreed that any attempt to mediate would be unsuccessful. 971 To 
make matters worse, Grey learned from Tevfik that the Turkish elections were not to be 
held before April. 972  
 At the end of January, Alexander von Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to 
London, suggested that the Powers could come to an agreement on the principle of 
mediation, to be ready when the combatants were willing to accept it. Vansittart thought 
that the question rested on how Turkey could be persuaded to leave the area. The more 
experienced Maxwell, however, poured cold water on his junior colleague’s enthusiasm. 
Germany would be unlikely to cooperate in applying pressure on the Turks, and given the 
risks involved, it would ‘not be desirable’ to commit Britain to such a policy. 973 Speaking 
to Benckendorff in early February, Grey returned to his theme of the turn of the year. The 
Powers would have to act together, he stressed, to avoid the risk of a non-participant 
Power taking advantage of a rejection. 974 Nicolson thought that this policy meant that ‘any 
proposal as to mediation’ could not lead to ‘any satisfactory result’, ‘unanimity of the 
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Powers’ having been laid down as an ‘indispensable condition’. 975 That is not to say that 
Britain was unwilling to take action. Nicolson remained ‘quite happy to join in any step 
which [held] out hope of a successful issue, provided that all the other Powers concur[red].’ 
976 Grey tried to get some movement out of the Italians, informing Imperiali that they had 
‘closed the door’ by proclaiming annexation, and that if they were willing to accept 
Turkish suzerainty and give the Powers a ‘free hand’ in mediation, then it might be 
possible for something to be done. 977 He kept up the pressure, telling Imperiali in mid-
April that ‘there seemed to be deadlock and not much light’, and assured him that Britain 
had not discussed the ongoing Baghdad Railway negotiations in conjunction with the war. 
978 Although happy to keep up the pressure on Rome, Grey was not keen to press the 
Italians for the benefit of the Russians and take a leading role in negotiations for a joint 
action of the Powers. He concluded that ‘we can let Russia settle the details’. 979 Although 
it had been planned that joint action would wait until after the elections, the 
communication, asking the Turks on what grounds they would end the war, was delivered 
at Constantinople on 16 April, the Russian Ambassador arguing that the Turks knew it 
was coming in any case. 980 The Turkish reply, when it came, stressed that they could not 
give land away, they were the party attacked, and the Italians were not making headway in 
any case. Vansittart concluded that it was ‘much as… expected, only a little more 
intransigent.’ 981 This move had failed, but Britain maintained her conditions. Nicolson 
thought it important that mediation be the work of all five Powers, and was also concerned 
about exerting too much pressure on Turkey, as ‘we must bear in mind that our Moslem 
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subjects in India are watching our line of policy very carefully.’ 982 He expanded on this 
point privately to Lowther, reminding him that although Britain was ‘always quite ready’ 
to participate in anything that would bring the war to a close, she must avoid taking the 
initiative, as this would result in Britain having to exert pressure on Turkey – which, for the 
benefit of the Indian Muslims, Nicolson was determined not to do. 983 
6.1.d. Direct Negotiations and the End of the War 
 
  
In July 1913, with Balkan troubles on the horizon, negotiations began between the 
belligerents via ‘private agents’, meeting in Switzerland. Said Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had 
‘let it be known’ that Turkey might allow Italy to retain land which she already occupied, a 
concession which broke the deadlock. 984 After a false start, when discussions were briefly 
suspended (a development which Norman gloomily asserted to have expected), 
negotiations continued, at times giving rise to hopes that a breakthrough was only days 
away. 985 As talks dragged on, the Italians hit out in frustration, accusing Britain of being 
the only Power to have failed to urge Turkey to come to terms. Vansittart retorted that no 
Power had done so, and Britain’s ‘Mohammedan interests’ meant that she could hardly be 
at the front of the queue. 986 This anger was forgotten in the euphoria of peace being 
agreed, and Italy put on record her thanks to Britain for her help in achieving it. 987 This 
was a subject of amusement in London. Vansittart wrote: ‘It is very satisfactory that the 
Italians are grateful to us – especially as we have done nothing at Constantinople to which 
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objection could be taken.’ 988 British policymakers could take a certain pleasure in having 
emerged from this difficult situation without having had to do anything contrary to wider 
ideas of strategy.  
 With this, the war was at an end, the Turks having come to terms quickly, in the 
end, to avoid fighting two wars at once. British policy throughout the war had intended to 
be neutral. Although sympathy for Turkey, motivated in part by an eye on Muslim 
opinion, had increased, Britain had not, and would not, taken any action to help her in the 
way she might have done in 1908. Furthermore, the risk of a Power confrontation over the 
Straits had been managed and avoided. Although it had sometimes presented dangers, this 
episode in European politics had been largely contained and had not presented a 
significant risk in the eyes of British policymakers. The same could not be said about the 
next. 
6.2. The Balkan Wars 
 
 Much as they had done before the Tripoli war, British policymakers saw the Balkan 
conflict approaching from some distance. In December 1911, Grey warned Sir George 
Buchanan, who had replaced Nicolson at St Petersburg, that he thought a Balkan outbreak 
in the spring was both possible and ‘most unwelcome’, recognising that Britain’s ability to 
deal with the fallout from any such collision was limited. Parker too thought that it looked 
‘as if the time-honoured fear of trouble in the Balkans in the spring were likely to prove 
justified [in 1912].’ 989 London was also well aware of the nascent Balkan League. In July 
1912, Nicolson communicated the outline of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty to Lowther. He 
noted that Russia had been heavily involved in bringing them together, and warned that 
there were two versions of the treaty available. The version communicated to Britain by 
 
988 Vansittart minute, Rodd to Grey, No. 140, Tel., 18 Oct. 1912, FO 371/1526/43918. 
989 Parker minute, 1 Jan. 1912, Buchanan to Grey, No. 342, Tel., Very Confidential, 31 Dec. 1911, FO 
371/524/4. 
 251 
Benckendorff was apparently inaccurate, and the sections dealing with mutual action 
against the Powers in the Balkans had been watered down. 990  
6.2.a. Early Fighting and Fears for Constantinople 
 
 The explosion of a bomb at Kochana, a town in Macedonia, proved an early sign 
of tensions in the Balkans. Opinion on the meaning of this event, and massacres that 
followed, was divided amongst the British policymaking establishment. Both Sir Charles 
Marling, chargé at Constantinople, and Parker in London thought that the bomb had been 
set at the instigation of the CUP, whilst Norman suggested ‘another version’: that Bulgaria 
had created the incident to try and gain the sympathy of the Powers. 991 Following further 
investigation, it became clear to Mallet that the evidence suggested it had been the work of 
local committee men. 992 War was by no means preordained, however. Parker thought it 
might be ‘hoped that the peace party in Bulgaria [would] triumph, - at all events till the 
cold weather [began], when [Europe] should be safe until [the] next year.’ His colleague 
Norman agreed that war might well be avoided, and that the French might be able to 
restrain the Bulgarians financially. 993 Unfortunately, further incidents did break out. In 
September, the Foreign Office received what Grey called ‘very bad news’ – two Bulgarian 
corporals had been ambushed on the Turkish border. Norman complained that this was 
‘the sort of incident which [made] the task of the Powers impossible’. 994 Buchanan, closer 
to the action at St Petersburg, could view the future more clearly. At some length he 
warned London that from the point of view of the League, there might never be a better 
time to fight a war: they were united, and the Austrian Emperor, Franz Joseph, was 
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believed to be unlikely to have a stomach for war at his advanced age. Furthermore, 
Austria would only be more powerful in the future, it was believed, and a war might now 
enjoy Russian support. Consequently, he thought conflict was likely. Privately, he told 
Maxwell of his belief that the Balkan states, now united, would not care about the 
consequences of their actions nor the risk of general war. He worried that the Powers 
would struggle to hold the Balkan states back, and that war in the winter was in fact 
possible. 995 Buchanan’s view that war was both possible and likely was shared in Austria, 
Germany, and Russia. Alfred von Kiderlin-Waechter, the German Foreign Minister, 
suggested that localisation of the war might be the answer: the Balkan States could be 
informed that were they to fight, then they would be left to do so alone, and they could 
take the consequences. Grey was pleased that thoughts were taking this direction in Berlin. 
He was ‘certainly in favour of an agreement between the Powers that would prevent 
complications between them’. 996 His views on this point would not change throughout the 
dispute.  
 Rumours of what exactly was contemplated continued to swirl. Barclay, at Sofia, 
reported that his Russian colleague believed that the Balkan States contemplated a 
‘decisive step’, which perhaps might be a demand for Macedonian reform under guarantee 
of the Powers. 997 Clearly, this was far from the mark, and suggested that this new 
development in the politics of the region had caught diplomats by surprise, and that they 
understood events through pre-existing frameworks, rather than considering them as 
novel. As time went on, however, it became increasingly clear that war was what was 
contemplated. The Russians warned Bulgaria and Serbia that should they use their new 
agreement to attack Turkey, Russia would consider herself ‘guided by her own interests’, a 
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clumsy warning which provoked ‘disgust’ in Sofia and Belgrade. Vansittart remarked that 
Russia had found herself in a tricky position, for ‘having made the marriage’, she now 
found herself ‘compelled to wage divorce for fear of its first fruits’. 998 Attempts to divorce 
the newlyweds proved in vain. In view of the warlike noises emanating from ‘Sofia, 
Belgrade and Athens’, Vansittart thought that the Turks would be ‘well-advised… to call 
out all the troops they [could]’, and that they were probably doing so. 999 As the march to 
war continued, Grey confirmed his belief that the only way to manage the oncoming crisis 
was to keep the Powers together. ‘There was ‘nothing to be done’ by Britain, ‘apart from 
what the other Powers [did]’. 1000 With the news from Greece that war was now considered 
‘inevitable’, unless Turkey could be ‘induced to demobilise’, Grey believed that there was 
nothing that would ‘have any real effect’, but it would be best if Britain could ‘act with the 
other Powers so long as they [did not] propose anything unfair.’ 1001 For their part, the 
Turks made suggestions to Britain of reform to stave off war, but it was clear that they 
would fight. What they said about reforms was ‘very natural’, Grey wrote, but ‘with the 
years of… misgovernment for which the C.U.P. were responsible & with the author of the 
Kochana massacre unpunished’, there was nothing to be done to hold back the Balkan 
States. 1002 The Turks, it seems, had little hope of averting war, but had, according to 
Lowther, been caught unawares by the mobilisations of their Balkan neighbours, having 
been on a peace footing. He believed war was likely, and that nothing could be done at 
Constantinople – it was ‘up to the Powers to put their foot down’. 1003 The introduction of 
reforms would be impossible, owing to the ‘bellicosity’ of public opinion, and the 
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opposition hoped to replace the CUP with a Kâmil administration which would try and 
avert conflict. 1004 
 The gloomy predictions proved correct. In early October, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside 
reported from Sofia that the Balkan states had prepared their ultimatum to Turkey. In it, 
they called for an autonomous Macedonia, governed by Christians, and overseen by the 
Powers. In Bax-Ironside’s opinion, the wording of the ultimatum was such that the Powers 
could not accept it. 1005 Hostilities soon commenced, with Montenegro being the first of the 
Balkan Allies to declare war. 1006 It looked as though her allies would soon follow suit.  
When the Turks asked Britain to warn Greece against touching the Turkish islands 
in the Aegean (many of which were still occupied in any case by Italy), Grey had another 
opportunity to outline his hopes for solidarity of the Powers. He refused to act, because, in 
the event of war: ‘if one Great Power takes part on one side others will do so on another… 
but I cannot promise to do anything… that would break up the concert of the Powers.’ 1007 
To the German chargé at London he expanded that he was ‘ready to agree to anything 
which would… [keep the Powers together]. It was most important that Austria and Russia 
should not fall apart.’ 1008 Clearly, at this juncture, solidity of the Powers was more 
important to Grey than the entente connections.  
 
In the meantime, Kâmil Pasha, who was soon to return to power in a coup which 
overthrew the CUP, had been busy trying to find a way to bring the war to a close as 
quickly as possible. He told Lowther that this could be achieved by the Powers stepping in 
after the first major engagement, from which, he confidently asserted, Turkey would 
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emerge on top. As Vansittart noted, this was a ‘very big’ assumption to make. Nicolson was 
unenthusiastic, unwilling to engage in such speculation, and Kâmil was told that Britain 
would keep her eyes open for a suitable moment for intervention. 1009 Undeterred, Kâmil 
continued to look to Britain for aid, making a clumsy reference to the position of Egypt (the 
neutrality of which he had recently blamed for the Turkish defeat to Italy), and pointing 
out that she need not be neutral in a war with Greece. Vansittart considered this a 
‘tentative allusion to the idea of getting Egyptian troops’, and Lowther’s refusal to 
countenance anything that might go against neutrality or risk breaking the unity of the 
Powers was approved by London. 1010  
 
With fighting underway, the Powers turned their thoughts to the post-war order. In 
discussion with Richard von Kühlmann, chargé at the German Embassy in London 
following the sudden death of Marschall (who had taken the post in London following his 
departure from Constantinople), Grey laid out his views. Given that it was ‘an axiom’ of 
European affairs that Turkey would not reoccupy Christian lands once vacated, he 
thought it would be easier to find a settlement if the Turks had the better of the fighting. 
On the other hand, he thought that it would be very difficult to turn the Balkan States out 
of territory which they had conquered. In terms of detail, he was less concerned. He 
thought that it was for Russia and Austria, the two most interested parties, to come to an 
arrangement which they could both tolerate. 1011 Developing these thoughts, Grey 
informed Bertie that British public opinion would ‘not join in turning Balkan states out of 
what they proved able to conquer unaided’, and should Turkey be defeated and ask for 
mediation, she would ‘have to do so on condition of placing settlement unreservedly in the 
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hands of the Powers’. 1012 Thus, the position as far as Britain stood, was clear. The status 
quo would largely be respected in the event of a Turkish victory, but should the Balkan 
Alliance prevail, there would be a redrawing of South-Eastern Europe. 1013 
 
A Balkan victory seemed the more likely outcome. By the end of October, Lowther 
had heard from Salonica that the situation was ‘deplorable’, with ‘Turkish troops 
completely routed everywhere… [and] demoralisation complete’. 1014 Vansittart was 
unsympathetic. He believed that the ‘chief cause of the Turkish debacle’ was the ‘vast 
amount’ of misspending of military funds under the CUP, which had left the Turkish 
‘materiel’ a ‘paper one’. 1015 Bulgarian forces were soon advancing rapidly across Thrace, 
approaching the defensive lines outside Constantinople near the village of Çatalca. If the 
Bulgarians were successful in breaching the Çatalca lines, the way would be clear for them 
to march straight into the Ottoman capital. In the Turkish Embassy in London, there was 
little confidence that the Ottoman Troops would be able to hold the line. 1016 In 
Constantinople, the diplomatic corps made preparations to protect themselves and their 
nationals, should the war reach the city. Lowther worried that another victory for the 
Bulgarians would lead to an ‘invasion of Constantinople by hungry, fanatical and 
disorganised soldiers’. 1017 This opinion was not unanimous, however. Some British 
military men at Constantinople believed, rightly as it turned out, that there was a 
reasonable chance that the Bulgarian Army, stretched by its enormous and unexpected 
advance, might be held on the Çatalca lines. Vansittart was dismissive, labelling one such 
figure an ‘optimist’. ‘One wished it were possible to believe he is right’, he added, a view 
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shared by Nicolson, who also thought that the fall of Constantinople was inevitable. 1018 
The Russians shared the views of British policymakers in this regard, and demonstrated 
significant concern at the prospect of Constantinople, so long a cherished aim of Russian 
policy, falling into the hands of others. 1019 Benckendorff ‘pressed [Grey] very earnestly’ to 
speak at Sofia, to try and prevent the Bulgarians from occupying the Ottoman capital – 
and more specifically, the Straits. Grey was not immediately sympathetic. He reminded 
Benckendorff that there might well be military considerations which compelled Bulgaria to 
push on, before the Turkish Army was able to reform and slow the advance. On 
Benckendorff’s continued insistence, Grey agreed to sound out the Bulgarian 
representative in London, who claimed that Bulgaria did not intend to hold 
Constantinople. 1020 Following Grey’s request, the Bulgarians informed Saint Petersburg 
that they had ‘no intention’ of ‘retaining Constantinople’. 1021 Nevertheless, Grey still 
contemplated a post Turk Constantinople, assuming that it would be ‘overrun’. He 
suggested to Sazonov, on 5 November, that Constantinople could be made a ‘free port’, 
kept neutral by the Powers. 1022 The Russians claimed to be against the permanent 
removal of the Turks from Constantinople, however, although they accepted that they 
might be ‘compelled’ to occupy it temporarily. 1023 Nicolson thought it likely that they were 
keen to maintain the Sultan at Constantinople. 1024 Certainly, this was the logical choice 
for Russia. It would be far better to maintain the Turks, propped up by the Powers, at the 
Straits than run the risk of the question being forced open. Although Bulgaria had been 
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something of a Russian protégé, she would be difficult to remove, once installed at 
Constantinople, and the wider consequences of her occupation would be unpredictable.  
 
By early November, the Turks themselves were not confident in their ability to hold 
the Çatalca lines. Tevfik met Nicolson on the 5th, and argued that something should be 
done to protect Constantinople in the way that the Powers had prevented Turkey from 
entering Athens in the wars of the 1890s. He admitted that the Turks were the 
‘vanquished’, but still able to cause significant damage by holding out at Çatalca for 
longer. It was, he warned, ‘a mistake to drive a race to desperation’. 1025 The threat of 
chaos was used again in a communication to the Powers days later, which raised the 
spectre of religiously motivated war to suggest that any Bulgarian entry would be 
accompanied by violence and disorder, and that the Government was determined to ‘die 
at their posts’. Although Lowther believed that this contained an element of ‘bluff’, he 
thought the basic conclusions probably accurate, and that there was a good chance of 
Bulgaria breaching the defences. Grey was sufficiently worried to send additional ships to 
Constantinople, with the promise of more if required, for the protection of British subjects. 
1026 British officials were also concerned with the Russian response. Vansittart noted that 
‘serious steps’ were contemplated by her to keep the Bulgarians out. If they succeeded, he 
went on, then ‘so much the better’, but he thought there was little that could be done. 1027 
The situation for Britain was now delicate, with several competing priorities, as Nicolson 
expressed privately to Lowther:  
Our position is an exceedingly difficult and embarrassing one. We are anxious 
naturally to maintain the concert of Europe and especially to work as far as it is 
possible in conjunction with Russia… It is quite true that we are a great 
Mussulman Power and cannot well leave out of account the feelings of our 
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Mussulmans in India and elsewhere. At the same time it is of paramount 
importance to us to preserve unimpaired our understandings with Russia and with 
France, as were these understandings to be in any way weakened we should find 
ourselves in a most awkward and uncomfortable international position. Moreover, 
public opinion here, rightly or wrongly, is strongly in favour of the Balkan States, 
and no Government possibly could take up an attitude which was in any was 
contrary to the general feeling in this country. 1028 
 
Although his final comment was untrue, and indeed even Nicolson himself was unlikely to 
have really believed it, it did betray the levels to which sympathy for Turkey had fallen 
both within and without the Foreign Office. There was little desire to help the Turks for 
their own sake, and the Russophile Nicolson saw little advantage for Britain in doing so 
either. Indeed, Islamic opinion seemed the only reason he could find to do so.  
 
 Having made little headway in their quest for intervention, the Turks now asked for 
mediation of the Powers, who agreed to inform the Balkan allies and ask them on what 
terms they would accept it. 1029 Ivan Geshov, now the Bulgarian Prime Minister, let it be 
known that Bulgaria was willing to listen, although he wanted Turkey, as the defeated 
power, to be seen to make the first approach. 1030 Whilst the Powers considered this joint 
step, the Turks opened direct negotiations with the Bulgarians, expressing a desire to avoid 
further bloodshed. 1031 Despite this, the Powers did deliver a joint, but not collective, note, 
offering mediation, but were told that their good offices unlikely to be required, as direct 
negotiations were ongoing. 1032 Nicolson was pleased at this development. This was the 
‘most practical and speediest way of reaching a settlement’. 1033 It would also mean that 
Britain might avoid some of the more difficult questions raised by the war. The British 
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Embassy had been involved in the promotion of direct talks, with Fitzmaurice, the 
dragoman, working closely with a Bulgarian dragoman who had remained in 
Constantinople, based at the Russian Embassy. Nicolson noted that London had been 
unaware of this development, and that Fitzmaurice had perhaps gone a little far in some of 
his comments. As the talks seemed likely to bring war to a close, Grey felt that this could be 
disregarded, and no more need be said. 1034 At much the same time the main Bulgarian 
assault on the Çatalca line was attempted, ending in failure. By the 20th, Lowther 
recognised a more positive outlook amongst experts, who now said that Turkey would be 
able to hold the position. 1035 This reverse slowed negotiations down, as Bulgaria tried to 
bring more troops up to the front, in order to be in a stronger negotiation position. 
Vansittart hoped for a more decisive result, to make negotiations easier: ‘If the… lines 
could be counted on to hold, it w[oul]d be better that there sh[oul]d be another attempt on 
the part of the Bulgarians.’ 1036 By early December, the battle had settled. Lowther 
reported a military attaché’s view that the Turkish army was ‘now comfortably settled into 
its defensive position, and… the chances of a successful attack on it appear[ed] to be small.’ 
1037 With this, the first phase of fighting was over, as was the period of intense anxiety over 
the fate of Constantinople and the Straits.  
6.2.b. Adrianople and Balkan Annexations  
 
 Throughout the early phases of the fighting, Britain had acted cautiously. The 
threats had been mostly hypothetical. However, the successes of the Balkan armies, 
especially the Bulgarian, opened out a new phase of trouble. Grey had made it clear at the 
outbreak of the war that the Balkans allies would be able to keep the territories they had 
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gained. They had, however, been more successful in the conquering of new tracts than 
many observers had predicted, and now occupied large parts of the Ottoman European 
holdings. Grey, true to his word, did not contemplate trying to retain much of Europe for 
the Turks, but the Turkish Government was unwilling, naturally, to surrender more than it 
was compelled to. Much of the difficulty surrounded the city of Adrianople, (today Edirne), 
which, as a former capital of the Empire and the resting place of several Sultans, had 
spiritual and sentimental resonance for many Turks. Furthermore, it was a heavily fortified 
city, an important aspect, in a geographical area devoid of defensive features, of the 
defences of Constantinople itself. As Lowther remarked privately, to lose Adrianople would 
be a ‘big gulp’ for the Turks, and Bulgaria would be able to take Constantinople virtually 
whenever they chose, if they held it. 1038 Problematically for both Bulgaria and the 
European Powers, its Turkish garrison held out stubbornly.  
 
 The Russian Government, concerned about the military implications of Bulgaria 
possessing the fortifications, had initially proposed, at the end of October, that France and 
Britain join her in warning the Bulgarians against retaining Adrianople. Britain and 
France, however, were against making such a communication. The French were 
concerned that this could not be enforced, and would be serve to irritate the Bulgarians 
without much purpose. Grey was inclined to agree, and expressed the view that Bulgaria 
should be permitted to ‘press home’ her military advantage, while conflict continued. With 
this reverse, Vansittart noted, Russian opinion turned towards allowing retention. 1039 Grey 
recognised the importance of remaining on good terms with Bulgaria, ‘speaking to him 
[the Bulgarian representative in London] as a friend confidentially, who desired to see 
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Bulgaria have as little difficulty as possible in securing a settlement after her victorious 
campaign. 1040 
He also reassured the Serbs that they had little to fear from negotiation:  
We ourselves had no reserves to make, but we wished to promote a settlement 
peaceably. The settlement of practically the whole of the European dominions of 
Turkey was a very large affair. The first step was to learn the views of all the parties 
who were most interested. We could then see what divergencies there were between 
all the parties interested and how these could be reconciled. 1041 
 
Grey had made it clear that he did not contemplate Turkey retaining much, if any, of the 
land she had lost, despite the greater than expected advances of the Balkan armies. The 
Turks soon realised that they could not expect support from Britain. Tevfik, having read a 
recent speech by H.H. Asquith, the prime minister, complained to Nicolson that he had 
made reference to the Balkan States retaining conquered lands, and this was not in ‘in 
conformity with usage for such statements to be made while war was ongoing’. Tevfik 
‘seemed inclined to enquire what was meant by it. Sir A. Nicolson, however, turned the 
conversation from so delicate a subject.’ 1042 British policymakers were still content to skirt 
around the issue. They heard that the Porte contemplated making significant concessions 
hoping that a conference would be arranged to settle the details, at which they would get 
much of it back, as had happened after their concessions at San Stefano in 1878. Nicolson 
did not see how the situation could be managed without a conference, but Grey thought it 
too early for a decision on that score. If one did take place, he hoped that it would be ‘a 
mere recording conference, and not a congress’. 1043 It seemed to many observers that 
there must necessarily be Great Power involvement in the final settlement of the war. The 
Triple Alliance Powers were agreed that the Powers should make a declaration, reserving 
 
1040 Grey to Bax-Ironside, No. 139, Tel., 2 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1513/46768. 
1041 Grey to Paget, No. 27, 6 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1513/47559. 
1042 Grey to Lowther, No. 522, 12 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1514/48633.  
1043 Bertie to Grey, No. 204, Tel., 19 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1514/49343, Nicolson and Grey minutes.  
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the right to adjust any peace terms arrived at. Vansittart thought it was dangerous to make 
such a declaration before peace terms were even known: ‘It seems premature to begin to 
bark before we know that there will be any need to bite.’ 1044 It was clear that Britain 
favoured a cautious policy towards the post-war settlement. She was not willing to help 
Turkey to regain territory lost, and generally thought that the Balkan States should be able 
to hold on to lands taken with the sword. However, policymakers recognised the need to 
keep a close eye on the situation, and to prevent disputes between the Powers.  
6.2.c. Great Power Involvement  
 
 
 It was at this point that Grey made his famous ‘conference of ambassadors’ 
proposal. 1045 The ‘quickest and most effective way’ of the Powers coming to agreement on 
the issues raised by the war would ‘be by a conference of delegates of the Powers; the 
Ambassadors at the capital chosen might be the delegates’. 1046 This would avoid the ‘delay 
and confusion’ caused by telegrams crossing each other across Europe. 1047 The proposal 
met with favour, and Benckendorff asked Grey to formally propose the idea. 1048 Key to 
the success of the proposal was the fact that Britain and Germany were in a similar 
position, given that neither had particular interests likely to be affected by any settlement, 
and both wished to avoid a war. 1049  
 The Turks initially seemed disposed to make a peace settlement difficult. Grey 
warned them, in early December, that their belief that they could settle on the basis of 
reforms and rectifications of borders in Macedonia was insufficient to gain peace, and that 
far greater sacrifices would be required. However, an armistice between Turkey and the 
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Balkan States (apart from the Greeks, who hoped to make further gains) was agreed in 
early December. Discussions on a Peace settlement were planned for London, starting on 
the 13th. 1050 This allowed Grey to flesh out his plans for Great Power talks. He sketched 
out a plan for discussions. The aims of the talks would be threefold. Firstly, the Powers 
should recognise that the belligerents were ‘entitled to settle their own terms of peace’, but 
with the proviso that the Powers were entitled to make ‘reserves’ on some points. Secondly, 
the Powers would ‘enumerate’ these points. Thirdly, the six Powers would agree mutually 
acceptable proposals on these points. It did not need ‘overly utopian’, he added, that this 
might be completed in time to give ‘Europe and ourselves a Christmas present of peace.’ 
1051 To prepare the present, however, he would need the Turks to be reasonable. Lowther 
was concerned that the Central Powers were encouraging Turkey to be ‘stiff’, and that she 
was likely to make proposals that would be rejected, including the retention of Adrianople, 
terms which Vansittart labelled ‘quite ridiculous & quite unacceptable’. 1052 Lowther went 
on to say that according to his German and Austrian colleagues, the Turks considered 
Adrianople vital to the defence of Constantinople, so much so that they were prepared to 
restart the war if they lost it. Vansittart was concerned that this attitude was the product of 
Austro-German encouragement. Both the Marquis von Pallavicini, the Austrian 
Ambassador, and Baron Hans von Wangenheim, the German, had an attitude which was 
‘most unfortunate’, he added. 1053 Although anxious for Turkey to make peace, the 
Turkish questions were not at the forefront of the British official mind. It was already 
decided that Turkey would have to give up Adrianople, and the only real problem was to 
get them to give it up. The ‘main object’ of the Conference, as Grey said, was to decide on 
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borders for a new independent Albania, and to settle the question of Serbia’s access to the 
sea. 1054 The Russian Government also tried to move the Turks to give up Adrianople in 
the interests of peace. Mikhail Nikolayevich von Giers, the Russian Ambassador to the 
Porte, warned the Turks that they risked reopening the war if they were not ‘conciliatory’. 
It was impossible to keep Adrianople, he said, as the Bulgarians had reached Çatalca, 
further into Turkish territory, giving short shrift to the Turkish claim, (accurate as it turned 
out) that the surrender of Constantinople would mean the end of the Government. Grey 
appreciated this line of argument, and instructed Lowther to make similar remarks to the 
Turks, as the French and Germans had also done. 1055 In London, there was a palpable 
sense of frustration at the Turkish attitude. On 20 December, just five days before his 
optimistic deadline, Grey told the Bulgarians that should Turkey reopen the war, Britain 
would be neutral, and that Turkey would be acting ‘entirely at her own risk’. 1056 To keep 
the pressure up, Lowther was instructed, in conjunction with Pallavicini, to ‘advise’ the 
Turks that if Adrianople was held, it would almost certainly mean another war with the 
Bulgarians. Grey thought that there might now be some movement, as he had heard from 
Sir Richard Crawford, employed in reforming the Ottoman customs system, that without 
peace, the financial situation of the Ottoman Government was such that it might collapse 
in the near future. 1057 Although desperate for peace, the Kâmil Government knew that to 
lose Adrianople would be a disaster for both the Ottoman State and themselves personally. 
Consequently, they tried to hold out. They also believed, Lowther reported, that the entente 
was in favour of the allies getting the fruits of their victories, whilst the Triple Alliance was 
less keen to see such a solution. They therefore thought that they might be able to split 
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them, and get more from a settlement than they had thought. With this in mind, they 
considered offering to hand the matter over to the Powers to settle, even offering to give up 
Adrianople if the six Powers unanimously asked them to, relying on the belief that this was 
unlikely to happen. 1058 Despite this, both Lowther and G.E. Tyrrell, military attaché in 
the Embassy, thought, from discussion with Turkish Officers, that war was likely to break 
out again. 1059  
 In the new year, the Conference of Ambassadors discussed ways to break the 
deadlock, considering that a compromise over Adrianople might be possible, if the Turks 
would give it up first. 1060 Lowther thought this idea to be a good one. The Turks might 
now agree to lose Adrianople, he reported, assuming the fortifications were completely 
removed and the Powers requested unanimously that they did so. 1061 Grey saw the 
elements of bargain. He believed that the Powers were willing to make ‘strong collective 
representation[s]’ at Constantinople, and so he launched another offensive with Tevfik. He 
informed him that so long as the Turks were unwilling to compromise on Adrianople, they 
would get nothing but pressure to give way, but if they were willing to discuss the matter, 
then the Powers might be willing to exercise influence on Bulgaria to ‘overcome 
difficulties’. In effect, having seen that the stick would be unsuccessful, Grey tried the 
carrot, asking the Turks to name their price, and suggesting that the Powers might then be 
able to get it for them. 1062 Such a representation made sense too because it was time 
limited. Lowther reported on 7 January that although estimates varied, Adrianople could 
not hold out for much longer than a few weeks. 1063 The Turkish position was weakening, 
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and Vansittart believed that Adrianople was ‘practically in extremis’. 1064 In the meantime, 
the Powers sent ships to Besika Bay near Constantinople, both for the protection of their 
nationals and in order that a demonstration might be made quickly if considered desirable. 
Grey informed Lowther that although this did not mean that a demonstration was 
committed to, if the presence of ships did anything to encourage the Turks to submit to the 
Powers, then ‘this impression should not be discouraged’. 1065 The Turks remained 
intransigent. They planned to refuse to submit to the Powers and stated that their attitude 
would not change after the fall of Adrianople. Vansittart hoped that the ‘fall of Adrianople 
[would] now take place quickly’, as it could not fail to change the view of the Turks, who 
he believed were still clinging to the idea that they could separate the Powers. 1066 Grey 
became further frustrated. Met by Tevfik and Resid, he told them that the Adrianople 
question was one of ‘facts’. If the war began again, would the Turks be able to save 
Adrianople? Would they not risk losing yet more than they had already lost? 1067 The 
Powers would not, Grey added to Tevfik a week later, ‘intervene to keep Adrianople for 
Turkey’. 1068 The Balkan States would not discuss peace without the surrender of 
Adrianople. Grey now thought that it would take the fall of Adrianople to break the 
deadlock. He instructed his Ambassadors that in the meantime, it was vital that the Powers 
presented a united front, to prevent the Turks from seeing a chance to divide them. 1069 
Following delays, caused by German modifications, the collective note, asking the Turks to 
give up Adrianople, was presented on 17 Jan. 1070 Kâmil and his senior ministers were 
increasingly aware that they had little choice but to submit, but they worried that this 
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might result in a coup. Lowther was disposed to act with his Russian and French 
colleagues to support the Kâmil Cabinet. Nicolson and Grey, however, worried that this 
presented an opportunity to split the Powers, warned him against such a policy. 1071 Once 
again, pragmatism and the need to keep in concert with the other Powers had come ahead 
of the Turks.  
 One area in which Turkey did receive British support was the question of a war 
indemnity being paid by them. Grey worried that if the Allies demanded a large indemnity 
they risked the financial collapse of the Ottoman Empire, an eventuality not in the interests 
of any Power. He suggested to the other Powers that the idea be ‘discouraged’. As Maxwell 
remarked, the idea would ‘hardly be fair’ on Turkey, who would lose so much territory. 1072 
By 25 January, the idea had been largely dropped. The Powers were ‘unanimous’ against 
it. 1073 
 Tevfik requested clarification on the terms of the Powers’ note from Grey, who was 
unwilling to discuss it with him, telling him to instead to put it in the Turkish reply. Again 
Grey, was keen to act together with the other Powers, through joint action. Nicolson used 
the meeting to ‘again impress… upon the Turks the absolute necessity of replying to the 
note with as little delay as possible, and also in making up their minds to give up 
Adrianople’. 1074 Such entreaties hit the mark. On the 22nd, Lowther reported that the 
Turkish Government was in the process of writing up their reply to the démarche, willing to 
give up Adrianople and make peace with the Allies. 1075 
6.2.d. A CUP Coup and Renewal of the War  
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 While the Kâmil Cabinet were in the process of drafting the reply, they were 
broken in on by a band of armed men, led by Enver Bey. They shot and killed Nazim 
Pasha, Minister for the Navy and a General blamed by some for the catastrophic 
performance of the Turkish Army, and invited Kâmil, at gunpoint, to resign. He did so, 
and was later replaced as Grand Vizier by Mahmud Shevket Pasha, a CUP member who 
had been in command of the ‘Action Army’ that put down the counter coup in 1909. It 
was soon clear to all that the main motivation for the coup was to prevent the Government 
from submitting to the Powers. Vansittart thought it ‘deplorable’, and that the CUP ‘ought 
to have been adequately dealt with in advance’. Grey reminded Lowther that he was 
welcome to ask for ships to be sent, if he thought it necessary. 1076 The new Cabinet, 
Lowther reported, had a ‘distinctly German colouring’, and the new Grand Vizier had 
been seen calling at the German Embassy late in the evening on the day of the coup. The 
new Government did not, however, propose to resume war if Adrianople, minus 
fortification, could be secured for Turkey. 1077  
 
Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, suggested that it would 
be best if negotiations could now be dragged out until the fall of Adrianople, when even 
the new Government would be unlikely to renew war. Seeing as Adrianople was not 
expected to hold out beyond the ‘first week in February’, this view was received with 
sympathy in Whitehall. 1078 Grey was keen not to give the Turks false encouragement: ‘we 
must be careful not to construe neutrality so as to encourage the Turks to expect that, if 
they held out and continued the war, the Powers, or any of them, would intervene to help 
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them.’ 1079 He warned the Turkish delegates, engaged in peace negotiations at the Palace 
of St. James, that the Powers could do nothing to prevent a resumption of hostilities unless 
they answered the note, and soon. 1080 The new Government, having seized Power, found 
that the constraints which bound their predecessors remained in place. The general feeling 
at Constantinople was warlike. Tyrrell had the impression that the ‘resumption of 
hostilities seem[ed] to be accepted on all sides as an inevitable consequence of… [the 
coup], though it [was] accepted with resignation rather than enthusiasm.’ 1081 Indeed, by 
the 26th, Turkish troops had already begun operations against the Bulgarians. In the 
meantime, the new Cabinet made a temporising reply to the Powers, trying to distract 
from Adrianople by discussing the question of the islands. Lowther found some of the 
requests to be almost laughable: ‘the demand for the abolition of foreign post-offices and 
the Capitulations in judicial matters seems to be so preposterous in a country governed 
during the last few years martial law that they can scarcely be seriously meant, even 
allowing for customary elements of bluff.’ The Government was not in a strong position, 
and there was little public enthusiasm for the renewal of hostilities, he continued, and so 
they responded (as do struggling governments the world over) by trying to promote 
chauvinist feeling. 1082 The Turkish Delegates in London, on the other hand, urged the 
Powers to help Turkey keep Adrianople, arguing that if it fell, the Allies would only push 
for more. Grey was unsympathetic, and told them that war would have to decide the fate 
of the city. 1083 Desperate for a way out, the Turks now requested arbitration, on the basis 
of minor economic advantages and an end to the capitulations. Grey, keen as ever to work 
through the concert of the Powers, informed them that it would be impossible unless they 
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accepted the note. As Norman remarked, the Allies would never have agreed to the war 
being brought to an end in this way in any case. 1084 The Turks were struggling for both 
financial and military reasons, which explained the more ‘pacific’ approach. For Alwyn 
Parker, the moral was that ‘Turkey should be given as little money as possible’ for the 
moment, to further encourage her to end the war and come to terms. 1085 
 In early March Lowther believed that the ‘public mind’ was being prepared for the 
idea of Adrianople being lost. 1086 It had already stood out for a month longer than 
expected, and would hold on for several weeks more, eventually falling on 26 March. 1087 
Although this development suggested that an end to the fighting might be in sight, Grey 
was anxious that the Bulgarians might now push on, finally breaching the Çatalca lines 
and allowing Tsar Ferdinand the opportunity of ‘presenting himself before 
Constantinople.’ 1088 Fed up with continued uncertainly and continued quibbling over 
minor points, Grey gathered the peace delegates together and informed them to sign the 
treaty or leave London. He promised support for those who did sign. 1089 After some delay, 
this took place, and the Treaty of London was signed on 30 May. It established that 
territory west of the Enos-Midia line would be ceded to the Balkan League, and established 
the existence (although not the boundaries) of an independent Albanian state.  
 In June 1913, the Turks again made a request to Britain for an alliance or at least 
to join the Triple Entente. Louis Mallet enumerated the objections to this. Although he 
thought that being involved in the regeneration of Turkey would be attractive and of 
strategic value, the risks were too high. It might prove irritating to other Powers. Were 
Turkey to join the Triple Entente, Germany might take this as a direct challenge. He 
 
1084 Lowther to Grey, No. 80, Tel., 10 Feb. 1913, FO 371/1789/6473, Norman minute.  
1085 Lowther to Grey, No. 87, Tel., 13 Feb. 1913, FO 371/1758/7024, Parker minute. 
1086 Lowther to Grey, No. 126, Tel., 5 Mar. 1913, FO 371/1758/10413.  
1087 Bax-Ironside to Grey, No. 110, Tel., En Clair, 26 Mar. 1913, FO 371/1759/13909. 
1088 Grey to Bertie, No. 213, 27 Mar. 1913, FO 371/1759/14357. 
1089 Grey to Cartwright, No. 116, 26 Mar. 1913, FO 371/1798/24518. 
 272 
thought that a general declaration of neutrality over Turkey’s Asiatic possessions would 
instead be the best course. Grey agreed, and once again wider strategic concerns overrode 
a specific Turkish policy. 1090  
6.2.e. The Second Balkan War  
 
 As early as April 1913, before the first Balkan War had even come to a close, 
British policymakers were observing the signs of a second conflict. Vansittart observed that 
the ‘signs of trouble’ between Serbia and Greece on the one side, and Bulgaria on the 
other, were ‘increasing’. In a sign of things to come, he remarked that the Powers should 
leave the Allies to settle their differences by themselves. 1091 The reasons for this were not 
hard to find. Grey deprecated a proposal by the Russian Government that the Triple 
Entente might mediate between the Balkan Allies. He thought the likely result would be a 
Balkan state seeking the patronage of the Triple Alliance, dividing the Powers. Paul 
Cambon, the French Ambassador, agreed with his assessment. 1092 Grey thought that non-
interference was the only policy likely to meet with success. Austria and Russia would be 
the only Powers willing to intervene with the use of force, he wrote, and this was the only 
way that war could be prevented. 1093 The Powers, exhausted by constant crisis, were 
unwilling to act with vigour to prevent a war, when such an action promised such 
uncertain benefits. On 25 June, the Foreign Office learned that Bulgarian troops had 
attacked Serbia in ‘strong force’, and that fighting had begun. 1094 By the 30th, it was clear 
to Vansittart that war had ‘broken out in earnest.’ In early July, Said Halim Pasha, (who 
had become Grand Vizier on the assassination of Mahmud Shevket by relatives of the slain 
Nazim) suggested to Charles Marling (Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy in the 
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interregnum between Lowther and Mallet) that Turkey would not take advantage of the 
war now raging between the erstwhile allies. Norman remarked that Turkey was likely ‘too 
exhausted to take much advantage of anything’. 1095  
  
Norman’s prediction was wrong. Days later, the Turks were reported advancing 
slowly west, aiming to retake Adrianople. The Bulgarians hoped that Britain would advise 
the Turks to confine themselves to the borders delimited by the Treaty of London. Grey 
thought such a warning was reasonable, but as ever sought the views of the other Powers 
before acting. 1096 In due course, Marling urged the Turks not to go beyond the Enos-
Midia line, but reported that ‘chauvinists’ had the upper hand, and they intended to do so. 
This prompted a rare breaking of ranks from Grey. He instructed Marling to urge the 
Turks not to advance beyond the line, without waiting for his colleagues to do likewise. 
Every new complication, Grey thought, increased the risk that a Great Power would 
intervene. 1097 Indeed, British policymakers were very keen to restrain the Turks. Marling, 
having been told, in response to his warning, that the Turks had not crossed the line, 
suggested that the negotiations on the 4% customs rise might be used as a lever. Hakki 
could be told that a ‘policy of adventure’ would threaten them. Parker, who had spent such 
an extended period immersed in the question, was horrified. He hoped that the 
negotiations would not be used in this way. 1098 With the news that the Turks were 
advancing, and the realisation that little other than force would restrain them, Marling 
raised the prospect again. 1099 Parker reacted decisively: 
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I cannot see any sufficient reason for our breaking off negotiations with Hakki in 
order to assist the Bulgarians, or why should we sacrifice our national interests 
because Bulgaria is reaping the just reward of a policy of adventure. At any rate 
other Powers have greater reason to restrain Turkey than we have, and it seems 
quite uncalled for us to take the lead in checking Turkey. 1100 
 
The lever remained unused. Turkish forces soon recaptured Adrianople, and continued to 
advance, apparently intending to return to the former Bulgarian frontier. 1101 The 
Bulgarian Army, fighting on several fronts and exhausted from bearing the brunt of the 
fighting in the first war, provided little resistance. The Turks ‘had an easy job’, as Norman 
put it, and Mallet thought their advance to be made in a ‘very businesslike’ manner. 1102 
Grey despaired. The Turkish advance represented a ‘risk’, he warned them, and although 
Britain was willing to help Turkey ‘consolidate her dominions’, she would not protect her 
from the consequences of her policy. 1103 Caught up in the euphoria of a successful 
advance, and filled with religious hatred stoked by the first war, Turkish troops committed 
various atrocities as they advanced. This, too, presented a problem to Britain. Marling was 
instructed to ‘bring this to the attention of the Grand Vizier’, inform him of the language 
used to the Bulgarian Government on similar occasions in the past, and note that it was 
with ‘regret’, that such language was now held to the Turks. 1104  
 British policymakers, having had little luck in persuading the Turks to restrain 
themselves, were now unwilling to contemplate further action. An Austrian proposal to 
offer peace to the belligerents, with distribution of territory settled afterwards, was rejected 
unless the Powers could agree what the settlement would look like beforehand. 1105 
Similarly, when the Russians hoped that Britain might take the lead in a naval 
demonstration, Norman thought that such a demonstration would be ‘unlikely to succeed’. 
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1104 Grey to Marling, No. 387, Tel., 8 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1834/35871. 
1105 Grey to Cartwright, No. 228, Tel., 17 Jul. 1913, FO 371/1835/33111.  
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1106 Grey now feared that Turkish action, both in advancing into Bulgaria and in taking 
‘vengeance’ against civilian populations, was ‘beyond the pale’, and would result in Russia 
entering the war to defend Bulgaria. He suggested to the German Government that, with 
this in mind, they had better get in contact with the Russian Government, to minimise the 
impact of this step if it came. 1107  
 By the end of July, there were signs that the war was coming to a close. Although 
the Turks were not represented, preparations were being made for a conference between 
the other belligerents at Bucharest. 1108 Peace was agreed between them on 10 August. 1109 
The Powers still clung to the idea that Turkey could not retain Adrianople. Coercion 
having failed, the Russian Government now contemplated offering the Turks 
‘inducements’ to leave. 1110 An identic communication of the Powers was made in this vein 
on 7 August. 1111 On the 10th, the Bulgarians unilaterally declared peace, and planned to 
demobilise as soon as possible. They called on the Powers to protect them from Turkish 
attack. 1112 Their chances did not appear promising, as the next day, the Turks replied to 
the identic communication in the negative, offering a ‘polite refusal to leave Adrianople.’ 
1113 The identic step had ‘proved a failure’. 1114 Once again, Marling suggested that the 4% 
was the obvious way to bring the Turks to heel. Once again, Parker offered a spirited 
defence of the Turkish position:  
I entirely disagree with Mr Marling’s suggestion… and I consider he has lost all 
sense of proportion in proposing it. I also think his summary of the Turkish 
attitude… is wrong. I do not think there is any evidence for the thesis he advances 
[that the Turks would take more land to seek more concessions], and I think the 
Embassy at Constantinople are altogether out of touch with the Turkish 
Government. 
 
1106 Buchanan to Grey, No. 268, Tel., 18 Jul. 1913, FO 371/1835/33167. 
1107 Grey to Granville, No. 281, Tel., 25 Jul. 1913, FO 371/1837/34488.  
1108 Barclay to Grey, No. 140, Tel., 25 Jul. 1913, FO 371/1835/34375.  
1109 Barclay to Grey, No. 170, Tel., 10 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1836/36916.  
1110 Buchanan to Grey, No. 285, Tel., 3 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1836/35840.  
1111 Marling to Grey, No. 395, Tel., 7 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1837/36533.  
1112 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 10 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1836/37807. 
1113 Marling to Grey, No. 399, Tel., En Clair, 11 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1837/37195, Norman minute. 
1114 Marling to Grey, No. 707, 8 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1838/38054, Norman minute.  
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As for Adrianople, in view of the fact a) that it is necessary to Turkey as a defence 
of Consple, b) that the Bulgarians have shown themselves guilty of the worst 
atrocities perpetrated in the whole war, and c) of the fact that the population is 
largely Greek, there is no reason for H.M.G. to take the initiative in devising 
measures for the procuring the Turkish withdrawal from Adrianople, especially as 
Herr von Jagow [German state secretary] seems to doubt whether any Russian 
action to that end is to be taken seriously. 
 
We cannot oppose the ejection of the Turks, but I cannot see any reason why we 
should promote it.  
 
Parker thought that Britain should not risk her own material interests to get the Turks out 
of Adrianople, and this opinion was shared by senior policymakers. 1115 Nevertheless, Grey 
continued to offer lukewarm support to proposals of the Powers to remove the Turks, 
remarking that it was of the ‘utmost importance’ to ‘maintain the concert of the Powers.’. 
1116 At the end of August, ‘Indirect pourparlers’ commenced for a direct settlement of the 
Thracian questions, and a treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey on 30 
September. 1117 The Turks had defeated both Bulgaria and Europe in regaining 
Adrianople, and had managed to negotiate what amounted to their own capitulations for 
Muslim residents in Bulgaria. Marling thought that more trouble was to come. Many 
senior CUP men were from Salonica, he said, and were waiting for the dreadnought now 
building in Armstrong’s yard to ‘pick a quarrel’ with Greece and regain their hometown. 
1118 Nevertheless, the Balkan Wars had now come to an end.  
6.3. The Balance Sheet 
 
 
 There was relatively little sympathy in British official circles for Turkey at the 
breakout of both the wars of 1911-13. In 1911, on the delivery of the Italian ultimatum, 
 
1115 Marling to Grey, No. 407, Tel., 15 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1837/37886, Nicolson minute.  
1116 Grey to Marling, No. 413, Tel., 20 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1838/38276; Grey to Buchanan, No. 294, 14 
Aug. 1913, FO 371/1838/38400. 
1117 Marling to Grey, No. 434, Tel., 26 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1838/39490; Marling to Grey, No. 492, Tel., 30 
Sep. 1913, FO 371/1838/44604. 
1118 Marling to Grey, No. 492, Tel., 30 Sep. 1913, FO 371/1838/44604; Marling to Grey, No. 836, 2 Oct. 
1913, FO 371/1838/45737.  
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Lowther complained that although the Turks claimed to have always been friendly, they 
had never shown it. 1119 Even Grey, generally more level headed than Lowther, thought 
that negative press towards the Turks in 1912 was justified:  
the effect upon public opinion of the long years of Abdul Hamid’s iniquities was 
inevitable; then came a wave of… [optimism] with the hopes of the Young Turk 
revolution, followed by a reaction to disgust the C.U.P rule turned out badly; the 
flicker of hope that we felt when the C.U.P fell would hardly counteract this & no 
doubt the general feeling is that the Turks are reaping what they have sown. 1120  
 
The coup of 1913 went further towards poisoning any chance of improved relations 
between Britain and Turkey. Lowther saw Turkish politics as being divided between ‘what 
is styled the Triple Alliance policy of the committee and the Triple Entente policy of its 
opponents.’ 1121 The coup was therefore seen as being in favour of Germany, as well as 
bring irresponsible men to power. Lowther complained that: 
A sort of delirium seems to possess the inside committee circles and the fiercer 
spirits among the military, and judging by appearances, they would seem to be bent 
on risking and perhaps destroying what is left of the Ottoman Empire, thus adding 
to the havoc wrought over the last four years. The capture of Adrianople may have 
a sobering effect, but, as the destinies of Turkey seem to be in the hands of men 
who have discarded the dictates of common sense, more decisive events may have 
to occur in the neighbourhood of the capital or the Dardanelles before they exhibit 
an accommodating or yielding mood. 1122 
 
It was clear that British officials were thoroughly fed up with the unstable and difficult 
Turkish state.  
 This growing alienation, important as it was, was not the deciding factor. The 
reasons for Britain’s distant relations with Turkey in this period stemmed almost 
exclusively from wider strategic considerations. Grey repeatedly expressed the vital 
importance of keeping the Powers together. Nicolson, too, agreed with this policy. He 
wrote privately to Lowther, in October 1912:  
 
1119 Lowther to Nicolson, Private, 27 Sep. 1911, Private Correspondence of Lowther, No. 258.  
1120 Grey minute, Grey to Lowther, No. 523, 15 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1506/48500. 
1121 Lowther to Grey, No. 69, 28 Jan. 1913, FO 371/1788/4854.  
1122 Lowther to Grey, No. 92, Confidential, 5 Feb. 1913, FO 371/1788/6200.  
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My personal idea is that we should take very great care, during the stormy period 
which is in front of us, to keep very closely in touch with Russia and endeavour to 
harmonise our action as far as possible with hers. If we do not do this, I very much 
fear that the outcome will be a serious weakening, if indeed not the breakup, of the 
Triple Entente, and this would leave Germany the absolute arbiter of the whole 
situation. 1123 
 
This was clearly the main influence on British policy at the time. British officials were 
frightened of the consequences of the established Great Power system breaking up, and 
were loath to do anything which might cause a general war between the Powers. In this 
context, it is no surprise that the relationship with a capricious and oftentimes unhelpful 





1123 Nicolson to Lowther, 14 Oct. 1912, Private Correspondence of Lowther, No. 322. 
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7. Final Months: the Liman Mission and the War  
 
7.a. The Advent of War 
  
The wars in Northern Africa and the Balkans had left Turkey much reduced in 
territory. Brief successes against the exhausted Bulgarians aside, the large Ottoman Army 
had been humiliated. Not for the first time, it appeared to many observers that the 
Ottomans had failed to keep pace with modernity. Nevertheless, there were signs of 
recovery. At the close of the Balkan Wars, Charles Marling, then chargé, had reflected that 
Turkish regeneration was not far away. 1124 The wars, and particularly the loss of Christian 
territory, had moulded Turkey into a more nationalist, populist state. The new dominance 
of Islam meant, more than before, that a sense of nationalism could now emerge, a 
consideration which would cause British policymakers some concern in 1914. 1125 
Geographically, the Turkish state had begun the shrinkage that would reach its conclusion 
in the 1920s, when Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) forced into being an ethnically 
homogenous and geographically defensible Turkish state centred in Asia Minor, marking a 
historical and titular break with the Ottoman Empire. The beginning of this process meant 
that, however, that it was already more viable as a going concern. One scholar, although 
 
1124 Marling to Grey, No. 492, Tel., 30 Sep. 1913, FO 371/1838/44604; Marling to Grey, No. 836, 2 Oct. 
1913, FO 371/1838/45737. 
1125 Hasan Kayalı wrote that ‘Secular Ottomanism failed to live up to the expectations of Young Turks. Its 
weakness was revealed and its relevance diminished as an ideology as separatist movements and 
dismemberment in Europe continued. In view of the fact that Arabs and Turks constituted the large majority 
of the Empire in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and that religion continued to be the primary focus of 
allegiance for the Muslim masses, Ottomanism underwent a final redefinition to stress Islam as its main 
underpinning’, Kayalı, Hasan, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 
1908-1918 (Berkeley, CA, 1997) p. 211. Eyal Ginio emphasised that the Balkan Wars confirmed this process, 
suggesting to Ottoman leaders that a secular ‘Ottoman’ identity was fragile, and taught them that they could 
not trust non-Muslim soldiers, leading to the development of a more explicitly Islamic Ottoman identity. Id., 
‘Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913): Awakening from the Ottoman 
Dream’ War in History, 12(2), 2005, pp. 156-177.  
Michael Reynolds wrote that the period from 1912-1922 is sometimes considered a ‘ten years war’ in 
Turkey, and that this can be a useful way of approaching the period, which saw the eventual emergence of a 
defensible, modern Turkey. Id., Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908-
1918 (Cambridge, 2011) p. 263. 
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he accepted that the wars had been a disaster for the Turks in general, has argued that the 
Turkish success in reclaiming Adrianople had sounded the starting gun for a new sense of 
national awakening in Turkey. 1126 Perhaps the greatest success, if it can be called that, of 
the Young Turk movement, lay in the way in which populism became an ‘essential 
element’ of Turkish public life, as demonstrated by the large public subscriptions for 
battleships – and the intense public anger when they were requisitioned by the Admiralty 
in August 1914. 1127 The development of a new nationalistic state coincided with the rise of 
men such as Enver Pasha (who led the coup d’etat in 1913, described by Mallet as a ‘fatuous 
young idiot’ in October 19141128), Talaat Pasha and Djemal Pasha, the so called ‘three 
Pashas’ who served as a de facto military dictatorship during the First World War. These 
men, especially Enver, were to a large part pro-German, owing to their military training. 
1129 By late 1913, as one scholar remarked, anglophile tendencies in Turkey had become 
‘unimportant’, and most senior men now looked towards Germany for the future. 1130 
 For Britain, the international outlook seemed on the brink of change. Policymakers 
appreciated that the Balkan wars had left significant tensions in their wake. Furthermore, a 
central pillar of Grey’s foreign policy, the convention with Russia, seemed less certain than 
it had been. The convention was due to be renegotiated in 1915, and there seemed to be 
an increasing sense in senior policymaking circles that the alignment was nearing its end. 
1131  
 
1126 McMeekin, Ottoman Endgame, pp. 83; 84-5.  
1127 Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 162 Ahmad discussed how these demonstrated that populism was an essential 
element of CUP Turkey.  
1128 Mallet to Tyrell, Private, 16 Oct. 1914, FO 800/80.  
1129 In the Ottoman Empire during this period, most levels of military training almost invariably meant a 
period of time spent studying in Germany, or at the very least under German instructors in Turkey.  
1130 Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 302-3 – this was partially because of the way in which international rules 
and the Powers were seen in Turkey to have let them down over Tripoli and the Balkans – see: Aksakal, 
‘Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War’.  
1131 See Ekstein, Michael, ‘Great Britain and the Triple Entente on the eve of the Sarajevo Crisis, Hinsley, 
Foreign Policy under Grey, pp 342-350; Otte, ‘Entente Diplomacy vs Détente’, Geppert et al, Wars before the Wars, 
pp. 264-282, Sweet and Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Russia, 1907-1914’, Hinsley, Foreign Policy under Grey, 
pp. 236-255. 
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 The difficulties of diverging policy priorities were laid bare by the so called Liman 
von Sanders incident. 1132 The appointment of a German military advisor, who would 
have, the Russians contended, command of Constantinople and therefore the Straits, 
caused significant concern for Russian policymakers, who insisted that Britain and France 
join them in objecting to Liman, despite the fact that his mission appeared to be less of a 
threat than it had at first appeared. Grey, nevertheless, worked to convince the Germans to 
find a solution, and Liman was eventually promoted, making him too senior to command 
the Constantinople corps.  
 Although the Turks increasingly looked towards Germany, they still had two 
dreadnoughts building in Britain – the ship first ordered in 1910, Reşadiye, and the Sultan 
Osman I, the former Rio de Janeiro, which had been purchased from the Brazilian 
Government whilst still in Armstrong’s yard. On the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, 
the Admiralty, at that time under the direction of Winston Churchill, decided that 
although Turkey remained neutral, the ships, almost complete, would have to be 
requisitioned by the British Government. Their Ottoman crews had already arrived to take 
delivery. Despite the outrage that this caused, both were commissioned into the British 
Navy as HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin. Turkey, nevertheless, had already signed, in secret, 
an alliance with Germany, which was solidified by the donation of two warships, the 
battlecruiser Goeben and her escort Breslau, which were notionally ‘bought’ by Turkey in 
order to maintain the appearance of neutrality. 1133 Both in London and Constantinople, 
British diplomatists were unaware that Turkey’s future was now committed to Germany. 
Nevertheless, there was an understanding that the best that could be hoped for was that 
 
1132 For an early discussion see Kerner, Robert J., ‘The Mission of Liman von Sanders. 1. Its Origin’, The 
Slavonic Review, 6(16), 1927, pp. 12-27, and the three sequels, in the same journal. For a more recent account, 
see Mulligan, William, ‘”We can’t be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy during the Liman von 
Sanders Crisis, 1913-1914’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17, 2006, pp. 261-282. 
1133 Geoffrey Miller alleged a ‘conspiracy’ on the part of British officials in Athens to allow the Goeben to reach 
Turkey, in order to prevent Russia from attempting to take possession of the Straits. Id, Superior Force.  
 282 
Turkey might remain neutral in the war. Mallet fought a lengthy and energetic, but 
ultimately futile, battle to support what he believed were the more moderate elements in 
the Turkish Government, although London remained unconvinced that his mission would 
succeed. Finally, war broke out between Britain and Turkey at the end of October, 
following a Turkish naval attack on Russian ports in the Black Sea.  
 Thus ended the period that had begun with such optimism in 1908, with Britain 
and Turkey at war. The reasons for this did not lie in 1914, however. Relations had 
already soured, and British efforts, certainly in London, focused on safeguarding British 
interests and massaging appearances for the benefit of the Muslims under British control.  
7.1. German Mission to Constantinople 
 
Although a new German Military Mission had been in the works since the Balkan 
Wars, London only learned at the end of October 1913 that it was contemplated. 1134 
Mallet reported on the 30th that a fresh mission was to be sent, with ‘extended Powers’ 
compared to those which had gone before. He noted that it would likely be commanded by 
Otto Liman von Sanders, a Prussian career officer later described by Mallet as a ‘mad 
German General’. 1135 In itself, this was not a matter for much concern. It was well 
accepted that foreign missions would work with the Ottomans to develop the institutions of 
the state – hence the positions of Crawford and Laurent in the financial machinery and 
Willcocks’ work on Mesopotamian irrigation. As the Turks sought materiel and expertise 
from Britain for their navy, given the view that Britain was the foremost naval power, so 
they naturally gravitated towards Germany for the needs of their army, the German Army 
 
1134 McMeekin, Ottoman Endgame, p. 88.  
1135 Mallet to Grey, No. 530, Tel., 30 Oct. 1913, FO 371/1847/49385; Mallet to Tyrell, Private, 16 Oct. 
1914, FO 800/80. Liman had added the sobriquet ‘von Sanders’ to his name on being ennobled, as a tribute 
to his deceased British wife, whose maiden name had been Sanders: Lord Acton to Grey, No. 9, 26 Feb. 
1914, FO 371/2111/9159. 
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(in particular the Prussian elements) being widely regarded as the best in the world. 1136 
Russia, however, distinctly jumpy after her bruising in the Balkans and always anxious 
about the future of the Straits, expressed disquiet once further details of the mission 
emerged. Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told Hugh O’Beirne, chargé at 
Saint Petersburg, that he was concerned about Liman’s proposed appointment as the 
commander of the First Army Corps, which was based at Constantinople. Furthermore, he 
suggested that Liman would be accompanied by forty-two other German officers, and 
thought that other Powers should make ‘compensating demands’. Claud Russell, an 
Eastern Department clerk, was unimpressed with Sazonov’s paranoia. He thought a policy 
of ‘compensating demands’ not something which Britain wanted to ‘embark on in Turkey.’ 
His colleague G.R. Clerk was cynical about ‘Russia’s indignation’, considering it to have 
‘calculated uses’, giving a ‘good excuse for Russian Officers in Armenia’. He added that 
Liman might not prove himself a Goltz – by which he meant powerful enough that he was 
able to influence Ottoman policy without formal command, as Colmar von der Goltz, a 
predecessor of Liman, had been able to do. 1137 Nicolson, deeply pessimistic and a 
dedicated Russophile, was more inclined to take the Russian claims at face value. Russia 
had a ‘just cause for complaint’, he argued, and it was not desirable that Britain should 
appear to be ‘indifferent, still less sympathetic’ to the German action, which he thought a 
‘most unusual [and] undesirable step’. Grey was more relaxed, although he conceded that 
it was a ‘surprising’ development. He was unable to see how compensating advantages 
could be given to other Powers in a manner consistent with Turkish independence. He 
needed more time to consider this ‘very difficult’ situation. 1138 Indeed, Vansittart rather 
 
1136 On Prussia, see Clark, Christopher, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (London, 
2006): ‘Prussia is bound up in the public awareness with the memory of military success’, p. xxv. Craig, 
Gordon, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (Oxford, 1967). 
1137 On von der Goltz, see Yasamee, F.A.K., ‘Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the 
Ottoman Empire’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9, 1998, pp. 91-128. 
1138 O’Beirne to Grey, No. 393, Tel., 25 Nov. 1913, FO 371/1847/53521, Russell, Clerk, Nicolson, Grey 
minutes.  
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summed up the prevailing views when he complained that Sazonov was ‘very upset [and] 
rather flustered’ – most thought that the Russians took a rather exaggerated view. As 
Vansittart added, suggestions as to how other Powers might ‘get… quits with the 
Germans… [had been] rather futile’ and there had been little suggested that would suit 
Britain. He was unsure whether there was in fact anything that Britain could ask for. 1139 
The Russian reaction seemed to have caught the Germans by surprise, but they were 
unable to change course – they explained to London that to ask for a change in the 
appointment at this juncture would entail a significant loss of German prestige. 1140 Faced 
with a general sense of inertia, Sazonov complained to O’Beirne about Britain’s 
lackadaisical response. He floated the idea of Liman’s command being moved to 
Adrianople, instead of the capital, and continued to talk of British and Russian officials 
being given roles in Turkey as compensation. Vansittart was unimpressed with such a 
solution. From the ‘practical point of view a German command at Adrianople w[oul]d not 
be much better than Constantinople’, asking ‘What’s in a name’? As to officials being 
appointed elsewhere, he thought there would be ‘no advantage’ to Britain in having a 
‘British governor general [sic] to play second fiddle to his Russian colleague in Armenia.’ 
1141 Sazonov spoke ‘seriously’ to O’Beirne about the lack of British support for Russia, 
warning that it was a test of the triple entente. He added that, in his opinion, Germany 
would ignore action taken unless it was backed by the threat of the British fleet. Vansittart 
remarked that the Russian idea was apparently to ‘bluff the Germans out’ with the 
assistance of France and Great Britain. Clerk added that the possibilities suggested were 
‘dangerous’. 1142 British officials were unimpressed with the Russian reaction, and hoped to 
minimise the incident. Grey instructed O’Beirne that there was no need to be ‘more 
 
1139 Vansittart minute, O’Beirne to Grey, No. 367, 26 Nov. 1913, FO 371/1847/54114. 
1140 Grey to O’Beirne, No. 402, Confidential, 1 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/53646.  
1141 O’Beirne to Grey, No. 395, 29 Nov. 1913, FO 371/1847/54081; Vansittart minute.  
1142 O’Beirne to Grey, No. 398, Tel., 1 Dec. 1913, FO 371.1847/54365, Vansittart and Clerk minutes.  
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Russian than the Russians’, and remarked that fear of Russia was likely to be a far stronger 
inducement on Germany to act than the British fleet. 1143 Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. Tyrell, 
a military attaché at the Constantinople Embassy, reported on the specifics of the mission. 
He noted that Liman could have a significant influence, especially as his proposed chief of 
staff had been in Turkey for six years, and was apparently on good terms with Enver. He 
added that the mission was likely to be of commercial value to Germany. His conclusions, 
however, echoed by Mallet, were that it was fairly likely that Liman would end up having a 
particularly strong position in Turkey. 1144 
Grey’s chief concern, as it had been throughout the crises in the east over the past 
year, was that the unity of the Powers might be broken up. 1145 That this unity formed the 
‘guarantee of the existence of Turkey’ added a further frisson. With this in mind, he 
accepted that some action was needed. Mallet was instructed to ascertain full details of the 
appointment from the Porte, in tandem with his French and Russian colleagues – although 
he was to use similar language, he was to avoid making the communication identic. 1146 
This seemed a wise policy, as it transpired that Russia were engaged in their own démarche 
at Berlin, and that the command of the First Army Corps in Constantinople did not 
include responsibility for either the Dardanelles or the Bosporus. 1147 On the spot, Mallet 
remarked that the ‘Advantages of a friendly settlement appear[ed] to be very great.’ The 
command was not, he said, as large a responsibility as had been suggested by Russia. He 
added that influence was as much a matter of getting on with the Turks as it was formal 
positions in any case, citing the success of Crawford, the customs official. Unless the 
Powers were willing to ‘see the matter through’, it would be best to avoid anything but a 
 
1143 Grey to O’Beirne, No. 780, Tel., 2 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54365. 
1144 Mallet to Grey, No. 982, 2 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55197 
1145 Kent in Hinsley, 159 – Kent identified this as Grey’s foremost concern.  
1146 Grey to Mallet, No. 557, Tel., 2 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54365.  
1147 Mallet to Grey, No. 602, Tel., 4 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54823.  
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verbal enquiry for the present, arguments which Crowe declared ‘forcible’. 1148 Mallet also 
pointed out the difficult position that Britain were in with regard to Admiral Arthur 
Limpus, the British naval advisor who served as commander of the Turkish fleet. His 
position meant that Britain would struggle to avoid accusations of hypocrisy were she to 
object too strongly to the appointment of Liman. This was news to both Nicolson and 
Grey, neither of whom had realised that Limpus officially commanded the fleet. Although 
Limpus was contractually prevented from serving in a time of war, and Nicolson thought 
that commanding the ‘inefficient Navy’ was not the same as being Commander in Chief of 
the capital, he admitted that Britain was ‘not on perfectly unassailable ground’. 1149  
As the mood in Britain shifted ever further away from taking serious action, 
Sazonov found himself more disturbed. He had decided to tell the German Government 
that he assumed the appointment of Liman had been made without their concurrence. If 
this step failed, (of which there was no doubt) then he argued that the time would come for 
identic action at Constantinople. He considered it ‘impossible for the three Powers to allow 
themselves to be defeated in this question’, and argued that occupation of Turkish ports 
and even a ‘rupture’ of diplomatic relations would be suitable action in the future. 
Surprisingly, he added that Germany would not treat such a course as hostile to her – a 
view seen through the rosiest of tinted glasses. Sazonov’s forward policy was greeted with 
dismay in London. Vansittart did not see how Britain could go so far as suggested without 
being put ‘completely in the wrong’. Crowe agreed that the measures proposed were not 
such as Britain could ‘assent to without entirely upsetting their general line of policy in 
Turkey.’ 1150 With British Officials already unwilling to object, Tyrell made another report. 
He noted that von der Goltz had held a position on the ‘superior military council’ without 
 
1148 Mallet to Grey, No. 603, Tel., 5 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54955; Crowe minute 6th.  
1149 Mallet to Grey, No. 603, Tel., 5 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54955, Nicolson and Grey minutes.  
1150 O’Beirne to Grey, No. 401, Tel., 7 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55115, Vansittart minute, Crowe minute 
8th.  
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objection, and that Britain could not well object to this now. He echoed the opinion that 
Liman’s influence would depend on his ability to ingratiate himself with his hosts. Britain 
had ‘already decided that… [she could not] well object to an appointment similar to that 
held by Marshal von der Goltz’, Vansittart remarked, and this despatch confirmed the 
‘wisdom of that decision’. 1151 For the French part, Bertie reported an opinion held in Paris 
that the Turks would give Russia a ‘satisfactory’ explanation which they would reject, and 
then come to private arrangement with Germany. Vansittart mused that if this were to 
come to pass, then it was so much the better that Britain had done little. 1152 Mallet 
confirmed that Maurice Bompard, his French colleague, thought the French Government 
not particularly concerned by the appointment, although they had a list of concessions to 
ask for if required. Not only were the French generally unimpressed, but it was increasingly 
clear that the proposal was not damaging to British interests. Furthermore, as Mallet 
noted, Limpus was able to ‘do anything except break the law or exceed the budget’. Mallet 
hoped that Britain would not ask for compensation, as he thought it likely to be dangerous. 
Vansittart took stock. He thought there were three reasons that Britain should limit herself 
to making verbal enquiries on Russia’s behalf. Firstly, it now seemed clear, the 
appointment was ‘innocuous’; secondly, Limpus remained in a similar position, and 
thirdly, it was likely that France and Russia would receive compensating advantages in any 
case. Although Crowe, suspicious of Germany, noted that Limpus remained ultimately 
responsible to the Ottoman Minister of Marine, and that it was unclear who would 
command Liman, Vansittart’s views represented the current of policy. 1153 Grey embodied 
this to Benckendorff on 11 December. He told him that a stronger wording of the joint 
communication would not suit Britain, as he doubted that the matter was as important as 
 
1151 Mallet to Grey, No. 987, 4 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55415, Vansittart minute. 
1152 Bertie to Grey, No. 165, Tel., 10 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55765, Vansittart minute.  
1153 Mallet to Grey, No. 609, Tel., 10 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55766, Vansittart and Crowe (11th) minute.  
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suggested by Russia, and he was hampered in any case by the role of Limpus. A day later, 
‘on reflection’ Grey told Benckendorff that this represented a ‘define opinion’ and that 
Britain would do no more until the precise details of the contract came to light. 1154  
While Grey had poured cold water on Russian dreams of a robust triple entente response, 
both he and Mallet still worked towards finding a solution to the impasse. The principal 
difference between the British and German commands, Mallet pointed out, was that in 
times of war, Germans had ‘become Ottoman’ and taken an active part in fighting. 
Although the Turks were in the process of asking for retired British officers to fulfil a 
similar role, this was still in the planning phase. This meant that German officers were 
perhaps of more use to the Turks. The position remained, however, that any discussion of 
Liman’s role would require willingness on the part of Britain to consider the nature of 
Limpus’ command. 1155 Limpus himself was unwilling to give up his title as commander of 
the Turkish Navy, except in extremis. The Turks wanted a good fleet, Mallet warned, and if 
they didn’t get it from Britain would not hesitate to look elsewhere. Vansittart was 
cautious. The fact that at present British officers couldn’t take an active part in war, 
combined with Limpus’ being demoted (however much this would be in name only), might 
well lead the Turks to the conclusion that Britain was not serious, and encourage them to 
look to Germany for their naval needs. On the other hand, Clerk argued, not changing the 
title would mean gridlock with Germany, and that influence depended on any case on the 
man: ‘Admiral Gamble could have done anything, Admiral Williams nothing.’ Grey was 
anxious to avoid a trap. Britain must wait, he said, for a clear indication that Liman’s 
position would be modified if that of Limpus was. 1156  
 
1154 Grey to O’Beirne, No. 789, Tel., 11 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55771; Grey to O’Beirne, No. 789, Tel., 
12 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/55771. 
1155 Mallet to Grey, No. 613, Tel., 11 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1857/55920, Vansittart minute.  
1156 Mallet to Grey, No. 623, Tel., Confidential, 14 Dec. 1913, FO 371/56310, Vansittart, Clerk and Grey 
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 Unsurprisingly, this was not an attitude which pleased Russia. Sazonov, ‘as wobbly 
as ever’, complained that the action of Britain marked the failure of three power action in 
this matter, and that Britain had failed a ‘test’, which threatened the future of the entente. 
1157 Vansittart complained about what he saw as Sazonov’s self-deception. It was 
‘ridiculous’, he blasted, to believe that Germany would not take umbrage at strong Triple 
Entente pressure at Constantinople. Sazonov was very difficult to deal with, he added. 
Crowe agreed, remarking that his opinions were ‘almost incredibly jejune’. 1158 Although 
frustrated, it was clear that further action to placate Russia would be required. Grey 
decided to speak to Germany directly. 1159 He informed Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, the 
German Ambassador to London, that Russia was more upset about Liman than he had 
known her to be over anything else throughout his time at the Foreign Office. Trying to 
convince Germany to help him, Grey told Lichnowsky that he had struggled to hold the 
Russians back from aggressive action at the Porte. At Lichnowsky’s request, he agreed to 
make no communication at Constantinople without informing the Germans. 1160 As he had 
done a year previously, Grey now worked directly with Germany to seek a solution to a 
European problem. As he told O’Beirne, any further steps in the direction of protest would 
provoke the question into becoming a ‘German and European question’. To avoid this, he 
was willing to modify Limpus’ contract, if this would encourage the Germans to do 
likewise. 1161 Once again, Grey was seeking external solutions to his entente problems. He 
was not willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of Russia.  
 
1157 Vansittart minute, 15th, O’Beirne to Grey, No. 375 9 Dec 1913, FO 371/1847/56341; O’Beirne to Grey, 
No. 411, Tel., 13 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/56323; O’Beirne to Grey, No. 413, Tel., 14 Dec. 1913, FO 
371/1847/56325. 
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1161 Grey to O’Beirne, No. 803, Tel., 16 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/56796. 
 290 
 This stance was further vindicated when the full details of the contract were 
provided by the Porte. Liman’s command would not include either the Bosporus or the 
Dardanelles. Furthermore, he would not be in command in the event of a siege. This 
seemed to confirm, although not to the cautious Nicolson, that there was little to fear from 
Liman’s mission. 1162 Having failed to get a commitment to action from the Triple Entente, 
and as had been predicted in Paris, Russia now considered a direct settlement with 
Germany. For their part, the Germans were hoped to avoid a rupture over Liman, and 
were willing to come to the table. This news was met with delight in London. Crowe and 
Grey hoped that the press could be ‘kept quiet’, in order to allow a compromise to be 
found. 1163 Grey was still willing to accommodate a solution by reducing Limpus’ powers, 
but he made it clear to his colleagues that he would not do so merely to put Britain in a 
better position to support the Russians. He would not dance to the Russian tune. 1164 
Frustrated and still ‘jumpy’, Sazonov now proposed joint action at Berlin, much to the 
irritation of officials in London, where it was worried that it would appear threatening. 
Grey thought that the Germans hoped for a way out, but that a joint communication 
would only stiffen their resolve, and make the question one between two alliance systems. 
He thought that the question could not be allowed to assume this form unless Russia was 
willing to make it a casus belli. Speaking personally, he did not believe it to be worth war, 
and that ‘patient pressure’ would be sufficient to achieve a modification. Consequently, 
Goschen was asked to make another effort with the Germans, emphasising that Russia was 
extremely concerned. 1165  
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 As the new year dawned, Sir Edward Goschen, in Berlin, reflected on the future. 
He saw ‘some nasty rocks ahead’, including the German mission. Meeting Jagow, the 
German State Secretary, whom he found ‘very friendly and nice’, he discussed the matter 
‘amicably’. 1166 Goschen believed him willing to settle the question in a ‘friendly way’, but 
Jagow warned that it was impossible if the entente Powers tried to exert pressure, or if the 
press in Russia and France inflated the importance of the matter. 1167 He made similar 
points in his telegram to Grey, and added that Jagow had hinted at a possible solution: 
promoting Liman, so that he would be too senior to command the 1st Army Corps. Jagow 
had also reassured Goschen that German officers would travel to Turkey with instructions 
to avoid interference in Turkish politics. This accommodating attitude was met with 
enthusiasm by Clerk, who thought that a solution could not be far away, if such a spirit was 
maintained. 1168  
 Sazonov had not passed such a relaxing new year. He complained to Buchanan 
that the Russians could not wait longer than a month for a solution. Vansittart was 
frustrated, warning that unless the Russian Government was willing to ‘show patience’ and 
‘refrain from their inclination to rush matters’, they would lose any chance of a ‘peaceful 
[and] amicable settlement’. Clerk thought that this indignation was perhaps intended to 
reach Lichnowsky. 1169 If movement from Germany was not forthcoming, Sazonov 
intended to return to the idea of joint action at Constantinople, much to the frustration of 
Crowe, who wished that Tsar Nicholas would settle the matter in direct correspondence 
with his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm. 1170 Days later, Sazonov, by now ‘bowling rather wild’, 
suggested that Britain and France might use the financial negotiations with Turkey as a 
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lever, in particular delaying consent to the 4% customs rise. 1171 This was too far even for 
Nicolson, who complained of Sazonov taking for granted Anglo-French cooperation, 
especially as ‘we are quite ready to use our good offices with Germany towards a 
satisfactory answer’. Furthermore, the customs question required unanimous assent of the 
Powers. If Russia felt strongly enough, there was nothing to stop her from refusing her 
consent. Grey expressed his agreement with this view, and emphasised that it was too late 
to change the conditions of the financial agreements. 1172 
 Despite the sense of chaos in Russian policy, her negotiation with Germany had 
borne fruit, and London learned on the 11th that Liman was to be promoted, so as to be 
unable to command the 1st Army Corps at Constantinople. If a direct command were to 
become necessary, he would take it at Adrianople and not the capital. The Russian 
Ambassador, Mikhail von Giers, who had been on the point of leaving Constantinople in 
protest, was hastily ordered to remain for the moment. 1173 British policymakers might 
have thought that this permitted a moment of calm, but Russia now requested that Limpus 
relinquish his command. The Foreign Office thought that this was completely unnecessary. 
Grey complained that, as he had already stated, he was willing to change Limpus’ position 
only to facilitate a solution, and not to put Russia in a stronger negotiating position. If 
Germany were to ask him to do it, he would agree, but she had not. 1174 Buchanan was 
nevertheless hopeful of an end to the spat within a fortnight, on the basis indicated. Tsar 
Nicholas, he added, had taken to talking as if the matter was already settled. 1175 On the 
14th, to British relief, the German press carried news of Liman’s promotion, and reported 
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that he had been offered the role of ‘Inspector General’ of the Turkish Army. 1176 This 
‘ingenious way out’ was soon confirmed by the German Embassy. 1177 Grey might have 
thought he was safe from Russian complaints for a time, but in February, a similar incident 
threatened, when the Russians voiced their displeasure at the news that a German would 
command Scutari, the town which had caused so much trouble for negotiators during the 
Balkan Wars. This time, however, Britain was not to be drawn. Vansittart noted that the 
Foreign Office was ‘rather in the dark’, a state of affairs which Crowe welcomed: ‘The less 
we hear of it, the better’. Nicolson agreed. 1178 
 So ended what was, in the end, a minor spat in the annals of Great Power relations. 
Keith Neilson and Zara Steiner argued that it had been difficult for Grey, as he tried to 
keep both Turkey and Russia onside. 1179 It seems that this perhaps overstates the case. 
Although Grey did try to find a balance, it was between the Russian entente, which seemed 
as though it might well be coming towards an end, and British policy more generally, 
which included avoidance of active hostility towards Turkey but also the growing 
possibility of developing the sense of détente which had been emerging between Britain and 
Germany. 1180 Grey’s communications to Germany were almost apologetic, in the nature 
of asking a friend to indulge the eccentricities and overreactions of a relative, and the 
unwillingness of British officials to associate themselves with joint action at Constantinople 
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owed more to the feelings of Germany than those of the Turks. 1181 Indeed, the fact that 
the Liman mission was not in reality particularly threatening, having been long in the 
planning, demonstrated that Britain was not especially concerned with Turkey. 1182 In the 
early years after the revolution, Britain was more active in opposition to German influence 
in Turkey. The incident suggested, indeed, that Britain had largely lost interest in trying to 
improve her position in Turkey, especially after having secured a number of commercial 
and strategic concessions following the Hakki negotiations. The outbreak of the European 
war would change this comfortable position.  
7.2. War  
  
The killing of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, along with his wife Sophie, by 
Serbian terrorists in Sarajevo has been considered, with the benefit of hindsight, as an 
epoch-shattering event, sending shockwaves throughout Europe. At the time, however, 
many British policymakers did not consider it more than a tragic incident which might 
provoke some trouble. Louis Mallet was among these. Following the news of the 
Archduke’s death he was compelled to cancel a ball and dinner he had been planning to 
give, but he did not consider further implications likely. Indeed, he departed for a planned 
period of leave soon afterwards. 1183 Nevertheless, the murders set in motion a chain of 
events leading to the outbreak of what would become known as the First World War, a 
conflict then unparalleled in its industrial levels of slaughter. 1184 Turkey initially remained 
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neutral in the conflict. Having seized the Turkish ships, British policymakers were aware 
that their credit would need significant rebuilding with the Porte. In London, there was no 
significant appetite to do so, and many policymakers thought that Turkey was already a 
lost cause. Mallet, on the other hand, was determined not to leave his first ambassadorial 
posting without a fight. Although he accepted that bringing Turkey into the war on the 
entente side was unlikely, he worked to the last minute to keep her neutral, unaware that she 
had already signed an understanding with Germany.  
7.2.a. Sultan Osman I to Agincourt 
  
Britain’s Russian partner was unhappy about the Turkish naval situation in 1914. 
The Russian Black Sea Fleet (isolated from the rest of the world by the Straits, which 
remained stubbornly closed to warships) did not possess any ships of the dreadnought class, 
and would not for at least two years, whereas Turkey was scheduled to possess two by mid-
1914. On delivery, they could significantly affect the balance of power in the Black Sea. As 
early as May 1914, Sazonov had suggested to Britain that she might seize the Turkish ships 
building in Armstrong’s yards. 1185 British officials had been aware of his unease even 
earlier. In January, Buchanan had noted Sazonov’s irritation at the fact that French banks 
had loaned Turkey the funds to purchase the dreadnought Rio de Janeiro, being built by 
Armstrong for the Brazilians, who had, reflecting economic trouble and improving 
relations with their neighbours, been willing to sell it on. Clerk recognised the Russian 
concern that Turkey would have two dreadnoughts to their none, and were further 
worried that, under the command of a British admiral, the Turkish Navy would likely 
develop into an effective fighting force. 1186  
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 The Turkish crew intended to man the ships arrived in Britain in March. There 
was some debate whether these men should be ‘feted’, and afforded hospitality. The 
Foreign Office, however, was unanimous that they should not be celebrated, as this would 
set an unhelpful precedent. 1187 By the end of July, with war threatening, the Turks decided 
to take control of the situation. The delivery date had already been deferred by Armstrong, 
and so the Turks planned to coal the ships and sail them to Constantinople as soon as 
possible, despite the fact that they were formally unfinished. 1188 By now, the Admiralty 
had already decided to seize the ships. Crowe was philosophical. Reflecting the strong 
‘separation of powers’ prevalent in Whitehall, he thought the Admiralty should be left to 
act as they thought best, and that the Foreign Office should focus on defending their action 
to Turkey as well as possible in the aftermath. 1189 On the third of August, with Britain’s 
entry into the war now inevitable, the Admiralty officially informed the Foreign Office that 
the Turkish ships were to be seized, and requested the Ottoman Government be informed. 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction in Turkey was outraged. The Grand Vizier, Said Halim 
Pasha, said that both he and his Government were deeply unhappy at what had happened, 
and considered it an ‘unfriendly act’, especially in the light of the ‘heavy’ financial sacrifices 
which had been made to pay for the vessels. 1190 Grey could only temporise. He was ‘sure’ 
that the Turkish Government could ‘understand the necessity’, and pledged to ensure that 
they did not lose out financially. 1191 The financial question remained open. Clerk pointed 
out that the Admiralty was ‘in no hurry to pay for the ship’, but the question of policy – 
‘whether immediate payment [would] mollify the Turks and keep them quiet’ was yet to be 
decided. 1192 
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 Henry Beaumont, chargé in the absence of Mallet, was not entirely sympathetic. The 
Minister of Marine, he said, had been ‘acting like spoiled child’, threatening that the Turks 
would never again order from Armstrong, and even questioning the future of the contract, 
recently signed, that would see British firms building the dreadnought docks in 
Constantinople. 1193 Part of the Minister’s rage stemmed, he said, from his belief that in 
drawing up the contract, Britain had produced a legal opinion making it clear that the 
ships could not be requisitioned. Beaumont said that although he maintained an 
‘unreasonable attitude’, this was only ‘partially shared by his colleagues. Winston 
Churchill, the First Lord, was uncompromising: ‘The Turks should have back whatever 
they have paid – no more. And there is no hurry about this. They may join the Germans, 
in which case, we shall save our money. Negotiate and temporise.’ 1194  
 Nevertheless, there was some sympathy. Beaumont noted that some of the funds for 
the ship had been raised by public subscription. The loss was ‘very deeply felt and widely 
resented’. 1195 Furthermore, despite Churchill’s attitude, it appeared, based on the legal 
opinions given at the time of the purchase, that there was ‘some formation for the Turkish 
grievance’. This did not mean that Britain should compromise herself, however. Clerk 
added that it would be best to wait and see how events developed before making any 
decisions. 1196 Personally, he thought that Turkey might be induced to stay out of the war if 
she received payment for the ships immediately, with a promise for their delivery at the 
conclusion of hostilities. If this, combined with an undertaking to protect her from Greece, 
would keep Turkey neutral and ‘soothe’ her feelings, then they should be granted. Crowe 
was unconvinced. If Turkey was ‘bent on war’, he said, she would not ‘be induced to desist 
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by the mere renewal of the offer to pay for the seized dreadnoughts.’ 1197 Mallet, who had 
since returned to his post, thought that public opinion might improve in Turkey if the ships 
were to be returned as soon as possible – he suggested that the Government would find it 
‘worth their while’ to comply as far as possible. The Foreign Office saw an opportunity to 
use this as a lever, and a communication was made to Turkey, in conjunction with the 
Admiralty, that the ships would be returned after the war, along with payment for 
inconvenience, and having been repaired at British expense. The catch was that this 
agreement would come into force the day the last German officer belonging to the Goeben 
and Breslau had departed, and would remain in force so long as Turkey remained neutral. 
1198 The Turks already being committed to Germany, this achieved little traction, and they 
would try to wriggle out of their difficulty by offering to sell the ships to Britain in 
September. 1199 There was little interest in Britain for such a procedure, as well there might 
not be, and the enquiry was not replied to. 1200  
 The seizure of the ships, although a ‘gift to hawks in Turkey’, did not have a 
particularly significant effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. 1201 The Turks had already 
signed an understanding with Germany, and war did not break out for some time in any 
case.  
7.2.b. Goeben and Breslau 
  
The Turkish Government, shipless and angry, presented an ideal opportunity for 
the Germans to build on their understanding. To encourage the Turks to join the war, 
they arranged for the Goeben, a post-Dreadnought battlecruiser (and therefore a rung beneath 
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a full battleship, such as the Sultan Osman I) along with her consort, Breslau, to travel to 
Constantinople, for the use of the Turks. Although meeting British ships on several 
occasions, they managed to outwit them. 1202 The Foreign Office had been aware of 
rumours that Goeben might be sold to Turkey as early as 1913, and so there was little doubt 
in London as to the intentions of Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, who commanded the Goeben. 
1203 Oliphant found it a ‘scandal’ that the ships were still flying a German flag, despite 
being within the supposedly neutral environs of Constantinople. 1204 The Turkish 
Government, to get around the stipulations of neutrality, declared that the ships had been 
bought from the German Government, despite the fact that no money had changed hands. 
By early September, Mallet was fully aware of the false nature of this transaction, and 
declared to the Turks that the sale would not be recognised. 1205 
 In itself, this was not a particularly important incident, and did not contribute 
significantly to the outbreak of war between Britain and Turkey, although it has often been 
considered to have been so. 1206 However, it did demonstrate clearly to British officials, 
who remained ignorant that Turkey had already ‘picked a side’, that they faced an uphill 
battle against German influence in the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, Souchon and his 
vessels were used to attack Russian Black Sea ports at the end of October, bringing Turkey 
into the war.  
7.2.c. Attempts to keep Turkey neutral 
   
The Turks had signed an agreement with Germany before Britain had even 
entered the war herself. Many scholars have shown that this reflected Turkish panic at 
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having failed to secure an alliance with another Power, and so she pursued an agreement 
with Germany, signed on 28 July. 1207 Due in part to the fact that this would have been 
unpopular with the Ottoman Public, the agreement was kept secret for some time. 1208 
Certainly, British observers were unaware of the agreement being signed. The Turks 
declared to Britain, on 13 August, that they intended to remain neutral in the war. 1209 It 
was clear, however, that Turkey remained suspicious of Britain. Limpus’ naval mission was 
withdrawn from active service, and ordered to work at the Ministry of Marine. Beaumont 
noted that the Turks seemed afraid, above else, of Russia, and that a declaration that 
France and Britain would protect her integrity would go some way to calm her. This 
prompted Crowe to write that the Turks were ‘playing with us’. Although he did not think 
it would have any effect, he still suggested that a communication of the sort be prepared. 
1210 Grey instructed Mallet to reassure the Turks, along with his entente colleagues, that 
Britain, France and Russia would uphold her integrity and independence against any 
Power seeking to take advantage of the conflict, so long as the Turks remined scrupulously 
neutral. 1211 The Turks continued to offer Beaumont ‘solemn promises’ of neutrality. 
Beaumont thought it a positive sign that Goeben and Breslau now flew Ottoman flags, and 
although some ‘allowance’ needed to be made for feeling in Turkey about the seizure of 
her ships, he thought that events were moving in a more neutral direction. 1212 Crowe was 
already thinking of war, considering the question of Admiral Limpus’ position. He 
produced a memorandum which noted that he would be unable to leave in the event of 
war, and advocated his removal, arguing that his contract had already been breached by 
being limited to land work. This would mean that Germans would take his place, but 
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1209 Tevfik to Grey, 13 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/38756. 
1210 Beaumont to Grey, No. 545, Tel., Urgent, 15 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/39783, Crowe minute, 16th. 
1211 Grey to Beaumont, No. 377, Tel., 16 Aug. 1914. (Also sent to St Petersburg, Cairo and Paris.) 
1212 Beaumont to Grey, No. 574, Tel., 16 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/39808.  
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Crowe thought that this was inevitable in any case. If Limpus was restrained, however, 
then Crowe saw the advantages – it would be useful ‘war cry’ in India. 1213 Indeed, India 
and Islam were at the forefront of many minds in London. Grey, by now committed firmly 
to Russia and France as a result of war, discussed British policy with regard to Turkey with 
their ambassadors. It would, he said, be ‘very embarrassing’ in India and Egypt for Turkey 
to fight against Britain, although if she chose Germany it could not be helped. If Germany 
was to lose the first big rendezvous of the war in Belgium, then the task of keeping Turkey 
out would become far simpler. The ‘proper course’, he said, was to convince Turkey that 
her possessions were protected, so long as she remained neutral. 1214 This summed up his 
policy throughout this period. Although he wanted to avoid fighting Turkey, he accepted 
that it might well be inevitable. In itself, this confirmed that Grey did not see war with 
Turkey as a particular threat, worried more about Muslim reaction than conflict itself. It 
also demonstrated that, at this early juncture, Grey had accepted that Turkey joining the 
British side in the war was impossible.  
 British attempts at inducement did not hit the mark. Tevfik, still Ottoman 
Ambassador in London, complained to Grey of a sense of ‘uneasiness’ about British 
intentions. Grey retorted that if Turkey wanted to set her mind at rest, she should send 
away the German ships’ crews, and preserve ‘real neutrality’. 1215 Although Said continued 
to complain about the seizure of Turkey’s ships, he seemed ‘relieved’, in Mallet’s words, to 
learn of the declaration made by the three Powers that Turkey would be protected if she 
stayed neutral. Eager to make a good go of his ambassadorship, Mallet reported his belief 
in Said’s ‘absolute personal sincerity’. Although he admitted that the situation was 
‘delicate’, he was convinced that it might yet be saved by ‘patience’ and the avoidance of 
 
1213 Crowe memorandum, 16 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/40391.  
1214 Grey to Bertie, No. 533, 15 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/40433. (also sent to St Petersburg) 
1215 Grey to Mallet, No. 395, Tel., 18 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/40611.  
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‘precipitate action’. 1216 Although optimistic, and of course unaware that the Ottoman path 
had already been agreed to some extent, Mallet was not otherwise naïve in his view. He 
was aware that the impetus for war and the German connection came largely from Enver, 
and reported that the forces in favour of neutrality seemed to gain whilst he was absent 
from the scene with illness. 1217 Similarly, he did not want to suggest that matters were not 
‘serious’, and he suggested that the British fleet should remain close to Constantinople, to 
guard against the possibility of a German led coup.  
 Towards the end of August, an attempt was made by Turkey, whose continued 
non-participation in hostilities caused some frustration in Germany, to extract a better deal 
from Britain. Mallet reported a lengthy list of conditions for neutrality, including 
agreements on the Aegean Islands and capitulations, restoration of the two dreadnoughts, 
and possession of Western Thrace in the event of Bulgaria joining the war against Britain. 
He conceded that these ‘strange’ demands were more like those imposed by a victorious 
power after a successful war, but thought that a guarantee against Russian incursion 
remained the key, and that a peaceful solution was still possible. 1218 The Foreign Office 
had still not given up on keeping Turkey out of the war, and worked on this assumption. 
The Russians were willing to declare that they would not touch Turkish territory, and 
Buchanan considered Turkish suspicions ‘groundless’. 1219 Sazonov expressed himself 
willing to work towards a solution on the basis of the Turkish proposals. He warned that 
Germany was making fresh offers to Turkey every day, and that to secure neutrality, 
Britain and Russia would have to go ‘as far as possible’. 1220 In keeping with this narrative, 
which it of course did no harm to Turkey to disseminate, Said told Mallet that a ‘battle’ for 
 
1216 Mallet to Grey, No. 557, Tel., 18 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/40628.  
1217 Mallet to Grey, No. 560, tel., 19 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/40642. 
1218 Mallet to Grey, No. 572, Tel., 20 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/41431.  
1219 Buchanan to Grey, No. 309., Tel., 20 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/41432.  
1220 Buchanan to Grey, No. 310, Tel., 21 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/41796.  
 303 
neutrality was being waged at Constantinople between those in favour of peace and the 
more pro-German elements, who favoured joining the war. He warned that a coup, 
backed by Germany, might put Enver in power and seal the victory of the German 
elements in Turkey. Mallet, although worried about this, thought that decisive action was 
unlikely whilst Goeben was undergoing repairs. Crowe concluded that this meant a period of 
grace: ‘If the Goeben’s boilers will not be ready before Sept 2, we may expect that the 
Turkish Govt. will continue their game with us up to then.’ 1221 
 Time had dampened Sazonov’s ardour for a settlement. If conversations were to go 
ahead, he suggested, the only guarantee of neutrality would be for Turkey to expel the 
crews of Goeben and Breslau, along with significant numbers of the German officers 
employed in the Ottoman Army. Crowe, unsurprisingly, agreed that their continuous 
presence was incompatible with neutrality. 1222 For different reasons, Mallet was not keen 
on the idea of joint representations. He thought that attitudes in Constantinople were 
softening, and he remained ‘fairly confident’ of keeping Turkey out of the war, despite the 
situation remaining ‘delicate’. With this in mind, he was willing to ‘gloss over’ incidents 
that would normally not be ignored. With this, joint conversations with Russia were 
shelved, although Mallet remained convinced that Britain must commit to discussions on 
the capitulations if they were to keep Turkey out. 1223 He continued his efforts to urge 
Turkey to expel German sailors, and reassured the Foreign Office that the forces in favour 
of strict neutrality were ‘slowly gaining’. Oliphant hoped that he was ‘right’, but the news 
that ninety German sailors had passed through Sofia, on their way to Constantinople, 
 
1221 Mallet to Grey, No. 491, Tel., 21 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/42003, Crowe minute, 22nd.  
1222 Buchanan to Grey, No. 319, Tel., 23 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/42338, Crowe minute, 24th.  
1223 Mallet to Grey, No. 599, Tel., 23 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/42326, Crowe (24th) and Nicolson minutes; 
Mallet to Grey, No. 602, Tel., 23 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/42527.  
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punctured his optimism. 1224 His comment was brief and to the point: ‘Instructive!’. Mallet 
was charged to complain about this latest evidence of bad faith. 1225  
 Mallet still thought that he needed more to offer the moderates in Turkey if he was 
to have a chance of keeping her neutral. He suggested that protection of Turkish territory, 
economic freedom and an end to the capitulations should be offered. For the time being, 
he was given permission to assure the Turkish Government, in writing, that the three 
Powers would protect the integrity of Turkey from any power seeking to ‘profit’ by the 
war. 1226 The question of the capitulations and commercial treaties was more involved. As 
Clerk remarked, this was not a question that could be solved in a day. Nevertheless, a 
commercial agreement with a fifteen year term was contemplated, granting commercial 
freedom to Turkey in return for most favoured nation status. 1227 Although British 
policymakers were willing to consider possible concessions towards the Turks, most 
thought that war was by far the most likely outcome. Preparations were made for 
communications to ‘prepare Indian opinion’ for war with Turkey, a Muslim country, 
quoting various wrongs committed against Britain by Turkey, such as British merchant 
ships being detained at the Straits. 1228 Clerk even contemplated desperate measures, such 
as ‘rushing’ the Straits, in response to what he called the ‘demonstrably non-existent’ 
nature of Turkish neutrality. Crowe remarked that the Turks now sought only to gain time 
in discussions with Britain. 1229 In Russia, too, thoughts had turned from ‘if’ to ‘when’. 
Giers warned his Government that it should avoid attacking Goeben and precipitating war, 
even if she moved into the Black Sea. It would be better to wait for a suitable moment. 
Mallet agreed, and demonstrating how close London thought war to be, was given the 
 
1224 Mallet to Grey, No. 607, Tel., 24 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/42747, Oliphant minute, 25th.  
1225 Bax Ironside to Grey, No. 66, Tel., 25 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/43125, Oliphant minute, 26th.  
1226 Mallet to Grey, No. 617, Tel., 25 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/43155. 
1227 Clerk minute, Mallet to Grey, No. 620, Tel., 26 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/53531; Foreign Office to 
Board of Trade, 28 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/53531. 
1228 Foreign Office drafts, 27 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/43829.  
1229 Mallet to Grey, No. 635, Tel., FO 371/2139/43860, Clerk (28th) and Crowe minutes.  
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power to decide when to ask for his passports from the Turkish Government and make 
preparations for departure. Crowe was already thinking about how the breakout of war 
could be best made to appear:  
It is of course important from the point of view of the British position before the 
Mahometan world that the war with Turkey should be made clearly to be what it 
will: an attack by Turkey on great [sic] Britain, France, and Russia. Turkey, under 
German advice, will on her part, take great care to provoke the war if possible in 
some way, giving a different impression. 1230 
 
Mallet, although alive to the possibilities of war, was ‘reluctant to relinquish the struggle 
until the last possible moment.’ 1231 He did not ‘wish it to be understood’ from his reports 
that he had ‘abandoned [the] last hope of Turkey maintaining neutrality to extent of not 
actually attacking Russian in Black Sea, or of making some other movement.’ 1232 
Although this was hardly a ringing endorsement of the Turkish attitude, Grey gave him 
permission to take part in the joint declaration that Turkey would be protected from any 
power seeking to profit from the war on 29 August. 1233  
Mallet, though at pains to stress that the situation was not ‘hopeless’, was aware of 
the direction of the wind, and suggested that plans be laid for war. 1234 Clerk also believed 
war a matter of time. Commenting on the military preparations carried out at the 
Dardanelles, he wrote that: ‘By the time Turkey comes out into the open, the Dardanelles 
will be a tough nut’. 1235 It was decided that the American Ambassador, Henry 
Morgenthau, would be in charge of British interests when war broke out, and Mallet was 
 
1230 Mallet to Grey, No. 636, Tel., 27 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/43881; Grey to Mallet, No. 451, Tel., 28 
Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/43881; Crowe minute, 28th, same file.  
1231 Mallet accepted that position of Naval Advisors might soon become ‘very embarrassing’, and that there 
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1232 Mallet to Grey, No. 640, Tel., 28 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2138/44212. He noted that most Germans at 
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compelled to leave. 1236 Minds turned to the best means of attacking Turkey. Given 
established British interests and her position of influence over much of the Islamic world, 
much discussion centred around focussing Arab discontent on the Turks. It was agreed 
that the India Office would give an assurance that Britain would respect Islamic holy 
places, such as Mecca, during the war. On its outbreak, Arabs would be encouraged to 
take the Holy Places for themselves, striking a blow at the pretensions of Turkey to the 
Caliphate. 1237 Mallet considered this a wise decision, and preferred the idea to any 
attempt to force the Dardanelles. The details of any such movement were left to the India 
Office, in part owing to the difficulties presented by the Foreign Office still being notionally 
at peace with Turkey. 1238  
7.2.d. Capitulatory Complications 
  
Whilst the British Government was deciding how best to dismember the Ottoman 
Empire, the Turks contemplated the future. Frustrated at the lack of progress made in 
forcing concessions from the Powers, they unilaterally declared an end to the capitulations. 
This provoked a rare moment of unity between combatants, a joint note being presented 
from the all of the Great Powers, declaring that as treaties, the capitulations could not be 
unilaterally ended. For a final time, old Europe came together to protect her ancient 
privileges. 1239 Mallet and his entente colleagues were agreed that this development 
precluded the use of the capitulations as a lever to force neutrality, as it would now suggest 
 
1236 Morgenthau became known for writing a book about the Armenian Genocide, among other matters, 
detailing his time at Constantinople: Morgenthau, Henry, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY, 
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that Britain, France and Russia were ‘afraid’, and trying to ‘buy’ the Turks. 1240 Attitudes 
in London were hardening still further. Mallet reported rumours of a German coup, and 
advocated further concessions on the capitulations to strengthen moderate elements. 
Oliphant expressed his ‘doubt’ ‘whether the “moderate” party [could] save the situation’. 
Clerk, already suspicious of the Turks, thought that a moment of decision was 
approaching. If the Turks were ‘blind’ and ‘in the German pocket’, there was no point in 
Britain continuing to make adjustments for Turkey. He thought that Britain was ‘very near 
the limit of possible concessions.’ 1241 The official attitude hardened. Grey thought that 
concessions would in fact be taken as a sign of weakness by ‘extremists’. Turkey was told 
that all that had been suggested would hold good, but that any further concession was out 
of the question owing to the position of the Germans. If Turkey chose to fight, then this 
would be her concern. 1242 The attitude of those in Whitehall was firmer than that of 
Mallet, who remained in favour of making a compromise with the Turks over the 
capitulations. Frustrated, Clerk retorted that the terms of any agreement did not matter. 
What was important was whether it would buy neutrality. 1243 By mid-October, even 
Mallet, upon reflection, had recognised the futility of his attitude. The ending of the 
capitulations could not have been stopped, he said, as the war offered the ‘opportunity of 
the young Turks’ life’. 1244 
 In early September, it had been decided that Limpus’ mission would be withdrawn, 
and he was given the command of a naval squadron in the Mediterranean. 1245 As he left 
 
1240 Mallet to Grey, No. 770, Tel., 14 Sep. 1914, FO 371.2138/49417. 
1241 Mallet to Grey, No. 785, Tel., Very Confidential, 15 Sep. 1914, FO 371/2138/49871, Oliphant and 
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1244 Mallet to Tyrell, Private, 16 Oct. 1914, FO 800/80.  
1245 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 9 Sep. 1914, FO 371/2141/47909. This decision was reached much to 
Mallet’s distress, who thought that this would go against his hard work. See Mallet to Grey, No. 765, Tel, 12 
Sep. 1914, FO 371//2141/48948; Mallet to Grey, Private Telegram, 11 Sep. 1914, FO 800/80: he 
regarded it as a ’grave mistake’ and thought that Limpus taking command of British ships in the area would 
give rise to further suspicions that Britain aimed to force the Straits. He thought it would arouse the ‘bitter’ 
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on 18 September, more and more German officers poured into Turkey. Mallet did not 
hold the situation to be ‘hopeless’, but he warned that the chances of the ‘Neutrality party’ 
holding back the group around Enver were now low. Oliphant feared that the outlook was 
‘exceedingly black’. 1246 Grey tried another stark warning to the Turks. Britain did not 
want to precipitate conflict with Turkey, but her attitude could not be regarded as 
‘neutral’. No Germans had left, and more had been allowed in. Grey warned the Turks 
that Germany was in control at Constantinople, and that the inevitable result of this would 
be war unless the Said acted to bring matters under his control. 1247 Mallet, becoming 
frustrated, accepted that there was nothing to gain from further concession, and informed 
Said so. 1248 He identified several schemes in place around the Empire aimed at provoking 
a war, many with German support. He counselled turning a blind eye to much that was 
going on in Turkey, trying to keep Turkey neutral. His former colleagues in London did 
not share his views. Clerk thought that the time was fast approaching when Britain would 
be forced to ‘open her eyes’, whilst Nicolson labelled the outlook ‘by no means promising’. 
1249 Mallet also proposed that the British fleet stationed at the mouth of the Dardanelles 
might move further out to sea, in order to calm fears in Turkey of an amphibious attack. 
This suggestion met with little initial sympathy in the Foreign Office. Grey pointed out that 
the Turks had closed the Straits ‘unnecessarily’ and that the British would not move until 
the Germans had left Constantinople. 1250 On reflection, however, he changed his mind on 
account of his ‘much confidence in Sir L. Mallet, who is on the spot.’ The outlook 
nevertheless remained bleak. Negotiations over the capitulations had broken down by 
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October over the refusal of the Powers to accept a ‘time limit for negotiation of a system to 
take place of judicial capitulations’, and the question had become ‘more or less academic’. 
1251 
 Although Mallet believed that the Turkish Government was now ‘in effect a 
military dictatorship inspired and supported by Germany’, he still aimed to keep her out of 
the war as long as possible. He argued that he had been met with success for nine weeks 
already, and that every week that went by increased the chances of ultimate success. 1252 
He still believed that he had a reasonable chance of keeping Turkey out of the war. 1253 
The evidence suggested otherwise to officials in London. Oliphant thought that Turkish 
military preparations could not be ‘in any way regarded as merely defensive’, and it was a 
‘matter of days’ before war would break out. 1254 A few days later, learning that German 
gold was being sent to Turkey, he thought it ‘more than probable’ that Turkey would join 
the war when it arrived. 1255 In general, he remained convinced that Turkey would fight, 
either to gain from a German success or to distract from a German failure. 1256 During this 
time, Clerk contemplated a scheme whereby reconciliation between Serbia and Bulgaria 
would be used to increase the sense of risk for Turkey, making her more likely to remain 
peaceable. Grey thought it too complicated to be practical, likely to cause further problems 
with Romania and ‘perhaps Greece’. 1257 Mallet still contemplated another angle. Having 
learned that all his en clair telegrams were read by government ministers in Constantinople, 
he requested short, clear messages be sent to him, suggesting that Britain was popular 
amongst Arabs and in Egypt. He would not necessarily publish them, he said, but he 
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hoped that the content would ‘sink into Ministers for whose consumption they must be 
simple and striking.’ 1258 By 27 October, Mallet and his entente colleagues were frustrated 
enough to warn Said that an attack on one would mean war with all. Mallet believed that 
the message had pressed home. 1259 
7.2.e. Final Stages and the Black Sea 
  
Whether this message had been heard or not made little difference. On 29 
October, Mallet reported that Turkish ships had raided ports on the Black Sea and sunk 
some Russian vessels. 1260 Although war was now inevitable, according to Mallet’s warning 
to the Porte, he still tried to stave it off, proposing that Turkey be asked to choose between 
war with Britain, France and Russia or removal of all Germans. Demonstrating the 
severity of the situation, this telegram was sent to London via the American Embassy, as 
the Turks had cut off communication to the British. 1261 Although Mallet still believed in 
avoiding war at all costs, this was too much for Giers and the Russians. He asked for his 
passports, starting the ceremonial process of withdrawing from Turkey. In keeping with 
their wartime alliance, and according to his pre-existing instructions, Mallet, along with his 
French colleague Maurice Bompard, also asked for theirs. 1262 Mallet was keen to point out 
that asking for his passport did not constitute a declaration of war, but his opinion was not 
shared by Henry Morgenthau, who advised him to leave as soon as possible, nor by 
Oliphant, who was convinced that withdrawal would do nothing to stem the tide. 1263 Said, 
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who had always been keen to conciliate Mallet, claimed to not want war, and that it could 
still be avoided. Oliphant complained that from the day Said had made assurances about 
the position of Goeben and Breslau, ‘no effect’ had been given to ‘his words’. Nicolson 
labelled his utterances ‘words in the air’. 1264 In the meantime, orders had already been 
given to the British fleet to commence hostilities against the Turks. 1265 All that was left was 
for Grey to communicate his thanks to Mallet, and express the view that the war would 
have come sooner if not for his efforts. 1266 
7.3. The First World War 
 
 More recent scholarship has been sympathetic to Mallet’s performance in the final 
months before war. Joseph Heller, for instance, could not see how any Ambassador could 
have prevented war, given the strength of Enver Pasha. 1267 Indeed, the fact that Mallet 
seemed to gain some ground when Enver was unwell adds weight to this conclusion. Sean 
McMeekin argued that the die had been cast some time before, and that the Turks had in 
general decided on war with Germany. 1268 Certainly, given the commitments given to 
Germany by the Turks, Mallet cannot be blamed. Indeed, his energy and optimism cannot 
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be faulted. What the final period before the war, including the Liman incident, did show, 
was the extent to which Britain had not only lost any position of strength she might have 
had at Constantinople, but that she was not particularly concerned by this. The British 
attitude was clear as early as January 1914, when the question of sending further officers to 
the Turkish Navy was raised. Mallet worried that this entailed the risk of raising the 
Turkish Navy to too high a pitch of efficiency, and that it might be used against British 
interests such as Egypt in the future. However, he went on, to leave meant abandoning the 
role to Germans, who would raise the navy to a similar level of effectiveness, and Britain 
would have lost her restraining influence. Crowe thought that continuing to provide the 
Turks with naval services was the only possible option, as everything else was open to 
greater objection. Grey agreed that Britain must continue to lend officers. 1269 This 
demonstrated that, although worried about an openly hostile Turkey, British policymakers 
were not particularly interested in improving relations with her. The bare minimum 
needed to be done to keep her on side. 
 The question of the Straits, which threatened, like a distant dark cloud, 
international relations of this period, also demonstrated British views of Turkey. The 1908 
promise that Britain would support the opening of the Straits, but not at the price of 
Turkish coercion, remained valid, but policymakers hoped to keep the question on ice for 
the time being, as to discuss the question could only lead to difficulties with the Turks. 1270 
However, there was a sense that this fragile equilibrium could not be preserved forever. 
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the Straits question was, indirectly, responsible for the Turkish entry to the war – if the entente Powers had 
offered Turkey a guarantee of her territory against Greece and Russia, then the Straits would have been 
treated as a neutral highway, he said, and the Turks would have remained out of the war. However, as such 
a commitment was not forthcoming, the only option remained Germany. See id., ‘How Turkey drifted into 
World War One’, p. 315.  
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Mallet privately told Tyrrell that it would be ‘impossible to allow this gate on a great 
highway to be in the hands of a set of epileptic lunatics forever.’ 1271  
 In general, it was clear that by 1914, British officials had lost interest in Turkey. 
They had secured their commercial and strategic interests via the 1914 agreement with 
Germany and the Hakki negotiations, and there was a sense that Turkey was perhaps 
‘done’, especially as the CUP had proved to be a disappointment. Little demonstrated this 
more than the question of the Turkish battleships. If Grey and the rest of the Foreign 
Office had really wanted to work with Turkey and prevent her from fighting in the war, 
they could have argued more forcibly with Churchill and the Admiralty about the 
requisition, rather than leaving the details to them. It was obvious that the ships, so tied up 
in Turkish amour propre and CUP populism, were a sensitive issue, and that their non-
delivery would cause significant anger. That the Foreign Office were willing to let this 
happen demonstrated clearly that the Anglo-Turkish relationship had become a distant 
one, and that British policymakers were not particularly worried about earning Turkey’s 
animosity.  
 The final, fevered attempts to keep Turkey out of the war also betrayed this 
weariness. Mallet and the Foreign Office alike never seriously considered the possibility of 
Turkey joining the war on the British side. 1272 Despite the fact that they were unaware of 
the Turkish agreement with Germany, they recognised enough of the signs not to try.  
 
 Thus, a period which had begun with so much hope in 1908 with the revolution, 
ended in estranged silence. Although Mallet gamely struggled against the tide for three 
 
1271 Mallet to Tyrrell, Private, 16 Oct. 1914, FO 800/80.  
1272 Despite the claims of Geoffrey Miller, who wrote that: ‘The British Foreign Office was fatally misled on 
the political situation in Constantinople by the over-optimistic reports of Mallet who believed, on the basis of 
his own powers of personal persuasion if little else, that at best he could swing Turkey over to the allied side 
and, at worst, he could guarantee neutrality’ see id., Superior Force, ch. 15.  
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exhausting months, in London, Turkey had been given up. In the final analysis, this 
proved more damaging to the Ottoman Empire than it did to Great Britain.  
  
 315 
8. Conclusions  
 
 
 This work has broken new ground by re-examining the role of Ottoman decline 
and revolution in British foreign policy, and the impact of this both in the region and more 
widely in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was an increasingly important element in Great 
Powers politics in the years before the First World War. This was not, however, a function 
of the Ottoman state. The revolution in 1908 had been provoked by a justified sense of 
weakness and decline, which the chronic political instability of post-revolutionary politics 
only exacerbated. Rather than being a formidable factor in both international politics and 
balance of power calculation as a result of her strength, as she had been long before, the 
weakness of the Ottoman state now provided sleepless nights for European policymakers. 
This was a cause of several of the crises which punctuated the final years before war. 
These, in turn seemed to signal to many observers that the oft-prophesied collapse of the 
‘Sick Man of Europe’ was now at hand, with all the associated fears of Great Power 
collision. From 1911, the crises which would most concern the Great Powers, including 
that which resulted in war, all sprang from Ottoman weakness and its legacy in the 
troubled hinterlands of the Empire. 1273 
 The retreat of Ottoman power was particularly important because of the way in 
which the Great Power’s interests in the region conflicted with the system of alignments 
which had emerged in Europe since the 1904 signing of an entente between France and 
Britain, erstwhile near combatants at Fashoda. Russia, whose designs on the Straits had 
been acquiesced in only with reservation by her convention partner Great Britain, had an 
 
1273 William Mulligan argues convincingly that the international system acted to make war less, rather than 
more, likely in the early 20th century, however, he argues that war became increasingly likely from 1911 
onward, as a result of greater instability, increased expenditure on armaments and radical nationalism. This 
would emphasise the importance of the Ottoman Empire to power relations of this period, as the more 
dangerous of the crises of the early 1900s all involved that power in some way. Indeed, Mulligan noted that 
this was because Ottoman issues cut across the established groupings of the Powers. See id., Origins of the First 
World War, pp 86-7; 232-4.  
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interest in the Empire’s complete collapse, especially once her pro-Slavic policy in the 
Balkans had been developed. Britain, on the other hand, preferred to maintain the 
Ottomans as a going concern for as long as possible, in the early part of the period because 
she hoped to be able to secure concessions with the new men in power on the Bosporus, 
and later because she was in the process of securing her interests in the Persian Gulf with 
both the Germans, via negotiations on the Berlin to Baghdad Railway project, and with 
the Turks themselves. For instance, when the possibility of using these negotiations as 
leverage was floated in 1913, most senior policymakers were aghast at the idea of 
sacrificing British interests for the benefit of Russia’s greater Slavic ambitions. Britain and 
France also found themselves in competition in Turkey, with British officials concerned 
about French economic penetration. To cite one example, the Foreign Office was less than 
impressed by French estimates of Bulgaria’s ability to pay compensation to the Turks 
during the Bosnian crisis; Sir Louis Mallet complained that French financial interests, 
which were heavily interested in Bulgaria, had ‘prevailed’ in the discussions. 1274 In keeping 
with general trends, Britain and Germany, despite supposedly being arranged on different 
sides of the ‘blocs’ which divided Europe, found a cautious modus vivendi in Turkey. They 
had come to terms on the complex railway questions by 1914, and British policymakers 
were generally unconcerned about the Liman mission in 1913-14, pointing out quite 
rightly that British naval advisors had (and did) occupied similar positions as that proposed 
for Liman.  
 In general, Turkey was an important element of the diplomatic environment before 
the war. As both the location and a cause of many of the diplomatic wrangles which 
characterised international relations during this period, she was at the forefront of many 
minds. As a region of the world where the interests of entente and alliance partners clashed, 
 
1274 Mallet minute on Bertie to Grey, no. 6, tel., en clair, by post, 12 Jan 09, FO 371/747/1642. 
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she was an element of chaos in a world where the existing system seemed as though it 
might be on the brink of change.  
  
 In terms of British policy, this period of Turkish history seemed to offer 
opportunities. Indeed, it has been argued that the events of 1908 presented a golden 
opportunity for Britain to improve her standing in the Empire, and to further her interests 
in the Persian Gulf. The Young Turk Revolution was a shock to many observers, and its 
unexpected nature has perhaps contributed to the misconceptions which surround it. A 
rising of young, educated men from the European provinces of the Empire seized the reins 
of power from the Sultan and declared that a new age of liberty had dawned in Turkey. 
Aware that professions of liberalism and constitutionalism would be welcomed by 
European Powers, especially those seemingly hostile to Germany, which was associated 
with the hated Hamidian regime, such sentiments were played up. Given the way in which 
a majority of British diplomatists and officials saw the world, associating ‘revolution’ with 
the principles of the revolution in France, such a presentation did not have to do much to 
take root. British officials, saw, in part because they wanted to, a new regime which would 
be run on more efficient, modern lines, resulting in a more equitable society and a more 
Anglophile line in foreign policy. This was a misreading of the revolution and the 
revolutionaries. Far from being gentle idealists, to be found in Parisian cafés, they were 
hard-nosed state servants and soldiers, acting to save the Empire within the context of the 
Social Darwinist thinking which was then so in vogue, rather than fundamentally change 
the nature of the state. Unaware that they had failed to get the measure of the Young 
Turks, British officials met the revolution with cautious optimism, believing that the future 
of Anglo-Turkish relations, led by coincidence by a new ambassador, was bright.  
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 This attitude was carried into the Bosnian Crisis, which erupted in part as a 
consequence of the CUP’s seizure of power. In the early stages, Sir Edward Grey was keen 
to try and follow a policy towards Turkey which was at the least sympathetic, even at the 
cost of full-throated support for Russia, the latest power with which Britain was continuing 
her careful descent from a position of formal diplomatic isolation. However, as the crisis 
went on, Grey found himself increasingly frustrated by the Turkish attitude. Turkey’s 
insistence, for instance, on prioritising the Eastern Rumelian question, seemingly unable to 
accept a fait accompli, and suggestions from Turkish officials that she might reject the 
Russian proposal to fund the Bulgarian indemnity also provoked disquiet. For Grey, 
Turkey was overly concerned with ‘shadow’ rather than substance. 1275 Turkey’s attitude 
only made the British attempt to conduct a dual-track policy more difficult, making Grey’s 
frustration more intense. 
  
 The counter-revolution of 1909 demonstrated further to Britain that the future of 
Anglo-Turkish relations was not as rosy as had been imagined. Although Grey professed 
his admiration for the strength of the CUP in taking back power so quickly, efficiently and 
decisively, he had learnt that Turkey was unstable and unlikely to be reliable, and he had 
also learnt a salutary lesson on the location from which the CUP drew its power: the barrel 
of a gun. Grey was certainly not helped by the notably anti-CUP attitude of the British 
embassy. Decisive evidence will probably never emerge on the question of whether British 
officials took an active part in the fomenting of the initial coup, although the evidence 
which does exist suggests that they were not. What is without a doubt is that the Embassy 
took active steps to try and keep the ‘old Turks’ in situ, once the CUP had been temporarily 
deposed. This diversion in policy between London and the Embassy was embarrassing for 
 
1275 Grey minute, Grey to Lowther, no. 17, 16 Jan 09, FO 371/748/2057. 
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Britain, and earned Lowther a rebuke from Grey, but was not of particular import in the 
longer term.  
 
 Indeed, it was at this point, it having become clear to Britain that a policy of 
closeness with Turkey was not likely to be a success, that the focus gradually shifted 
towards a more cynical method of guaranteeing the British position. This saw the 
launching of wide ranging and eventually fruitful negotiations with the Turks and the 
Germans on matters so diverse as the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, navigation on the 
Euphrates river, spheres of influence in the Persian Gulf and oil rights in Mesopotamia. 
Having succeeded in achieving for herself a position of some strength in these commercial 
and strategic matters, in part owing to rather strong-arm tactics, Britain lost interest in 
improving her political position in Turkey.  
 
 This was laid bare in 1911, when Britain gave Italy what amounted to permission 
to launch her attack on Tripoli. Although the British had lost interest in Turkey, aside 
from their commercial negotiations, this period also coincided with a gradual and gentle 
sense of détente with Germany. With Germany having been the dominant power in 
Turkey, and fast becoming so again, it seemed that wider European developments were 
again having their influence on matters within Turkey. The effective end of the naval race 
in 1912, and the growing sense of cooperation which was fostered by Anglo-German 
cooperation in maintaining peace between the Great Powers during the Balkan Wars, all 
suggested a thawing of relations with Germany which meant that Britain, who had for her 
own reasons become tired of Turkey, was presented with even less of a reason to prioritise 
action to supplant Germany in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Grey’s comments at the time 
of the Liman incident, that Germany was far more likely to be frightened by Russian 
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threats than British, seem to suggest a reorientation of British policy, and that he 
understood Germany’s position to be weakening. 1276 
  
 This is not to say, as might be inferred, that Britain ever became hostile to the 
Turks in this period. Indeed, it could certainly be argued that she was fairer than she had a 
cause to be with Turkey during the disastrous years of 1912-13. Indifference, and not 
hostility, was the order of the day. Relations did not break down, as such, and although 
Mallet strove to hold the Turks out of the war in 1914, it came as no surprise that he was 
working to prevent Turkey from joining the Germans in war, rather than trying to 
convince the Turks to fight alongside the newly minted triple alliance.  
 
 Thus, it is clear that the so-called ‘golden opportunity’ was an illusion, dreamt into 
being by those who misread the Turkish Revolution and who willed such an idea into 
being. In any meaningful sense, it would not have been possible for Britain and Turkey to 
cooperate. Their methods, their aims, and the worldviews held by their governments and 
senior officials were in many ways fundamentally incompatible.  
 
A victim of this notion has been the reputation of Sir Gerard Lowther, who was 
British ambassador for all but a few months of the revolutionary period. This work does 
not vindicate Lowther completely. It is without doubt that he proved inefficient and 
ineffective as an ambassador, and Grey and Hardinge had come to regret their choice 
within months of his arrival on the Golden Horn. He found the Young Turks not to his 
taste, and he relied heavily on the sometimes unhelpful advice of his dragoman, Gerald 
Fitzmaurice. But to blame Lowther for failing to grasp firmly at what was no more than 
 
1276 Grey to O’Beirne, No. 780, Tel., 2 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1847/54365. 
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illusion is unfair. This work posits that there is little in the way of blame to be apportioned 
for the fact that Britain and Turkey found themselves at war at the end of 1914, but that 
the reasons for this state of affairs lay firstly in Whitehall, and perhaps to a greater extent, 
in Constantinople.  
 
 This work has also suggested conclusions of wider significance. The role of Foreign 
Office staff in the formulation of British Policy has emerged clearly from the analysis. 
Throughout this period in his dealings with Turkish matters, Grey was clearsighted in his 
pursuit of his Foreign Policy aims. He was unafraid to overrule his staff when he felt the 
occasion demanded it, just as he was willing to allow talented specialist officials their head, 
so to speak. The latitude afforded to Alwyn Parker during the Hakki negotiations, for 
instance, was striking. Having been encouraged to develop specific expertise, Parker was 
given the opportunity to work in an independent fashion, with what amounted to minimal 
oversight. More generally, the archival record of the period indicates, as others have 
argued, that the post 1906 Foreign Office was an organisation which sought the views of its 
more junior employees. 1277 Men at the beginning of their careers were afforded ample 
opportunity to display their talents and their views were often considered seriously. Grey 
was supported by a skilled group of professionals. Indeed, the Foreign Office emerges as a 
more equitable organisation than might be expected by the casual observer of early 
twentieth century British governance, and one which brought a professional influence to 
bear on decisions of state.  
  
 
1277 See, Otte, Foreign Office Mind; Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy; Jones, Nineteenth Century Foreign Office; 
Otte and Neilson, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Steiner and Neilson, Origins of the First World War; 
Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 
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 The work also reveals the lack of interest that British policymakers had in many of 
the issues of Eastern European international politics. The significance of the Straits, for 
instance, for so long a central concern of British policymakers, can be seen to have receded 
by the early 1900s. Grey was willing to reassure Isvolsky, as early as 1908, that Britain 
would not stand in the way of a change in their status – although the Admiralty was keen 
to avoid the Straits falling under Russian control. Grey’s ‘honest broker’ act in 1913, too, 
betrayed the extent to which Britain was uninterested in the detail of Balkan politics. As 
ever, the bigger picture of wider great power politics was of far greater significance, 
suggesting too that British interest in the Macedonian question before 1908 had its roots in 
the potential for great power collisions and agreement rather than interest or engagement 
in the issues at hand. What Britain was interested in, this work has made clear, was 
economic spheres of influence in the Persian Gulf, and particularly protecting India. This 
was prioritised over almost any other Ottoman adjacent issue, and suggested that 
policymakers were beginning to grapple with the idea of Indian policy in a post-Russian 
convention world.  
 
 Since the 1980s, Grey has been criticised for an apparently slavish devotion to his 
policy of ententes. Keith Wilson argued that British policy in this period came from a sense 
of weakness, and that Grey’s repeated insistence that he had maintained a ‘free hand’ was 
a myth. 1278 To Grey, the entente, in particular with France, was tantamount to an alliance. 
This was not entirely Grey’s choice. Britain’s interests, Wilson added, compelled her to act 
as though she were allied to Russia and France, and to join in any war. Britain had put 
herself in such a position, he argued, owing to the fears of senior officials that a hostile 
 
1278 Keith Neilson contended that Britain remained, in 1914, the greatest of the Powers, if not a superpower 
in the modern sense. See id., ‘’Greatly Exaggerated’: The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914’, 
The International History Review, 13(4), 1991, pp. 695-725.  
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France and Russia was a greater threat than a hostile Germany. 1279 John Charmley, no 
friend of Grey, argued that his fear of isolation stemmed from his formative experiences in 
the 1890s, that he failed to appreciate that Germany was weakening, and that Weltpolitik 
was a failure. Much as he had argued about Neville Chamberlain and 1939, Charmley 
suggested that Britain had had no need to go to war in 1914, and could have remained 
aloof. Much as Wilson had done, he suggested that Anglo-French staff talks meant that 
Britain was allied to France in all but name. 1280 Niall Ferguson was also critical of Grey’s 
‘inflexible mind’, labelling him a chronic underachiever and ‘complete angler’, who had 
needlessly and obsessively considered Germany as a threat even when there was little 
evidence to suggest that this was the case. Again, Ferguson suggested that Grey had 
allowed the Anglo-French entente to become a ‘defacto defensive alliance’. 1281 More recent 
scholarship has worked on this basis too. Christopher Clark argued that the First World 
War broke out in part due to what he called a ‘Balkan inception scenario’, arguing that the 
alignments of the Powers and their interests in the Balkans had created a ‘geopolitical 
trigger’, which, once set off, resulted in war. 1282 Other scholarship has suggested that this 
is a misreading of the situation. T.G. Otte, for instance, has suggested that there was a 
‘palpable sense of détente’ between Britain and Germany by 1914, and that British officials 
were beginning to doubt the ongoing utility of the relationship with Russia. 1283 William 
Mulligan also noted that the period before the war saw a relaxation of tension between 
Britain and Germany. 1284 
 This work would suggest that arguments that Britain was tied to Russia and France, 
unblinkingly devoting herself to a policy of ententes, are wide of the mark. As early as 1908, 
 
1279 Wilson, The Policy of the Entente. 
1280 Charmley, Splendid Isolation?’.  
1281 Ferguson, The Pity of War.  
1282 Clark, The Sleepwalkers.  
1283 Otte, ‘Entente Diplomacy vs Détente’; Otte, ‘Détente 1914’. 
1284 Mulligan, Origins of the First World War. 
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Britain was keen to try and work for the benefit of Turkey, even if this meant that she 
compromised the closeness of her relationship with Russia. Indeed, this was axiomatic; 
Russian policy was hostile to Turkey, and thus British attempts to support the Turks 
during the Bosnian crisis could not have been anything but unwelcome. British 
acquiescence in the Italian attack on Tripoli too, cannot but be seen as an anti-ententist act. 
The Anglo-German railway agreement of 1914, albeit never ratified, and the way in which 
Grey worked closely with the Germans to reconstruct the concert and prevent war in 1913, 
too, clearly demonstrated that Grey was willing and able to think outside the ententist box. It 
is hard to reconcile the ‘complete angler’ of Ferguson, Charmley and Wilson with the Grey 
who dismissed almost out of hand Russian complaints over the role of Liman.  
 
 In conclusion, any suggestion of a ‘golden opportunity’ for Britain to get herself on 
good terms with the Young Turk regime was an illusion. Little blame should be attached to 
either side for this, and indeed it is hard to see how such a connection could have been 
practical. Misunderstandings of the nature of the Young Turk regime on the part of British 
officials contributed to a sense of disillusion when the regime turned out to be unstable, 
unwilling to treat Britain as she would have liked to have been treated, and in many ways 
as repressive as the regime of Abdülhamid. It was no surprise that a period which had 
begun with such (superficial) optimism in 1908 ended with Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire entering the cataclysm of war on opposing sides. In the final analysis, and although 
the British emerged from the conflict in a better position than the regime of the Three 
Pashas, Turkey was merely another problem for the British imperial state to ponder. The 
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